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accompanying action activity arise asserted attributes become body cause certain changes chapter coexistence cognition colour common compared complex conceived conception conclusion consciousness considered constituting continuous definite developed direct distinct distinguished effects elements equal established excited existence experiences express extension eyes fact feeling follows force further give given greater hand Hence ideas implies impressions individual inference intuition involved kind known less magnitudes manifest means mental mind motion muscular nature needs object observed organism original pain particular pass perceived perception positions possible predicated present produced proposition quantitative reached reasoning recognized relations relative remains represented resistance respect seen sensations sense sentiments separate side similar simple simultaneous sound space species stand structure successive suppose surface things thought tion touch true truth unlike various visual vivid whole
Page 321 - And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the .body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.
Page 199 - The sense of space, and in the end the sense of time, were both powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, &c. were exhibited in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. Space swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable infinity.
Page 347 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Page 21 - The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to each other ; and if the equal sides be produced, the angles on the other side of the base shall be equal.
Page 342 - We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.
Page 321 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Page 341 - Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.
Page 348 - When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.