been frequently expressed, of treason, felony, and breach, or surety, of the peace. Whereby it seems to have been understood that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families, or servants, in any crime whatsoever: and instances have not been wanting, wherein privileged persons have been convicted of misdemeanors, and committed, or prosecuted to outlawry, even in the middle of a session; which proceeding has afterwards received the sanction and approbation of parliament. To which may be added, that a few years ago, the case of writing and publishing seditious libels was resolved by both houses, not to be entitled to privilege; and that the reasons upon which that case proceeded extended equally to every indictable offence. So that the chief, if not the only privilege of parliament, in such cases, seems to be the right of receiving immediate information of the imprisonment or detention of any member, with the reason for which he is detained.

The laws and customs relating to the house of lords in particular, will take up but little of our time. They have a right to be attended, and constantly are, by the judges of the court of king's bench and common pleas, and such of the barons of the exchequer as are of the degree of the coif, or have been made serjeants at law; as likewise by the king's learned counsel, being serjeants, and by the masters of the court of chancery; for their advice in point of law, and for the greater dignity of their proceedings. The secretaries of state, with the attorney and solicitor general, were also used to attend the house of peers, and have to this day, together with the judges, &c. their regular writs of summons issued out at the beginning of every parliament, ad tractandum et consilium impendendum, though not ad consentiendum; but, whenever of late years they have been members of the house of commons, their attendance here hath fallen into disuse.

Another privilege is, that every peer, by licence obtained from the king, may make another lord of parliament his proxy, to vote for him in his absence. A privilege, which a member of the other house can by no means have, as he is himself but a proxy for a multitude of other people.

Each peer has also a right, by leave of the house, when a vote passes contrary to his sentiments, to enter his dissent on the journals of the house; with the reasons for such dissent; which is usually styled his protest.

All bills likewise, that may in their consequences any way affect the right of the peerage, are by the custom of parliament to have their first rise and beginning in the house of peers, and to suffer no changes or amendments in the house of commons.

QUESTIONS.

What is the nature of the power of Parliament ?

Can Parliament alter the succession to the throne? or change the established religion? or re-model the whole constitution of the kingdom?

State instances of the exercise of such power.

What is the great reason there exists for sending fit persons into the House of Commons ?

How old must a person be, before he can be elected a member of the House of Commons ?

What oaths are necessary to be taken, before sitting in the House of Commons ?

Can naturalised aliens be elected into Parliament?

On what maxim is the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti founded? What did Sir John Fortescue declare to the House of Lords concerning the privileges of Parliament ?

Why was privilege of Parliament principally established?

What are the advantages of keeping these privileges indefinite? What is the extent of the freedom of speech, and of person? Can a peer be arrested for any civil matter? or a member of the House of Commons?

What privileges have the House of Lords with respect to advice in point of law?

What is the privilege of voting by proxy? And does it extend to the House of Commons? Why?

What is the "protest" of a Peer?

Can the House of Commons interfere with any bill that affects the rights of the peerage?

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS-ITS CONSTITUTION, AND THE METHOD OF ELECTING MEMBERS.

THE peculiar laws and customs of the house of commons relate principally to the raising of taxes, and the election of members to serve in parliament.

First, with regard to taxes: it is the ancient indisputable privilege and right of the house of commons, that all grants of subsidies or parliamentary aids do begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them; although their grants are not effectual to all intents and purposes, until they have the assent of the other two branches of the legislature. The general reason given for this exclusive privilege of the house of commons, is, that the supplies are raised upon the body of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the right of taxing themselves. This reason would be unanswerable, if the commons taxed none but themselves: but it is notorious that a very large share of property is in the possession of the house of lords; that this property is equally taxable, and taxed, as the property of the commons; and therefore, the commons not being the sole persons taxed, this cannot be the reason of their having the sole right of raising and modelling the supply. The true reason, arising from the spirit of our constitution, seems to be this: The lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleasure by the king, are supposed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue so, than the commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would therefore be extremely dangerous to give the lords any power of framing new taxes for the subject; it is sufficient that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the commons too lavish or improvident in their grants.

Next with regard to the election of knights, citizens, and burgesses; we may observe, that herein consists the

exercise of the democratical part of our constitution for in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by suffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the suffrages are to be given. And the Athenians were so justly jealous of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the assemblies of the people, was punished by their laws with death because such a man was esteemed guilty of high treason, by usurping those rights of sovereignty, to which he had no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body, but by representation, the exercise of this sovereignty consists in the choice of representatives. The laws have therefore very strictly guarded against usurpation or abuse of this power, by many salutary provisions, which may be reduced to these three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The qualifications of the elected. 3. The proceedings at elections.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors. The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely and without influence of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his liberty, and his life. But since that can hardly be expected in persons of indigent fortunes, or such as are under the immediate dominion of others, all popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications whereby some who are suspected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting, in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.

And this constitution of suffrages is framed upon a wiser principle, with us, than either of the methods of voting, by centuries, or by tribes, among the Romans. In the

method by centuries instituted by Servius Tullius, it was principally property, and not numbers, that turned the scale in the method by tribes gradually introduced by the tribunes of the people, numbers only were regarded, and property entirely overlooked. Hence the laws passed by the former method had usually too great a tendency to aggrandise the patricians or rich nobles; and those by the latter had too much of a levelling principle. Our constitution steers between the two extremes. Only such are entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own: there is hardly a free agent to be found, who is not entitled to a vote in some place or other in the kingdom. Nor is comparative wealth, or property, entirely disregarded in elections; for though the richest man has only one vote at one place, yet if his property be at all diffused, he has probably a right to vote at more places than one, and therefore has many representatives. This is the spirit of our constitution; not that I assert that it is in fact quite so perfect as I have here endeavoured to describe it; for, if any alteration might be wished or suggested in the present frame of parliaments, it should be in favour of a more complete representation of the people*.

2. Next, as to the qualifications of persons to be elected members of the house of commons. Some of these depend upon the law and custom of parliament, declared by the house of commons; others upon certain statutes. And from these it appears, 1. That they must not be aliens born, or minors. 2. That they must not be any of the twelvet judges, because they sit in the lords' house; nor of the clergy, for they sit in the convocation ; nor persons attainted of treason or felony, for they are unfit to sit any where. 3. That sheriffs of counties, and mayors and bailiffs of boroughs, are not eligible in their respective jurisdictions, as being returning officers; but the sheriffs of one

* Since the death of the Commentator, three Acts of Parliament, passed in the 2nd and 3rd year of the reign of his present Majesty, to amend the representation of the people of England and Wales, Ireland and Scotland respectively, have extended the elective franchise considerably beyond what were its limits when the above passage was written. These Acts must be consulted by persons who are now desirous of knowing the precise qualifications of electors throughout the United Kingdom.

+ Now fifteen.

The Clergy are expressly excluded by Statute 43 Geo. III. c. 63.