OCT. 13, 1837.]

Sub-Treasury Bill.

[H. OF R.

behalf of the unfortunate; when we see them promptly and eagerly rushing to the rescue ?

And, sir, here I must be permitted to intimate to my political opponents, that in order firmly to establish their characters for superior patriotism and philanthropy, it will be necessary for them to act as well as to feel. If you know the remedy, gentlemen, and apply it not, the sincerity of your professions may be doubted. The uncharitable may surmise that party is your object, and public good the scape-goat. Sir, what would we think of the patriotism of the man who was able, but unwilling, to succor his country in the hour of her extremity? Or what would we say of the benevolence of a physician who refused to administer to his sick and dying patient the remedies which he knew would restore him to life, health, and vigor? And are not gentlemen aware that, after having so constantly, so earnestly, ar.d so eloquently, bewailed the fallen fortunes of their country, they will naturally be lookfor the remedies competent to heal the deep disease, which we are told is preying upon its vitals? Are they not aware that their benevolence will be questioned, and their sincerity doubted, even by the confiding and the faithful?

in a great degree, indebted to the influence of the banks for his political elevation. Sir, I deny the correctness of this assertion. I am satisfied that Martin Van Buren owes his elevation to his own merits, and to the unbought suffrages of a majority of the American people. But, sir, if my colleague represents this matter truly, and the election of Mr. Van Buren to the Presidency was achieved through bank officers or bank influence, what an important lesson does it teach us? And how forcibly does it illustrate the dangers of the banking system? If banks band together in one political contest, they may in another. If they unite their energies in behalf of one individual, they also may unite in behalf of another, without any regard to his merits, his virtues, or his qualifications, provided he will lend himself to their interests. This is a fruitful theme, but I will not pursue it at present. I now turn to the subject of political changes, on which my colleague has said so much. If I mistake not, he took occasion to rebuke the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means for certain alleged po-ed to by that country with anxious, shuddering solicitude litical somersets, which he is said to have made some few years since. My friend over the way [Mr. CAMBRELENG] is fully competent to defend himself from the charge, and I shall, therefore, leave this part of the subject in his hands. On the general topic of political changes, my colleague [Mr. HOFFMAN] has all the advantages over me which practice and experience can give. It would, therefore, be manifestly imprudent for me to enter the lists with so old and so experienced a tactician in this branch of political science. Did I desire instruction on this subject, my colleague would be the very first man to whom I would apply. He should be my preceptor above all others; for I am satisfied that none can be better qualified than himself, to descant on the facility with which political changes can be made; none have the power to speak more feelingly and understandingly on the subject. It was but a short time since, sir, when my colleague and myself stood foremost in the ranks of the democracy: when the old wigwam resounded with our respective voices; when we advocated the same measures and the same men; when we sang the same political hosannahs, and worshipped at the same political altar. But, sir, that time has passed; and my colleague, instead of joining with me in the old rallying cry, chooses to lift up his musical voice in a political palinode; and we now find ourselves planted foot to foot as political opponents, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder, as political associates, as we were wont to stand. In the course of his remarks, my colleague discoursed right eloquently on the calamities of the times and on the sufferings of the people. But on this topic he is not singular nor alone. All his whig brethren have strenuously emulated each other in their extraordinary professions of peculiar love for the patient people. When I reflect on the wonderful solicitude manifested by the members of the opposition for the welfare of the nation, I cannot withhold an expression of admiration at the patriotic and benevolent spirit which pervades and warms and expands their benevolent bosoms.

We have heard gentlemen from the East and the West, from the North and the South, mingling their notes of lamentations over the sufferings of the unfortunate wherever found. Every fibre of their heads and hearts, every feeling of their souls and bodies, appears to be attuned to benevolence, and to vibrate with deepest sympathy at the calamities which they assure us have befallen our common country. Sir, these are honorable feelings, and highly creditable to human nature. Patriotism so exalted, philanthropy so generous, sympathy so sincere, benevolence so pure, holy, and disinterested, cannot fail to challenge our warmest admiration. When we hear men sincerely deplore the misfortunes of their fellows, we cannot but admire, honor, and respect them. But how are these feelings of respect and admiration strengthened and augmented when we behold them exerting their utmost energies in

But, sir, we have been told that the friends of the administration have the power, and that the responsibility rests with them! Sir, what are we to understand by this? Is it meant to be insinuated that the administration party in this House have the power to relieve the distresses of this country, but that they have not the will to exercise it? Is it meant to be affirmed that the dominant party are so utterly destitute of feeling and of patriotism as willingly and intentionally to withhold the aid which they might rightfully and constitutionally extend to the people? Is it their intention to represent us to the American people in so odious and offensive a light? Sir, I am aware that the gentlemen in the opposition have long claimed all the wisdom, and all the worth, and all the decency; but I did not suppose, until now, that they also claimed all the patriotism, and all the benevolence, and all the sympathy.

For one, sir, I protest against such unwarrantable and unfounded pretensions. I am clearly against this additional monopoly. If the gentlemen really possess all the charity and benevolence which they claim, I trust that they will not be inexorable towards us; that they will not thrust us beyond the pale of humanity; that they will not strip us of all the common attributes of civilized men, nor paint us as savages or brutes, by representing us to be deaf or indifferent to the voice of distress. Why should we be thus treated as guilty of the grossest injustice-of the most flagrant inhumanity? If the gentlemen of the opposition do not consider adequate the means of relief proposed by the Executive, let them suggest such as will be effective, and, my life on it, if these means shall be just, proper, and constitutional, the friends of the administration will cheerfully yield them their most cordial and hearty support. We confess that we know no other remedies for the ills complained of than those we have already suggested. And if the gentlemen in the opposition have it in their power, as they would have us and the country believe, of proposing an efficacious and constitutional remedy, for heaven's sake let them tell us what it is! If there be a balm in Gilead-if there be a physician there-let him administer the balm to our afflicted country. Do not, I beseech you, gentlemen, do not any longer keep secret your political catholicon, like quack physicians; but, like good and true patriots, make it publicly known, that it may be employed for the healing of the nation.

My colleague has pronounced the sub-Treasury system unconstitutional, but did not attempt to prove it so. Now, sir, by way of a set-off, I pronounce unconstitutional the substitute of my colleague-a national bank; and so I shall endeavor to prove it by calm and dispassionate argument.

H. OF R.]

Sub-Treasury Bill.'

A national bank being the principal antagonist measure to the bill under discussion, I shall confine my remarks principally to that subject; and, as this is the only point that has not been fully and thoroughly discussed in the progress of this debate, there will be the greater propriety in this coursc. I shall, therefore, attempt to argue at length this part of the subject.

I can find no authority in the constitution for granting charters of incorporation, of whatever name, kind, or description; and no honorable gentleman, I presume, will hazard the declaration that such power is directly given to Congress by the constitution. The most hardy and reckless advocates of a national bank have never ventured to affirm that such power was specific and direct; that the warrant was express. They all resort to the doctrine of implication and construction. Sir, let us examine this doctrine; let us take up the constitution in a spirit of honesty and soberness, and see what clause of that instrument, if any, vests in Congress even an implied power to incorporate a national bank.

Sir, I am aware of the vastness of the subject which I propose to examine. I am aware that the constitutionality of a national bank has been repeatedly discussed by the most eminent jurists and statesmen of the nation. And I am also aware that an attempt, on my part, to grapple with a subject of such magnitude, and under such circumstances, will be attributed by many to a want of discretion, if not to a culpable vanity. Be it so. I conceive it to be my duty-I know it to be my right-to express my views fully on this subject; and, although I may be unable to shed any additional light on this long agitated and vexatious question, yet I will, nevertheless, state the arguments and considerations which exert a controlling influence on my judgment. Permit me, then, sir, to call, for a moment, the attention of the committee to the peculiar character of our Government. It is conceded by all parties, I believe, to be a Government of limited and specified powers; which powers are expressly prescribed by the constitution. To the constitution, then, and to the constitution alone, must Congress look for all and every power they would exercise. Unless, therefore, the power to grant charters of incorporation be expressly granted by the constitution, the exercise of such power, on the part of Congress, would be a violation of that instrument. But, say gentlemen, although we do not pretend to assert that the power to incorporate is given in direct terms to Congress by the constitution, we contend, nevertheless, that such power is derived by fair and legitimate construction. But, when the advocates of this doctrine have been called upon to designate the clause of the constitution which confers on Congress the power to incorporate a bank, they have been sadly puzzled to comply with the requisition, but have wandered and wandered from article to article, and from clause to clause, seeking in vain for authority. When driven from one position they flee to another; ever vacillating; never fixed in their views; never satisfied with their own, nor with each others' arguments. No unity of opinion prevails among them as to the particular clause in the constitution, where this doctrine of construction and implication, authorizing acts of incorporation, is to be found; but, like certain deluded ones of old, one cries, lo! it is here; and another, lo! it is there; when, as was the case with the asses of Kish, it happens to be "nowhere." But, sir, let us examine those parts of the constitution where this power is said to reside. Some have attempted to locate it in the first article of the eighth section of the constitution, which gives Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." The power to "lay and collect taxes" and to "pay the debts of the United States;" in other words, the power to raise and appropriate money, and the power to grant char

(OCT. 13, 1837.

ters of incorporation, I believe never have been, and I presume never will be, regarded as synonymous, even by the most desperate "constructionists." Those, therefore, who pretend to find authority to grant charters of incorporation in the article under consideration, must look for it in the words "common defence and general welfare." And it is from these words that some pretend to derive the power to incorporate a national bank. Can those who have contended for this construction have considered well of the consequences which must inevitably follow from an exercise of such implied powers? Have they reflected that, by giving to these words the construction they contend for, they render the enumerated powers of the constitution nugatory; that they virtually annul the powers reserved to the State Governments; break down all the constitutional guards designed to protect the rights of the States and of the people, and make the constitution itself, in the hands of Congress, what clay would be in the hands of the potter? And, lastly, have they considered that this doctrine is flatly contradicted by the tenth amendinent to the constitution, which expressly declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people?" General Hamilton, latitudinarian as he was on the subject of construction, had too much regard for his reputation to give to the words "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," a construction that would confer on Congress powers not enumerated in the constitution. By reference to his report on manufactures, it will be found that he confines, in every instance, the application of these words to the power given by the first sentence of the clause; and, in this particular, Mr. Jefferson agrees with him. The latter, in adverting to this subject, calls it "a grammatical quibble, which has countenanced the General Government in a claim of universal power. For," continues he, "in the phrase to lay taxes, to pay the debts, and provide for the general welfare, it is a mere question of syntax, whether the two last infinitives are governed by the first, or are distinct and coordinate powers; a question unequivocally decided by the exact definition of powers immediately following." Sir, I conceive that the clause of the constitution under consideration admits of but two constructions-the one limiting the powers of Congress, as contended by General Hamilton and Mr. Jefferson; the other conferring on Congress powers incompatible with the spirit, and utterly subversive of all the express powers of the constitution-powers independent of, and paramount to, the constitution itself-pow ers indefinite, boundless, omnipotent. If the latter construction be admitted, the will of Congress, and not the constitution, is the law of the land. Or if, peradventure, Congress should think it expedient to revert to the constitution at all, it would only be necessary to refer to that part of it containing the cabalistic words "common defence and general welfare." And as these words, according to certain commentators, convey a plenary power on all subjects, and are applicable to all cases that come within the jurisdiction of the national legislature, it would be quite unnecessary to look further. This would be economical, withal, saving much precious time to the people's representatives, which otherwise might be squandered in wandering about the constitutional kingdom in search (as well search for the lost pleiad) of the enumerated powers, which, unfortunately, have been swallowed up by the implied powers discovered in the words "common defence and general welfare." Let us suppose the doctrine here combated to be established and carried out into practical legislation. Congress is applied to by a number of influential individuals for an act of incorporation, granting to them and to their successors and assigns forever, the sole and exclusive right, extending to all the States in the Union, of smelting iron ore with anthracite coal, and of manufacturing the same. The memo.

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H. OF R.]

Sub-Treasury Bill.

[OCT. 13, 1837.

vide money, and a power to perform certain acts, of mittee with any further remarks on this point, but proceed which money is the ordinary and appropriate means, to examine the third paragraph of the 8th section of the must, of course, carry with them a power to pay the constitution, which gives Congress the power "to regu expense of performing the acts. Nor was any special late commerce with foreign nations, among the several provis on for debts proposed, till the case of the revolu- States, and with the Indian tribes." This clause has been tionary debts was brought into view; and it is a fair pre-appealed to by the advocates of internal improvements, as sumption, from the course of the varied propositions which authorizing Congress to construct roads and canals, &c. ; have been noticed, that, but for the old debts, and their as- it has also been appealed to by the friends of the tariff syssociation with the terms common defence and general tem, as vesting in Congress an implied power to protect welfare,' the clause would have remained, as reported in our domestic manufactures; and, lastly, it has been apthe first draft of the constitution, expressing generally 'a pealed to as authorizing Congress to establish a United power in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, im- States bank. Now, sir, in my humble opinion, the power posts, and excises,' without any addition of the phrase to regulate commerce does not include the power to make to provide for the common defence and general welfare.' internal improvements of the character just noticed-to With this addition, indeed, the language of the clause be- protect manufactures by imposing a tariff-nor to establish ing in conformity with that of the clause in the articles of a national bank. Neither the clause immediately under conconfederation, it would be qualified, as in those articles, sideration, nor any other found in the constitution, authorizes by the specification of powers subjoined to it. But there Congress, in my judgment, to do either of those three things. is sufficient reason to suppose that the terms in question | Sir, is it meant to be affirmed that the power to "reguwould not have been introduced, but for the introduction late commerce," includes the power to regulate the curren of the old debts, with which they happened to stand in a cy of the several States? If so, then is Congress authofamiliar, though inoperative relation. Thus introduced, rized, under the power to "regulate commerce," to reguhowever, they pass undisturbed through the subsequent late the issues of all the State banks; for these constitute stages of the constitution. the principal currency of the country. On the other hand, if it be meant that Congress have not the power, under this clause of the constitution, to regulate the currency, how can it be said that Congress are thereby authorized to charter a bank for the purpose of regulating commerce, when the only object of a national bank, as we are told, is to regulate and equalize the exchanges and currency of the country? Again: If the power to regulate commerce" includes the power to incorporate a bank, why may it not also include the power to grant charters of incorporation for other purposes? Why not authorize Congress to incorporate companies for objects of internal improvements for manufactures-or, what would appear to be rather more congenial, for ordinary commercial purposes? If Congress can, by this clause of the constitution, authorize one set of men, under an act of incorporation, to deal in bank paper, they possess equally the power to authorize another set to deal in silks and satins, calicoes and ginghams. Nor can this position be controverted. stockholders and agents of a bank are as much traffickers "The obvious conclusion to which we are brought is, and dealers in paper money, which is a species of commerthat these terms, copied from the articles of confederation,cial commodity, as merchants are in broadcloths and caswere regarded in the new, as in the old instrument, merely as general terms, explained and limited by the subjoined specifications, and therefore requiring no critical attention or studied precaution.

"If it be asked why the terms common defence and general welfare,' if not meant to convey the comprehensive power, which, taken literally, they express, were not qualified and explained by some reference to the particular power subjoined, the answer is at hand, that although it might easily have been done, and experience shows it might be well if it had been done, yet the omission is accounted for by an inattention to the phraseology, occasioned, doubtless, by the identity with the harmless character attached to it in the instrument from which it was borrowed. "But may it not be asked, with infinitely more propriety, and without the possibility of a satisfactory answer, why, if the terms were meant to embrace not only all the powers particularly expressed, but the indefinite power which has been claimed under them, the intention was not so declared; why, on that supposition, so much critical labor was employed in enumerating the particular powers, and in defining and limiting their extent?

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"Mr. Wilson, justly distinguished for his intellectual powers, being deeply impressed with the importance of a bank at such a crisis, published a small pamphlet, entitled • Considerations on the Bank of North America,' in which he endeavored to derive the power from the nature of the Union in which the colonies were declared and became independent States; and also from the tenor of the articles of confederation' themselves. But what is particularly worthy of notice is, that, with all his anxious search in those articles for such a power, he never glanced at the terms common defence and general welfare,' as a source of it."-Elliot's Debates, vol. 4, pp. 646-'7.

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And here, sir, I think I may safely rest this part of the subject.

The second paragraph of the 8th section of the constitution, which vests in Congress the power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," has also been appealed to by the friends of a national bank. But as nothing like an argument has ever been adduced in support of this position, as it rests upon mere conjecture, without the shadow of authority to support it, and as a bill to charter a bank is not a bill to borrow money, I will not trouble the com

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simeres. If an act of incorporation, therefore, can be claimed in the one case, as a proper and necessary means to regulate commerce,' it unquestionably can in the other. But the clause in question confers no such power. The power to "regulate commerce," and the power to grant charters of incorporation, are separate and distinct. The former is conferred by the constitution, the latter is Sir, what was the nature of the power which the framers of the constitution intended to confer on Congress by this clause? Evidently, to authorize Congress to prescribe or establish certain rules by which commerce should be governed. But will it be pretended that the authors of the constitution meant that this power, which they vested in Congress alone, should be transferred by Congress to an incorporated company? That a chartered company should possess the exclusive power of regulating the commercial interests of the nation-of prescribing rules for its Government-of determining the principles on which it should be conducted, and thus place one of the great interests of the country beyond legislative and constitutional control? No one, I presume, will say, in direct terms, that such was the intention of the framers of the constitution; and yet such is the inevitable result to which the doctrine of construction here combated leads. If such rules of construction prevail, it will be impossible to define the limits of the power of the Federal Government under the clause "Congress shall have power to regulate com