an interminable business of it ourselves, for where, indeed, can it end if we continually allow existing cities to be destroyed, and require those which are in ruins to be restored?

It is urged by the most plausible speakers that the pillars 10 of their treaty with Thebes must be taken down if they mean to be our steadfast allies. These people say that with them it is not pillars, but interest, that binds friendship, and they consider those who assist them to be allies. Granting such to be their views, my notion is this: I say we should both require of them the destruction of the pillars and of the Lacedæmonians the observance of peace; if either party refuse to comply, whichever it be, we should side immediately with those that will. Should the Megalopolitans, notwithstanding the maintenance of peace, adhere to the Theban alliance, it will surely be evident to all that they favour the ambition of the Thebans instead of justice. On the other hand, if the Megalopolitans in good faith espouse our alliance, and the Lacedæmonians do not choose to observe peace, they will surely prove to the world that they are striving not only for the restoration of Thespiæ, but for an opportunity of conquering Peloponnesus while the Thebans are entangled in this war. One thing in certain men surprises me: that they dread the enemies of Lacedæmon becoming allies of Thebes, and yet see no danger in the Lacedæmonians conquering them; although we have actual experience furnished by the past that the Thebans always use these allies against Lacedæmon, whereas the Lacedæmonians, while they had the same people, used them against us.

I think, further, you ought to consider this. If you reject the Megalopolitans, should their city be destroyed and themselves dispersed, 11 the Lacedæmonians at once become powerful; should they chance to escape (as unhoped-for events do happen), they will in justice be steadfast allies of the Thebans.12 If you accept them for allies, the immediate consequence to them will be deliverance by your means; but, passing from their case, let us consider what may be looked for and apprehended with reference to Thebes and Lacedæmon. Well, then: if the Thebans be vanquished in war, as they ought to be, the Lacedæmonians will not be unduly great, having these Arcadians for their rivals, living near them. If the Thebans chance to recover and come off safe, they will at all events be the weaker for these men having become our allies and been preserved through us. So that in every point of view it is expedient that we should not abandon the Arcadians, and that they should not appear (in case they do escape) to have owed their deliverance to themselves, or to any other people but you.

I have spoken, O Athenians (Heaven is my witness), not from private affection or malice toward either party, but what I consider advantageous for you; and I exhort you not to abandon the Megalopolitans, nor indeed any other of the weaker states to the stronger.

It is quite clear, from the argument of Demosthenes, that the claims of Megalopolis upon the Athenians stood upon a different footing from those of Messene, not being grounded upon any former alliance. Yet in the narrative of Diodorus, xv, 94, we read that the Athenians sent a body of troops under Pammenes to quell an insurrection in Arcadia, which broke out in about a year's time after the peace, and threatened to dissolve the Megalopolitan community; that Pammenes reduced the malcontents to submission, and compelled those who had seceded from Megalopolis, and gone back to their ancient homes, to return to the capital. The name of Pammenes, a distinguished Theban general and colleague of Epaminondas, pretty well indicates (as Thirlwall has remarked) that Θηβαίους ought to be read in Diodorus instead of 'Αθηναίους. Besides (independently of the proof afforded by this oration), what could be more improbable than that the Megalopolitans should so soon after the battle of Mantinea request the assistance of Athens, their opponent? On the other hand, what more probable than that they should solicit the aid of Thebes, their ally?

Oropus was on the confines of Attica and Bœotia, on the coast opposite Eretria in Eubea. It anciently belonged to Athens, but frequently changed masters. In the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war is was betrayed to the Bœotians and Eretrians. It became independent at the close of the war, but a few years after the Thebans took advantage of some internal disturbances to seize upon the city, which they removed nearly a mile from the coast, and annexed to the Bœotian confederacy. A new revolution some time after restored it to Athens. But in the year 366 в. с. Themison, ruler of Eretria, got possession of it by the aid of some exiles. The Athenians marched against him, but, the Thebans also making their appearance with an army, they were induced to leave Oropus under Theban protection until the dispute could be amicably settled. The Thebans, however, kept it in their own hands; and so it remained until after the battle of Chæronea, when Philip gave it up to the Athenians.

This statement accords not with the narrative of Xenophon, who makes no mention of such an application to Athens, though he states that the Athenians invited a congress to their own city, which was attended by many of the Peloponnesians. Diodorus, however, relates that in the second year after the battle of Leuctra the Spartans sent a force into Arcadia and took possession of Orchomenus; that they were afterward defeated by Lycomedes of Mantinea, but the Arcadians, still fearing the power of Sparta, even after they had been joined by the Eleans and Argives, sent an embassy for assistance to Athens. The Athenians having refused their request, they applied to the Thebans, who sent an army under Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

He alludes to the war that followed the seizure of the Cadmea, begun by the invasion of Cleombrotus B. c. 378.

When the Thebans attempted to get possession of the island.

Triphylia was a small province on the Cyparissian Bay, between Elis and Messenia. Concerning this there had been many disputes between the Eleans and the Arcadians. The chief town was Lepreum, which in the Peloponnesian war became the cause of a rupture between Elis and Sparta. The Eleans had assisted Lepreum against the Arcadians on condition of receiving half the Leprean territory, for which the Lepreans afterward paid a sort of rent or tribute of one talent to Olympian Jupiter. On their refusing to pay this during the war the matter was referred to Sparta, who decided in favour of the Lepreans; whereupon the Eleans went over to the alliance of Argos and Athens. In the year в. с. 366 the Arcadians were in possession of Triphylia, when a body of their exiles who had fled to Elis assisted the Eleans to surprise Lasion, one of the Triphylian towns. A war then broke out between Arcadia and Elis, in which the Eleans greatly suffered, though at the close of the war they distinguished themselves by a victory, gained over the Arcadians and Argives at Olympia. It was the time of the festival which the enemy had determined to celebrate under the presidency of Pisa; the games had actually begun when they were vigorously attacked and routed by the Eleans on the sacred ground.

Tricaranum was a fortress in the Phliasian territory. The city of Phlius was on the confines of Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia. During the Theban war, when most of their allies had deserted the Lacedæmonians, Phlius continued faithful, and was exposed to the attacks of her neighbours. The Argives fortified Tricaranum, and kept it as a hostile post, making incursions to plunder the Phliasian country, and attack the city, which at one time was nearly surprised by an ArgiveArcadian force assisted by some exiles. The Phliasians, whose constancy is praised by Xenophon, baffled all the attempts of their enemies. In the year 366 Chares the Athenian was sent to their assistance and took Thyamia, another hostile fortress occupied by the Sicyonians. Tricaranum, it seems, remained in possession of the Argives.

10 It was the practice among Grecian states to inscribe their treaties on pillars of stone or brass which, so long as the treaties remained in force, were religiously preserved and exposed to view in temples and other public places. And it was frequently provided in the treaty itself where the pillars recording it should be deposited. Thus, in the treaty of peace between Athens, Lacedæmon, and their respective allies, in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, it was stipulated that pillars sould be erected at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus; hmus; and also in the Acropolis at Athens and in the Temple of Apollo at Amyclæ. In the treaty between Athens, Elis, Argos, and Mantinea, made in the following year, it was agreed that stone pillars should be set up by the Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the Temple of Apollo in their market-place, by the Mantineans in the Temple of Jupiter in their market-place, and that they should jointly erect one of brass at Olympia. This (among many others) was seen by Pausanias in the Olympian temple.

"Into villages.

"The event proved the justice of this remark. Demosthenes could not prevail on the Athenians to follow his counsel. They joined the alliance of neither party. Archidamus declared war against the Arcadians, who were assisted by Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. In the course of the same year, Philip having defeated Onomarchus in the great battle of Pagasæ, the Thebans were enabled to send forces to the succour of their old allies. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians were re-enforced by some Phocian mercenaries; the war was carried on for two years with various success, and at length terminated by a truce. The Arcadian confederacy, however, were alienated from Athens, and the bad effects of this were discovered some time afterward, when, alarmed at the designs of Sparta, they applied not to Athens, but to Philip, for assistance, and thus caused Macedonian influence to extend itself in Peloponnesus.

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

В. С. 351

AD the question for debate been anything new,
Athenians, I should have waited till most of the

usual speakers1 had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the subject of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if these men had advised properly in time past there would be no necessity for deliberating now.

First, I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as regards the past is best for the future. What do I mean? That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the same, there would be no hope of amendment.

2

Consider, next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember, how vast a power the Lacedæmonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; nothing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples the strength of the Lacedæmonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidæa and Methone and all the region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued