and it seems more probable that there were two occasions on which Artaxerxes marched in person against Egypt. To the Rhodian government, in case of Athenian interference, as Schaefer rightly explains it. Leland mistranslates this: "Yet were these Rhodians who now possess the city strong enough to maintain their possession, I should not have advised you to grant them aid"; as if Demosthenes actually did advise the Athenians to aid the Rhodian government. And then he has a long note, which is transcribed by Jacobs, to explain this mistranslation. The meaning of Demosthenes is as follows: If this had been a question not between Rhodes and a foreign power, but only between the Rhodian government and the popular party, still I would have advised you to side with the latter against the former. That is, to the people at large, and to the select few whom they associated with themselves in the first instance. • Vitruvius relates a stratagem by which Artemisia got complete dominion of Rhodes. The Rhodians had plotted with a party in Halicarnassus to overthrow the Carian government, and sent a fleet with troops to assist in the execution of their design. The troops landed and advanced to the city, where the inhabitants were ranged under the walls as if to give them a friendly reception. But this was done by order of Artemisia, who had discovered the plot and laid an ambush for the Rhodians. They were surrounded and slain. Artemisia took their ships and put a Carian force on board, which, sailing to Rhodes and being mistaken by the people for their own armament returning, got possession of the Rhodian capital. If the story be well founded, the occurrence was probably later than this oration, which refers to no act of hostility between the Rhodians and the ruler of Caria. It should be noticed that, besides the capital city of Rhodes, there were other considerable and much more ancient towns in the island-Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus. Homer calls the Rhodians ἀγερῶχοι, which is translated "magnanimi" or "superbi," and seems to be a term of praise. Though the orator speaks slightingly of them, they became celebrated for their commerce and their laws. 10 The Melian orator, in the debate written by Thucydides, warns the Athenians not to be cruel and oppressive to others, for fear of retaliation at some future time; lest, rendering no mercy, they should find none. Demosthenes recommends a still higher policy, to succour the unfortunate, to win golden opinions in the hour of prosperity, and secure friends against the day of misfortune. "This occurred soon after the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was under the dominion of the thirty tyrants, and a large number of Athenian citizens were compelled to seek safety in exile. "It was to the pecuniary assistance of Persia, obtained by the management of Lysander, that the Spartans were mainly indebted for their success in the Peloponnesian war. A few years afterward Cyrus, who had been most active in the Spartan cause, marched from his province in Asia Minor to contend for the crown with his brother Artaxerxes. Clearchus commanded the Greek mercenaries in his service. The death of Cyrus, who was slain charging at the head of his troops in the battle of Cunaxa, delivered Artaxerxes and his kingdom from further danger. This expedition is the subject of Xenophon's "Anabasis." The retreat of the ten thousand Greeks (after the treacherous murder of their generals), under the skilful conduct of Xenophon himself, is one of the most interesting pieces of Grecian history. About a year only had elapsed since the speaking of the first Philippic. Whatever effect that speech may have produced at the time, it seems to have made no lasting impression. The inaction of Philip in the two following years relieved the Athenians from any immediate apprehension of danger. They were roused to new alarm by the rupture of Philip with Olynthus. *Chalcedon, founded by the Megarians on the Asiatic coast of the Bosporus, was called the city of the blind because the settlers had overlooked the more beautiful spot on the European coast, where afterward Byzantium (site of the modern Constantinople) was built. The fate of Chalcedon, like many other towns similarly situated, was to fall alternately under the dominion of Persia, Athens, and Lacedæmon. It was taken from the Lacedæmonians by Alcibiades, but surrendered to Lysander after the decisive battle of Ægos-Potamos. The Peace of Antalcidas restored it to Persia. At this time the Byzantines, who had acquired considerable power since the Social War, were endeavouring to draw it over to their alliance. * Selymbria is on the Propontine coast, between Byzantium and Perinthus. 16 The island of Cos, celebrated as the birthplace of Hippocrates the physician and Apelles the painter, lies a little off the coast of Caria, not far from Halicarnassus. It is mentioned in the Oration on the Peace that Cos, Chios, and Rhodes were seized upon by the Carian government. (See p. 121.) Shortly before this time the city of Cos had been rebuilt on a scale of great splendour, and had become one of the richest and most beautiful in Greece. "That is, the Byzantines and Artemisia. " Demosthenes may seem here to be setting up expediency against right and justice, but his reasoning, properly understood, does not amount to this. He means to say: In the politics of nations it is impossible that the same rules of justice, which ought to regulate the conduct of individuals toward each other, can be strictly applied. To a great people, in order that they may perform their duty to weaker states and administer justice on a large scale, the maintenance of power is essential. They must not permit their neighbours, because they are nominally at peace with them, to commit aggressions upon neutral states. The end of such acquiescence would be the destruction of their own empire. Such is the principle on which in modern times our own and other governments have frequently gone to war, to preserve the balance of power in Europe. To apply this argument to the present case-Persia has a treaty of peace with Athens: therefore Athens ought not to attack Persia. But Persia has oppressed Rhodes: therefore Athens may break the treaty with Persia, because Persia has committed an injustice, tending (at least in its remote consequence) to ruin Athens. In reality, the protection of Rhodes against Persia is not an act of injustice; but granting, for argument's sake, that it is, Athens has done right in committing it, and the discussion about justice or injustice is nothing but a verbal dispute. The first of these treaties is supposed to be the Peace of Cimon, according to which the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor were made independent, the Persian king was precluded from approaching the coast within the distance of a day's journey on horseback, and from sending any ship of war between the Cyanean islands at the mouth of the Bosporus and the Chelidonian islands off the Lycian coast. Whether this peace was made after the battle of the Eurymedon, gained by Cimon over the Persians B. c. 466, or after his expedition to Cyprus B. C. 449, has been a matter of controversy, and some historians have doubted whether such a peace was ever made. The second of the treaties here referred to is the Peace of Antalcidas, negotiated by the Lacedæmonians B. c. 387, according to which the Greek cities were to be independent, Sparta retaining her dominions in Peloponnesus and Athens keeping only Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus; the Greek cities of Asia and the islands of Cyprus and Clazomenæ were acknowledged to belong to the Persian Empire. The Lacedæmonians, by sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, detached that monarchy from the Athenian alliance, and were enabled to maintain their own ascendancy over the Grecian states. * The argument is thus pursued: In national affairs right follows might. An illustration of this is afforded by the two treaties with Persia. In each case the various claims and questions of right were settled upon a different plan and according to a different rule. This proves that there can be no fixed principle of international justice, by which the relations of different states to each other can be immutably preserved. The civil law of every free country prescibes a uniform rule of right and justice for all. But there is no such rule in the law of nations, as experience demonstrates. This observation is in accordance with the argument as above explained. He assumes that his countrymen were sincerely desirous of acting on the principle of justice, but contends that they could not carry out their purposes by abstaining from interference with other nations. If they espoused the cause of the oppressed, they would be looked up to and respected as the patrons of freedom; if they kept aloof they would be despised, and their allies would gradually fall away from them. "An Athenian who deserted the army in time of war was liable to prosecution by a process called λειποστρατίου γραφή. One who deserted his post or rank was liable to a λειποταξίου γραφή. A conviction for either of such offences was followed by disfranchisement, ἀτιμία. The generals were the presiding magistrates, who took cognizance of these matters. She is The speech of Demosthenes produced no effect. Athens abstained from interference; the Rhodians continued under the government of an oligarchy and subjection to Caria. Artemisia died soon after the delivery of this oration, having reigned two years. said to have been inconsolable for the death of her husband Mausolus, whose ashes she drank dissolved in scented water, and to whose memory she paid the most extravagant honours. The monument which she erected was so magnificent as to be considered one of the wonders of the world; and from this the name of mausoleum has been applied to all sepulchres built on a grand scale. She invited the most eminent literary men to her court, and offered a reward for the best funeral panegyric. Theopompus the historian, a native of Chios, and pupil of Isocrates, gained the prize. Artemisia was succeeded on the throne by her brother Idrieus, who reigned seven years. THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC В. С. 349 BELIEVE, men of Athens, you would give much to know what is the true policy to be adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the case, you should be willing to hear with attention those who offer you their counsel. Besides, that you will have the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I esteem it part of your good fortune that many fit suggestions will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from them all you may easily choose what is profitable. The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand if you care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in the matter.1 My own opinion is, vote succour immediately, and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before; send also ambassadors to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For the danger is that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other times (his threats may well be believed), slandering us and urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some of our main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the very cause of Philip's strength is a circumstance favourable to you. His having it in his sole power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and everywhere accompanying his army, is a great advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but for a peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians that now they are fighting not for glory or a slice of territory, but to save their country from destruction and servitude. They know how he treated those Amphipolitans 2 3 who surrendered to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance. And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all else of importance considered, I say you must take heart and spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing undone. No plea or pretence is left you for declining your duty. What you were all so clamorous about, that the Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of itself come to pass, and in a way most advantageous to you. For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they might have been slippery allies, with minds but half resolved, perhaps; but since they hate him on a quarrel of their own, their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when we returned from succouring the Eubeans, and Hierax and Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform, urging us to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of Eubœa you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pegasæ, and the other places (not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt and reasonable succour, we should have found Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the present and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any King of Macedon ever was. Here, then, is come a crisis, this of Olynthus, self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks, men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an alliance to counterbalance them is open to our acceptance, I must 6 |