ON THE PEACE SEE, men of Athens, our affairs are in great perplexity and confusion, not only because many interests have been sacrificed, and it is useless to make fine speeches about them, but because, for preserving what remains, you can not agree upon any single expedient, some holding one opinion and some another. And besides, perplexing and difficult as deliberation of itself is, you, Athenians, have rendered it far more so. For other men usually hold counsel before action, you hold it after; the result of which during all the time of my remembrance has been that the censurer of your errors gets repute and credit as a good speaker, while your interests and objects of deliberation are lost. Yet, even under these circumstances, I believe, and I have risen with the persuasion, that if you will desist from wrangling and tumult, and listen as becomes men on a political consultation of such importance, I shall be able to suggest and advise measures by which our affairs may be improved and our losses retrieved. Well as I know, Athenians, that to talk before you of one's self and one's own counsels is a successful artifice with unscrupulous men, I think it so vulgar and offensive that I shrink from it even in a case of necessity. However, I think you will better appreciate what I shall say now by calling to mind a little that I said on former occasions. For example, Athenians, when they were advising you in the troubles of Eubœa to assist Plutarch,1 and undertake a discreditable and expensive war, I, and I alone, stood forward to oppose it, and was nearly torn to pieces by the men who for petty lucre have seduced you into many grievous errors. A short time later, when you incurred disgrace, and suffered what no mortals ever did from parties whom they assisted, you all acknowledged the worthlessness of their counsels who misled you, and the soundness of mine. Again, Athenians, when I saw that Neoptolemus 2 the actor, privileged under colour of his profession, was doing serious mischief to the state, managing and directing things at Athens on Philip's behalf, I came and informed you, not from any private enmity or malice, as subsequent occurrences have shown. And herein I shall not blame the advocates of Neoptolemus (for there were none), but you yourselves; for had you been seeing a tragedy in the Temple of Bacchus, instead of it being a debate on the public weal and safety, you could not have heard him with more partiality, or me with more intolerance. But I suppose you all now understand that he made his journey to the enemy in order (as he said) to get the debts there owing to him, and defray thereout his public charges at home; and, after urging this argument, that it was hard to reproach men who brought over their effects from abroad, as soon as he obtained security through the peace, he converted into money all the real estate which he possessed here, and has gone off with it to Philip. Thus two of my warnings, justly and rightfully pronounced in accordance with the truth, testify in my favour as a counsellor. A third, men of Athens, I will mention, this one only, and straight proceed to the subject of my address. When we ambassadors, after receiving the oaths on the peace, had returned, and certain men were promising that Thespiæ and Platæa would be repeopled; that Philip, if he got the mastery, would save the Phocians, and disperse the population of Thebes; that Oropus would be yours, and Eubœa given as compensation for Amphipolis, with more of the like hopes and delusions, which led you on, against policy, equity, and honour, to abandon the Phocians; you will find I neither aided in any of these deceits nor held my tongue. I warned you, as you surely remember, that I knew not of these things nor expected them, and deemed it all idle gossip. These instances, wherein I have shown greater foresight than others, I mention not by way of boast, nor ascribe, Athenians, to any sagacity of my own, nor will I pretend to discover or discern the future from any but two causes, which I will state: first, men of Athens, through good fortune, which I observe beats all the craft and cleverness of man; secondly, because I judge and estimate things disinterestedly, and no one can show that any lucre is attached to my politics or my speeches. Therefore, whatever be your true policy, as indicated by the circumstances, I have a correct view of it; but when you put money on one side as in a balance, it carries away and pulls down the judgment with it, and he that does so can no longer reason upon anything justly or soundly. The first thing which I maintain to be necessary is this: Whether you seek to obtain allies, or contribution, or aught else for the state, do it without disturbing the present peace; not that it is very glorious or worthy of you, but, whatever be its character, it had better suited our interests never to have made peace than to break it ourselves, for we have thrown away many advantages which would have rendered the war then safer and easier for us than it can be now. Secondly, Athenians, we must take care that these people assembled and calling themselves Amphictyons are not by us necessitated, or furnished with a plea, to make a common war against us. I grant, if we renewed the war with Philip on account of Amphipolis, or any such private quarrel, in which Thessalians, Argives, and Thebans are not concerned, none of them would join in it, and least of all-hear me before you cry out-the Thebans; not that they are kindly disposed to us, or would not gratify Philip, but they see clearly, stupid as one may think them, that if they had a war with you the hardships would all be theirs, while another sat waiting for the advantages. Therefore, they would not throw themselves into it unless the ground and origin of the war were common. So if we again went to war with the Thebans for Oropus or any private cause, I should fear no disaster, because our respective auxiliaries would assist us or them if either country were invaded, but would join with neither in aggression. Such is the spirit of alliances that are worth regard, and so the thing naturally is. People are not friendly either to us or the Thebans to the extent of equally desiring our safety and our predominance. Safe they would all have us for their own sakes; dominant, so as to become their masters, they would not have either of us. What, then, say I, is the danger? what to be guarded against? Lest in the coming war there be found a common plea, a common grievance for all. If Argives, and Messenians, and Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians who are in league with them are hostile to us on account of our negotiating with the Lacedæmonians and seeming to take up some of their enterprises; if the Thebans are (as they say) our enemies, and will be more so, because we harbour their exiles and in every way manifest our aversion to them; Thessalians again, because we harbour the Phocian exiles; and Philip because we oppose his admission to the Amphictyonic body. I fear that, each incensed on a private quarrel, they will combine to bring war upon you, setting up the decrees of the Amphictyons, and be drawn on (beyond what their single interests require) to battle it with us, as they did with the Phocians. For you are surely aware that now the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians have co-operated, without having each exactly the same views. For example, the Thebans could not hinder Philip from advancing and occupying the passes, nor yet from coming last and having the credit of their labours. True, in respect of territorial acquisition, something has been done for them, but in regard to honour and reputation they have fared wretchedly; since, had Philip not stepped in, they would (it seems) have got nothing. This was not agreeable to them, but having the wish without the power to obtain Orchomenos and Coronea, they submitted to it all. Of Philip, you know, some persons venture to say that he would not have given Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, but was compelled to do so. I wish them joy of their opinion, but thus far I believe that he cared not so much about that business as he desired to occupy the passes and have the glory of the war, as being determined by his agency, and the direction of the Pythian games. Such were the objects of his ambition. The Thessalians wished not either Philip or Thebes to be aggrandized, since in both they saw danger to themselves, but sought to obtain these two advantages, the synod at Thermopylæ, and the privileges at Delphi,10 for which objects they aided the confederacy. Thus you will find that each party has been led into many acts unwillingly; and against this danger, being such as I describe, you must take precautions. Must we then do as we are bidden for fear of the consequences? and do you recommend this? Far from it. 1 advise you so to act as not to compromise your dignity, to avoid war, to prove yourselves right-thinking, justspeaking men. With those who think we should boldly suffer anything, and do not foresee the war, I would reason thus. We permit the Thebans to have Oropus; and if one asked us why, and required a true answer, we should say, To avoid war. And to Philip now we have ceded Amphipolis by treaty, and allow the Cardians 11 to be excepted from the other people of the Chersonese; and the Carian 12 to seize the islands Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to detain 13 our vessels; evidently because we think the tranquility of peace more beneficial than strife and contest about such questions. It were folly, then, and utter absurdity, after dealing thus with each party singly on matters of vital moment to ourselves, to battle now with them all for a shadow at Delphi. NOTES Callias, sovereign of Chalcis, had invited Philip into Euboea, to assist him against Plutarch, sovereign of Eretria; Plutarch applied to Athens for assistance, and Phocion was sent with an army into Eubœa, where, by the carelessness or treachery of Plutarch, he was exposed in a defile at Tamynæ, and attacked by Callias with a superior force of Chalcidians and Macedonians. He gained the victory, but to punish Plutarch expelled him from Eretria. This happened B. c. 354. After Phocion quitted the island, a Macedonian party began to prevail at Eretria, and Philip got possession of the city, defeating and taking prisoner Molossus, the Athenian commander. *Neoptolemus on some professional engagement at Pella had probably been bribed by Philip. He was active in promoting the peace, and afterward abandoned his country for Macedonia. Thespiæ and Platæa were taken and razed to the ground by the Thebans under Epaminondas, B. C. 373. That is, dismantle the city, and disperse the inhabitants into villages in order to destroy their power. An example of such α διοίκισις was the dismemberment of Mantinea by the Spartans in the year В. С. 385. *Oropus was a border town, for the possession of which Thebes and Athens had long contended. Themison of Eretria had taken it from Athens, and put it in the hands of the Thebans. That is, money contributed by allies. When the Athenians reestablished their confederacy, which had been dissolved by the Peloponnesian war, the payments received from the allies received the name of contributions, σύνταξις, as less obnoxious than tribute, φόρος. |