SERM, dity, or else probability will be the fame XV. with demonftration. Again, in our reasonings about probability, we must judge upon what appears to us, and not suspend our belief becaufe we don't know all the circumstances of things, or all the ends that an infinitely perfect being may have in view. For probabilities fubfift in their full force, and will influence the conduct of every wife and confiderate man, notwithstanding poffibilities to the contrary. And there must be allow'd to be a great probability in the argument before us, if the notion of a future ftate be fhewn to be most agreeable to the conftitution of man, to the moral attributes of God his fupreme Governour, and the present condition and circumstances of human nature. This I fhall briefly examine. And,

ift. If we confider the nature of mankind, we shall find that they are reafonable beings, capable of difcerning the difference between good and evil, of understanding that particular law, whatever it be, by which they are to be govern'd, and the weight and importance of the feveral motives which urge

to

to the obfervation of it; that they are SERM. likewise voluntary agents, who are nei- XV. ther by their internal frame, nor by any foreign influence, neceffarily determined to virtue or vice; and confequently moral and accountable, capable of being govern'd by laws, and rewarded or punish'd for their behaviour.

The next thing to be confider'd then is, whether God, their fupreme Governor, has actually given them a law, by which to direct and regulate their conduct. And, in general, it is highly probable that there must be fome law of intelligent natures, as there are in the animal and material world: For doubtless the great Creator defign'd them for fome end, as he did, evidently, the various systems of infenfible matter; otherwife, the most perfect parts of the creation are the most useless and infignificant. Now no creature can anfwer an end but by means adapted to it, which are the law of its nature. So that fome peculiar laws are as neceffary to be fuppos'd for rational Self-determining beings, as the laws of motion in the material world: And the dif

SERM. ference only lies here, that whereas matXV. ter is govern'd by necessary laws, and ne

ceffarily determin'd to its effects; rational and free beings are capable of directing their own conduct, either in conformity, or oppofition, to the law of their nature; which (as I obferv'd before) renders them accountable for their behaviour, and proper fubjects of reward or punishment.

The general law which men are under is in fhort this, to do whatever is fuitable to their intelligent nature, agreeable to the relations in which they are plac'd, and to their rank and station in the world, and what will beft anfwer the end of their being, so far as it refpects themfelves, or the whole community of mankind of which they are members; and, consequently, to fubject all the inferior appetites and paffions to the conduct of reafon, which is the nobleft and most perfect principle, to do nothing but what becomes the dignity of their frame, nothing that will dishonour and debafe it, to practise reverence, love, fubmiffion, and gratitude to God, and imitate his moral character by

the

the exercise of justice, meekness, peaceable- SERM. nefs, univerfal benevolence, fidelity, and all XV. other focial virtues, on which the order and happiness of the world depends: And this I call a law which God has given to mankind, becaufe whatever appears to be a rule, arifing from the establish'd conftitution of things, with reference to the actions of the creature, can be no other than a law in the defign of the Creator. Let us now proceed to enquire in the

2d place, Whether it be not moft reafonable to fuppofe, that God, as the wife Governour of mankind, will reward or punish their behaviour, in obeying or difobeying the law of their trial. And, in general, to imagine that he takes no notice of the conduct of his creatures, and is determin'd to make no difference at all between the virtuous and the vitious, reprefents him as having but little regard to the order and harmony, or even to the hap piness of the rational world; and feems very nnfuitable to his wisdom and goodness, in the character both of their father and governour: And if he makes any difference, which all our notions of him

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lead.

SERM. lead us to expect, the fame reasons must XV. induce him to do it in every instance. For if it be not fit to reward virtue and punish vice in particulars, and confequently, proportionably, in every particular, it can hardly be a point of wisdom and goodness upon the whole. And from hence it undeniably follows, that no virtuous man can, upon the whole, have less happiness than one that is vitious; for in this cafe, virtue would, in effect, be punish'd, and vice rewarded.

But to give this argument its full strength, it may be proper briefly to state the true foundation of the divine rewards and punishments. The rewards, bestowed by the great Creator on his creatures, are not the refult of any proper merit in them; nor his punishments the effect of paffion in himself. Punishments I therefore fuppofe to have, chiefly, a medicinal defign, in order to correct the disorders of mankind, and to have their foundation in the wisdom of the great Governor of the world, because they are proper to check the growth of vice, and maintain the authority of the divine laws and govern

ment;