'The Amphictyonic league, at the head of which Philip was now placed, was a federal union of Hellenic (or Greek) tribes, having for its object the maintenance of a common religion and nationality. The various deputies met twice a year, in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn at Anthela, near Thermopyle. They met not only to celebrate games and festivals, but to transact the business of the league, to determine questions of international law and religion. The oracular sanctity of Delphi gave a dignity to these meetings, but the rivalry and jealousies of the more powerful Greek states did not permit them (in general) to be controlled by Amphictyonic decrees. The three Sacred wars are instances in which their decrees were enforced by combination; but in the last two, for which Philip's aid was invited, there was but little enthusiasm in the cause from any motive of religion or patriotism. The meeting at which Philip had been chosen president was so tumultuous and irregular that the Athenians would not allow it to be a legal convocation of the Amphictyonic body. Philip greatly resented this, because his election was considered to establish the title of his countrymen to rank among the Greek nations. * Bœotian stupidity was proverbial. So Horace, "Epist. II," i, 224:

Bœotûm in crasso jurares aere natum.'

• Demosthenes did not entirely scout the suggestion made with regard to Philip's views; but perhaps he thought that Philip could not venture to offend his Theban allies then, and one of the means of humbling Athens was to increase the power of her neighbour. If it be asked why Philip might not have seized upon Elatea at this time, as well as eight years later, I should say, not on account of the peace with Athens, but because he desired to rest upon his Amphictyonic honours, and have the full benefit of the moral ascendency which he had acquired. It was not clear that his grand object, which was rather to lead than to conquer Greece, might not be obtained without a war against any of her principal states. Afterward, when the Athenians, under the active administration of Demosthenes, baffled his efforts in the north, and showed a determination to counteract all his projects, it became necessary for him to strike a decisive blow, even at the risk of irritating Thebes. He ran this risk, and succeeded, but not without danger.

10 The Thessalians were peculiarly aggrieved by their exclusion (during the Sacred War) from the national synod, and from the oracle and festivities of Delphi. Their country had been the cradle of the Hellenic race, their deputies were the most numerous in the council, and their vicinity to the places of meeting gave them a greater interest in the proceedings. Hence they most eagerly pressed for punishment of the Phocians. The tribes of Mount Eta proposed that the male population of Phocis should be precipitated from the Delphian rock, which cruelty was not permitted by Philip. To gratify the Thessalians, Philip put them in possession of Nicæa, one of the towns near the pass of Thermopylæ, but even there he kept a Macedonian garrison. The Thebans had expected to have that town themselves, and were disappointed.

"Cardia was a city at the northwestern extremity of the Chersonese, and from its position on the isthmus was considered the key of the peninsula. Among the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes, Cardia had not been included; but the Athenians afterward laid claim to it, and Philip supported the Cardians in resisting that claim.

"Idrieus, King of Caria, who was now in possession of these islands, which had revolted from Athens in the Social War.

Compel them to go into their port to pay harbour duties.

THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

В. С. 344

N all the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made in our behalf are thought just and generous,1 and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of Athens brought, that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece, the more difficult it becomes to advise you how to act. The cause lies in all of us, Athenians, that when we ought to oppose an ambitious power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings shrink from our duty, of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only declaim on the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue justly, or comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his designs, are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest about: Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with using the better arguments it is an easy matter, and there is no trouble; but if we are to take measures for the correction of these evils to prevent their insensible progress and the rising up of a mighty power against which we could have no defence, then our course of deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and agreeable.

First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons why I am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may give your adherence to them.

Thus, then, I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master of after the peace? Thermopylæ and the Phocian state. Well, and how used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace, quiet, or justice, he saw plainly that to a people of our character and principles nothing could he offer or give that would induce you for self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you, having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as much as if you were at war; but the Thebans he expected (and events prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him in everything else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the highest panegyric upon you, Athenians, for you are adjudged by these proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed not only from a view of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal when Alexander, this man's ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention, though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore I must be silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either joined the barbarian's army or did not oppose it, and therefore he knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage without considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought, then, if he chose your friendship it must be on just principles; if he attached himself to them he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.

Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the least open to him. He that bids the Lacedæmonians resign Messene, how can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, to have acted on a conviction of justice?

But, forsooth, he was compelled this plea remainshe made concessions against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust the Thebans, and some carry news about that he will fortify Elatea. All this he intends and will intend, I dare say; but to attack the Lacedæmonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected himself with a great force. The Lacedæmonians, who are enemies of Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed, will he now preserve?

And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip, either if he was forced into his former measures or if he were now giving up the Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove to a correct observer that his whole plan of action is against our state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He desires empire; he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him, since, by retaining what belongs to you, he secures the rest of his dominion; had he given up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he deemed himself unsafe at home. He knows, therefore, both that he is plotting against you and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you. Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain people-Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views who from cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from dulness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is better they should be repeated to you.

You, men of Messene, said I, how do you think the Olynthians would have brooked to hear anything against Philip at those times, when he surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidæa, taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think you they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think you, said I, when he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicæa and Magnesia, they expected to have the decemvirate which is now established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylæ would take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a dispenser of gifts and promises; pray, if you are wise, that you may never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter! I said, there are manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like; these are