589 Essay on a Particular Providence, by Dr. Good. excitement which religious principle alone | can give; and the other by neglecting the ordinary means of accomplishing great moral changes. Dr. Chalmers dwells strongly on the necessity of local instruction within prescribed limits; for, as he truly observes, the pastor who has the charge of an extended population must unavoidably be ignorant of the spiritual state of his people, for want of that reciprocal intercourse, without which mere preaching is of little abiding efficacy. It is nearly the same in tuition, where the schools are conducted on so large a scale as to preclude the possibility of individual inspection. Dr. Chalmers therefore recommends such a division of pastoral and school instruction as may bring the minister more acquainted with his flock, and the tutor with his pupils, than is to be found on the present system in large towns and crowded cities. The subject of Church patronage occupies a large space in these interesting volumes; and here, while the author points out the defects in the legislative measure for the erection of new places of worship in England, he pays a handsome tribute of respect to the "Ecclesiastical Establishment, which," he says, "is a piece of goodly and effective me. chanism." Dr. Chalmers directs much of his attention to the evil of pauperism, and, in common with many other economists, reprobates the compulsory system of parochial rates and poor-houses, as encouraging imprudence and idleness. We cannot follow him in the discussion of this subject; nor even enumerate the other productions of his fertile and enterprising genius. After labouring with the most beneficial effect several years in Glasgow, he accepted the chair of moral philosophy in the University of St. Andrew's, from whence he was removed in 1828 to the professorship of divinity at Edinburgh. The popularity of this eminent divine is not an ephemeral admiration, gained by the art of an insinuating address, or the glare of a specious eloquence. It rests upon the solid basis of principle. At the outset the hearer is rather displeased by harsh tones, an awkward manner, and a strong northern accent; but as the orator proceeds, all this is forgotten amidst a blaze of light, and a variety of arguments upon subjects often handled before, and supposed to be too hackneyed for novelty of illustration. In proof of this, we might have quoted largely from his discourse on the use and abuse of wealth. His astronomical theology also displays an extraor 590 dinary depth of thought, and a felicitous mode of rendering an abstract and scientific subject new and edifying to the most simple understandings. In conclusion, we cannot characterize this eminent divine better than in his own description of the learned Jonathan Edwards: "He affords, perhaps, the most wondrous example in modern times of one richly gifted both in natural and in spiritual discernment; and we know not what most to admire in him, whether the deep philosophy that issues from his pen, or the humble and child-like piety that issues from his pulpit; whether, when, as an author, he deals forth upon his readers the subtleties of profoundest argument, or when, as a Christian minister, he deals forth upon his hearers the simplicities of the gospel; whether it is, when we witness the impression that he has made, by his writings, on the schools and high seats of literature, or the impression that he makes, by his unlaboured addresses, on the plain consciences of a plain congregation." AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF A PAR- THIS essay from the Life of Dr. Good, by 'Among the essays composed by Mr. Good in the midst of these varied exertions, that which is devoted to the defence of a particular providence, is, in my judgment, one of the best. He does not seem, however, to have attended to the discussions relative to "the spring of action in Deity," in which Balguy, Bayes, and Grove, each defended a separate theory. Balguy, as many will recollect, refers all the Divine actions to rectitude, Bayes to benevolence, and Grove to wisdom. Yet both Grove and Balguy acknowledged that the communication of happiness is so noble an end, that the Deity unquestionably keeps it always in view; while the wisdom adduced in Grove's theory differs very little from the rectitude assumed as the basis of Balguy's. Had Mr. Good been acquainted with the different branches of this controversy, the commencement of his own disquisition would probably have been somewhat modified: and if, instead of starting from a doubtful position, he had simply reasoned from a proposition in which all agree, viz. that God always does that which is right and good, the general 591 Essay on a Particular strain of his reasoning would have been the same, while the exposure of Hume's sophistry, would, I think, have been more complete." ESSAY ON PROVIDENCE. "Whatever arguments may be adduced in proof of the existence of a Deity, may likewise be adduced in proof of the existence of a general and particular providence. If it be true, and no one, I believe, will be disposed to doubt it, that every power we meet with in the universe ought originally to be attributed to the great First Cause of all things, it follows inevitably that this great First Cause must itself be all-active and all-powerful. And if, again, it be true, as I have endeavoured to demonstrate on another occasion, that the principal, not to say the only motive by which the Deity could be excited in the creation of any order of beings, was their own individual happiness, it follows, moreover, that the constant exertion of this power and activity must be employed in the promotion and continuance of that happiness. It follows therefore, again, that the Creator must, of necessity, be employed in a course of general and uninterrupted providence. But we cannot conceive, (as Dr. Price justly observes,) any reasons that can influence the Deity to exercise any providence over the world, which are not, likewise, reasons for extending it to all that happens in the world.' A providence that neglects or forsakes individuals is incomplete, and inadmissible; because incompetent to the conception of a perfect being. The providence, therefore, which is a general, must, at the same time, be a particular one. "Whether indeed the constant harmony and regularity observable in nature, with all the various events that occur around us, be the effect of original appointment at the first formation of the universe; foreseen, and predetermined; or the result of one continued energy incessantly protracted-is not, perhaps, fully to be decided, and is, moreover, totally irrelevant to our present purpose. Every individual circumstance that has since occurred, both in the moral and physical departments of creation, must, even on the first hypothesis, have been clearly represented to a Being of universal prescience, and without obtaining his approbation could never have taken effect. However, therefore, philosophers may differ in their ideas on this subject; and though the doctrine of incessant interposition must, on many accounts, appear the most plausible; yet each may "I know of but three objections that can be fairly urged either by the one side or the other, in opposition to the doctrine in dispute. The first is, that the Deity is incapable of exercising such a power: the second, that it would be derogatory to him: the third, that its exertion must be inconsistent with the liberty of moral election. "There is no author I am acquainted with, who has advanced the first objection with so much success and authority as Mr. Hume and it will be to his writings, therefore, I shall direct myself more particularly in my reply. The position he so much labours to demonstrate appears to be this: that even allowing a Deity, he does not seem to have been, and we have no reason to suppose he was, possessed of more than just that determinate quantity of power which was requisite to produce the creation the exertion of which obliged him to sink into rest through mere debility, and leave his scarcely finished undertaking to itself, and its own imperfect powers of mutual dependence. "In support of this extraordinary proposition, the arguments he adduces are the following. "Causes are, at all times, proportioned to their consequent effects, and ought not to be supposed to possess any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce them. A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred. The same rule holds true universally, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. No one, merely from a sight of one of Zeuxis's, pictures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone or marble than in colours. talents and taste displayed in the particular work before us, these, and only these, we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of. The Vide Sect. 11. On a Particular Providence and a Future State.. 593 Essay on a Particular Providence, by Dr. Good, "The chief or sole argument for a divine existence is derived from the general order of nature; which is an argument drawn from effects to causes. Every argument, therefore, deduced from causes to effects must be a gross sophism, since it is impossible to know any thing of the cause, but what has been antecedently, not only inferred, but discovered to the full in the effect. On the same account, we cannot, according to the rules of just reasoning, ascend from the effect to the cause, and thence return back from that cause with any new inference; or, making any addition to the effect as we find it, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour. Though, from a knowledge of the actions and sentiments of the human species, we may, with propriety, infer more than the simple appearance of objects presented to us would otherwise give us a right to infer: as, for instance, from a halffinished edifice, and the materials for building scattered around it, we might presume that such an edifice would soon be completed, and receive all the further improvements which art could bestow upon it; yet we are not allowed the same liberty of ascending from the effect to the cause, and thence descending from the same cause to infer other effects, in any of our arguments respecting the Deity; since the Deity is only known to us by his actual productions, and since we are ignorant of the motives by which he is actuated, and the sentiments by which he is governed.'* 1. "It is not strictly true, however, in the first place, that the sole or even the chief argument in proof of the existence of a Divine Being is derived from the general order of nature. The existence of man alone is sufficient to prove the existence of a Deity, and to demonstrate his perfections. And this simple fact, without any addition whatsoever, has been successfully selected by Mr. Locke for this very purpose; and been made the means of deducing a proof of such an existence, equal, as he himself expresses it, to that of mathematical certainty.'+ Wherever a human being exists, if in the possession of his reason, he must have an undoubted perception and certainty of his existence; he must, moreover, be certain that nothing could possibly proceed from nothing, and "Since he is a Being, as Mr. H. continues, who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection; and a Being respecting whom what we imagine to be a superior perfection may really be a defect." In the delineation of these arguments, though I 127.-VOL. XI. 594 he must be therefore certain there must be something uncreated and eternal. That which is uncreated and eternal must, again, possess all the powers, and that in an infinite degree, as being devoid of opposition or obstruction, which can possibly be traced in the being that is finite and created. It must be, therefore, omnipotent, and allintelligent. From the possession of which intelligence it is easy to deduce every other attribute, whether moral or physical. The argument à priori must, at all times, be at least equal to that deduced from effects to causes. "But, according to the position, that all our arguments for a divine existence are derived from the general order of nature, and the display of objects around us; and that this general order and display of objects is the effect, and the Deity himself the cause; it is far from being a necessary conclusion, and by no means invariable, that the cause in this instance is adjusted precisely to the effect exhibited, and possesses no power or property whatsoever but what is therein displayed. "In brute unconscious matter, it is true, the experienced train of events shews us there is a constant proportion observed between the cause and the effect, however, varied: but is an obvious error to contend that the same law obtains among rational and intelligent beings; and it is an error proceeding from the belief of a doctrine we have before animadverted upon the doctrine, I mean, that maintains the same species of absolute necessity to subsist among moral as among physical agents. HERCULES did not, on all occasions, put forth the utmost quantity of his strength; nor CICERO nor DEMOSTHENES exert the whole of their eloquence. They found themselves at full liberty, and not subjected to the same inflexible laws that actuate mere incogitative atoms. It is acknowledged that no one, merely from the sight of a picture of ZEUXIS in ancient times, or of SALVATOR ROSA in more modern, could determine that the former was also a statuary and an architect, and the latter a poet and musician, whose satires and harmonic compositions fell but little short of his skill in the art of colouring. But what is the reason that we are here incapable of determining? Plainly this: that there is no necessary connexion have been under the necessity of contracting and condensing them from the original, I am not conscious of having injured their strength; and I have used Mr. Hume's own expressions as often as I could possibly introduce them. Essay on Human Understanding, b, i. ch. 10. 2 Q 595 Essay on a Particular Providence, by Dr. Good. 596 between these different arts and sciences | the former of this portion of the universe whatsoever. They may be conjoined in the same subject; but they may subsist by themselves: and he who is the best musician may be the worst painter, and the best poet may be the worst statuary. "The case is very different with respect to the perfections of intelligent beings, and especially the perfections of the Deity; through the whole of which there is a natural link subsisting so obviously, that, from the demonstration of one or two, the rest seem to follow of inevitable necessity. The Being, who is eternal and all-powerful, must be all-intelligent: he who is allpowerful and all-intelligent, must be infinitely happy: he who is infinitely happy in himself, can only be actuated in what he does by motives of benevolence. "Yet how are we capable of determining at all on the Deity which is the cause, if we can only reason respecting him from a full knowledge of the creation, which is the effect? This creation is extended around us on every side: let us confine ourselves alone to the proofs of power it exhibits. Are we acquainted with its unfathomable dimensions? Have we penetrated into the whole system of laws by which it is regulated? Can we develop the causes of gravitation, magnetism, or muscular motion? Is nothing obscure, nothing mysterious, concealed from our view? If to inquiries like these we can return a satisfactory reply--then, but not till then, let us think of determining our idea of the great original Cause by the effect alone which he has thus exhibited. But if this we cannot do-if, here we are obliged to acknowledge our ignorance and incapacity, does it not evince the grossest presumption to set bounds to the power of a Being who has thus magnificently manifested himself? a power that defies the calculations of science, and overwhelms the conceptions of the most daring? "Yet if we are not adequate to the comprehension of his power, why should we attempt to fix bounds to any other attribute or perfection of which the Deity may be possessed? That the exertion of power in the works of creation surpasses the limits of human conjecture, is what the most hesitating sceptic must allow. As far, however, as we have been able to discover, an order and disposition, uniform and similar, prevail throughout the whole. But order and disposition must be the result of intelligence. Is the display of power then illimited and incomprehensible? so is that of wisdom and intelligence. Is the same all-powerful and intelligent Being, who is on which we reside, the Creator of the universe at large? the same motives must actuate him, and a conduct not inconsistent be exhibited. That he may possess qualities and energies with which we are totally unacquainted, will readily be granted; yet this must for ever remain mere hypothesis, since we have no data on which to found our judgment of them. Yet be they what they may, they cannot be incongruous with those which are developed to our notice in the present world: much less can any of them which he has exhibited, and which reason has taught one class of intelligent beings to deem perfections, be ever regarded by another as defects. "To confine therefore our ideas of the Deity by the general appearance of objects and events in the present world, or any part of that section of the universe, the mere threshold of creation, with which we are acquainted; or to bound those attributes we cannot but allow him by deductions drawn from so limited a scene-is both inconsistent and unphilosophical: inconsistent, because we have no reason to conceive that an active intelligent Being should at all times exert himself to the utmost of his power; unphilosophical, be Icause we have the clearest reasons for believing that a scene so limited bears not the proportion to the general system of the universe that a grain of sand does to the Pyrenees, or a drop of water to the ocean. And we may, therefore, with the strictest propriety, suppose the Divine Being possessed of a greater degree of perfection in all his various attributes, than the present situation of things will immediately demonstrate to the view: and this without advancing from the effect to the cause, and thence descending to infer other effects which are totally unconnected with their original. The reason being, that the limited capacities of the human species are not adequate to a comprehension of the effects themselves; and if they cannot fully comprehend the effect, how is it possible they should be able fully to comprehend the cause? "I cannot, however, forbear to notice in this place, that the ascending from an effect to a cause, and thence descending from the same cause to infer other effects which we were ignorant of before, is a liberty which is often taken by philosophers. And that not only in researches which refer to man, or any other animal with which they are intimately acquainted, but which refer to the works of the Deity himself. And it is a liberty, indeed, with 597 Essay on a Particular Providence, by Dr. Good. out which science could no longer exist. The general laws of nature with which we are acquainted will most of them afford us a proof of the truth of this assertion. A close attention to a few particular facts has commonly been the mode in which they have been deduced, and when thus deduced as causes of those facts, they have been afterwards applied to the explanation of other occurrences, which before appeared perfectly unaccountable. The laws of gravitation, which have since been so successfully applied to every point of the heavens, were, as is known to every one, at first determined from the most trifling event possible. And thus, in optics, from a few observations on some of the phenomena of light are inferred the general laws of refraction and reflexion: which, when in this manner once obtained, are applied to the solution of a variety of other phenomena, which would, otherwise, remain inexplicable paradoxes. "But suppose we make a farther concession still; and allow-what, indeed, we find every hour in every day continually contradicting that the same proportion and adjustment between cause and effect obtains among rational and intelligent beings, as among brute, unconscious matter; and that the power or capacity of exertion, which is the cause, is never superior to the operation, which is the effect: even by this concession, the argument urged against us, so far from obtaining the least additional force, would, on the very principles of Mr. Hume himself, prove the means of its own refutation. “All our knowledge, even according to his own system, with respect to matters of fact and existence, we derive from experience; and every event, that takes place in opposition to this grand criterion of our judgment, must bring with it proofs that will more than counterbalance the observations of every day, before a philosopher can assent to its truth. It is this constant and unremitted experience which shews us the continual coherence subsisting between cause and effect. Not that the first bears any analogy to the second, or exerts any sensible influence over it; but only, by long habitude, we have accus "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.-Hume on the Natural History of Religion. "I know, for I can demonstrate, by connecting the clearest and most distinct of my real ideas, that there is a God; a first, intelligent cause of all things, whose infinite wisdom and power appears evidently in all his works, and to whom therefore I ascribe, most rationally, every other 598 tomed ourselves to expect the second as the necessary result of the first. For had causes any analogy to their effects, or exerted any known energy over them; immediately on the appearance of a cause, however singular, and however impossible to be classed under any determined species, we should be able, very nearly, to decide at once what effect it might produce; or, to invert the whole, were an effect, equally singular and unparalleled, to be presented to our view, we should, with the same facility, be enabled to interpret its cause. Yet in all such cases, on the present constitution of things, we should certainly find ourselves at a loss for an answer. "It is owing, therefore, entirely to the constant conjunction of occurrences, as established by the laws of nature, that we are capable of inferring one object from another, or of predicting one event from a preceding. If we examine the universe at large, we shall find it an effect absolutely unparalleled; and which cannot be comprehended under any species with which we are acquainted. And as we cannot, prima facie, infer any effect from a presented cause, or any cause from a given effect, we find ourselves obliged to hesitate about what the cause of such an extraordinary effect may be; or whether, in reality, we are capable of conceiving any cause at all. Yet, taken collectively, the arguments for the existence of a cause are so potent and convincing, that even in the present age of speculation and refinement, and amongst those who have indulged themselves in the largest latitude of conjecture, there is no philosopher whatever who has been bold enough to controvert them: or rather, who has not stood forward as the champion and espouser of a truth so obvious and incontestable: a truth to which Mr. Hume himself submits with the most cordial acquiescence,* which is completely assented to by Lord Bolingbroke, and imagined to be self-evident by the late royal philosopher of Sans Souci. This mode of arguing, therefore, is obviously fallacious; is destructive of principles acknowledged to be incontrovertible; and if pursued, would lead us into endless mazes of error and perplexity. Perfection, whether conceivable or not conceivable by me."-Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. Le monde entier prouve cette intelligence. Il ne faut qu' ouvrir les yeux pour s'eu convaincre. Les fins que la nature l'est proposées dans ses ouvrages, se manifestent si evidemment, qu' on est forcé de reconnaitre une cause souveraigne et superieurement intelligente qui y preside necessairement. Pour pen qu' on soit de bonne foi, il est impossible de se refuser à cette verité.-Refiexions du Roi de la Prusse sur la Religion. |