Democratic Deficit?: Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, Switzerland, and the United StatesIs the European Union democratic? Much has been written claiming that the EU's institutions and policymaking processes are insufficiently accountable to, and representative of, the European electorate. In Democratic Deficit?, Thomas D. Zweifel offers a provocative new treatment of the concept of democracy in the EU. The work provides a rigorous, comparative examination of the European Union and the federal democracies of Switzerland and the United States. Drawing upon established, quantifiable scales of democracy, the study demonstrates that the EU's decision-making and regulatory processes do not show a democratic deficit greater than that of the bureaucracies of most liberal democracies and finds that in certain policy areas liberal democracies may even benefit from adopting EU practices. Supported by two case studies comparing regulatory policymaking in action across the three polities, Zweifel's work will prove to be a valuable and thought-provoking addition to the debate about European governance and the increasingly important role of transnational and supranational organizations. |
Contents
Democratic Deficit Arguments | 11 |
Institutions Compared | 45 |
Bureaucratic Democracy | 65 |
Case 1Regulating Mergers | 83 |
Case 2Regulating Biotech | 105 |
Democratic Surplus? | 135 |
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Democratic Deficit?: Institutions and Regulation in the European Union ... Thomas D. Zweifel No preview available - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
accountability administrative agency Alvarez antitrust appointment approved Article authority biotech Bureaucratic Democracy cartel Chapter chief executive Cini and McGowan citizens comitology commissioners competition Competition Commission Congress constitutional consumer Council of Ministers criteria decisions delegation Democracy Scale Democratic Deficit Arguments demos economic effective electoral EU’s Europe European Commission European Parliament European Union example Federal Council freedom Freedom House genetically GMO Foods GMO regulation independent indicators industry information asymmetries institutions legislation legislature legitimacy Maastricht Treaty Majone majoritarian majority Medium member-state ment merger policy merger regulation monitoring Neven Novartis officials organizations overrule participation percent political Pollack procedure proposed qualified majority voting Reason-Giving regime regulatory require rules Scharpf Shapiro sion supranational Swiss Switzerland Table three polities tion Treaty Treaty of Rome U.S. Supreme Court United vote voters weak Weiler Weingast Wood and Waterman
Popular passages
Page xi - If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this : you must first enable the Government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.