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changing the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin, as required by the provisions of that treaty, on or before the 26th of June, 1859. Besides the whole of his correspondence with the imperial commissioners and other officers of the imperial government, the undersigned has transmitted to the government of her Britannic majesty a copy of the imperial decree, dated the 9th of August, and handed, by the emperor's desire, to the United States minister, Mr. Ward, on the eve of his departure from Pekin.

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The decree begins as follows:"Last year the ships of the English sailed into the port of Tien-tsin and opened a fire on our troops. We accordingly instructed Sangkolin-sin, prince of the Khorchin tribe, to adopt the most stringent measures for the defence of Taku, and (the envoys of) the different nations coming up to exchange treaties on this occasion were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai that Taku was thus strictly guarded, and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to Tien-tsin, in the fifth moon, did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Taku, destroying our defensive apparatus."

served towards Admiral Hope, commanderin-chief of her majesty's naval forces in these seas, when, in furtherance of the objects made known to his Excellency Kweiliang in the letter above cited, he appeared on the 17th of June at the mouth of the river to announce the approach of the undersigned and his colleague the minister of France. The admiral was assured that the passage had been closed by the so-called militia, whom he found in charge of the booms obstructing it, without the orders of their government, none of whose officers, the militia repeatedly affirmed, was near the spot; also that it was closed, not against foreigners, but against a native enemy. These false representations were supported by false appearances; the batteries of the forts were masked, no banners were displayed, no soldier discovered himself. Still further to prevent verification of the statements of the militia, no communication was allowed with the shore. After promising to remove the obstacles at the river mouth, the militia repudiated the promise. They conducted themselves with rudeness and violence to the of ficers who were sent to speak with them, in one instance proceeding so far as to threaten the life of a gentleman despatched with a message from the admiral.

The undersigned did not fail at once to Such was the state of things when the unapprise the government of her Britannic maj- dersigned arrived outside the bar on the esty that the emperor had been singularly 20th of June. Finding that the officials misled. Had it, indeed, been signified by persisted in keeping aloof, while the militia him by the commissioners at Shanghai that continued to assert that the obstruction of his majesty had decided on closing to foreign the river way was their own unauthorized envoys the natural and most convenient act, he called on the admiral to take such highway to his capital, such evidence of an steps as would enable him to reach the capunfriendly disposition on the part of the im- ital by the time appointed. This, after due perial government would certainly have been notise given to the militia, and after receiv regarded by the undersigned as fit matter ing from them an assurance on the previous of remonstrance and negotiation. No inti- evening that they should certainly have nothmation of the kind, however, was conveyed ing further to communicate, the admiral was to the undersigned in the letters of the im- proceeding to effect, on the 25th of June, perial commissioners. The port of Pch-tang the eighth day from his arrival, when the was never named by them, nor did the un- forts, which had been for these eight days to dersigned enter into any engagement with all appearances deserted, suddenly opened them other than that contained in his letter of the 16th of May, in which he acquainted his Excellency Kweiliang of the nature and object of his mission, and of his intention to proceed by ship to Tien-tsin, from which city he requested his Excellency to give the necessary orders for his conveyance to Pekin. He begs to enclose copy of this letter, as also of that received from the imperial commissioner of the 12th of June. These will prove that the undersigned was allowed to quit Shanghai in total ignorance of the emperor's objection to his employment of the usual river route. A like silence on the subject of the imperial prohibition was ob

fire upon his squadron. Apparently to cover this treacherous conduct, the officers in charge of the forts have imposed another fiction on his imperial majesty, who has been led to believe that the British squadron assumed the offensive by bombarding the forts. This is utterly without foundation; no shot was fired until the batteries had opened; the ships having no other object in advancing but to remove the obstacles placed across the river without authority.

The facts of the case are simply those stated by the undersigned; and her Britannic majesty's government, after mature de

liberation, have decided that whether the emperor of China was cognizant of this act of hostility, or whether it was directed by his officers, it is an outrage for which the Chinese government must be held responsible. Her Britannic majesty's government require, therefore, an immediate and unconditional acceptance of the following terms:

ipotentaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by
his imperial edict of July, 1858.
"The undersigned, etc.

"F. W. A. BRUCE."

DECREE.

(Translation.)

The great council writes a reply (to the Commissioner Ho, which he is) to transmit. The council received yesterday (or a short time since) a despatch from the commissioner, and with it a communication he had forwarded from the British Minister Bruce, the contents of which have occasioned the council the greatest astonishment.

He states (1), for instance, that Peh-tang was never alluded to by the imperial commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues. It appears that last year the imperial commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, waited for the British minister at Shanghai for the express purpose of considering with him in person all the conditions proper to an exchange of treaties. On ascertaining that the Minister Bruce had arrived at Wu-sung, they wrote to him several times to engage him to meet them; their object being, in fact, to acquaint him that Taku was fortified (or that the arrangements had been made for keeping people out of Taku), and that he must go by the way of Peh-tang. He, however, repelled them, refusing them an interview. The imperial commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues, moreover, informed him that vessels of war must on no account (2) cross the bar; but the British Minister Bruce paid no attention to these words; and when on arriving off the Tientsin coast (or the port or ports of Tien-tsin), Hang, governor-general of Chih-li, des

1 That an ample and satisfactory apology be made for the act of the troops who fired on the ships of her Britannic majesty from the forts of Taku in June last, and that all guns and material, as well as the ships abandoned on that occasion, be restored. 2 That the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin be exchanged without delay at Pekin; that when the minister of her Britannic majesty proceeds to Pekin for that purpose, he be permitted to proceed up the river by Taku to the city Tien-tsin in a Britsh vessel; and that provision be made by the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of himself and of his suite with due honor from that city to Pekin. 3 That full effect be given to the provisions of the said treaties, including a satisfactory arrangement to be made for prompt payment of the indemnity of four million taels, as stipulated in the treaty, for losses and military expenses entailed on the British government by the misconduct of the Canton authorities. The undersigned is further directed to state that in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct the passage of the undersigned to Pekin, the understanding entered into between the Earl of Elgin and the imperial commissioners in October, 1858, with respect to the residence of the British minister in China, is at an end, and that it rests henceforward exclusively with her Britannic majesty, in accordance with the terms of Article II of the treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she shall instruct her min-patched an officer with a communication to ister to take up his abode permanently at Pekin. The undersigned has further to observe that the outrage at the Peiho has compelled her majesty's government to increase her forces in China at a considerable cost, and the contribution that may be required from the Chinese government towards defraying this expense will be greater or less, according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the imperial government. The undersigned has only to add that, unless he receives within a period of thirty days from the date of this communication, a reply conveying the unqualified assent of his majesty, the emperor of China, to these demands, the British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as they may deem advisable, for the purpose of compelling the emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his plen

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the effect that he was to proceed by the way of Peh-tang, and sent him a present of provisions, he would receive nothing but suddenly brought his vessels into Taku, and (commenced) destroying the defensive apparatus there placed. How can he allege that he never received the slightest intimation that he was to go by Peh-tang? And, as he was coming to exchange treaties, why did he bring with him ships of war? It was plainly his intent to pick a quarrel. How, then, can he (when the blame is all his own) charge China with shortcomings towards him.

The defences prepared at Taku are not either (as he implies) prepared to keep out the British (3). Suppose that some other nation's ships of war were to go to the length of presenting themselves under British colors, could it be left to them to commit any breach of propriety they pleased? Well, then, the

defences of Taku cannot possibly be removed, tails of the treaty, those which it will be even when the treaty shall have been exchanged.

(Then the demand for) indemnity under different heads, and for the restitution of guns, arms, and vessels, is yet more against decorum (4). The war expenses of China have been enormous. The cost of defending the coast from Kwang-tung and Fuh-kien up to Tien-tsin, from first to last, has not been short of several millions of money. Were she to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses do not amount to the half of those of China.

As to restoring ships and guns, the year before last England destroyed the forts at Taku, and obtained possession of a number of guns belonging to China; ought she not, then, on her part to be considering how to make these good? But, besides this, half the British ships and guns (demanded) were sunk in the sea; they are not in the possession of China at all. The question may be dropped, therefore, by both parties alike.

Then there is (the announcement that) the compromise, the treaties once exchanged (the minister, was to have resided somewhere else, is at an end. The compromise by which once the treaties were exchanged (the minister) was either to select some other place of residence, or to visit (the capital) whenever there might be business of importance to transact, was definitely settled by the British Minister Elgin in negotiating with the imperial Commissioner Kweiliang and his colleagues. The revocation of this compromise now (announced) is even more unreasonable (than all the other propositions).

Last year when, after the Americans had exchanged their treaty, there was an alteration in the rate of tonnage dues, and the ports of Tai-wan and Cheng-chow (Swatow) were opened to trade, the British minister earnestly prayed for a like arrangement (in his favor). The English had not exchanged their treaty, but his majesty the emperor, liberal to foreign nations, and full of tender consideration for the interests of commerce, graciously sanctioned an extension of the boon to the English, for which they should be equally grateful (5). But, if the compromise duly negotiated is to be annulled, there will be no impropriety on the part of China if she cancel the arrangement by which she has conceded to the English (the same advantage of) the improvements in tonnage dues and trade that accrues to the Americans under their treaty.

To come to the (British minister's) request to be treated with courtesy when he comes north to exchange treaties. If he be sincere in his desire for peace, let the commissioner, when he shall have thought over all the de

proper to give effect to, and those respecting which compromise (or errangement) is to be made, negotiate (with the British minister), and when both parties shall be perfectly agreed, if he come north without vessels of war, and with a moderate retinue, and will wait at Peh-tang to exchange the treaties, China will not take him to task for what is gone by. He must be directed to acquaint himself with the rules (observed or laid down) at the exchange of the American treaties, and the course to be pursued will be further discussed with him (by the commissioner). But if he be resolved to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he insist in proceeding by way of Taku, this will show that his true purpose is not the exchange of treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such steps as shall be thereby rendered necessary (lit., as shall accord with reason).

The despatch written on this occasion (by the British minister) is, in much of its language, too insubordinate and extravagant (for the council) to discuss its propositions more than superficially (lit., to go deep into argument). For the future he must not be so wanting in decorum.

The above remarks will have to be communicated by the commissioner to the British minister, whom it will behoove not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as, so doing, he will give cause to much trouble hereafter. A necessary communication.

[In copying this Chinese State Paper, we cannot refrain from saying that we think the English entirely in the wrong, and the Chinese entirely in the right. It makes one's heart ache to think of the misery which Barbarism is about to inflict upon Civilization.-Living Age.]

From The Saturday Review, 26 May. THE DIPLOMATIC HORIZON. AMONG the motives which induced the Lords to take the very serious step of enforcing the retention of a tax repealed by the Commons, a prominent place is to be assigned to the conviction that the money will be needed for the defence of the country and of Europe. The war with China was on the lips of the speakers. A very different war was in their minds. Mr. Gladstone's Budget is justly condemned as tending — if not, as its judicious friends insinuate, actually meant to cripple the nation on the eve, it may be, of a great struggle. It is too true that the cruel and profligate rapacity of the French Government still threatens Europe with war. Public accounts announce continued activity in the French arsenals, and new additions to the already enormous

numbers of the French army. With these statesmen have done their best to alienate, accounts our private information entirely all France goes with him heart and soul in corresponds. If, indeed, we were to believe his schemes. Not a twinge of shame was all the statements that come to us, we should felt by the nation at the annexation of Savoy, be driven to the conclusion that the imme- or at the nefarious arts by which it was acdiate aim of the French Emperor's aggres- complished. The mendacity, the duplicity, sive preparations was our shores. But it the hypocritical pretexts, the insolent mockhas never seemed, nor does it now seem, to ery of universal suffrage, as they led to the us probable that we shall be the next as- aggrandizement of France, were received sailed. The trial which awaits us is not that with unalloyed satisfaction and universal of making up our minds to defend our own applause. This proof of the utter absence country, as to which we are all agreed. It of a controlling conscience in a nation armed is that of making up our minds to assist with with enormous powers of aggression, is the our whole force the next European nation really formidable part of the Savoy affair. which may become the victim of an aggres- When our government, in manifest, though sion sure, ultimately, to extend to ourselves. irregular, self-defence, seized the Danish fleet There is among us, as there has been in all at Copenhagen, its act was arraigned, and nations bound to other nations by interest has never ceased to be arraigned by a large and duty, and threatened in common with party in the nation, as contrary to the laws them, a party anxious, from shortsighted of morality and the national honor. Lord selfishness, to desert the confederacy, and Palmerston was condemned by the House convinced-if wilful infatuation can be called of Commons for his fillibustering in China; conviction that the insolent aggressor will and if a majority of the constituencies rebe appeased by weakness and submission. versed the condemnation, they did so in the On the co-operation of this party, which he conviction that his act was reconcilable with has done his utmost to secure-as well as honor, strengthened, perhaps, by the recolon the personal connections which he has lection of his conduct and that of his opbeen unhappily able to form with our lead- ponents during the Russian war. But in ing statesmen-Louis Napoleon probably France, it is enough for the author of a calculates as a check, at any critical moment, hundred perfidies and treacheries to plead upon what he must see to be the rising spirit that he has added to the sacred territory of of the English people. But he probably cal- "the sun of nations," and his statue is at culates still more, and certainly with much once crowned with laurels, and placed by better reason, on the great fleet which he is French historians in the pantheon of evercreating-it may be, not for immediate pur- lasting fame. What has France left herself poses of maritime aggression, but as a screw but military ambition? What hold, but the on England, while his other designs are car- gratification of her military ambition, has ried out, first, perhaps, in the East, then Louis Napoleon, or any adventurer who may upon the Rhine. climb into his place when he is gone, upon the heart of a nation which, to do it justice, has never been content with bread alone? Six hundred thousand Frenchmen are in arms, and a vast fleet has been collected for the indulgence of the ruling passion. Would the ruler of France be permitted, even if he were disposed, to send the men back to their homes inglorious, and leave the fleet to rot useless in the ports?

We will go as far as any peacemonger in abusing war, and deploring the waste of national wealth in powder and shot. The present situation seems to us no more glorious than being waylaid by a highwayman or chased by a pirate. The only comfort we can draw from it is, that the nation may become-and, indeed, it has already become greater under the trial, and that the issue of the contest may be to quell, once for all, the spirit of French ambition, and give to Europe, and to France herself, the blessing of secure and lasting peace. But it is idle to doubt the existence or the imminency of the danger. It springs, as we have before said, from no personal or accidental cause, but from causes deeply seated in the history and temper of the French people. Fawning on the emperor to prevent French aggression, is like stroking the crater of Vesuvius to prevent an eruption. If Louis Napoleon is not the elect of the French people, he is their representative. With the exception of that small party of Constitutionalists, which our

The diplomatic horizon is everywhere dark, and in the east it portends storm. Yet, upon the whole, it is not unhopeful. The traditional object of French diplomatists is to surround France with weak and subservient nations. That object is now in a fair way to be completely frustrated by a course of events to which France herself has unwittingly contributed. The enterprise of Garibaldi tends to liberate Italy from the French as well as from the Bourbons and the Austrians. Of this fact the French government, through its journals, has shown itself well aware. An attempt will probably be made to set up a French satrapy in place of the

for union, and an intelligent sense of the
common interests of the nation, have spread
through the whole German race; and it may
well be hoped that in case of extremity an
effort would be made, under the leadership
of Prussia, which would shake royal and
serene traitors out of their thrones. French
intrigue is indirectly accelerating German
unity, as the seizure of Savoy has roused
the spirit of Italian independence.
with Germany united, Italy free, Spain re-
stored to something of her pristine spirit,
and England as she is, Europe and liberty
will not have much cause to fear lest they
should be piled into a pedestal for the vanity
of Paris.

And

expelled tyrant of Naples, as an attempt was made to set up a French satrapy in place of the expelled grand duke of Tuscany; but there is reason to hope that it will be made with no better success. The real Muratist party at Naples consists of two or three surviving officials of the old Muratist régime; and an appeal to universal suffrage, managed by French agents and coerced by the French bayonets which we are not surprised to hear are for the present to remain at Rome, is a scheme which, familiar as it may be to the imperial mind, it would surely not be very difficult to foil. We may venture to hope, therefore, that Italy will be great and independent. In Germany, matters look not so well. The Prussian regent's assurance of universal loyalty to the fatherland must, we From The Saturday Review, 26 May. fear, be read rather as an exhortation than SPANISH AMERICAN REPUBLICS. as a statement of fact. Yet even in GerTHE Spanish American republics have many all is at bottom tending the right way. now for thirty years been the opprobrium of After the blow which French vengeance has liberty, and the friends of free institutions inflicted on her, Austria must reform thor- have grieved over them too long not to be oughly, and restore the independence of her glad of any explanation which does away different populations, or she must die. The with the necessity of dwelling on their wild issue of her wavering fate is now the grand pell-mell of revolutions, constitutions, civil point of interest in European politics. But, wars, and dictatorships. Such an explanabe that issue what it may-whether Austria tion is furnished by an interesting paper in deceive all expectation by putting tyranny the Revue des Deux Mondes. The point of and Jesuitism finally behind her, and return- it is that the disturbances of Mexico and of ing to the better path, or whether she go to pieces, as every thing now portends-she will cease to be a power of evil in German councils; and nothing but her influence prevents Germany from being, for defensive purposes as least, a united nation. No doubt, should a crisis immediately arrive, a road might be opened to the enemy by the treachery of the petty German princes whose meanness French diplomatists so thoroughly understand, and have so often turned to fatal account. The partial mediatization of petty principalitics which took place after the war with Napoleon has, unfortunately, not proved a real approach to that great European object-the unity of the German nation. It has rather tended to create in the confederacy separate interests of a stronger and more uncontrollable kind. The old confederation, with as many independent states as there are days in the year, was in some respects more capable of being controlled by a Diet or a dictator in the hour of danger, and offered less facility to an intriguing enemy seeking to form a treacherous combination in his own favor. To expect self-sacrifice of the German princes would be imbecile. It is the misfortune of royalty, especially of petty royalty, to be reared in a fool's paradise of consecrated selfishness, which shuts out all thoughts more noble than the preservation of dynastic interests. But across the boundaries of the petty states an intense desire

South America proceed nearly exclusively from the Indian clement in those countries. Englishmen have been dimly conscious that the so-called Spanish Americans are a mongrel race, but they have probably had very inadequate ideas of the extent to which the Spanish blood has been diluted, and it is certainly a fact known to few that almost every revolutionary leader is a pure Indian. We are curiously misled by the Spanishsounding names of these Mexican and South American worthies. Many of us have the impression that Juarez, Vidaurri, and Degollado are as actual Spanish gentlemen as Sartorius, Narvaez, and O'Donnell. Yet the truth is, that the three persons named, who are all Mexicans, generals, and Constitutionalists, are neither more or less than fullblooded Indians, and are therefore much nearer relations of the Ojibbeways who were exhibited in London a few seasons ago than of any Hidalgo in Spain. It need not be said that this circumstance entirely destroys the importance of the Spanish American revolutions as precedents or illustrations. The king of Siam, according to Sir John Bowring, is a very intelligent sovereign, and the establishment of a Nepaulese republic at Katmandoo would be a very singular event, but nobody would dream of basing any political lesson on the intellect of the Siamese monarch or on the democratic institutions of Napaul. Consciously or unconsciously,

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