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plaintiff pledged a large quantity of furniture and plate, valued at about £2000, as a further security for the loan. By the instrument of charge it was provided that in the event of default of payment of the promissory note, or any instalment, the defendant was to be at liberty to sell the furniture and chattels and repay himself thereout for all principal, interest, and costs arising out of the transaction. When the plaintiff signed the necessary documents at the defendant's office she had no independent advice and was unable to calculate the rate of interest which was charged upon the loan. At that time she was in dire financial straits and had no alternative but to sign the promissory note and the instrument of charge on her furniture and chattels. The plaintiff failed to pay the first instalment due under the promissory note, and the whole sum of £500 became payable forthwith. Even if all the payments had been duly made, the rate of interest would have been 82 per cent. Mr Justice Eve held that as the loan was not made on personal security only, but was adequately secured by the goods pledged, the rate of interest, which might not have been regarded as necessarily excessive for a loan on personal security only, became outrageous and extortionate for an advance upon good security. The learned judge was also of opinion that the lender had made an unconscionable bargain, and directed that the contract should stand as a security for £300 with interest, at the rate of 15 per cent. from the date on which the loan was originally made. In this connection it is very important to note that a high rate of interest cannot per se constitute a harsh and unconscionable" bargain. The rate of interest charged on the loan is a very important element to be considered, but it must be combined with other circumstances in order to enable the Court to relieve the borrower on the ground that the transaction in question is a "harsh and unconscionable " bargain within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Money-Lenders Act, 1900.

tration of a lady greatly distressed for money not being regarded as standing on equal terms with the lender. The facts of the case are somewhat involved and need not be explained in detail. The plaintiff, a widow, was in difficulties in consequence of having resorted to money-lenders on several occasions. She very unwisely borrowed more money from the defendant, another registered money-lender, and also agreed to pay the defendant £100 in consideration of services to be rendered by him in adjusting her financial arrangements. This necessitated a further loan from the defendant, and eventually the plaintiff became involved in a perfect network of complicated financial transactions. The borrower then claimed relief under the Money-Lenders Act, 1900. Kekewich J. did not regard the charge of £100 for services to be rendered by the money-lender as unconscionable, but the learned judge ordered an account to be taken on the footing of the plaintiff being charged with interest at 5 per cent. on the amount actually advanced. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, where Vaughan Williams L.J. (21 T.L.R. at p. 12) said that the Legislature threw upon the money-lender who chose to advance money to persons in a position of financial distress the obligation not to take advantage of their distress or of their incapacity to negotiate.

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The third leading distinction is between cases where some unconscionable circumstance is present and cases where no such circumstance exists. The distinction is a wide one, and a number of unconscionable circumstances have already been discussed. It remains, therefore, to enumerate certain other important grounds on which the Court may be entitled to reopen a money-lending transaction under the Act of 1900. A fairly common scionable circumstance in contracts of loan is found in connection with the default clause. As we have already noted, the customary default clause provides that the whole amount of principal and interest outstanding shall become due upon default in payment of any Another leading distinction is that between agreed instalment. This clause is, of course, a borrower who is an intelligent and competent thoroughly understood by professional moneyperson, able to appreciate the terms of the lenders, but its full significance is not always bargain and in a position to bargain with the appreciated by the borrowers. The authorities lender on fairly equal terms, and a borrower have established that it is the duty of the who does not possess such qualifications and money-lender to bring the nature and the advantages. There is, for example, a wide gulf effect of the default clause to the attention of between an experienced man of business who the borrower. In Levene v. Greenwood (20 resorts to money-lenders in order to tide over T.L.R. 389) Channell J. held that a default some period of temporary financial embarrass- clause understood by the lender, but not underment, and an elderly widow, unaccustomed to stood by the borrower, made the transaction deal with monetary affairs, who is driven to harsh and unconscionable" within the meanhave recourse to money-lenders through strait-ing of the statute. ened circumstances. The case of Poncione v. Other common examples of "harsh and Higgins (1904, 21 T.L.R. 11) affords an illus- unconscionable" circumstances comprise the

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following: Lending money to a youth in we come to consider the personal status and reliance upon fear of exposure to force his financial position of the borrower. At the parents to pay; improperly tempting the bor- time of obtaining the loan the borrower was rower, as, for example, by sending bank-notes employed by a responsible firm at a salary which in reply to the first preliminary letter of investi- varied from £600 to £1000 per annum. The gation; the exaction of a high rate of interest | defendant Kerman said that he was not aware when the lender knows that he is not running of this fact. Tomlin J., however, expressed any appreciable risk; in fact, any loan trans- the view that a lender could not resist an appliaction at a high rate of interest brought about cation for relief under the Money-Lenders by means which are not consistent with fair Act by saying that he was unaware of material dealing between man and man. In this facts which he might have elicited by making connection, the circumstances in which the reasonable inquiries. The learned judge was Court will exercise its discretion in reopening satisfied that each of the four transactions was a transaction with a money-lender were admir- "harsh and unconscionable." He considered ably summarised by Eve J. in the course of that 30 per cent. was a fair rate of interest his judgment in Jennings v. Seeley (40 T.L.R. to be charged by both defendants, and directed 97): First," said the learned judge, "there an account upon that basis to be taken in is the status of the contracting parties. Were respect of each of the first three bills, with a there any, and, if so, what disparities as to age, declaration that the defendant Kerman was intelligence, education, and capacity between liable to repay any sum he had received in excess them? Next, one has to see whether there thereof. In regard to the defendant company was any trickery, overreaching, or undue M. Dunn Ltd., an account must be taken in pressure or other misconduct, not necessarily respect of the fourth bill on the same footing, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation on the plaintiff undertaking to redeem the goods the part of either, and, if so, how far such by paying whatever was found due to the misconduct really influenced the conduct of company on taking the account. And on the other; and thirdly, one must not interfere those terms Tomlin J. gave judgment against in the case of a party understanding the contract both defendants with costs. and appreciating the obligations thereby undertaken and the consequences resulting from any breach thereof. Now it may well be that the answers to those questions, or some of them, are such as to afford good ground for the exercise of the statutory discretion. On the other hand, while not affording such good grounds, these answers may constitute contributory elements in favour of its exercise when the further relevant matters have been examined. But it by no means follows that if there be no disturbing answer to the questions with which I have to deal the contract may not be varied.

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What were the circumstances present in Garde v. Kerman and Others (supra)? There is no doubt that the first three bills of sale granted by the borrower were adequately secured on the furniture. It is true that when the fourth bill was executed some slight fall had taken place in the market value of the furniture, but the lender does not appear to have given any regard to that. The value of the security did not vary substantially in all four cases, and the learned judge (Tomlin J.) accepted the view that at the time of the first transaction the value of the furniture was such as to justify a loan of £175 to £200. It is true that the plaintiff borrowed money on four different occasions on the same security, but it must be remembered that each loan was substantially exhausted in paying off the previous advance. So much for the value of the real" security, which might be regarded as fairly sound. Now

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COMPANY PRACTICE.
SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT.

[From a Correspondent.]

Practitioners are perplexed by the unreasoning diversity of practice between the two Divisions of the Inner House in reference to the procedure for the carriage of schemes of arrangement under section 120 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908. There seems to be no justification for different rules in such matters. Not so long ago the First Division announced that all applications for sanction of schemes under this section should undergo an induciæ of so many days for the purposes of intimation on the Walls and in the Minute Book. So far as public notification is concerned, this formality serves much the same purpose as an intimation in the old days to the lieges at the pier and shore of Leith by the almost now extinct messenger-at-arms. But the application for sanction may be incompetent, and there is just the millionth chance that some eagle eye may discover this and lodge answers, and so prevent the Court from ordering abortive meetings. The Second Division takes an entirely opposite and perhaps a more business view, and orders the meetings by its first deliverance to be summoned right

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away. Naturally, some solicitors rush to the Second Division to escape all necessity for a first order for needless intimation. Surely the Court should rule by Act of Sederunt in favour of one uniform practice for both Divisions.

The Second Division, again, without any announcement to the profession, to judge by a recent application in April last, has departed from its own invariable practice, and that of the First Division for decades in another respect, with regard to these arrangement schemes. It is no longer competent, according to the officials of the Second Division, for the Court to authorise the directors of a company to fix the dates of the meetings of creditors or of members, or of both such classes, as they may find convenient. The proposed dates must be specified in the prayer of the petition or supplied to the Court for incorporation in its first order. It may be that English Chancery judges adopt this practice. But one would conjecture that the Court is master of its own procedure, and as the section of the Act leaves the Court to summon the meetings "in such manner as the Court directs," it is difficult to see wherein the Court is made so helpless as to be unable to delegate the fixing of the dates with time and place to the Board of Directors of a going company or to the liquidator of a dissolving one. It is a pity that there is here also no common rule for both Divisions. Practitioners have long expected to see some comprehensive Act of Sederunt dealing with all company business, including liquidations.

C. K.

NOTES FROM PARLIAMENT HOUSE. Another session is here, and as regards work there has again to be recorded an adverse report. The atmosphere in Parliament Hall is once more what Lord Oxford would call one of inspissated gloom." The only really satisfactory feature is that, contrary to the general practice of recent years, there seems to be no immediate prospect of a general election. As to the state of the rolls, for what it is worth, the session began with 41 cases in the First Division, made up by 12 Summar Roll, 17 Short Roll, and 12 Long Roll; the Second Division had a total of 62 cases, made up by 14 Summar Roll, 45 Short Roll, and 3 Long Roll. The Lords Ordinary again have moderate rolls, and the opening days of session were once more marred by a distressing rush to settle. One hundred and fifty-one cases were called in the vacation, and of these fully one-third are of the consistorial" variety, raised largely in the names of poor litigants. So far as the writer is aware, there is in Scotland no tendency such as that noted in the extract which follows from

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an English paper. "There is a shortage of solicitors, and in order to get the right men for their offices, many firms are offering tempting terms to barristers to leave the Bar and qualify as solicitors. Many firms of city solicitors now have ex-barristers on their staffs." It may be doubted if there is a shortage in any branch of the legal profession in Scotland.

The extract quoted suggests that perhaps this is the thin end of the "fusion" wedge. Polls taken among solicitors have frequently revealed that there is no demand whatever among them for such a reform. Can it be that a demand for it will first come from the other branch of the profession? Certainly reform, which during the past year has been very much in the air, seems rather to have faded away once more. There seemed some months ago to be a general agreement that something must be done, and done quickly, to save the situation. The Faculty of Advocates passed a resolution asking for a Royal Commission to consider the question of reform of Court of Session procedure. Other legal bodies passed pious resolutions in similar terms. More than that, concrete proposals of the way in which reform might best be effected were laid before the learned faculties. The mountains rumbled; but nothing has been brought forth, not even a mouse. Perhaps those concerned have decided that it is better to gang the gait we are going, and lapse through genteel stagnation into complete decay, than to make a vigorous effort to restore an institution so obviously doomed as the Court of Session. It may be so, but it sometimes seems a little pusillanimous to go down without the semblance of a struggle.

During the vacation the appointment was announced of the Scottish Ecclesiastical Commissioners under the Church of Scotland (Property and Endowments) Act of 1925. As was anticipated, the chairman is a senator of the College of Justice, in the person of Lord Ashmore; another of their number is Mr R. C. Henderson, K.C. From the standpoint of the Commission these are admirable appointments, but from the point of view of the Court's work it is to be feared that the appointment of Lord Ashmore is virtually equivalent to depriving the Court of the services of a learned and popular judge for an indefinite period, possibly two or even three years. The duties of the Commissioners are multifarious and may extend over a very considerable time. They have to frame and give effect to schemes under the Act relating to burgh churches, to deal with the transfer to trustees of churches, manses, endowments, to give effect to the provisions of the Act which relate to the transfer of rights in glebes, and so forth. Of course they are masters of their own procedure, and may possibly devise

means of dealing expeditiously with these difficult topics. They are to give " such enquiry in each individual case as they may think fit," but without doubt in some cases it will need to be considerable. Mr Fisher, advocate, has been appointed secretary to the Commissioners.

It will be remembered that when Lord Mackenzie's Committee recommended a Court of Criminal Appeal for Scotland, Sir Herbert Stephen came forward with two important improvements which he suggested might be introduced, in view of the need felt for them in the English practice. The first was the ordering of a second trial where it was felt necessary, the second was the granting of appeals at the instance of the Crown. A third, rather acute question has now arisen in England. There are, it seems, far too many appeals, and some means of curtailing the present system may have to be sought. The Lord Chief Justice has more than once deprecated "the regularity, amounting to routine, of appeals from convictions for murder.' It is hard to see, however, any satisfactory method whereby appeal can be allowed and then restricted. This point is one which must needs be carefully considered when the new Scots Court is established. Increased labour will in any case be thrown on the judges, and whether our judicial establishment is large enough to bear the burden remains to be seen. It may be said, however, that the question is academic, for if, as appears likely, the inauguration of a Court of Criminal Appeal is deferred until it can be effected simultaneously with reform of the Court of Session, it may be that no one now living will see it.

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The "appointed day has come and gone under the statute dealing with the transfer of the Advocates' Library to the nation. On 26th October the first meeting of the Board of Trustees was held, under the presidency of Sir Herbert Maxwell. A large and distinguished body assembled, prepared to apply to the library that steadfast, unremitting, and efficient attention which a body like the Faculty, necessarily absorbed in professional labours, was never able to do. Speeches were made, in which suitable tributes were paid to the part played by the Faculty in maintaining the Library so long and so successfully. To the regret of the keen conveyancer there was no symbolical tradition of a book and a pinch of dust made by the Dean of Faculty to the Secretary for Scotland. Nor to the enquiring visitor would any great change have been apparent on the following morning. There was no queue of eager new proprietors of Scotland's National Library pressing forward to view the ample page, rich with the spoils of time, which the munificence of Sir Alexander

Grant had now unrolled; there were no husky proletarians, in scarves and corduroy trousers, spitting in the sawdust on the floor of the public reading-room while discussing the latest tips in the "Noon Record." Nothing of that sort was visible. In fact, it was made quite plain at the trustees' meeting that there would be no change of any sort or kind in the public arrangements of the Library. But none the less a great tradition has been broken, and one cannot but be sorry for the end of another “auld sang." Certainly the Faculty of Advocates could no longer sustain a burden of which they are no doubt well rid. But it is much to be regretted that it was found impossible to retain the name which two and a half centuries of their devoted care have made famous, if not, indeed, to politicians and plutocrats, certainly to every man of culture in both hemispheres. In the books of every library there must be numerous references to books or manuscripts contained in "Advocates' Library, Edinburgh "; it seems a pity that our modern craze for nationalisation should have rendered these meaningless and have stamped the new library with a name which lacks both character and tradition. But these things happen. It would be interesting to hear the views of "Bloody "Mackenzie on the subject.

After various unedifying scenes in Committee the Law Agents (Scotland) Bill was dropped by its promoters. The Bill was designed to set up a disciplinary committee for the solicitors' branch of the legal profession in Scotland on the lines of the well-tried and successful committee which has been established for many years in England. A great deal of the opposition to the Bill was based on the fear, real or pretended, that it would give opportunities for victimisation of a political kind. It was suggested that to place the power of defining professional misconduct in the hands of a coterie or clique of seven members selected by the Lord President of the Court of Session would be a bad thing both for the public and (a rare solicitude on the part of a politician) for the members of the legal profession. A distinguished member of the Privy Council and ex-member of the Cabinet stated that everyone was filled with suspicion about the Bill, and it made them more suspicious that there had been no word of explanation from members of the legal profession, who sat like dumb dogs." Unfortunately, this state of mind was so generally prevalent that the Bill had to be dropped, especially in view of the fact that the Scottish Grand Committee had other Bills of importance which required its immediate attention. It is to be hoped, however, that a measure which commanded the support of moderate men in all parties will be successfully

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revived on a more favourable occasion, and that it has not received its final quietus from an opposition that was both factious and ill-informed.

LONDON LETTER.

THE TEMPLE, 27th October 1925.

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The year 1825, besides seeing the birth of Paul Kruger and the invention of the candle, witnessed also the establishment of the " Society of Attorney Solicitors, Proctors, and others, not being barristers, practising in the Courts of law and equity of the United Kingdom.' They took a longer time to describe everything a hundred years ago. To-day we cannot be bothered to refer to that same society by any longer name than "the Law Society," but, though its name may be short to-day, its influence for good has been very great. A symposium was published in 1901 called "A Century of Law Reform," being a collection of twelve lectures given by various eminent lawyers on different aspects of the complete revolution brought about in every form of legal procedure and judicial administration between 1800 and 1900. It is a most interesting book, and the picture it gives of legal administration in 1800 bears scarcely a single point of resemblance to legal administration to-day. In point of fact, that revolution really only began about 1830 and not in 1800, and the greatest stimulus to revolt was probably given by the insupportable weight of Lord Chancellor Eldon. A few days ago the Times published an extract from a leading article printed by it in 1825 which is worth transcribing as shewing the state of public feeling at the time that the Law Society began its beneficent career.

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"Our table is loaded with the complaints of worn-out and ruined heads of families against Lord Chancellor Eldon and the Court which he overhangs, as it were a perennial nightmare. Neither public opinion, nor parliamentary enquiry, nor the sense of right, nor the feelings of humanity, nor the promised approach of an event which levels all ranks and crushes all perverted powers and punishes all transgressions, whether negative or positive, seem to penetrate that case-hardened fortress in which the spirit of Chancery has for almost a fourth part of an hundred years enthroned itself. No cries of distress can melt it-all mortal arms rebound from its adamantine surface-neither moth nor mould have yet impaired its vigour; but Time, the consumer of all else beneath the sun, is himself devoured by the everlasting demon of the woolsack. It is vain and foolish to talk of the Court of Chancery

as an abstract thing which involves no personal considerations. That Court is identified with one living-we had almost said one immortalman. Its abuses have all sprung to their full enormity under him. If he has not produced, he has reared, cherished, and protected them."

But, once the revolution had begun, there can be no doubt that the Law Society was the most powerful influence that enabled the revolution to be carried through. In fact, the late Mr Blake Odgers, K.C., in his lecture in "A Century of Law Reform " on "Changes in Procedure and in the Law of Evidence," points out that, in that very Court of Chancery, thanks largely to the efforts of the Law Society, enormous abuses were swept away. Individual barristers and judges have in their time done great work for the development and simplification of legal procedure-and now and again we have had a reforming Lord Chancellor-but their efforts were unco-ordinated and their views were not backed up by any corporate body. It is largely due to the united and powerful voice of the Law Society that the present Law Courts were opened forty years ago, when the Courts were concentrated under one roof in a convenient place, that the Solicitors' Act was passed in 1843, and that the Supreme Court of Judicature Act was passed in 1873, all achievements of the greatest importance.

It is, of course, easy to make a butt of the Rent Restrictions Act and to shew the absurdities inherent in it, but what are we to say when two Divisional Courts, differently constituted, give flatly contradictory judgments on the same point of law? How is an unfortunate lawyer to advise his client, except by saying that it does not matter what the County Court judge may think on this point, because, even on appeal, no one can say which way a third Divisional Court, differently constituted from the other two, may lean. It is an apparently simple point in dispute. Can an order for possession be made against a defendant who has legally sublet and who is thereby himself no longer in actual occupation? As long ago as 15th April 1924 an appeal from the Chesterfield County Court was heard by a Divisional Court consisting of Swift J. and Acton J. (Hicks v. Scarsdale Brewery, [1924] W.N. 189). The County Court judge held that an order for possession could be made. Acton J. disagreed with this decision, but Swift J. agreed, and so, of course, the opinion of the appellate Court being equally divided, the decision of the inferior Court held good. On 5th February 1925 the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, in Martin Estates v. Watt & Hunter ([1925] W.N. 79), came to the same decision. Moore L.J. expressly said that he preferred the conclusion of Swift J. in the former case to that

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