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it impracticable to contend against Perdiccas and the entire revolted region successfully with their actual force, turned towards Macedonia, the original object indeed of the expedition,

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and assuming a station and forming a junction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had descended from the interior with an army, they prosecuted the war.

LX. At the same time the Corinthians, Potidea having revolted, and the Athenian fleet hanging on the coast of Macedonia, apprehensive for the safety of the place, and deeming the peril as their own, sent forward a force of sixteen hundred heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed soldiers, in part their own troops serving gratuitously, and in part Peloponnesians whom they had hired. 2. This army was commanded by Aristeus, the son of Adeimantus, always well affected to Potidæa, a friendly regard towards whom was not the least of the motives which induced the greater number of the Corinthian troops to attend him gratuitously. 3. They arrived in Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidea.

LXI. News reached the Athenians of the revolt of the cities, and as soon as they heard that the forces under the command of Aristeus had reinforced the garrison, they sent to this disaffected region two thousand of their own heavy-armed troops, and forty ships, with Callias, the son of Calliades, for general, with four others. 2. Immediately on their arrival, they effected a junction with the one thousand men who had preceded them, who had just taken Therma, and were besieging Pydna. 3. Halting then themselves, they laid siege to Pydna, but very soon became obliged, by the defection of Potidea and the arrival of Aristeus, to conclude an accommodation and the best practicable terms of alliance with Perdiccas, and to retire from Macedonia. 4. They proceeded, therefore, along the coast toward Potidea, but diverged, before arriving thither, from their line of march to the left to attack Bercea, and failing in their attempt on it, resumed their original route. This force consisted of three thousand heavy-armed Athenian troops, besides a numerous body of allies, and six hundred Macedonians in the service and attached to the cause of Philip and Pausanias. Seventy ships accompanied the march of the army. Advancing very leisurely, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus, and encamped.

LXII. Awaiting the approach of the Athenians, the Potidæans, with their Peloponnesian allies, took a station upon the isthmus over against Olynthus, and established a market of supplies without the city. 2. They appointed Aristeus commander of the whole foot, and Perdiccas of the horse; for he had again abruptly deserted the cause of Athens, and attached himself to

that of Potidæa, having designated Iolaus to succeed him in the post which he left. 3. The plan of Aristeus was to keep the force under his command upon the isthmus to watch the approach of the Athenians, if they should seek to enter it, and that the Chalcidians and their allies without the isthmus and the two hundred horse of Perdiccas should remain in Olynthus; and that when the Athenians should advance against him, these coming to his assistance in rear should place the enemy between two assaults. 4. But Callias and his associate commanders detached their Macedonian horse and a few of their allies to Olynthus, in order to shut in those there posted, and so prevent their coöperation; and then breaking up their encampment, they advanced directly towards Potidæa. 5. Approaching near the isthmus, they saw that the enemy had made his preparation for action, whereupon they set themselves also in order of battle, and soon engaged. The wing under immediate command of Aristeus and the Corinthians, and other picked troops around him, put to flight the wing opposed to them, and pursued it a considerable distance; but the other part of the army, composed of Potidæans and Peloponnesians, was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the city wall.

LXIII. Returning from his pursuit, Aristeus discerned the defeat of this part of his army, and for a space was at a loss whether he should run the hazard of retreating to Olynthus or to Potidea. The more expedient course, however, seemed to him to contract his troops to the smallest possible space, and to force his way by running at full speed to Potidæa. Accordingly, he marched along through the water around the projecting end of the mole, exposed to a severe discharge of missiles, by which he lost a few men, although he brought off the greater number. 2. When the battle began, and its signals were lifted up, the troops stationed to aid the Potidæans at Olynthus, which is about sixty stadia distant, and conspicuously situated, advanced a little way, as with a view to assist; and the Macedonian horse were drawn out and arranged to prevent them; but victory declaring speedily for the Athenians, and the signals of battle being lowered, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians fell back on the Athenians; so that the cavalry of neither army assisted the infantry in the engagement. 3. The Athenians then erected a trophy, and gave up the slain under truce to the Potideans. Of these and their allies died a little less than three hundred; of the Athenians one hundred and fifty, of whom was Callias, their commander.

LXIV. In pursuance of the plan of war, the Athenians next proceeded to construct a wall of circumvallation around that wall of Potidæa, which looked forth upon the main land, and

therein to place a garrison. The wall looking towards Pallene, they did not immediately so inclose; for they deemed themselves unable to maintain a garrison upon the isthmus, and also to pass through and construct a line of circumvallation towards Pallene, apprehending that this separation of their army into two disconnected divisions might induce an attack of the Potidæans and their allies. 2. Hearing in Athens that no wall of circumvallation was built towards Pallene, the government, some time afterwards, sent sixteen hundred heavy-armed native troops, under Phormio, the son of Asopius, to the seat of war. Arriving in the peninsula, and establishing his head-quarters at Aphytis, he led his army towards Potidæa, advancing slowly and wasting the country before him. No one sallying out to fight him, he built a wall of circumvallation on the side of Pallene; 3. and thus Potidea became closely besieged on both sides, and was assailed also by the fleet from the sea.

LXV. Thus walled in, and retaining no hope of safety, unless something from the Lacedæmonians or some other accidental circumstance should supervene, Aristeus advised that all but five hundred, waiting fair winds, should escape by sea, so that their provisions might hold out the longer, he himself preferring to be one to remain. This advice not being followed, as the next best step to be taken, and with a view of giving the most favorable direction to operations elsewhere, he caused his whole force, secretly and unobserved by the Athenian garrison of blockade, to put to sea. 2. For some time he remained in Chalcidice, and, besides other military operations, he cut off great numbers of the Sermylians, by planting an ambuscade about the city. He took measures, also, by communicating with the Peloponnesus, to obtain assistance from that quarter. Phormio, after accomplishing the circumvallation of Potidæa, at the head of sixteen hundred men, visited Chalcidice and Bottice, and took several towns.

LXVI. Thus, therefore, were these additional grounds of reciprocal accusation induced upon the other difference between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. The Corinthians had to complain that the Athenians had besieged Potidea, their colony, and Corinthians and other Peloponnesians within it. The Athenians, that the Peloponnesians had moved an ally and tributary to revolt, and had openly sent thither an expedition and fought for the Potidæans. Still war had not broken out, and the truce subsisted, for thus far the Corinthians had acted alone. LXVII. The siege of Potidæa, however, determined the Corinthians to remain inactive no longer, both because their own troops were shut up within it, and because they feared for its safety. Forthwith, therefore, they invited their allies to Lace

dæmon, and going thither themselves, they vehemently inveighed against the Athenians for breaking the truce, and for doing injury to Peloponnesus. 2. The Æginetans, too, although they openly sent no delegation, from fear of Athens, yet in secret not less strenuously urged Lacedæmon to war, alleging that they were not permitted to be independent according to the spirit of the truce. 3. Whereupon the Lacedæmonians, having summoned their confederates, and all such others as had aught of wrong to complain of against Athens, and having convoked their accustomed assembly, called upon them to speak. 4. Others thereupon preferred, each in succession, their accusations against Athens, and among them the Megareans, who displayed numerous matters of grievance, and particularly that they were restrained from all intercourse of trade, both by sea and land. 5. Last of all the Corinthians, having permitted those who preceded them to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, thus addressed them.

LXVIII. "The good faith, Lacedæmonians, which marks your own system and your own private life, inclines you to disbelieve a charge of bad faith, when made against others. It is thus that you are distinguished by moderation and sobriety of mind and policy, and yet labor always under a corresponding misconception of the affairs of other States. 2. When we have forewarned you, as frequently we have done, of injuries Athens was about to inflict on us, you did not always derive the instruction which you might have done from our representations, but rather suspected us of speaking from private interests. The consequence has been, that not in anticipation but under the actual pressure of suffering have you assembled the allies. Among these it is not unfit that we should have most to say, since we have the weightiest charges to prefer,- charges of outrage against Athens, of neglect against you. 3. If she had prosecuted her policy of injury to Greece in a secret manner, it would be necessary to apprise you of it, as if ignorant of its existence. But now, why consume time in enumerating those whom you yourselves see, some reduced to servitude, others plotted against, and of these, among the most prominent, our own allies, herself all the while prepared beforehand for the war which possibly you may resolve to hazard? 4. For what else but a design against the liberties of Greece, could have prompted them secretly to withdraw and hold Corcyra from us, and to lay siege to Potidea Potidea, that post so eminently important to secure you the use of your Thracian dominion, which could give Peloponnesus the largest navy? LXIX. "Of all this the blame rests on you, in that you fered them, after the Persian war, first to strengthen their city,

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and then to construct the long walls; and in that also you have down to this moment bereaved of liberty, not those alone whom they have reduced to servitude, but your own allies. For not he whose direct act reduces to servitude, but he who, able to prevent it, does nothing, is author of the deed; especially is he so, who arrogates the praise of being hailed liberator of Greece. 2. Even now we have met tardily to act we see not on what. For no longer ought we to be pondering whether we are sustaining injury or not, but rather how to repel it. This moment they are advancing, active, resolved, and undallying, upon you, all undetermined what to do. 3. In what manner indeed, by what gradual advance they assail others, we know. While they suppose themselves unobserved through your inattentiveness, they are less audacious; but when they discover that you know and permit what they do, they will press on you vehemently. Ye alone of all the Hellenes are quiet, repelling your enemy, not by force but by being evermore about to resort to force, alone of all ye prefer to break down his doubled strength rather than his incipient growth. 5. And yet ye used to be reckoned worthy of all reliance, a reputation which outwent the fact. For it is within our own knowledge that the Mede advanced from the very ends of the earth into Peloponnesus, before you went out to meet him as became you. And now you look supinely upon the Athenians, not distant as he was, but at your door, and instead of marching upon them, you prefer awaiting to repel their attack on you, casting yourselves on the doubtful chances of a war with an adversary grown far stronger than you. And all this, although you are well aware that the barbarian overthrew himself more than he was overthrown, and that any advantages which we have gained over the Athenian, these we have gained more by their blunders than by your help. Indeed the hope of help from you has wrought the ruin of some, unprepared because they trusted it. Let no one deem this the reproach of enmity, but rather the remonstrance of friendship, for remonstrance we address to a friend who mistakes, reproach to an enemy who wrongs.

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LXX. "Yet do we think that, if any ever might, we may complain of our neighbors, especially since subjects of controversy so vast have arisen, which you seem to us very inadequately to appreciate, and since you seem not to comprehend who, what, how totally in all things unlike yourselves, are these Athenians with whom you may have to contend. 2. They are ever projectors of some novelty, quick to plan and to execute; you guard what you have, devise nothing new, and fail to accomplish even that which is absolutely necessary. 3. They, again, dare beyond their ability, incur risks unwarranted by a

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