of the prudence, discretion, or judgment, of their Senators, so that they may continue or withdraw their confidence? No, sir, the whole plan would present the anomaly of most important powers exercised in a free Government without any check from the fear of punishment or of popular disfavor.

[MARCH 15, 1830.

The President has the right of removal for just causes. If he abuses it for corrupt or party purposes, he is liable to impeachment.

Whenever the Senate suspect that a removal has been made without cause, or from such improper or corrupt motives, they may ask for the reason of the removal.

The President is bound to communicate the cause whenever it may be demanded by the Senate.

The Senate, if he should refuse to give any, or give an unsatisfactory answer, may, and ought to, reject, successively, all the nominations he may make.

one occurring in the recess, and therefore cannot be filled by the President, but the office must remain vacant.

These are, as accurately as I could note them, the positions laid down by the Senator from Delaware. Let us inquire whether they are more tenable than the general doctrine I have just examined.

If it were possible then for the Senate to participate in| this power, it would be not only contrary to the true construction of the words of our social compact, but would be destructive of one of the most important principles on which it is founded. But it is totally impracticable, morally and physically impracticable, in its exercise, And the conclusion to which the gentleman is brought consistently with the existence of the Government. Take by this series of positions, is, that the temporary appointthe case of a minister to a foreign court, charged with a ments made by the President, being in force only until the negotiation of the most important kind, on the subject end of the session, the vacancy that is thus created is not of which the commercial prosperity, perhaps the peace of the country depends; he becomes negligent in his correspondence, he addicts himself to play, to pleasure, to intemperance; he becomes unworthy of his trust, from these or other causes; or from malady, mental or bodily, becomes incapable of performing his duties; or, he makes himself so obnoxious to the court to which he is sent, that The first position I accede to. The President has the it demands his recall. The knowledge of these facts is right of removal, and he is liable to impeachment for brought to the President, soon after the adjournment of Con- corruption and malconduct in the exercise of this, as well gress; he cannot recall this minister, because he has been as any other of his functions. But this true position is appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate; and by fatal to all the errors which the Senator has built upon it. the newly vamped doctrine, the same advice is necessary He admits the right of removal to be in the President, to displace him. The President must then convene the without the advice of the Senate. As it is no where in Senate-sixty days, at least, is necessary for this operation. terms given by the constitution, it must exist as a necesAll this while the unworthy, or inefficient, or obnoxious sary means of executing some power which is expressly minister must remain, to betray or disgrace his country, given. What is that power? Clearly the Executive; or, or irritate the Power which he was sent to conciliate. The as more fully expressed, the duty of “seeing that the Senate are at length convened, and the President commu-laws shall be faithfully executed." He has it then, amnicates the information which he has received. But here ply, completely, solely, and the second member of this another new principle stands in the way of his recall. The proposition proves it; he is impeachable for corruption minister, like all other officers, (such is the doctrine of the in its exercise; he has the power without participation, and day) has an interest in his office, which it is injustice, tyran- must bear the responsibility without any one to share in it. ny, and proscription, to deprive him of without cause. He Having seen that the President derives the power he is ought not then to be deprived of this interest unheard; he admitted to possess from a legitimate constitutional source, must have a copy of the charges, the names of the and that this gives it to him without any, other limitation witnesses, time to reply, and a right to examine his evi- than that of his own responsibility, we must inquire from dence in discharge. Gentlemen must acknowledge this, whence the Senate derives the control with which they or they must give up their favorite cry of oriental des- are, gratuitously, I think, invested by the argument. potism and cruel proscription. The examination of ex They may call on the President for the reasons of the parte evidence here is quite as fatal to the vested interest removal; and if they have the right, the obligation to they contend for as any removal the President has made. comply with it follows of course. But in what part of the These formalities are gone through, and at the end of constitution is this right given? It is not pretended that three or four months the charges are substantiated, and there is any express provision. From what part is it a nethe minister is recalled, or the proof is not deemed satis-cessary inference? To the execution of what power, factory, and he remains, having lost the confidence of the vested in the Senate, is it the necessary means? Not to President, who is forced, however, to retain him, and he the power of advising on the fitness of a candidate prohimself irritated by the accusation, and endeavoring to posed to fill the vacancy, because the vacancy must be defeat every negotiation that will reflect credit on the created before that advisory power can be exercised, and administration of his country. Ten days after this trial the argument admits that the President has the right to is concluded, before the members from the distant States create the vacancy by a removal. Of what power, then, have reached their homes, advice is received that a col-I ask, vested in the Senate, is this the necessary appendage? lector is speculating with the funds committed to his charge; Or where is it expressly given as a distinct power? If the same operation is to be renewed, the same delay in-given neither expressly nor by implication, it cannot exist. curred, the same waste of public money, the same vexa- But for what purpose should it exist? What is the tion to the members of this body, the same impossibility-advantage to be derived from it that should make us solet us come to the conclusion at once--the same utter im-licitous to give a construction that should admit it? Repossibility of carrying on the operations of Government member in this inquiry the first position which is assumed with such machinery. by the argument, and which I admit, that the President

This was scen, felt, and acknowledged, as I have said, is impeachable for a corrupt removal; and remember also, in the outset of our Government, and, from that time to the that we are the judges of fact and of law on an impeachpresent, it has never been made a serious question. Why ment. The power, then, is one that makes us accusers is it raised now ?Doubtless from conscientious motives, by as well as judges, and judges who have predetermined those who advocate it here; but, out of this House, it has the guilt of the accused: for if, on the inquiry, the corbeen (in the total absence of better matters, for a reproach ruption appear, and we make it the ground of refusing to the President) made a party cry, which will be hushed to confirm the President's nomination, do we not prejudge as soon as the matter is examined by an enlightened people. The gentleman from Delaware does not go this length; his doctrine is this:

the question on the impeachment that must follow? This is an insuperable objection, which the doctrine of the Senator entirely overlooks in zeal to apply his remedy.

MARCH 15, 1830.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution.

[SENATE.

And what is that remedy? One surely worse than the ginning of the recess; not at any moment while the session disease, although that should have all the bad symptoms continues. An official act, done at the last instant of the ascribed to it. The evil complained of is, the removal session, would be well done. The vacancy then happens of one good officer, to be replaced by another as good. at the first instant of the recess; but the constitution makes Observe, sir, that I grant the fact in dispute. I admit, no distinction whatever; whether at the first moment or for the sake of showing the weakness of the argument, the last day is immaterial. When I use this argument, I am that all the removals have been of men well qualified for free to admit that I do not think the framers of the contheir offices; and all I ask in return is, a similar admission stitution did intend to provide for so extraordinary a case that the Senate, for whose powers they contend, will con- as that which the ingenuity of the Senator from Delaware sent to no nomination of a person not qualified. This is has imagined, of the Senate rejecting all the nominations the evil. What is the remedy? It is contained in the of the President, successively, because they might be disSenator's last position, that, if the President refused to give satisfied with a removal. But the words of the constituhis reasons, or the Senate are not satisfied with them, tion permit the exercise of his powers to fill all vacancies, they may refuse to confirm his nominations, and suffer whenever they should occur-with the advice of the Sethe appointment to expire by its limitation, at the end of nate, if in session; without it, by temporary appointment, the session; and then it is the opinion of the Senator that when they are not. The exercise of the extraordinary the office can no longer be filled; because, according to and destructive power contended for never certainly enhis reasoning, it is not one that accrues during the recess. tered into their minds; it was left for the ingenuity of our This is his remedy: for this you are to suppose powers times to discover. But, it has been said that this power that are no where given. For this admirable result you is liable to abuse; the President may remove from caprice, are to strain the construction of the constitution until it prejudice, or a worse motive. No doubt, sir, he may; he breaks. For this you are to add the accusing to your may do worse; he may embroil you with foreign nations, judicial power. For this you are to leave the laws un- by his abuse of the treaty making power; he may cause executed, and disjoint the whole machinery of Govern- your fortifications to be dismantled and your army to be ment. No matter whether the offices to be filled are the dispersed in time of war; he may destroy your revenue commanders of your army, or the captains of your fleet by the appointment of corrupt men in the management of in time of war, or the heads of departments, or collectors the treasury: but what argument can be drawn from this? of revenue, or marshals to execute the decrees of your That he has not the constitutional power? Certainly not. courts in time of peace-all must remain vacant. Apply But if the President might abuse the power of removit in the present case. A number of removals in every'de-al, may not the Senate abuse the control with which partment has been made. Suppose the Senate should have it is attempted to invest them? If he has enemies to disasked for the causes, and the President, as he most pro- place, may not they have friends to keep in? If he is bably would, should have declined to comply with the liable to be actuated by political feelings, are bodies, conrequest: what would have followed? All our diplomatic stituted as this is, at all times free from their influence? relations would have at once ceased: for all the ministers The President has the power to remove, it is said again, appointed in the recess would cease their functions at the but only for just cause; but who is to judge of what is end of the session. The revenue in some of our largest just cause? not the Senate, or if so, the power would be ports would be uncollected. The administration of justice theirs, not the President's; he must himself be the judge, in most of the districts would be stopped for want of or else it would be a solecism to say that he has the powdistrict attorneys and marshals. This is the remedy for er; he must judge and he must act, as I have said, unan evil, perhaps of doubtful existence in any case, but controlled but by his responsibility to the laws for corrupt certainly much aggravated in all. acts; to his country for those which are indiscreet or errc

persecu

But suppose this right in the Senate to call for the neous. causes of removal, and an acknowledgment by the Pre- This, sir, is my view of the constitutional power of the sident of an obligation to comply. He sends us his rea-President in relation to removals--a power, in my view sons, and in one case they are that he has no confidence of it, vested solely in him, and for the duc exercise of in the man he has dismissed. Confidence cannot be com- which he must bear the sole responsibility. I will not manded; it is the result of observation on character and consent to divide it with him. No terms seem sufficiently conduct; on a thousand indescribable impressions. But energetic for the gentlemen to express their disapprobaa majority of the Senate say we have confidence in him. tion of the manner in which the President has exercised What is to be the result? Is he to be restored to office? this power. As it is their only subject for declamation No one pretends it: What then? The grand remedy to and invective, it would be cruel to deprive them of it; punish the President for his want of confidence in an of- but, by their own showing, are they not accusing without ficer whom he has not appointed, is to adopt the plan of evidence? Why all these attempts to call on the Presi the Senator from Delaware, and leave the office vacant. dent for his reasons of removal, if they already know he The whole reasoning on the general question of the right has none? Why call for evidence if they already have it? of the Senate to participate in removals, applies with the If these proofs of corruption, of favoritism, of same force to this power of inquiring into the causes of tion, are sufficient, plead the cause before the people, or removals; both are gratuitously assumed in argument; prefer accusations of impeachment in the other House; both are destitute of either express or implied authority but do not render yourselves, by prejudging the cause, in the constitution; both lead to absurd consequences, liable to be challenged for the favor, or, by bold accusaand to impracticable results; ruinous, if they were prac- tion, endeavor to influence the minds of your fellow judges with your own prejudices! If their doctrine be true, But I deny that the remedy proposed (ruinous and ex- as it undoubtedly is, that, for corruption in the exercise traordinary as it is) could be applied. The offices would of this as well as any other function, the First Magistrate is not, in my opinion, remain vacant. The President would liable to impeachment; and if they believe, as they rehave a right to fill them, and would certainly exercise that peatedly allege, that there is evidence of it in the late reright; the expressions used in the constitution are general: movals; I put it to them whether they are correct in he shall have a right to "fill all vacancies that may hap-showing a feeling inconsistent with the calm investigation pen during the recess of the Senate." Now, sir, in the that becomes a judge. If, on the contrary, as I am more supposed, the vacancy arises when the commission inclined to believe, the warmth that has been expressed expires; when is that? At the end of the session? When arises only from a feeling for political friends, who have is the end of the session? Certainly not before the be- lost their places, are not the expressions they have used

ticable.

case

SENATE.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution.

[MARCH 15, 1830. highly exaggerated? and ought they not to have been sup-ance of the subject, I have given it the most profound, pressed? But if there has been, in their opinion, an indis- the most anxious, and painful attention; and differing, as creet use of the power, let them plead the cause before the I have the misfortune to do, in a greater or less degree, people, who have the power to apply the remedy. To from all the Senators who have preceded me, I feel an them the President is responsible, and to them, I have lit- obligation to give my views of the subject. Could I have tle doubt, his conduct will appear, as on other occasions it coincided in the opinions given by my friends, I should has done, correct, upright, disinterested, and intended for most certainly have been silent; from a conviction, that their best advantage. Yet, sir, if the contrary be proved, neither my authority nor my expositions could add any I shall, as a Senator and an individual, hold myself open weight to the arguments they have delivered. to the conviction that evidence may produce.

My learned and honorable friend, the Senator near me, I had almost forgotten [said Mr. L.] a complaint that from South Carolina, [Mr. HAYNE] comes, in the eloquent this body was deprived, by Executive appointments, of arguments he has made, to the conclusion, that whenever, one-eighth (I think that was the alleged proportion) of its in the language of the Virginia resolutions, (which he members. There is only one view of the subject by which adopts) there is, in the opinion of any one State, "a palthis can be considered as matter for reprehension. But pable, deliberate, and dangerous violation of the constituthat is one so derogatory to the dignity of this body, that tion by a law of Congress," such State may, without ceasI can scarcely think it was so intended. A Senator of the ing to be a member of the Union, declare the law to be United States, dividing with a single colleague the repre- unconstitutional, and prevent its execution within the sentation of a sovereign State; the constitutional adviser of State; that this is a constitutional right, and that its exerthe President in appointments, and the formation of treaties; cise will produce a constitutional remedy, by obliging Cona judge of the High Court of Impeachments, to which the gress either to repeal the law, or to obtain an explicit President is himself amenable; holds a station superior in grant of the power which is denied by the State, by submitimportance and honor to any the Executive can give. ting an amendment to the several States, and that, by the

Whoever, therefore, quits it for one of the Depart-decision of the requisite number, the State, as well as the ments, must be considered as having made a sacrifice rath- Union, would be bound. It would be doing injustice, er than accepted a reward. The President's recommen- both to my friend and to his argument, if I did not add, dation of a change in the constitution, which should dis- that this resort to the nullifying power, as it has been qualify members of the Legislature from office, has been termed, ought to be had only in the last resort, where the alluded to as inconsistent with his practice. To this, it ap- grievance was intolerable, and all other means of remonpears to me, his message gives a satisfactory answer; and strance and appeal to the other States had failed. it may be added, that the refusal by any of the States to adopt the amendment he suggested, afforded a conclusive proof, that neither the States nor the people desired that the requisite talent and fitness for office should be excluded, because it was found in the Legislature. In these appointments, then, the will of the people has been pursued, provided the choice has fallen on persons properly qualified; but this we cannot question: for we have concurred in all the appointments.

In this opinion I understand the honorable and learned chairman of the Judiciary Committee [Mr. RowAN] substantially to agree, particularly in the constitutional right of preventing the execution of the obnoxious law.

The Senator from Tennessee, [Mr. GRUNDY] in his speech, which was listened to with so much attention and pleasure, very justly denies the right of declaring the nullity of a law, and preventing its execution, to the ordinary Legislature, but erroneously, in my opinion, gives it to a

All these Senators consider the constitution as a compact between the States in their sovereign capacity; and one of them [Mr. RowAN] has contended that sovereignty cannot be divided; from which it may be inferred that no part of the sovereign power has been transferred to the General Government.

I now approach a graver subject--one on the true un-convention. derstanding of which the Union, and of course the hap- My friend from New Hampshire, [Mr. WOODBURY] Of piness of our country, depends. The question presented whose luminous argument I cannot speak too highly, and is, that of the true sense of that constitution which it is to the greatest part of which I agree, does not coincide in made our first duty to preserve in its purity. Its true the assertion of a constitutional right of preventing the exconstruction is put in doubt; not on a question of power ecution of a law believed to be unconstitutional, but refers between its several departments, but on the very basis up- opposition to the unalienable right of resistance to oppreson which the whole rests; and which, if erroneously de- sion. cided, must topple down the fabric raised with so much pain, framed with so much wisdom, established with so much persevering labor, and for more than forty years the shelter and protection of our liberties-the proud monument of the patriotism and talent of those who devised it, and which, we fondly hoped, would remain to after ages as a model for the imitation of every nation that wished to The Senator from Massachusetts, in his very eloquent be free. Is that, sir, to be its destiny? The answer to and justly admired address on this subject, considers the that question may be influenced by this debate. How Federal constitution as entirely popular, and not created strong the motive, then, to conduct it calmly; when the by compact; and, from this position, very naturally shows, mind is not heated by opposition, depressed by defeat, or that there can be no constitutional right of actual resistelate with fancied victory, to discuss it with a sincere de-ance to a law of that Government, but that intolerable and sire, not to obtain a paltry triumph in argument, to gain illegal acts may justify it on first principles. applause by tart reply, to carry away the victory by ad- However these opinions may differ, there is one consodressing the passions, or gain proselytes by specious fal- latory reflection, that none of them justify a violent oppolacies, but, with a mind open to conviction, seriously to sition given to an unconstitutional law, until an extreme search after truth--earnestly, when found, to impress it on case of suffering has occurred. Still less do any of them others. What we say on this subject will remain; it is suppose the actual existence of such a case. not an every day question; it will remain for good or for But the danger of establishing on the one hand a conevil. As our views are correct or erroneous; as they stitutional veto in each of the States, upon any act of the tend to promote the lasting welfare, or accelerate the dis- whole, to be exercised whenever, in the opinion of the solution of our Union; so will our opinions be cited as Legislature of such State, the act they complain of is conthose which placed the constitution on a firm basis, when trary to the constitution; and, on the other, the dangers it was shaken or deprecated, if they should have formed which result to the State Governments by considering that doctrines which led to its destruction. of the Union as entirely popular, and denying the existWith this temper, and these impressions of the import-ence of any compact; scem, both of them, to be so great,

as to justify, and indeed demand, an expression of my dissent from both.

The arguments on the one side, to show that the constitution is the result of a compact between the States, cannot, I think, be controverted; and those which go to show that it is founded on the consent of the people, and, in one sense of the word, a popular Government, are equally incontrovertible. Both of the positions, seemingly so contradictory, are true, and both of them are false-true, as respects one feature in the constitution; erroneous, if applied to the whole.

These States, during the short period of the contest with Great Britain, which preceded the Declaration of Independence, although colonies in name, were, in fact, independent States, and, even at that early period, their political existence partook of this mixed character.

By a popular or consolidated Government, I understand one that is founded on the consent, express or implied, of the people of the whole nation; and which operates in all its departments directly upon the people.

By a federative Government, as contradistinguished from the former, I mean one composed of several independent States, bound together for specific national purposes, and relying for the efficiency of its operations on its action upon the different States in their political capacity, not individually upon their citizens.

[SENATE.

if they had been formally conferred, would have constituted a Government which could not properly be called either purely a federation of States, retaining all their sovereignty, or a consolidated Government, to which it had been surrendered.

The Confederation was at length entered into. This was certainly a compact between the States; but, among a number of stipulations strictly federative, contained others which gave to the Congress powers which trenched upon the State sovereignties; to declare war and make peace; enter into treaties binding on the whole; to establish courts of admiralty, with power to bind the citizens of the States, individually, in cases coming under that jurisdiction; to raise armies, equip fleets, coin money, emit bills of credit, and other similar powers. The defects of this bond of union are well known: among these the most prominent was the want of a power, acting directly on the citizens, to raise a revenue, independent of the agency of the States. And it is a most instructive fact, that the common danger, though at times extremely imminent, during the continuance of the war, could never produce any kind of attention to the requisitions of Congress; yet there was no want of patriotism or attachment to the cause. Each State then possessed, on the subject of the requisition, the practical power of giving a veto to the operations they disliked, by refusing its quota; and the power was abused, and will always be abused, whenever it is the interest of the State possessing it to exercise that right.

In the Federal constitution this combination of the two

In the incipient state of our political existence, we find traces of both of these features. When the oppressive acts of the mother country had excited the spirit of resistance, we find the colonies sending delegates to a General characteristics of Government is more apparent. It was Congress; and, without any formal federative contract, framed by delegates appointed by the States; it was ratithat Congress assumed, by general consent, and exercised fied by conventions of the people of each State, convened powers which could strictly be classed only under the head according to the laws of the respective States. It guaranof such as belong to a consolidated Government. In order ties the existence of the States, which are necessary to its to effect a non-importation of goods from Great Britain, own; the States are represented in one branch by Senators, instead of operating through the agency of the separate chosen by the Legislatures; and in the other, by Reprecolonies, and recommending that they should use their in- sentatives taken from the people, but chosen by a rule fluence or authority to effect the object, the Congress ad- which may be made and varied by the States, not by Condressed their recommendation to the merchants of all the gress--the qualification of electors being different in dif united colonies individually. It is true this was only in ferent States. They may make amendments to the conthe shape of a recommendation, not an imperative order; stitution. In short, the Government had its inception with but this makes no difference in the argument: it was still them; it depends on their political existence for its operaan action of the Government, addressed to individuals of tion; and its duration cannot go beyond theirs. The States the colonies, not through the medium of the colonial au- existed before the constitution; they parted only with such thority, as would have been the case under a strictly fede- powers as are specified in that instrument; they continue rative compact. This was on the 19th of September, 1774. still to exist, with all the powers they have not ceded; and On the 27th of the same month, they proceeded more di- the present Government would never, itself, have gone rectly, and resolved that there should be no goods import- into operation, had not the States, in their political capaed after a certain day, and that those so imported should city, have consented. That consent is a compact of each not be used or sold; and a few days after, a resolution of one with the whole; not, as has been argued, (in order to non-exportation was entered into; the negotiation of Bri- throw a kind of ridicule on this convincing part of the artish bills was prohibited, and besides levying and equip. gument of my friend from South Carolina) with the Govping a naval and land force on the continental establish- ernment which was made by such compact. It is difficult, ment, they erected a Post Office Department, emitted mo- therefore, it would appear, with all these characters of a ney, and declared that persons refusing to receive the bills, federative nature, to deny to the present Government the on conviction, be deemed, published, and treated as ene- description of one founded on compact, to which each mies of the country. All these acts were, in a greater or State was a party; and a conclusive proof, if any more were less degree, direct operations of the general temporary wanted, would be in the fact, that the States adopted the Government upon the citizens, and, in that degree, were constitution at different times, and many of them on conproofs of its character as a mixture of popular with a fe- ditions which were afterwards complied with by amendderative Government. After all these acts, and many more ments. If it were strictly a popular Government, in the of the same nature, came the Declaration of Independence, sense that is contended for, the moment a majority of the in which they jointly declare themselves independent people of the United States had consented, it would have States, but still, it would seem, as one nation. In the pre-bound the rest; and yet, after all the others, except one, amble they assert the right, as "one people," to take the had adopted the constitution, the smallest still held out; station, not the stations, to which they are entitled. The and if Rhode Island had not consented to enter into the whole instrument complains of illegal and oppressive acts confederacy, she would, perhaps, at this time, have been against them jointly.

unconnected with us.

After this decisive act, for more than two years the But with all these proofs (and I think them incontroStates, thus declared free, remained connected by no oth- vertible) that the Government could not have been er bond than their common love of liberty and common dan- brought into being without a compact, yet I am far from ger, under the same authority of a general Congress, which admitting that, because this entered so largely into its continued to exercise all the powers of a mixed kind, which, origin, therefore there are no characteristics of another

VOL. VI. 34

SENATE.]

Mr. Foot's Resolution.

[MARCH 15, 1830. kind, which impress on it strongly the marks of a more and as, in all cases, the constitution of the United States intimate union and amalgamation of the interests of the is paramount in authority to a law of the United States, citizens of the different States, which gives to them the and as both of them are so to a law of the State, the Sugeneral character of citizens of the united nation. This preme Court of the United States must, of necessity, single fact will show, that the entire sovereignty of the when a contrariety between these authorities is alleged, States, individually, has not been retained: the relation of in any case legally before it, determine that question, and citizen and sovereign is reciprocal. To whatever power its determination must be final; the parties must be bound; the citizen owes allegiance, that power is his sovereign. the States to which they belong must be bound; for they, There cannot be a double, although there may be a subor- in this compact, have agreed that their citizens shall be so. dinate fealty. The Government, also, for the most But it is asked, suppose the law of Congress is palpably part, (except in the election of Senators, Representatives, contrary to the constitution, and endangers the liberties and President, and some others) acts in the exercise of its legitimate powers directly upon individuals, and not through the medium of State authorities. This is an essential character of a popular Government.

of the country, must the State submit? If the question be, whether the State can constitutionally resist, there is but one answer. She has by the constitution consented that the Supreme Court shall finally decide whether this I place little reliance on the argument which has been be constitutional or not. If the question be, of the right mostly depended on, to show that this is a popular Gov- which all people have to resist ruinous oppression, the anernment: I mean the preamble, which begins with the swer is as clear; and I should be the last man in the world words, "We, the people." It proves nothing more than to contravene the existence of that unalienable right. But the fact, that the people of the several States had been that is not the question; it is of a constitutional right, consulted, and had given their consent to the instrument. whenever, in the opinion of the Legislature, (or as some To give these words any other construction, would be to think, of a convention of the people of any one State) a make them an assertion directly contrary to the fact. We law of Congress is palpably unconstitutional, such State know, and it never has been imagined or asserted, that has a right, under the constitution, not only to declare the the people of the United States, collectively, as a whole act void, but to prevent its execution within the State, people, gave their assent, or were consulted in that capa- until Congress shall propose a declaratory amendment to city; the people of each State were consulted, to know the States, and their decision shall be obtained; and all whether that State would form a part of the United States, this without quitting their place in the Union, without disunder the articles of the constitution, and to that they turbing its peace, it is said; but, on the contrary, it is congave their assent, simply as citizens of that State. tended, for the purpose of preserving the general compact This Government, then, is neither such a federative inviolate. Now, sir, independently of the argument drawn one, founded on a compact, as leaves to all the parties from the express consent of the people of the several States, their full sovereignty, nor such a consolidated popular that in all matters where the Supreme Court have jurisdicGovernment, as deprives them of the whole of that sove-tion between individuals, they should determine, and must reign power. It is a compact, by which the people of determine whether a law be unconstitutional; independ each State have consented to take from their own Legis-ently of this, and supposing no such powers given to the latures some of the powers they had conferred upon court, can it be supposed that so essential a feature of the them, and to transfer them, with other enumerated pow- Government, as a positive veto given to, or reserved by ers, to the Government of the United States, created by that compact; these powers, so conferred, arc some of those exercised by the sovereign power of the country in which they reside. I do not mean here, the ultimate sovereign power residing under all governments, democratic or despotic, in the people; a sovereignty which must always in theory exist, however its exercise may by foreign or domestic power be repressed; but I mean that power to regulate the affairs of a nation, which resides in its government, whatever the form of that government may be; and this may be, and generally is, distributed into several hands. As to all thesc attributes of sovereignty, which, by the federal compact were transferred to the General Government, that government is sovereign and supreme; the States have abandoned, and can never reclaim them. As to all other sovereign powers, the States retain them.

each State, upon the operations of the whole, would have been left, not only unprovided for by express words, but without even an ambiguous phrase-a single doubtful word, to hang the argument upon? It is derived solely from the rights attached to the sovereignty of the States, unimpaired by its accession to the Union, indivisible, according to the argument of my learned friend from Kentucky, and always alive and active, (not one of those which he expressively says will keep cold) and ready to go into operation whenever it is attacked.

I have called it a positive veto on the operations of the whole Government. Is it not so in effect? That the right, when exercised by a single State, can only prevent the execution of the obnoxious law in the State alone which objects to it, does not take from the power the character I have given to it, is apparent. For, if the General Government were under an obligation to desist from execut But the States have not only given certain powers to ing the law in the opposing State, they must, of necessity, the General Government, but they have expressly given refrain from putting it in force in the others: if it were a the right of enforcing obedience to the exercise of those tax, because they must be equal; if any other subject of powers. They have declared that "the constitution and legislation, imposing a burthen or restriction, they could the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof [shall not, in justice, force the others to bear what one was rebe the supreme law of the land, any thing in the consti- lieved from, nor would the other States submit to so untution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstand- equal an imposition. The argument, then, supposes a ing." And they have also expressly consented, that the feature in the constitution which certainly is not expressJudiciary of the United States shall have cognizance of ed in it, which, most assuredly, would have been express all cases coming under those laws. Here the words of ed, if it had been intended: for it totally alters its charthe compact provide for the means by which controversies acter; puts the power of the Union at the will of any one coming under it are to be decided; but this must be taken of its members; and allows it, without risk, to throw with the understanding that they are controversies arising off all the burthens of Government at its pleasure. Renot only under the laws of the United States, (including member, sir, that I am speaking of a constitutional right; the constitution and treaties) but they must be between (for that is the one claimed) a right under the constitu parties over whom the constitution has given jurisdiction tion, not over it; a power that may be exercised without to the courts. Every case, then, of this description, incurring any risk, or committing any offence--without must be submitted to the Judiciary of the United States; forfeiting a place in the Union, or any right or privilege