selves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated mine." There is a vast difference here from understanding. We can talk of a human understanding in distinction from that of an angel or a brute, but we cannot thus speak of reason: it is one universal light, an effluence from the Deity; like lustre from the sun, granted unto all men, and shining upon the individual understanding, making it reasonable. The understanding is discursive and reflective; the reason is fixed and contemplative. The understanding, when judging, refers, as its ultimate authority, to some other faculty. Reason, on the contrary, appeals in all its decisions to itself alone, as the ground and substance of their truth: even as the Almighty, being unable to swear by one greater, sware by himself.

It is evident, from what has been already stated, that the understanding depends upon the senses is even commensurate with the impressions made upon them, to which impressions it is posterior. On the other hand, reason is independent of sense, anterior to its operation; predetermining experience, or else, employing that of the past, superseding its future necessity; affirming "truths which no sense could perceive, nor experiment verify, nor experience confirm." For example: the truth," before Abraham was, I am," cannot be explained by the understanding, perceived by sense, verified by experiment, or confirmed by experience. Yet this is a truth reviewed by reason. The difference between the understanding and reason is thus admirably illustrated by Coleridge, to whose "Aids to Reflection " I would refer the reader, if he wishes the whole question argued at length, with as much of clearness as ingenuity, and of ingenuity as truth:"The dependence of the understanding on the representations of the senses, and its subsequent posteriority thereto, as contrasted with the independence and antecedency of reason, are strikingly exemplified in the Ptolemaic system, that truly wonderful product and highest boast of the faculty judging according to the senses, compared with the Newtonian, as the offspring of a yet higher power, arranging, correcting, and annulling the representations of the senses according to its own inherent laws and constitutive ideas."

already given prove reason and the understanding to differ in kind. It will also be apparent that reason is totally distinct from that faculty of the mind, called by Locke, Reid, and others, Reasoning.

Leaving superior intelligencies entirely out of the question, I would now endeavour to show that reason is confined to man, i. e., that inferior animals are destitute of it.

Finding it impossible to doubt that animals select and appropriate means to an immediate end, according not only to circumstances, but also according to varying circumstances,* my opinion coincides entirely with that of Green, expressed in his "Vital Dynamics," that animals do not possess understanding, but "a power of selecting and applying appropriate means to an immediate end, according to circumstances and the changes of circumstances, these being variable and varying, but yet so as to be referable to the general habits arising out of the constitution and previous circumstances of the animal, considered, not as an individual, but as a race." The purposes of the animal (and they vary) are all pre-determined by its organization-"the actions and the purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the preservation and continuance of the particular animal or the progeny. There is selection, but not choice; volition rather than will." The intelligential faculty, then, possessed by animals differs from reason in kind, and from understanding in degree (requiring the co-existence of reason, consciousness, and free will to be identical).

Thus, remembering the former limitation, it appears that reason is confined to man. I have endeavoured to show it as briefly as possible, but I ought to apologize for the uninteresting nature of this article. Would that I possessed the magic pen of the Author of the Art of Reasoning," which has garbed metaphysical truth in so fascinating a dress! But this study is deeply interesting in itself, and should fill our hearts with humble gratitude and devout thanksgiving to that supreme Intelligence, who, though he has not given to us the vastness of the ichthyosaurus, the strength of the elephant, or the motive power of the swift, has bestowed upon

OBSERVING the numerous instances of clever action and graceful conduct frequent amongst animals, it is difficult to conserve to man alone those principles which furnish motive, and those powers which guide action. Without impeaching the pride which has produced an opinion at once so vague and so inoperative, and without seeking to degrade a philosophical investigation, which has led to a conclusion so little satisfactory, it seems to me desirable to question the one and to criticise the other.

Comparing humanity and the grosser animals, the superiority of the human form and the diversity of organization are prejudicial to fair inquiry. Let that prejudice be put aside, and the comparison made in all simplicity and truth. In the comparison of physical manifestations, let it be remembered to how great an extent fitness goes for beauty, in order that every characteristic may have its due appreciation-each for its possessor, all for their utilities.

The perception of the various characteristics of human action and animal conduct has led philosophers to deny that they spring from the same albeit modified powers. Hence we have an hypothesis investing the grosser animals with a directionary power, called Instinct.

But what is intended by the word "instinct"? Is it an ability, an aptitude, an incentive to do a given thing in a certain manner, at a determined time, for a decided purpose? This may be sufficient to provide for the arts of life, and to serve such requirements as rise periodically, and require periodical treatment. Under any other supposition, it is not possible to account for the wondrous and equable ability of the grosser animals in these arts, and for their superiority in this respect. There yet remains to be shown, however, the manner in which such a principle can guide them in any other matters-matters for which neither time, mode, nor purpose can be predicted or pre-arranged-matters which are unforeseen, and which arise accidentally.

I found my claim of reason for animals on what may be observed every day.

First. They know and remember. Every man who has had a dog will know the facility with which he and his family were recognized, and how affectionately attended. This capability proves a power of discrimination, joined to one of memory. For, on a stranger entering the house, the salute is loud, boisterous, and challenging; and until it is shown that he is on good terms with its inmates, that salute continues with increased vigor. The dog, therefore, knows the general order of the community wherein he resides; he recognizes its various members, remembers their persons, and orders his bearing according to this knowledge and that discovery.

Secondly. They comprehend and estimate. Again we turn to our valuable friend, the dog, and notice the attention with which he waits for a command, the readiness of execution, and the vivacity of movement with which he carries it out. Particularly is this the case with that member of the canine race assigned to the aid of the shepherd. Obeying the slightest indication, he displays an immense activity and zeal, and does not desist until his labours have been effective. Here we have the comprehension of a motion, of an object, and of a wish; and, remembering how the dog refrains when the object is accomplished, we perceive, also, powers of estimation, which very nearly approach to human judgment.

Thirdly. They anticipate and expect. Ordinarily it might be sufficient to refer to general observation. To that, however, I shall add a familiar instance. It was once my good fortune to possess a young cat, who invariably accompanied me into my study at ten o'clock in the evening, and seated herself on my left arm as I wrote, or on my shoulder as I read. A more general and better known example may be found in the conduct of horses on a cab-stand. When one of their number has gone away, they habitually and without direction move forward, and so preserve the regularity of the rank, and the position of the stand. In these we find proofs of some appreciation of the regularities of time and place, and some

What, then, is the meaning of this thing, Instinct? Does it enable its possessor to recognize an individuality or a locality? Does it qualify him to appreciate a motion, or to know the meaning of a gesture? Does it permit him to understand the propriety of an action, to be aware of the advent of a period, the approach to a place, or the recurrence of an event? These are the faculties which dignify the mind, and envalue its operations. We have seen in the grosser animals memory as director, comprehension as motor, and system as guidance. And it is knowledge, intelligence, and prudence that we claim as distinctive of the mind of

man.

Nor is it in their proceedings alone that we may mark an intelligence; there is also in their manner a grace of dignity and a felicity of consciousness. There is, indeed, a great expressiveness in all the things of nature. In the vegetable and mineral worlds this may be the result of a combination of material influences, grouping themselves as laws, and divulging themselves in beauty. Amongst animals, however, it can be but the result of consciousness, active through volition, and declaring itself in gracefulness.

In the muscles of the horse, in his strong frame, in his valiant neck, in his proud head, his distended nostrils, his flushed veins, is there not something fully expressed? He stretches forth his head for speed, he contracts his muscles for effort. In his eye there is passion, in his bearing pride. He knows the power that he has, and he puts it forth with joy and grace. He is self-possessed, and full of joyousness in his strength.

The fidelity of the dog, and the household affection of the cat, only match in their charms the usefulness and the beauty of the horse; and in all one may read, if read he will, the same self-possession, the same knowledge, which alone are proofs of mind and indications of intelligence.

There is also a noticeable physiognomical expression in the grosser animals. In the eye of the horse we may detect strength, integrity, earnestness: when he becomes fatigued and exhausted, these are lost in a peculiar languid vacancy. With what in

These three animals excel in the domestic and commercial virtues, and to them man owes much, by whatever means it may be that they are enabled to serve him. Amongst creatures connected less with civilized life, we may observe vivid and forceful representations of fierce passion, of cunning device, of delicate feeling, of gentle conduct, of patient endurance, of useful art, speaking in all their actions, and investing all their motions.

Reason may exist without volition, or, in other words, there may be reason which comprehends, but does not create; which is obedient, but not directive; which supplies means, but does not unfold objects. Such belongs to the grosser animals; and in this lies at once their inferiority and their utility to man. A critical discretion, or an inquiring comprehension, would have rendered their services unavailable, because proficient to know, to determine, and to direct; while a mere ability to do would leave them powerless for their own necessities, and incapable of serving humanity.

It is very noticeable to how great an extent the history of mankind represents that of the grosser animals. Progression, it may be novel to assert, is traceable in both.

But it would appear that in humanity are all the seeds and elements and materials of this progression; that on ourselves it devolves to direct our aims, to amplify our means, and to fulfil our objects. Whatever adjuncts may be observed, or may be employed, they originate in our necessity, and are still obedient, either to a desire to use, or to a caprice to disregard them.

On the other hand, it was entrusted to man to direct and to utilize the powers of those creatures which share with him the beauty of the world. They, too, have ascended from unknown degradations of wildness and of baseness, to usefulness, to government, and to honour. Tamed, trained, educated, all their strength, all their ability, are gradually bowed to human objects; and all their beauty, and all their elegance,

Nor can it be denied that in the exercise of these useful or pleasing powers, which may be organized and developed, not supplied, by man, the grosser animals discover much acuteness of observation, much readiness of acquirement, much aptness in practice, and much tact in application; that is, their abilities are coincident with their condition. That matter of condition is various; so also is the development of individuals. Especially is this to be observed in regard to those powers of the mind known as the affections. It would be ungraceful to forget, in this discussion, the numerous and agreeable manners in which these are manifested. Another difference remains to be observed. Some individuals display, or may be trained to use, an amount of cleverness impossible to others. In this fact we find sufficient denial of the assumption of uniformity of

powers.

If instinct be a principle unvarying in its operation, and observing no distinction of fitness or of capacity, how can we apply it to animals? Neither in a natural or "wild" state of life, nor in a trained or educated state, can a principle of action so limited, and whose utility is so confined, be competent for all exigencies, or valid for all conditions.

The arts practised by bird and beast are peculiar to them, because prescribed by the simplicity of their requirements, and the limitation of their influence. The facts of their being attained by animals with greater ease, and their restricted applicability, have led to the opinion that they are naturedirected, not nature-empowered. It is this facility of attainment, and this restriction of application, which constitute one main distinction between the human organization and that of the grosser animals. Nor can there be any hesitation in admitting the deficiency of constructive powers, of strategic abilities, or of analytic perception. The dog may not know the object for which he is barking, nor the horse the design which his labour assists in developing. Yet the one

occasion, and the other sufficient ability to furnish direction of means. In some of the least gifted and least fortunate of mankind we are not always able to detect more than this; but, by the grosser animals, those powers are displayed only by the aid of education, which are active in man without this aid. And it is this kind of tact,—the operation of which may be self-protective,joined to some general adaptability to conditions, which balance their relationship to humanity, and their capability of self-enjoyment. The service rendered in the one relationship, and the pleasure experienced in the other, meet in the accomplishment of an existence of mingled utility and delight, which are inter-compensatory, because sufficient for the present, and final, because they bear no reference to a future.

Thus the position of the other animals is undoubtedly inferior to that of man, since their powers are inferior. This position of servitude, however, is neither disgraceful nor derogatory. The dog is his master's meanest friend, his lower servant, but his delight is in obedience, and his pleasure in service. For this he is fitted; and I doubt not that each animal has an ultimate relationship to man in some manner. There is honour in such service, in such aid of higher aims.

The aim of action is progress; the end of thought, precept. Whatever may be our judgment on this subject, there is a practical value necessarily arising from the consideration thereof. In our dealings with the lower animals, there are many occasions upon which we, presuming upon their indisposition to retaliate, or to rebel, exceed the limits of our sway; or, relying on their want of protection, lose our dignity in too harsh a correction, or in an unnecessary chastisement. It would be well if we remember how little we know of animals and of their relationship to ourselves; and if, applying the extent of our knowledge, we treat them more gently, correct them less harshly, and refrain from capriciousness towards them.

THOR.