THE NATURE OF TRUTH AN ESSAY BY HAROLD Henry FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS PREFACE THE following Essay does not pretend to establish a new theory. Its object is to examine certain typical notions of truth, one or other of which-whether in the form of a vague assumption, or raised to the level of an explicit theory-has hitherto served as the basis of philosophical speculation. If I am not mistaken, every one of these typical notions and accredited theories of truth fails sooner or later to maintain itself against critical investigation. And I have tried, whilst exhibiting the nature and the grounds of their failure, to indicate in what direction (if in any) there appears some prospect of more successful construction. The reader will find no mention of the theory known alternatively as 'Pragmatism' or 'Humanism'. It is not easy to discern the meaning of its advocates through the noise of their advocacy. But they appear to be engaged in a twofold enterprise. For firstly they desire to emphasize certain elementary theses, which many idealists are equally concerned to maintain; and these I have endeavoured to discuss, so far as the subject demanded, in my third and fourth chapters. But secondly they wish to revive certain views, which in Plato's Theaetetus are attributed to Protagoras. The revival is a reconstruction. The old wine is poured into new bottles; the ancient doctrine 300337 |
