1817. DOE, on the demise of BLAND, v. Smith. EJE In an ejeet. ment for premises, where the plaintiff the original which the ex JECTMENT for the recovery of a house, &c. which the defendant held under Bland. The counsel for the lessor of the plaintiff produced the lessor of from the sheriff's office a writ of fieri facias against Smith, at the suit of the plaintiff Bland. It was then proved that the writ had been executed, and the premises seized; after which assignment from the sheriff to the plaintiff given in evidence. The counsel for the lessor of the plaintiff rested their case here. an he is bound not was du Richardson, for the defendant, contended, that as the lessor of the plaintiff was the original party in the action in which the writ of fieri facias issued, and was the person who put the sheriff in motion, it was incumbent upon him to prove the judgment, in order to make out his legal title. Non constat, that there was any judgment. The writ might have been sued out wrongfully. There was an obvious distinction between the officer, and the party who employs him in a public duty. The officer may justify under the writ; but the plaintiff must go a step further, and prove the judgment. Raine and Tindall, contrà. The plaintiff, in this case, is like a common purchaser under the sheriff. He derives title through him, in the same manner as any stranger would acquire a title to duce the writ of fieri facias, under which the sheriff has sold, but likewise the judg ment. 1817. DOE v. SMITH. a chattel, real or personal, bought under a sale made by the sheriff. WOOD, Baron.-I should think that it would be enough in this action for the plaintiff to produce the writ. But I will reserve the point. Verdict for the lessor of the plaintiff. Raine and Tindall for the plaintiff. Richardson, for the defendant. This case came before the Court of K. B. at Serjeants' Inn, during the Sittings there after Mich. Term, 1817;when the Court were of opi nion, that the lessor of the plaintiff was bound to produce the judgment; and they accordingly directed a nonsuit to be entered. 1817. A ANDERSON V. SANDERSON. SSUMPSIT.-The wife of the defendant had bought of the plaintiff certain goods, which the defendant hawked about the country. All the articles had been obtained previous to the year 1810. The admis. sion of the wife, who was conduct her husband's bu accustomed to siness, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations in an action The defendant pleaded the general issue, and the statute of limitations. Many acknowledg- against the ments of the wife were offered in evidence for the purpose of taking the case out of the statute. On the part of the defendant it was objected, that the wife could only be considered as the agent of her husband; and that the admissions of the agent could only bind the principal, if made at the time when the goods were ordered or received by him. That, since the last receipt of goods was more than six years before the action was brought, the only admission which, upon the principle above stated, could be given in evidence, was likewise before that time; and, therefore, that there could be no authority in the wife to make an admission which would take the case out of the statute. RICHARDS, C. B.-The wife was the only person accustomed to purchase goods at all. She was, therefore, the only proper person to ask for mo husband. 1817. ANDERSON v. ney, and to make admissions on the subject as to the sum due. Verdict for plaintiff. SANDERSON. Starkie, for plaintiff. Williams and Gilby, for defendant. See Gregory v. Parker, 1 Campb. 394. 1817. REX V. WILLIAM MEADE and ROBERT MEADE. TH THE prisoners were indicted on Lord Ellenborough's act for cutting and maiming certain persons, assisting a sheriff's officer, who had a warrant directing him to arrest William Meade, on mesne process out of K. B. The warrant was first put in and proved. was directed to one Meadley, a sheriff's officer, residing at Whitby. The arrest was made Stainton Dale, which was proved to be in It to produce the warrant made at the out by the sheriff to the officer, but likewise the writ. liberty of Pickering Lyth. And it appeared that a Mr. Hill, who was lord of the manor, and chief bailiff of the liberty, had the sole right of executing writs within the liberty. The writ was not produced. Upon this it was objected-1. That the prosecutors were bound to produce the writ. The sheriff was only a ministerial officer of the court above, and the bailiff was merely his servant. The warrant could not put the bailiff in any better situation than the sheriff himself would be placed in, if he had executed the process; and it is perfectly clear that his own warrant could confer no additional authority upon him; and that, if in such case an action were brought against him for false imprisonment, he would be obliged to set out the writ in his plea of justification. 2. That |