course, in proportion to the development of the organ: for if this be not its use, what purpose does it subserve? "Its anatomical relations clearly demonstrate that it is not one of the essential or fundamental portions of the nervous system, but only a superadded one; and an extension of our inquiries to comparative anatomy shows that there is a very close correspondence between the development of the Cerebrum in the several tribes of Vertebrata and the degree of intelligence they respectively possess, using the latter term as a comprehensive expression of that series of mental actions, which consists in the intentional adaptation of means to ends, based on definite ideas, as to the nature of both."*

to place their members in such positions as will lead to the building of hives or dams, as the case may be, to the storing of mimic granaries, and to haste to their midnight orgies. Such acts should excite in us no more astonishment than the refinement and perfection of the instruments by which they are effected than the feet and mandibles of a bee, mantle of a snail, or locomotive system of an ant-than a process which comes much nearer home to our own door, the impulse by which a new-born infant directs its lips to its mother's breast, although utterly ignorant of the law of atmospheric pressure. "But," in the words of a talented writer (Dr. Carpenter, " Principles of Human Physiology," p. 666, note), "we have not any right to affirm that there is nothing The actions of a dog, a horse, or an elewhatever analogous to the reasoning power phant, are, in many instances, evidently and will of the higher animals, even amongst the result of a train of complex reasoning, the Invertebrata, though if these faculties similar to what man would perform under exist at all, it must be in as rudimentary a the same circumstances: are they then to be state as the Cerebrum itself, for some of looked upon exactly in the same light? them possess, in a slight degree, the power We think not. There is plenty of evidence of learning by experience-an educability to prove that the Cerebrum of man may which is less developed in proportion to that automatically respond to impressions that of the automatic powers." If this be the have been made upon it, and give origin to correct interpretation of the term "instinc- most complex trains of thought or action, in tive," it must be pretty clear that those quite as mechanical a manner as the instinctactions by which animals seek their indi-ive processes in the lower animals. vidual pleasure, or by which they testify those emotions which circumstances and education call forth, are of a very different character, and evidently connected, in many respects, with similar states of being in the human mind.

Up to this time we have taken no note of the Cerebrum, or Brain par excellence, which first makes its appearance in the class of Vertebrata (all of whom possess it, with the exception of the Amphioxus), and with the relative development of which the social and educable traits of its members are intimately connected. What are its functions, and how are they manifested? Without claiming metaphysical exactness for our answer, we may say that a reference to our own consciousness, no less than the common verdict of all men, and the results of direct experiment, indicate that it is the seat of those psychical changes which are called forth in the acts of Reasoning, Imagination, and Volition. If this be the case in man, analogy would lead us to infer the existence of similar functions in the brute, complex, of

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phenomena of Dreaming, Somnambulism, Reverie, and others, to which the name of "unconscious cerebration" has been happily applied, prove that the will may be suspended, and yet all these psychical actions go on just as if they were under its control. But can the term instinctive be applied to them? In strictness of phraseology it cannot; but we think that the similarity between these and the purely automatic functions is sufficient to justify an extension of the meaning of the word, always, however, with a remembrance of its original application.

Such, we conceive, is the nature of the process which goes on in the brains of the higher animals whenever their intellectual faculties are called into action by external circumstance, for of them it may be truly said that "sensation is the only fountain of their ideas," and that there is no conscious self-investigating mind; they think-elaborately in some cases-by a very simple effort

* Dr. Carpenter, loc. cit.

of memory, or induction in others, but in all alike they cannot help themselves, because they do so mechanically. The faculty of volition is entirely absent, or so faintly developed as to exercise but slight influence over their thoughts: hence they possess no power of voluntary abstraction-no moral responsibility: they are docile only through the force of association. Their mind is as essentially the subject of reflex action as are their lungs or involuntary muscular system; and though many of their actions would seem to denote a certain amount of volitional reasoning, there can be but little doubt but that they are prompted only by some modification of this same principle, although we may not satisfactorily be able to demonstrate it, for we must expect to meet with much that will defy our explanation, even in the metaphysics of the brute creation.

Here, then, on this neutral ground, the anti and pro-instinctive champions may meet, shake hands, and be the better for an amalgamation; and they will at least have learned this truth, that the more we attempt to contract the laws of Nature to our pre-conceived formulæ, the more we shall find that she will shroud, not only the mysteries, but even the every-day phenomena of her being, from our view.

We must apologize for not referring to any of the articles of our predecessors in this

question, but the reason why we have refrained from doing so is, that we think that they have all failed to place the subject upon that broad basis on which alone it can stand, and that they have all also-with the exception of "Clement," whose article gave us much pleasure-involved themselves in such a maze of metaphysical confusion, that if they saw their way clearly out, we certainly did not. It must be obvious that the present is a most imperfect resumé of even the leading points of the question at issue, and we fear that even now we have been diffuse, even ad nauseam, for some of our readers; but to those who may feel inclined to extend their knowledge of the subject a little further, and who are not acquainted with the two following authors, we would recommend the able papers by Dr. Carpenter (to whom we are much indebted in the present instance) on the nervous system in his large work on Human Physiology," and that on "Instinct," by Dr. Alison, in the "Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology." The former contains much interesting matter quite foreign to this subject, without an acquaintance with which, however, we are of opinion that no one can satisfactorily pursue the study of metaphysics.

Brompton.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

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nents. If he has mistaken the true point at issue, it is for us to show that he has done so; but it is inexcusable in those writers who enter on the debate subsequently to the appearance of their opponents' articles, if they waste their efforts in proving what is not denied, and do us the injustice of attributing to us opinions the very opposite of which are expressed or implied in the matter put forth by us.

OUR experience in debate has often given | suppose were the views and opinions of oppous occasion to reflect on a predisposition on the part of disputants to attribute to their opponents a necessary retention of opinions and prejudices which imply a denial of the data on which their own views are based;they deduce the scope and spirit of their opponents' arguments from their own, as being in an inverse ratio; and thus it comes to pass that the construction they put upon the otherwise explicit statements of their opponents is warped and coloured by their own pre-conceptions, and this even to the extent of attributing to them affirmations which are in effect denied, and denials which are as plainly conceded.

These remarks are quite à-propos to some of the features of the present debate. It was of course quite legitimate for the opener of this debate on the negative side to shape his arguments so as to meet what he might

We do not find that there exists any real difference between ourselves and the opener of the debate on the negative side. We admit his data, and, further, we admit that his arguments, founded on these data, are valid for his purposed conclusion. The issue between us is, as we shall show anon, but one remove from mere logomachy. He has proved that "the lower animals do possess, in common with man, faculties of a

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mental nature,” and that they are not "ever will not affirm that our opponents may not led by a blind something, over which they be able to find authorities for such a mishave no control." The first clause has not application of the term, since it has been been denied, nor the second affirmed, so far explained and used in so many different as we can see, by any of the writers on the senses, by various writers and founders of affirmative side, notwithstanding the rash systems of philosophy, as to have become and unfounded assertion of “Beta," that we quite equivocal in its meaning, and it is only allow "blind instinct to the possession always a point with the advocates of mateof animals." "Threlkeld" admits that "they rialistic doctrines to endeavour to break down may possess an inconsiderable amount of the generic distinction between men and the understanding "-"the_faculty of judging lower animals. If, then, our opponents, taking according to sense." J. F. says that "ani- this ground, will insist on applying the term mals do possess much in common with reason to some of the faculties displayed man,” and “Arhondhu❞ enjoins the re- by brutes, they may enjoy such a logical membrance "that it is generally conceded advantage as the play upon an equivocal that animals have some kind of a mind;" term can afford them; but the common while our opening affirmative article, by im- sense of mankind has appropriated a differplication, admits all that has been claimed ent, and, we opine, a more correct term, to for the lower animals in this regard, in that designate the same faculties. It is usual to a physical appreciation of effects" is attri- speak of the sagacity of animals, and of the buted to them. Now, appreciation implies rationality of man. It remains to be proved perception, memory, reflection, and conclu- that sagacity is neither instinct nor reason. sion, and these faculties include all that has That we have three terms, ordinarily used been proved to belong to brute mind. It in a discriminated sense, is perhaps primâ would have been sufficient for the purpose facie evidence of this; albeit, we are well of Clement' "if he had simply postulated aware that the term has been casually used the fact of the lower animals possessing in reference both to reason and instinct. sentient life, since these faculties must exist The primary signification of sagacity is in connection with that life, in extent and "quick of scent," but by an ordinary way of quality proportionate to the number and language, development, that which in its acuteness of the senses adjoined to it. origin applied only to one sense, has come to "Clement" is evidently under the impression be applied to all; hence its comprehensive that in the sentence embodying the two radical signification may be rendered " quick clauses quoted above he has given a true of sense." Now it is to quickness of sense, rendering of the question, and a correct acting under the auspices of animal instinct, indication of the point at issue. He assumes appetite, and passion, that we attribute all that the mental faculties of animals must those ordinary and extraordinary actions of belong either to instinct or reason; and the lower animals which may be said to be having proved that animals" perform actions" out of and beyond the province of instinct;" that lie beyond and out of the province of instinct," he thinks he has proved the question in the negative. But we beg to dispute his assumption, and the disputed point between us is merely one as to the propriety of applying a term reason to faculties which we both recognize.

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We must here observe, that the line of argument pursued by "Clement" has been adopted by each of the writers on the negative side, to prove their conclusion on the main point at issue, so that in answering him we answer them all. This argument can only achieve its purposed decision by honouring the faculties it proves beasts to possess with the name of reason. We

and hence we see the correctness of the popular predication of sagacity, as contradistinguished from reason and instinct, to them.

Whilst we have conceded all that "Clement " has advanced, except his conclusions, he, on his part, has admitted that which we were mainly interested in establishing; thus he quotes approvingly the words of Dr. Hamilton:-" The power of analyzing mental phenomena is doubtlessly denied to these humbler existences; but we may, in comparing ourselves with them, boast of it as our exclusive faculty."

Now this "power of analyzing mental phenomena" proves that the mental consti

NEGATIVE REPLY.