Democratic Deficit?: Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States
Is the European Union democratic? Much has been written claiming that the EU's institutions and policymaking processes are insufficiently accountable to, and representative of, the European electorate. In Democratic Deficit?, Thomas D. Zweifel offers a provocative new treatment of the concept of democracy in the EU. The work provides a rigorous, comparative examination of the European Union and the federal democracies of Switzerland and the United States. Drawing upon established, quantifiable scales of democracy, the study demonstrates that the EU's decision-making and regulatory processes do not show a democratic deficit greater than that of the bureaucracies of most liberal democracies and finds that in certain policy areas liberal democracies may even benefit from adopting EU practices. Supported by two case studies comparing regulatory policymaking in action across the three polities, Zweifel's work will prove to be a valuable and thought-provoking addition to the debate about European governance and the increasingly important role of transnational and supranational organizations.
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2—Regulating Biotech accountability agency agency’s antitrust appointment approved Article authority biotech bureaucratic democracy Chapter chief executive Cini and McGowan citizens Commission’s Community competition Competition Commission Congress constitutional consumer Council of Ministers criteria Dahl’s decisions delegation Democratic Deficit Arguments economic effective electoral EU’s Europe European Central Bank European Commission European Parliament European Union example FDA’s Federal Council freedom Freedom House Gastil GMO foods independent indicators industry information asymmetries institutions labeling legislation legislature legitimacy low low low Maastricht Treaty Majone majoritarian majority Medium ment merger policy merger regulation monitoring Neven Novartis officials organizations overrule participation percent Pollack procedure proposed qualified majority voting Reason-Giving regime regulatory rules Scharpf Shapiro sion supranational Swiss Switzerland three polities tion Treaty Treaty of Rome U.S. Supreme Court United vote voters weak Weiler Weingast Wood and Waterman yes yes yes
Page xi - If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this : you must first enable the Government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Page 4 - The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.