man may be a Whig, or a Tory; a Radical, or an admirer of despotism; a believer, or an infidel; and may yet decide with the most unbiassed mind a question of a contract between Brown and Robinson whom he has never seen before, and will, probably, never see again. It is otherwise with the ecclesiastical suits which are decided by Lord Penzance and the Judicial Committee; in them the individual defendant is but the peg upon which certain doctrines or principles hang; the suit might, to all intents and purposes, be conducted in fictitious names; the proceedings are in appearance judicial; in reality, and in their effects, they are legislative.

It must, we think, sometimes occur to the New Judge, whether he is after all not somewhat disqualified for his present office by the nature of that which he previously held. Whether any man, professedly a Churchman, ought to accept such an office as that of Judge of the Divorce Court, we will not here discuss; but, as a matter of fact, Lord Penzance has filled that office; and has, when Judge of the Divorce Court, repeatedly done that which, according to the Prayer Book, no man ought to do. The individual who is thus situated would seem, apart from any legal or technical arguments, to be the last person who should undertake to be the Judge of the conformity of the clergy to the Book of Common Prayer. It would be interesting to have Lord Penzance's judicial interpretation of the formula: Those whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." We are not sure that the most effectual way of meeting the Public Worship Regulation Act would not be to prosecute some individual in Lord Penzance's Court for denying the indissolubility of Christian marriage. The Court and its present Judge could hardly survive such a suit. "Solverentur risu tabulæ."

S

WHAT IS CONSERVATISM? NO. III.

ANCTION is whatever is added to a command for the purpose of enforcing obedience; thus it is either attractive or deterrent. It is again either intrinsic or extrinsic. The whole sanction of Divine law, whether implicit or explicit, is intrinsic; that is to say is altogether within the competence of the legislator. The sanction of human law, as far as regards rewards, is, as we have seen, wholly extrinsic, that is to say beyond the competence of the legislator (rewards, so-called, promised to informers or the like, are mere compensations for trouble, obloquy, &c.); as far as regards punishments, the sanction of human law is partly extrinsic, partly intrinsic.

Here an enquiry arises which demands our closest attention; it is fundamental in relation to the general subject we are considering. Can human law claim a divine sanction?

The utilitarians and secularists hold that intrinsic utility should be the sole motive of human conduct, and that it is needless to look for any further sanction to law.

Others teach that it useful and beneficial that men should believe in a divine sanction to human law, since the consideration of mere intrinsic utility has not sufficient weight with the bulk of mankind.

Others again, setting aside all consideration of utility or expediency, affirm that human law is certainly accompanied by divine sanctions, and they adduce certain positive declarations of such divine sanctions.

It is manifest that the entire range of social science must be influenced fundamentally, according as we adopt one or the other of these answeres to the questions we are considering. This is certain upon the very face of it. For if human law cannot be, nay if it is not absolutely certain that it is in fact, enforced by divine sanction, it cannot be binding upon the conscience-in this case, disobedience to law may be a crime-it cannot be sin. This is the a priori method of arguing the matter. But when we consider it in the light of experience, the conclusion is even more forcibly shown. We have therefore carefully to reflect upon the force of these several answers, and thoroughly to discuss the positions they take up. And in the first place it is of moment to point out that the two opinions placed first, do not really differ essentially in what they actually affirm. For they both set forth utility as sole object in view, and the utilitarians and secularists themselves would not deny that it is desirable to secure obedience to the law. They, it is true, positively deny the existence of divine sanction at all; but then many who hold

the desirability of a belief on the part of other men, that God will punish crime, do not themselves affirm or believe that He will certainly do so in every case. Seeing this, certain politicians are in the habit of enlarging upon the duty of believing that human law is guarded by divine sanctions. But what sane human being ever really believed a thing simply because he is told that it is his duty to believe it? Give him a motive to belief-a legitimate motive; and it does not always follow that this must be an intellectual or argumentative motive, children do not believe their parents on these grounds; give him such a motive and he may be led to faith -but simply to tell a man he ought to have faith, is like telling him he ought to be as strong as an elephant.

But there is another flaw in this way of answering our question, and that is its selfishness, and more than that, its offensive selfishness, its manifest selfishness. We are dealing with a subject which relates to the general motives of the conduct of the mass of mankind. These general motives have a tendency which is irrepressible, to make themselves known. I can easily conceal my motive to a particular act, but the motives which actuate my entire life cannot be hid. Accordingly, when a man asks me whether it is matter of conscience with me to obey the laws, Imay answer him in words that it is. But if in giving this answer I am merely influenced by a desire to direct his conduct, he is sure to find me out in the long run. My actions are sure to speak louder than my words. The assertion of the utility of a general belief in divine sanction of human law is thus obviously futile, it is a favourite view of our shallow and sceptical age, and in truth can impose upon nobody.

On the other hand, if we believe that human law is certainly and invariably consecrated by a divine sanction, our estimation of it will be grounded upon this truth. The responsibility of the legislator as well as that of the subject will be indefinitely enhanced. Of the legislator, we say, for he too is in his measure is a subject of law-he comes under the prescription of the existing laws, and he is moreover responsible in proportion to his power in addition. As we shall, in the sequel, have to point out, permanence is one of the first characteristics of good legislation, inasmuch as the efficient obedience of the subject depends upon his knowledge of the law, and a reckless spirit of innovation is inconsistent with the requirement of the subject in this respect. Accordingly, if there be sin in disobedience-in anomia; as there certainly is; and if, in consequence of rash or bungling alteration of the law, the subject be led into it-then the sin, with all its consequences, lies at the door of the legislator.

Reviews and Notices of New Books.

SCIENCE, THEISM, AND REVELATION: Considered in relation to Mr. Mill's Essays on Nature, Religion, and Theism. By John T. Seccombe, M.D., F.R.A.S. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1875.

WR

E heartily commend to the attention of our readers, this masterly and well-timed exposition and exposure of fallacies, which underlie the so-called rationalistic literature of modern evidential discussion. The specific line of argument which Bishop Butler so admirably developed in antagonism to the coarser, broader, and less scientific infidelity of the eighteenth century, Dr. Seccombe has here ably continued, in refutation of the more intellectual, subtle and exact method of attack initiated by the so-called "philosophers" of the nineteenth.

As the "Analogy" enables us to clear away the rubbish which has been so freely shovelled upon the fair domain of Christian Evidences by the brilliant emptiness of a Voltaire, the bold ignorance of a Paine, and the abstruse crotchets of a Hobbes; and as the "Fundamental Philosophy" of the great Balmez laid anew the basis of certitude, in opposition to the attempts of a Spinoza, a Kant, and the small-fry of more modern transcendentalists, to overthrow objective truth in the regions of philosophy and faith; so does the Essay before us effectually deal with the latest development of the infidel-scientific method of which the writings of the late Mr. Mill are at once the most concise and, it may be, the most conscientious examples.

Dr. Seccombe, in the first place, lays down the theory of Evolution as accepted by scientific men, and joins issue on

this ground; not only fighting the enemy with his own weapons, but carrying the war with consummate skill and ability into the heart of the enemies' country. Thus, on the very basis of their own theory of Evolution, he shows, by analogy, how it renders probable, e.g., the doctrine of eternal punishment. In fact the keynote of the greater part of the Essay will be found in the proofs afforded that intellectual and moral evolution-indeed the whole Thomist ontology-is corroborated to demonstration by an extended application of the doctrine (for so we may term it) of mental and sensible evolution, i.e., correspondence of mental processes to environment of the subject to the object-by selection. A few passages bearing upon this subject will serve to show the author's method :

Matter assumes shape, organization, and life, at the expense of certain force or motion, which becomes, as it were, latent. Molecular motion is thus latent in living matter, to which it imparts life. Thus we have a continual accession of new lives; and it is by the operation of a process of natural selection upon this raw material, so to speak, of life, that

actual existing forms are brought about.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has appropriately termed this process "survival of the fittest," and illustrates it strikingly in these words: "That organisms which live, thereby prove themselves fit to live, in so far as they have been tried; while organisms which die, thereby prove themselves, in some respects, unfitted for living; are facts no less manifest than is the fact that this self-acting purification of a species must tend ever to ensure adaptation between it and its environment." Mr. Darwin is careful to point out that "natural selection depends on the survival, under various and complex circumstances, of the best-fitted individuals, but has no relation whatever to the primary cause of any modification of structure." So it is clear that this theory does not affirm a vague and fortuitous productiveness in nature, limited only by the use. And if this be not affirmed, we are again brought face to face with that unifying, plastic, and determinating force which pervades the universe, and renders it instinct with the principle of life, intellect, and will. (Pp. 10–12.)

There appear very clear indications of rational and moral selection, evolution of mind, evolution of will, a general development of moral beings, and purification of species. And, if we admit this, as natural

selection or survival of the fittest is attended with a destruction and elimination of the less fitted, surely we may expect to discover some

analogue to that physical death which plays so important a part in natural selection. (P. 43.)

Then as to the application of these principles to Christian

doctrine on the existence of Hell :-
:-

The doctrine of a future state of retribution is a sublime complement of the theory of physical evolution: to the different stages of both, the same terms may be, and often are, applied. Both doctrines imply a stage of probation, including struggles, variation, inequality, difficulty, and danger; the operation of selection and rejection tending to ultimate development, advance, and purification of race. And as to that part of the result which involves rejection; the objection taken by Mr. Mill to the goodness of God, or the acceptableness of Christianity on account of its affirmation of the existence of a hell is, in great measure, removed by reflection on the analogous notions in the physical order. Individuals who attain to the future state of happiness thereby prove themselves fit for it; those who are excluded thereby prove themselves unfitted. It will, I believe, satisfy the teaching of orthodox Christianity to hold that hell is strictly the realization of a state of moral evil, being the necessary condition of a moral being who has deliberately and perversely chosen the ill, and has at last arrived at a knowledge of his actual state; so that it does not imply that there is any material region constructed for his torment, but simply the sinner's own chosen sphere in its ultimate development. Though it be true that God must have foreseen the failures, the inevitable rejections consequent upon the process of moral selection; yet it does not follow that we are to postpone His will to His foreknowledge any more than His foreknowledge to His will. And in the operation of the laws of moral evolution, moral selection-one taken and the other left-we know not what infinite developments may yet unfold themselves. On the whole, the theory of the origin of species proves that evolution is favourable to the general progress of beings, and thus, in itself, it is indicative of benevolence, regarded as an efficacious will of the general good of being, for it tends to such general good of being, notwithstanding the non-survival of the less fitted. (Pp. 70, 71, 72.)

In the second chapter, under the heading of "Evidences," we are presented with a most clearly-arranged view of the à posteriori arguments, upon which class the author alone relies, which establish the thesis that God exists. In this category he comprises Abstract Reasonings, Final Causes, and Reflex or Indirect Arguments, under all of which heads Mr. Mill's positions and difficulties are analyzed and shown to be susceptible of no other solution than that offered by Christianity. For instance, treating of the prevalent scientific theories respecting the phenomena of the universe, which refer all sensible manifestations to the energies of certain "modes of motion,” he remarks:

:

Every power capable of inducing nerve activity is shown to be a "mode of motion." Nothing can change or determine directly the conditions of matter save there modes of motion. Now, these modes are

various, and, though continuous, they are changeable; indeed motion, by its very essence, consists in change-change of place. But motion implies a mover and all that is wanted to complete the generalisation is the recognition of a prime motor, an unit of activity, the common antecedent of all modes of motion. Such prime motor may be regarded as the opposite pole of activity to the motion it originates, so that, in itself, it involves the notion of absolute immobility and unchangeableness, itself unmoved, all motion's source. (P. 15.) And he proceeds to show, from Mr. Mill's own admission, that force itself is essentially one and the same, that he must refer to something beyond these varieties of motion which they presuppose, and the conclusion is logically drawn outthat they infer a necessary common antecedent-a prime, unmoved motor unit, the Eternal Source of all motion; whilst under the heading of "Final Causes" the argument is carried further; and from admissions of the fact of a concerted action in nature, which amounts to a proof of control and design, the conclusion is forced upon us that not only does a Supreme Force most certainly exist, but also that this Supreme Being knows and wills. The chapter on "Evidences' closes with the following graphic passage:

We have already mentioned Professor Tyndall's allusion to "kosmic life," which is the formula adopted by him for expressing his belief in a Supreme Force. Professor Huxley has given utterance to a corresponding belief. Mr. Mill, though guarded in his language, has yielded his contribution to it. So that it would be as difficult now, as it has been at all times, to indicate any considerable body of men who can properly be denominated rational Atheists. The conclusion to be drawn by the reflective unbiassed thinker, from the general drift of public opinion on these matters-not, be it remembered, of physicists only, but also of moralists, statesmen, historians, publicists, and, in short, the whole of those who in any way are engaged in studying the entire conditions of human existence-will assuredly amount to this, that at no time in the history of mankind was there a more general and intelligent assent to the great truth of the existence of a Supreme Being. Such, then, is the fairly ascertained statement of the common measure of human intellect in relation to this inquiry. (P. 32.)

The section on the Divine Attributes, Power, Wisdom and Mr. Goodness, will well repay the most careful perusal. Mill's statements are in every case followed up with a zest and ability which plainly prove a thorough mastery of his subject on the part of Dr. Seccombe. We had marked many passages for quotation in this and the following chapters on 'Immortality" and "Revelation; but the space at our command will allow us to transcribe only a few. In reply to the dilemma which Mr. Mill proposes, that every indication Designer; design implying the adaptation of means to an of design is so much evidence against the omnipotence of the end, but the necessity for contrivance being a consequence of the limitation of power-for "who would have recourse to means if to obtain his end his mere word was sufficient?" our author says:·

The more or less extended application of this thought forms the gist of all three Essays. But, with all due submission, it may be asked, Was there ever a more complete specimen of a sophistical argument? Once for all, therefore, it is necessary that it should be met and considered. In its simplest form it may be reduced, I think, to the following syllogism:— If God be infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness, He will make nothing but what is as perfect as is conceivable.

But, by hypothesis, nothing conceivable can be as perfect as God Himself.

Therefore God can make nothing besides Himself.

The major premiss can only be sustained on the supposition that we know precisely what line of action is consistent with attributes of a being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; but so far is this from being the case, that it has been denied that we can even conceive of the existence of such a being. However, it is perfectly obvious that creatures with such limited capacities as we possess cannot determine what is consistent or inconsistent with the possible modes of operation of such a being. The minor premiss depends upon the denial of the possibility of any such thing as relative perfectness. Thus the whole argument amounts to a fallacy, but in its application it will be again met and considered. (Pp. 33, 34.)

The vexata quæstio of the origin of evil, as it has ever been to those who have not received the gift of faith and the blessing of Catholic dogmata, was, as is well known, the special crux of the late Mr. Mill. The evidences of evil, physical and moral, observable in nature are the subject of continual "lamentation, and mourning and woe" throughout his Essays. "If," he wrote, we are not obliged to believe the animal creation to be the work of a demon, it is because we need not suppose it to have been made by a being of infinite power" (p. 58). "To jump to the inference that His sole or chief purposes are those of benevolence, and that the single end and aim of the Creator was the happiness of His creatures, is not only not justified by any evidence, but is a conclusion in opposition to such evidence as we have" (p. 192). Our readers will thank us, we are sure, for printing

the following admirable reply, in the words of Dr. Seccombe :

The question before us is not whether benevolence is the "sole or chief purpose" of the Creator; or "the single end and aim of the Creator was the happiness of His creatures." Christianity does not teach either; and bas, indeed, often been reproached with not doing so; but what we are chiefly concerned in is to show that, other attributes being assumed, the

evil which is observable in the constitution and course of nature is consistent with the supposition that benevolence-that is to say, a complacency and efficacious will in favour of the general good of being-is a prevailing attribute of God.

One remark must be made before we go further. It is obviously improper, and can conduce to no good result, to bring anything like a mathematical method to bear upon such a subject as the origin of evil, or the distinction between evil and good. Force and matter are elements the relations of which do admit of mathematical investigation, but though mind, emotion, and will may be scientifically defined as modes of motion, who can expect to state the dynamical equivalent of a thought, an emotion, or an intention? And yet this consideration, obvious as it is, has been overlooked by many who have entered upon these inquiries.

What is evil? The Essays afford us no tangible definition of it; and as to its origin, it is remarkable that they refer with something like approval to the old Manichæan modification of the Platonic view of a struggle between a supreme good and a supreme evil-a doctrine which Mr. James Mill, the father of the author, wondered had never been revived. A brief consideration of this doctrine is here necessary. It consists essentially in the belief in a summum malum, the efficient cause of all evil. But it has been argued that no existing being is or can be bad in its essence. For every being, purely as such, is, in itself, necessarily good, and evil does not exist substantially as such, but only in some good thing as an evil good; and, though evil always detracts from the goodness of that in which it inheres, yet it can never utterly annihilate it. And thus there is always remaining some vestige of good in every being; nothing can be entirely and altogether evil. If evil were absolute it would destroy itself; for the destruction of all good, which would be necessary for the integrity of the evil, would extinguish the evil itself, which requires some good thing for its subject, just as a disease cannot entirely prevail over the system in which it inheres without itself ceasing to exist. (Pp. 41, 42.)

It is in such passages as the above quoted that the peculiar strength of our author lies. His book proclaims him, in its every page, an accomplished man of science, and a deeply thoughtful and learned philosopher. But above all he is a Catholic, and thoroughly at home in the domain of Catholic Theology. When we express our opinion that his Essay is a complete success, and will take its place as a worthy appendix and completorium, to Bishop Butler's "Analogy," Balmez's Philosophy," and Dr. Newman's "Grammar of Assent," we are only saying that the Catholic Religion is so essentially reasonable, so thoroughly rationalistic" (in the good and true sense of the term), that, cæteris paribus, a Catholic Philosopher and Theologian, when he addresses himself to solve the difficulties of scepticism and infidelity, will succeed when another would most lamentably fail. Heresy and, in its measure, even infidelity will generally be found to have their raison d'etre in the abnormal assertion of some truth which accident, or untoward spiritual or mental development, has caused to run to seed; and Christian Theology, which, because it is Catholic, has a recognized place for all truth in its wonderful circle of Divine Revelation and sanctified Human Thought, can alone adequately meet the heresy or the infidelity!

Dr. Seccombe's penultimate chapter on "Revelation " affords an emphatic illustration of this truth; but we have already quoted so largely from his pages that it is hardly fair to take more. To each and all of our readers who admire Butler, Balmez, or Newman, we would say, Study "Science, Theism and Revelation" from beginning to end-you will not regret having taken our advice,-for-subtracting its criticisms-it is a very masterly exposition, constructive as well as critical, of Christian philosophy.

The following, our last quotation, is from the close of Dr. Seccombe's Essay :

Here, then, at last, we have the result of what is, I believe, on the whole, the most complete, and by far the most candid, inquiry into the evidences of religion which has proceeded from the so-called rationalistic school of our day. We have an edifice of argument raised up, from which great results might fairly be expected, but when we regard it as a whole it is seen to be so artificially raised that it resembles a pyramid supported on its apex. The equilibrium is so unstable, so utterly precarious, the balance is so nicely even, that a grain of solid evidence on one side or the other must suffice to overturn the whole. It is for others to judge whether what has been submitted in these pages will suffice to yield the disturbing element. But unless Mr. Mill has estimated the weight of the evidence on both sides with something like a miraculous correctness, it is evident that the balance will soon be overthrown. Meanwhile, there are some points of great value which we may secure in favour of Christianity. One is the confirmation here afforded to the statement of the Aualogy. "Some persons, upon pretence of the light

of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible and what must be fictitious." Mr. Mill has, in these three Essays, disposed of this objection as completely as if he had written them for no other purpose. And he has illustrated with equal clearness the force of one-half of the saying of Pascal: "Reason confounds the dogmatists." Some persons may be inclined to think that he has also corroborated its other half: "Nature refutes the sceptics." The difficulties alleged in the Essays do not apply particularly to Christianity, but are equally obnoxious to any system which attempts to account for the existing state of the world. Christianity alone affords some kind of solution of these difficulties, and it is suprising that Mr. Mill should not have seen this. He has shown an acute perception of the difficulties themselves, and of many of the strong points in favour of the Christian revelation, but has just stopped short of that one central doctrine which goes so far to remove all obscurities and reconcile all apparent inconsistencies. For while the Gospel assures us that all nature groaned in travail for the coming of Christ; His advent, His life, and death, were for the very purpose of effecting an atonement, of removing the curse, of eventually overcoming evil with good, and of giving us the assurance of the goodness of God. But this could only be effected by supreme goodness in person; no other assurance would suffice, and accordingly He has transmitted to us, by the hands of His beloved disciple, and last surviving apostle, the sublime utterance, so consolatory to the perplexed, so assuring to believers, so inexplicable to the sceptic.-"I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, which is and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty." (Pp. 77-79.)

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PRINCE CHARLES STUART, COUNT OF ALBANY, &c. By A. C. Ewald, F.S.A. In Two Vols. London: Chapman and Hall, 1875.

F

ROM the days of the maligned Queen Mary to the time of "Prince Charlie" the treatment of the Stuarts by the Knox-ites, Puritans, Hot-gospellers, scheming Whigs, Dutch adventurers, sensual Hanoverians, and so-called "Liberals," has always been most ungenerous and base in the extreme. When the persons of the Stuarts could not be harmed and insulted, their memories have been carefully traduced and artistically blackened by low and lying scribes. English historians, as manipulated and bribed by such various political cliques as those above mentioned, have carefully maintained that black and white, truth and falsehood are respectively one and the same. Now-a-days there are literary skulkers about, who, in any revolutionary turn of the political wheel in England-not at all impossible-would only be too ready and happy to style the Prince of Wales's children 'Pretenders," and favour them with a taste of their savoury abuse, just as such writers' literary ancestors threw plenty of mud at the royal but unfortunate exiles of old. The foulmouthed Foresters of Folkestone, who yelled like demented demons at Don Carlos on His Majesty's arrival in England, are a fine specimen of the unwashed and unmanly British "Liberal:"—a wild beast which ought to be either caged or shot.

66

We procured the books before us because of their subject: hoping to find an impartial and generous treatment of it. We cannot say that this is so. The two volumes which consist of nearly 400 pages each,-the first containing ten, and the second twelve, chapters,-are written, from end to end, in the obvious interest of "Liberalism." Vox populi, with Mr. Ewald, appears to be vox Dei: with ourselves it is vox Diaboli. We have, consequently, been almost unable to read the book— though our duty as reviewers compelled it. The author has evidently taken some pains to gather together the old Whig traditions and popular misleading misconceptions; while he has added to them several of his own conceiving, with due gusto. The noble attempt of the Prince to re-gain the Throne of his forefathers is described at length in the first volume. His early successes, his capture of Edinburgh: his bold and ably-planned march southward are all narrated in tolerably good English, but in a ponderous and dull style which is very wearisome. The account of the Prince's mistaken retreat from Derby is fairly stated. Whether the affrighted Hanoverian monarch,—who had packed up his jewels and hastily scraped together what he thought worth carrying away,would have decamped, with his foreign mistresses and German satellites, can never of course be known. But it is certain that numbers of the English aristocracy, and more than half the middle classes would have rejoiced to have been utterly rid of the hungry Hanoverian harpies; for they were sick of their rapacity and constant craving after place and pay. Mr. Ewald's accounts of the skirmish at Clifton and the surrender of Carlisle are narrated with some power. The Battle of Culloden is also described with general fairness. No one can read it without a pang of sorrow for the brave Highlanders who there fought and fell. The record of the Prince's escape

from Scotland is likewise told with minute detail. The very facts make it engrossingly interesting. His Royal Highness's latter days, saddened by disappointment and sorrow, are described with that gloating glee which is natural to the "Liberal" who believes that success is the only test of truth, and that failure is the sole, single and unpardonable sin. But the whole truth, we believe, is not generally known even now, -while, as to the "descendants of the Stuarts" still living, no word is forthcoming.

Prince Charles's relations to the Scotch Episcopalians were both cordial and intimate. He trusted them, and they-to their eternal credit-were thoroughly loyal to their own Prince, and trusted him. His father's Declaration had laid down a sound principle of toleration; and his own was equally excellent and commendable. The Anglican Church had been almost entirely Hanoverianized. Atterbury's well-fought battle in defence of Legitimacy had been fought and lost: and Whiggery found itself in excelsis. The following comment on the mode of Episcopal preferment in England during the eighteenth century is worthy of particular notice. Such a policy is not altogether unknown now :—

"I remember Dr. Wagstaff (with whom I wish I had conversed more frequently, for he always told me the truth,)" wrote the Prince, "once said to me, that I must not judge of the English Clergy by the Bishops, who were not promoted for their piety and learning, but for very different talents, viz., for writing pamphlets, for being active at elections, and voting as the Ministry directed them. After I've won another battle, they'll write for me and answer their own letters." (Vol. I., pp. 218, 219.)

Mr. Ewald has consulted the Stuart papers, the State papers, and other important documents with some care. Many more MSS. however, exist, of which he evidently knows nothing. The present Count of Albany and the Lord Viscount Dillon possess several. The words and opinions of Sir Horace Mann, the tool and the toady of the Hanoverian harpies in England-on whom Mr. Ewald has drawn largely -should always be taken cum grano salis. He was evidently an untrustworthy partizan; a worshipper of whatever golden calf happened to be then set up; a painstaking scavenger of questionable gossip: sticking at nothing to compass his own ends, or to checkmate his better-principled opponents.

The record of the concluding volume, relating to the Prince's death and to the sufferings and losses of the Cardinal Henry Benedict Stuart, are interesting, though most sad and melancholy. George the Third's timely and touching gift of £4,000 a year to His Eminence was an act right royal in its nobility. It blessed him who gave as well as him who took. And George the Fourth's good taste, when Prince Regent, in raising a suitable monument by Canova to the memory of the Three Royal exiles, at St. Peter's in Rome, is a ray of sunshine on his fly-blown memory.

Mr. Ewald owns but little imagination, and has no power of picturesque writing; he is ponderous, flat and tedious in the heavy and laboured style in which he has told his story, and his judgments are untrustworthy. Obviously meaning to be fair,—or as fair as a common-place "Liberal," without very noble aspirations or generous sentiments, can be,-he is almost always incurably one-sided; following thus the general run of mischievous Radical writers, who, both at home and abroad, (though they may not be at all aware of the fact,) have for years been painfully striving to render all Government impossible, except that stupid and pestilent form of it set forth in the newly-twisted Scripture:-"Parents obey your children in the Devil,"-now apparently as applicable to states and kingdoms as to families and individuals. Its end, of course, sooner or later, is Revolution, the Guillotine or Block, Petroleum, the Worship of undraped Harlots, and Moral Chaos.

every principle of either law or justice has been violated by them, serve, no doubt, to excuse its champions for falling into what, nevertheless, seem to us to be grave mistakes. Apart from what we must plainly call Mr. Mackonochie's lamentable want of principle, in not having treated the decrees of the civil power in things spiritual as mere waste paper, we must also demur altogether to Dr. Littledale's so-called "Working Men's" movement. And that for three reasons:-First, because we do not admit that the mere fact of being a "Working Man" carries with it any special right to control public affairs; secondly, because it seems to us to be sheer arrogance and cant to limit the title of " Working Men" (with a capital "W" and a capital "M") to those who happen to form one particular class of workers, and that, too, the least educated; and, lastly, because we believe that all Government, whether spiritual or temporal, rests upon Authority alone, and not upon the Liberal principle of an appeal to the vox populi. We grant the right of persecuted Catholics to seek redress. By all means let communicant parishioners, as such, whether Working Men " or not, speak out plainly in defence, not of their likings or dislikings, but of the Faith. So far as they take their stand on the Church's law, the St. Alban's people have our cordial sympathy. But we warn them against the mischievous and suicidal notion that Truth is ascertained by counting heads. Such a principle would certainly, in the time of Elijah, have condemned the minority of seven thousand in Israel, who did not bow the knee to Baal. And it cannot do other than turn out a very broken reed upon which to lean now.

6.

THE ANNALS OF ENGLAND: An Epitome of English History, from Contemporary Writers, the Rolls of Parliament, and other Public Records. Library Edition. London: J. Parker and Co., 1876.

TH

HIS volume needs no lengthened review. Widely known, it has already pushed its way and made its mark. Previous editions were smaller in size, rather hand-books than volumes for the Library. The compact and well-printed Edition before us, however, is one of the greatest usefulness : for it comprises in a single volume an amount of historical information,-names, dates, facts and authorities,—which

truly make it a necessary book of reference and authority for The numerous illustrations provided add materially to its all students, public writers, statesmen, and educated persons. value,-while the corrections of former issues, and the judicious additions made here and there, render it very complete. While we do not profess to follow the compiler in all and every statement; yet, on the whole, we cannot do otherwise —while we recommend it cordially to our readers' attentionthan testify to its strict impartiality, painstaking care and marked literary integrity.

E may very possibly, on some future occasion, deal at length with the subject of Lord Salisbury's "University of Oxford Bill" now before Parliament. Meanwhile, we call the attention of those of our readers who are interested in this question to an able pamphlet by Mr. J. R. Magrath, Senior Fellow, Tutor and Bursar of Queen's College, on University Reform, (Oxford and London: Parker and Co.). The author, a man of moderate opinions, is, from his position and his reputation, qualified to pronounce a judgment on the subject here treated of, which is entitled to very considerable weight. His detailed opinions, and the reasons upon which he bases them, are best learnt from the pamphlet itself, which is well worth reading. Suffice it to say here, that Mr. Magrath, who, from our own point of view, himself somewhat of a Liberal, energetically opposes the perpetual "constitution-making and consequent ferment," favoured by many so-called "Reformers." "What the interests of education here," he says, "and in England require, is, not a pulling down and building up again every quarter of a century, but freedom to develope in our own way." Mr. Magrath holds up to deserved ridicule the absurd argument, for which the University Commission is primarily to blame, as to "the great disparity between the property and income of the several colleges and the numbers of the members." The amount of this disparity was calculated by the ingenious device of adding together the Revenues of each college, and (after some deductions) dividing the sum by the number

3. The Words, "All power is given unto Me in Heaven and in earth: go ye therefore and teach all nations .. and lo, I am with you alway, &c.," show that the Au hority possessed by the Church for the teaching, discipline, and edification of her members is derived from CHRIST, and in things Spiritual is independent of any Civil Power, and superior to it.

4. The aforesaid Spiritual Authority, conferred upon the Apostles, was, under the guidance of the HOLY SPIRIT, transmitted by them to their succes-ors, to be exercised in conformity with the original Commission and the Law of the Church Universal.

5. This Authority, being the gift of GOD Incarnate to His Church, and a trust committed by Him to the Priesthood, is inalienable; and, therefore, comes within the scope of the Divine Rule, "Render unto Cæsar the things that be Caesar's, and unto God the things that be GOD'S."

6. A national Church which surrenders this Authority to any Civil Power is unfaithful to the trust committed to her by CHRIST.

7. Spiritual Courts, or "Courts Christian," whether Diocesan or Provincial, if rightly constituted, are, among other means, the Canonical instruments of the Church for the regulation and exercise of the aforesaid Authority.

II. CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES ARE VIOLATED BY

1. The creation of a Court for the trial of Spiritual causes by the Civil Power alone.

2. The acquiescence of the Church in the suppression, whether partial

or total, of her Courts Christian, by the Civil Power.

3. Judgments in Spiritual causes pronounced by a secular Court. 4. Sentences in Spiritual causes inflicted by a secular Judge.

5. The appointment, without the consent of each several Bishop or Archbishop, of one and the same person as Judge in the Spiritual Court of more than one Diocese or Province.

6. The appointment, by the Civil Power, of the Judges of Spiritual Courts.

7. The interference of the Civil Power with the right of Bishops and Archbishops to exercise a free and independent choice in the appointment of the Judge of their respective Courts.

III. ANGLICAN PRINCIPLES AFFIRM

1. That "alterations" which are "of dangerous consequence (as secretly striking at some established Doctrine or laudable Practice of the Church of England, or indeed of the whole Catholic Church of CHRIST)" should be "rejected." (Preface to the Prayer Book.)

2. That "congregations" are "committed " to the "charge" of "Bishops and Curates;" not Clergy to the charge of congregations. Morning Prayer; and Ordering of Priests.

3. That it is the duty of the Clergy "to fashion themselves after the Rule and Doctrine of CHRIST;" not after Public Opinion or the National Will. (Ordering of Priests.)

4. That the Clergy are bound by their Ordination Vow "so to minister the Doctrine and Discipline of CHRIST as the LORD hath commanded, and as this Church and Realm hath received the same, according to the Commandments of GOD;" not as the Realm apart from the Church may decree. (Ordering of Priests.)

5. That "the Church hath power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and authority in Controversies of Faith." (Article XX.)

6. That "we give not to our Princes the ministering either of God's Word or of the Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queen do most plainly testify; but that only prerogative, which we see to have been always given, to all godly Princes in Holy Scripture, by GOD Himself." (Article XXXVII.)

7. That "the government of the Church of England under his Majesty," is "by Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Archdeacons, and the rest that bear office in the same;" not by Parliament and a secular Judge. (Canon VII.)

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ARE ASSERTED IN

1. The Ordinance of William the Conqueror, A.D. 1085: "I command and enjoin, by Royal authority, that no Bishop or Archdeacon or anyone else.... bring a cause which pertains to the cure of souls to the judg

ment of secular men."

2. The Eighth of the Constitutions of Clarendon, A.D. 1164: "Of Appeals; If they arise, they ought to proceed from the Archdeacon to the Bishop, from the Bishop to the Archbishop, and lastly, (if the Archbishop fail in doing justice.) to the King, that by his precept the controversy be ended in the Archbishop's Court, so that it go no further" [i.e to Rome]"without the King's consent."

3. The Magna Charta, A.D. 1215: "First; We have granted to God, and by this our present Charter have confirmed, for us and for our heirs for ever, that the Church of England shall be free, and shall have her whole rights and liberties inviolate."

4. The Statute of Appeals, A.D. 1533: "The body Spiritual . . . . usually called the English Church, which always hath been reputed and is also at this hour, sufficient and meet of itself, without the intermeddling of any exterior person or persons, to declare and determine all such doubts as to their rooms Spiritual doth appertain."

5. The Declaration prefixed to the XXXIX Articles, A D. 1628: "If any differences arise about the external policy, concerning the Injunctions, Canons, and other Constitutions whatsoever thereto belonging, the Clergy in their Convocation is to order and settle them;" recognized by and acted upon in the Roval Licence and Letters of Business to Convocation in the years 1661, 1689. 1710, 1713, and 1715.

6. The Bill of Rights, A.D. 1289: "The Commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, and all other Commissions and Courts of a like nature, are illegal and pernicious."

7. The Coronation Oath, A.D. 1837: “Will you preserve unto the Bishops and Clergy of this Realm, and to the Churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?': All this I promise to do.'" V. CONCLUSION. THE "PUBLIC WORSHIP REGULATION ACT OF 1874 CONTRAVENES THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES:

1. Because the new Judge was created by the sole authority of Parliament, in order to decide Spiritual suits and to inflict Spiritual censures. 2. Because the new Judge was created without the consent and against the will of the Church, so far as it was formally expressed; apart from all authority from Convocation; and in defiance of a Resolution of the Lower House.

3. Because the constitutional rights of Convocation have thus been violated and denied; and the Clergy have been deprived of their prescriptive rights by the House of Commons, from which they alone, as an order, are excluded.

4. Because, for certain causes, the Act virtually suppresses the Diocesan Courts, and, for all causes, actually suppresses the Provincial Courts.

5. Because, by the operation of the Act, the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the Episcopate is in some cases practically suspended, and in others absolu ely abolished.

6. Because, by the office of the new Judge, the Spiritual rights of the Priesthood are infringed, both in the Courts of first instance and in those of appeal.

7. Because the Act (j.) violates the laws of Canonical Discipline even to a greater extent than the Bill originally introduced by the Archbishops; (ij.) creates a new Court for the decision of questions not only of Ceremonial but also of Doctrine, by enacting that the new "Judge shall become ex officio" the "Official Principal of the Arches' Court of Canterbury," and that "all proceedings thereafter taken before the shall be deemed to be taken in the Arches' Court of Judge Canterbury;" and (iij.) furnishes unbelievers with a weapon of offence against Catholic Faith and Worship.

THE DECISIONS, THEREFORE, OF THE NEW JUDGE CANNOT IN CONSCIENCE BE RECOGNIZED AS POSSESSING ANY SPIRITUAL CHARACTER, VALIDITY, OR AUTHORITY BY ENGLISH CHURCHMEN.

ANCIENT TRIPTYCH.-A triptych. belonging to the Duke of Devonshire, is exciting some attention at Burlington House. It has very great historical significance for antiquarians. The centre panel shows, in a kneeling attitude, Sir John Donne, of Kidwelly, Carmarthenshire, and Elizabeth, his wife, sister of the first Lord Hastings. Sir John wears the collar of the Rose and Sun, with the Lion sejant badge. He was killed in 1469 at the Battle of Edgcote.

ST. ETHELDREDA'S, ELY PLACE, E.C.-The Roman Catholics have recently purchased the old Church of St. Etheldreda, Ely-place, London, a gem of Catholic art, dating from the thirteenth century, which formed part of the palace of the Bishops of Ely. It is a place full of sacred and historic memories. About a century ago, the Bishop of Ely of that day obtained an Act of Parliament, to enable him to sell his London Palace, in order to build the more convenient family residence in Dover-street, known as Ely House. A sketch of the ancient and modern Episcopal mansions figures in "Pugin's Contrasts." The property was bought by a builder, who erected on it the fine street known as Ely-place. The chapel was, until lately, leased to the Welsh Episcopalians. Last year, however, the greater part of the property was sold under an Order of the Court of Chancery, and the chapel of St Etheldreda, and spacious mews adjoining, were bought by the Fathers of Charity. All their available funds having been expended in the purchase, which cost more than £8,000, the Fathers think they have some claim to appeal to the worthy of its sacred and archæological character. They hope without Catholic public to enable them to restore the ancient church in a way delay to reopen it, but all they can themselves hope to do, is to clear out pews and galleries, and restore the strict necessaries of Roman Catholic worship. To bring out the beauties of the ancient roof and architectural details, to add stained glass and an altar worthy of the ancient work around, they trust will be the work of generous benefactors, who feel that the first ancient Church in England restored to Roman Catholic worship is, in itself, no ordinary appeal for generosity to help in a loyal attempt to restore an ancient historical monument. Any one wishing to see the church can do so by calling on the Rev. W. Lockhart, 14, Ely-place, by whom donations will be gratefully acknowledged.