self-governing Colonies took part in Empire warfare far from their own shores. The Governor of New South Wales called to mind that it was blood and iron that brought about German unity', and war was calling forth the latent forces of unity in the British Empire. Very noteworthy it was that the movement should have originated in Australia—all the more noteworthy in that Australians had lately been bitterly incensed against the Home Government for the vacillation which had enabled the Germans to plant themselves in New Guinea; and it was wholly fitting that the Mother State of Australia should be the Colony to make the first offer and actually to send the troops. But there was more than this. Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, rightly laid stress upon the fact that the incident gave evidence of the progress which had been made by the Australian Colonies. 'I could hardly have anticipated', he wrote to New South Wales, that your government would be in a position to supply immediately, and with complete efficiency, an important contingent fully prepared for foreign service in a distant country'; and of the Australian Colonies generally he noted, 'The desire and the power to offer effective military help in a campaign at a great distance from their shores, of which they have now given such satisfactory proofs, mark a distinct and important advance in their political growth.' The desire had long been there, and now the power was in evidence; the children were coming to manhood and stepping out into the world as active members of the household. It was a small beginning, but the 800 men who went to Suakim and who, as the correspondence showed, were available for service in India or the Mediterranean, if they wished to volunteer for it, were the forerunners of coming legions in the coming time. Fifteen years more and the hundreds became thousands in the South African War; another fifteen years, and to the call of the race tens of thousands came up from the Southern Seas.1 1 See Australia-Canada Correspondence respecting offers by the Colonies of troops for service in the Soudan, Cd. 4324, March 1885, and Cd. 4494, July 1885. It has been seen that other motives, besides those of economy, favoured the reduction of the Imperial garrisons in the Colonies, and that the Committee of 1861 had noted the tendency of modern warfare to concentrate its blows. It had become an obvious source of weakness, in days of steam communication, constantly being accelerated, to disperse small bodies of trained soldiers here and there throughout the world. On the other hand, it was equally obvious that the first and the main line of defence of the British Empire, the Royal Navy, must in all parts of the world be provided with coaling bases, strongly fortified and securely held. All military experts could be in agreement on this head, while differing as to whether or not, in this Colony or that, some special reason might exist for the temporary retention of a few Imperial troops, to be the nucleus of a large defence force locally raised, or to keep the Imperial factor in evidence before the eyes of coloured races and foreign visitors. The bedrock of naval and military policy came to be concentration of strength. How the defence forces stood in the middle of the eighties is shown by the following extract from the Introduction to the Colonial Office List for 1887, written on the eve of the first Colonial Conference, which was held in that year: Since 1870 the Imperial troops have gradually been withdrawn from all the self-governing Colonies, and now, with the exception of the garrisons of the naval stations at Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Capetown, the land defence of these Colonies rests entirely on their local forces. Of the other Colonies, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Natal, Mauritius, St. Helena, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana, British Honduras, Bahamas, and Bermudas still possess Imperial garrisons. Including the garrisons of Halifax and Capetown, the total number of Imperial troops stationed in the Colonies numbers 23,000 men, and the cost £1,816,762, of which the Colonies contribute £185,000. The various local forces of the Colonies, including the Volunteers, Militia, and armed constabulary, number about 70,000, the Canadian Militia alone furnishing a force of 37,000 men.' It is evident from this list of Colonies that there was still no little dispersal of Imperial troops, notably in the West Indies. 1879 on To this matter, and to the all-important question of The Imperial coaling stations, attention had for some years CommisRoyal past been called by a Royal Commission. The scare of sion of war with Russia in 1878 had for the moment opened coaling men's eyes to the vulnerability of the Empire, to the stations. total absence of preparation against a time of war. Accordingly, in 1879, a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad, and the apportionment of the cost of defence between the Imperial Government and the Colonies. The Chairman was Lord Carnarvon, who had lately left the Colonial Office, and who in this, as in other matters relating to the safety and the progress of the Empire, showed courage and foresight rare among the statesmen of his day. Three reports were presented in 1881 and 1882, and they partially saw the light when, but not until, the first Colonial Conference met in 1887.1 They dwelt upon 'the paramount importance to the British Empire of securing coaling stations. Not until the important coaling stations shall have been made secure can the strength of the British Navy be adequately exerted at sea'; and they pointed out that the Australian Colonies were taking effectual measures for the defence of their principal ports '.2 This was the beginning of tabulating on an intelligible plan Imperial fortresses and fortified coaling stations on the ocean highways, of a scheme for systematic Imperial defence, keeping in view the requirements of the Royal Navy as the great bulwark of the Empire, the security of sea-going commerce as the life-blood of its widely sundered peoples. The direct route to the East would be safeguarded at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong The first two reports and extracts from the third and final report were among the papers laid before the Conference. See Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1887, vol. ii, Appendix, Papers laid before the Conference': Cd. 5091, 1887, pp. 297-338. 2 pp. 337-8. |