we might be able to give a pension as of course, or have, what I should much prefer, some contributory scheme. I am told that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board said that he himself at an earlier period had been in favor of a contributory scheme. I do not think that he ought too hastily to have given up such a scheme as impracticable. Such a scheme would at all events have two plain and manifest advantages it would avoid inquisitorial investigation, and it would get over the other difficulties which have been alluded to at less cost to the Exchequer, and that means that more money would be left free for the necessary purposes of national defence or other great purposes of social reform.

I regret the hasty course which the Government have taken, but the responsibility must lie with them. The Government alone have the opportunity of estimating the resources at their disposal for carrying it out. They, and they alone, have the machinery for making some comparative survey of all the needs of the State. On them lies the responsibility. The Bill does not satisfy the demands of those who claim the right to old-age pensions, and on the other hand it so burdens and cripples the national resources that we may find it impossible to meet other obligations not less pressing, not less connected with the safety of the State and the well-being of the poorer members of the State.

A DEFENCE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS1

SIR WILLIAM ANSON

You are practically proposing to make this a single Chamber Constitution. Are we in accord with general principles in accepting a Constitution of this kind? I will venture to say that there is no civilized government which has not secured itself in some way or other from rash or hasty legislation by the popular Assembly, either by a written Constitution, or by a

1 A Speech delivered in the House of Commons, June 23, 1907. Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. 176, col. 998.

referendum, or by a Second Chamber - - by one of these three methods which are universally employed for protection against this undoubted risk. The object of a Second Chamber, as stated by an eminent Colonial authority, is to delay great changes until the will of the people has been permanently and conclusively ascertained. We are not singular in retaining this precaution; we are rather singular in having so little precaution against violent and revolutionary changes.

May I refer to other democracies and republics? Turn to the United States, and note the precaution taken against legislation which runs counter to the will of the people. The Federal Government is based on a written constitution and two legislative Chambers, whose powers of law-making are defined and expressly limited by the constitution, and a change in the constitution can only be effected by something in the nature of a referendum. Not only that, but every State has a written constitution, and although the legislative powers of those States are unlimited, except in so far as the federal constitution prescribes, I may say that the tendency of the constitution is to add to the number of subjects which are excluded from the general legislative powers of the State, and in which the constitution requires that there should be a referendum to the people of the country. And not only that, but every State has two Chambers. Mr. Bryce, one of the chief authorities on this subject, says, “The need of two Chambers has become an axiom of political science, based on the belief that the innate tendency of an Assembly to become hasty, tyrannical, or corrupt, can only be checked by the co-existence of another House of equal authority." He further states "that the only States that have ever tried to do with one House are Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont, each of which gave up the system, one after four years, the other after twelve years, and the third after fifty years."

Turn to the constitution of the French Republic. There you have a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives coördinate in respect of legislative power, except that the Senate has no initiative in matters of finance. The power of demanding

a dissolution of the Chamber does not rest with the Prime Minister, but with the President acting with the consent of the Senate. And the Senate, according to a recent authority, does very valuable work in correcting the over-hasty legislation of the Chamber, and, in case of disagreement, often has its own way, or effects a compromise.

Lastly, I take the Australian Commonwealth. I think that the democratic character of the Australian Colonies can hardly be called in question. But there is a difference in the two Chambers of the Australian Commonwealth. The procedure is as follows: The House of Representatives passes a proposed law, and if the Senate rejects or amends it in any way to which the House of Representatives cannot agree, the Bill drops for the time. It comes up again after three months, and if the Senate still disagrees, the Governor may dissolve both Houses. If afterwards the same difference arises, and the disagreement still goes on, then the two Houses sit together, and the opinion of the majority of the whole number prevails.

There you have three great modern democracies, each of which guards itself against such legislation as might well be effected by this House of Commons, if it received the unlimited powers which are proposed to be given to it by the Prime Minister. I venture to think that there is nothing pedantic in looking at the actions, the law, and the practice of other constitutions as democratic as our own. If these safeguards are necessary for them, they are necessary for us. If they cannot trust a single Chamber, we may learn from them how to guard against the possibilities of a House of Commons whose powers were limitless.

But setting aside those examples, if we look simply at the proposals of the Prime Minister, these two questions arise. What are the faults of the House of Lords that they should be superseded and set aside in this way, and what is the claim of the House of Commons to arrogate to itself this unbounded legislative power? Now, I am perfectly ready to admit that the House of Lords has its faults as a Second Chamber; but it was never constructed to discharge the purposes of a Second

T

Chamber in the modern sense; it is, historically, the estate of the baronage, a coördinate estate of the realm with the House of Commons. It has become a Second Chamber, I admit, and to my mind discharges extremely well many of the duties of a Second Chamber. I admit that it is too large, that it contains too many men who take no active part in politics, and that, like every Second Chamber that can be devised, it is conservative in its tendencies, because the very object of the existence of a Second Chamber is to preserve the nation from the over-hasty legislation of the other House. But I will undertake to say that the House of Lords has never crossed the will of the people where that will has been clearly expressed.

Take any instance since the Reform Act of 1832, which you may say is the beginning of our modern constitution. Take cases in which it was extremely possible that a majority of the House of Lords were not wholly in accord with the legislation that was passed. Take the disestablishment of the Irish Church, the Irish land legislation of Mr. Gladstone, the changes in the franchise of 1884-1885, or the Trades Disputes Bill of last year. On every one of these measures the country had clearly expressed its opinion. The Aliens Bill of last year, alluded to by the Honorable Member for Clitheroe, was not rejected by the House of Lords; it was not proceeded with because it was not taken up by the Government, or it might have been passed. Where there might have been irritation or delay before Bills had been passed, the ultimate result has been valuable, because the settled and the permanent will of the nation has been ascertained, and a measure when it became law has been accepted as a final settlement by all parties. If there were no such certainty, one House of Commons would undo the work of another, and there would be a legislative see-saw and lack of continuity which would be disastrous. There is to be borne in mind the monumental case in which the House of Lords understood the will of the nation better than the House of Commons. In 1893 it was the will of the House of Commons to pass a Home Rule Bill, and it would have gone on passing it under the scheme of the Prime Minister as long as the Parliament endured. But in 1895 it

was plain that the will of the House of Commons was not the will of the nation. Which do you wish to see carried into effect?

If you wish to see the will of the nation carried into effect, what steps will you take to see that that will is properly expressed? You claim that the majority of the House of Commons is finally representative during the duration of a Parliament, of the will of the nation. So long as there are single-Member constituencies, and until all elections take place on the same day, the House of Commons will not represent the country for more than a few weeks after a general election. Although a mandate is claimed by Honorable Members opposite to deal with subjects mentioned by them on political platforms, what really determines at a general election, apart from their promises as to the future and the misrepresentations of their followers as to the past, is that at a general election where there is a great turnover of parties, many people think that one party has had a great spell of power and that the other side should have a chance; and then you say that every measure you bring in and introduce into this House is expressing the will of the people? Why do you not take the measures which are open to you to ascertain the will of the people?

The Under-Secretary for the Colonies wrote an article in the Nation in which he expressed his view as to the constitution of a second Chamber, and his view is not the view of the Prime Minister. The Under-Secretary thinks that the Ministry should constitute a second Chamber to suit their own purposes at the commencement of every Parliament, for he wrote: "Since the political supremacy of the House of Commons must be the vital characteristic of any Liberal scheme, we must reject with regret, but with decision, all proposals for enabling the House of Lords to force every Liberal measure to the test of a referendum. Such a provision would be contrary to the whole spirit of the British Constitution." The Under-Secretary for the Colonies maintains that the referendum is contrary to the spirit of the British Constitution. There is a curiously undemocratic ring about that. I thought the Party opposite were going to breathe a new spirit into the Constitution, but it seems