character in this point, and, in his conversations, recorded by Count Las Cases, frequently complains of it. In war, the effects of this organ are very conspicuous in the conduct of the two nations. The French, under the influence of a large Combativeness, and moderate Cautiousness, make the most lively and spirited attacks, shouting and cheering as they advance to the charge; but if steadily resisted, their ardor abates; and, from deficiency in Firmness, they yield readily to adversity. The British, on the other hand, advance to the assault with cool determination, arising from great Firmness, and considerable Cautiousness and Secretiveness; and although repulsed, they are not discomfited, but preserve presence of mind to execute whatever may appear most advisable in the circumstances which have occurred.

This faculty contributes greatly to success in any enterprise, by communicating the quality of perseverance. Exhaustion will damp the ardor of the bravest after much exertion, and hence he who is able to maintain his faculties in a state of vivid application for the greatest length of time, will at last frequently succeed, by merely wearying out his opponent. Fortitude and patience, also, as distinguished from active courage, result from this faculty. The organ is large in the American Indians, and their powers of endurance appear almost incredible to Europeans. Dr. Gall found it very large in a highwayman, who was exceedingly hardened in crime. He was kept in close confinement for a considerable time, with the view of forcing him to disclose his accomplices; but this had no effect, and he was then put to the torture by beating. Finding this infliction intolerable, he strangled himself with his chain. After his death, the parietal bones were found separated precisely at the point where the organ of Firmness is situated. Dr. Gall could not determine whether the separation arose from the violent strangulation, the excessive energy of the organ, or from accident; but records the fact, to call attention to similar cases, should they occur in future. This organ, and that of Destructiveness, are very large also in John Thurtell, executed for the murder of Weare, and he manifested both powerfully in his conduct. The organ is also very large in King Robert Bruce; and he was dis

tinguished for unshaken firmness, in circumstances in which an ordinary mind would have been overwhelmed by despair. It is large in Haggart, who also manifested determination in crime and constancy in suffering, in a remarkable degree.

When the organ is small, the individual is prone to yield to the impulses of his predominating feelings. When Benevolence assumes the sway, he is all kindness; when Combativeness and Destructiveness are excited, he will be passionate, outrageous, and violent and thus afford a spectacle of habitual weakness and inconsistency. If Love of Approbation and Benevolence be large, and Firmness small, solicitations will, with great difficulty, be resisted. The organ is very small in the cast of Mrs. H., and she manifested much unsteadiness of purpose.

The figures introduced on p. 281, represent this organ large and

small.

I am not aware that the metaphysicians admit any faculty corresponding to this sentiment. It exercises a great influence in forming the character, and its omission is very important in any system of mental philosophy.

The effects of disease of the organ seem not to have been observed. We may infer, that they will be the exaltation of the function, namely, extreme stubbornness and infatuation. This organ is regarded as established.

16.-CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.

THIS organ is situated on the posterior and lateral parts of the coronal region of the brain, upwards from Cautiousness, and backwards from Hope. In Dr. Gall's Plates, the function is marked as unascertained, and the discovery and establishment of the organ are due to Dr. Spurzheim.

The dispute among philosophers about the existence of a moral faculty in the human mind, is of very ancient standing, and it has been conducted with great eagerness since the publication of the writings of Hobbes in the middle of the seventeenth century. This author taught, "that we approve of virtuous actions, or of

actions beneficial to society, from self-love; because we know, that whatever promotes the interest of society, has, on that very account, an indirect tendency to promote our own." He farther taught, that, "as it is to the institution of government we are indebted for all the comforts and confidence of social life, the laws which the civil magistrate enjoins are the ultimate standards of morality."*

Cudworth, in opposition to Hobbes, endeavored to show that the origin of our notions of right and wrong is to be found in a particular power of the mind, which distinguishes truth from falsehood.

Mandeville, who published in the beginning of the last century, maintained, as his theory of morals, That by nature man is utterly selfish; that among other desires which he likes to gratify, he has received a strong appetite for praise; that the founders of society, availing themselves of this propensity, instituted the custom of dealing out a certain measure of applause for each sacrifice made by selfishness to the public good, and called the sacrifice Virtue. "Men are led, accordingly, to purchase this praise by a fair barter;" and "the moral virtues," to use Mandeville's strong expression, are, "the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." And hence, when we see virtue, we see only the indulgence of some selfish feeling, or the compromise for this indulgence, in expectation of some praise."

Dr. Clarke, on the other hand, supposes virtue "to consist in the regulation of our conduct, according to certain fitnesses which we perceive in things, or a peculiar congruity of certain relations to each other ;" and Wollaston, whose views are essentially the same, "supposes virtue to consist in acting according to the truth of things, in treating objects according to their real character, and not according to a character or properties which they truly have not. "

In

Mr. Hume, it is well known, wrote an elaborate treatise, to prove, "that utility is the constituent or measure of virtue :" short, to use the emphatic language of Dr. Smith, "that we have

*Stewart's Outlines, p. 128.

Fable of the Bees, vol. i. p. 28-30. 8vo. London, 1728; and Brown's Lectures, vol. iv. p. 4. + Brown's Lectures, vol. iv. p. 17.

no other reason for praising a man, than that for which we commend a chest of drawers."*

There is another system "which makes the utility according to which we measure virtue, in every case our own individual advantage. Virtue, according to this system, is the mere search of pleasure, or of personal gratification. It gives up one pleasure, indeed, but it gives it up for a greater. It sacrifices a present enjoyment; but it sacrifices it only to obtain some enjoyment, which, in intensity and duration, is fairly worth the sacrifice." Hence, in every instance in which an individual seems to pursue the good of others, as good, he seeks his own personal gratification, and nothing else. †

Dr. Hutcheson, on the other hand, strenuously maintains the existence of a moral sense, on which our perceptions of virtue are founded, independently of all other considerations.

Dr. Paley, the most popular of all authors on moral philosophy, does not admit a natural sentiment of justice as the foundation of virtue, but is also an adherent of the selfish system, under a modified form. He makes virtue consist in "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." According to this doctrine, "the will of God is our rule, but private happiness our motive," which is just selfishness in another form.

Dr. Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, endeavors to show, that the standard of moral approbation is sympathy on the part of the impartial spectator, with the action and object of the party whose conduct is judged of.

Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart maintain the existence of a faculty in man, which produces the sentiment of right and wrong, independently of any other consideration.

These disputes are as far from being terminated among metaphysicians at present, as they were a century ago; a late writer on the subject, the Author of the article Moral Philosophy in the Edinburgh Encyclopædia, disputes the existence of a moral sense, and founds virtue upon religion and utility.

* Lib. cit. P. 32.

t Lib. cit. P. 64.

Lib. cit. vol. iv. p. 100, 101.

I have introduced this sketch of conflicting theories, to convey some idea of the boon which Phrenology would confer upon moral science, if it could fix, on a firm basis, this single point in the philosophy of mind, That a power or faculty exists, the object of which is to produce the sentiment of justice or the feeling of moral duty and obligation, independently of selfishness, hope of reward, fear of punishment or any extrinsic motive; a faculty, in short, the natural language of which is "Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum." Phrenology does this by a demonstration, founded on numerous observations, that those persons who have the organ now under consideration large, experience powerfully the sentiment of justice, while those who have that part small, are little alive to this emotion. This evidence is the same in kind as that adduced in support of the conclusions of physical science.

The faculty produces the feeling of obligation, incumbency, right and wrong, for which we have no single definite expression in the English language; just as Ideality produces the sentiment of Beauty. Justice is the result of this sentiment, acting in combination with the intellectual powers. The latter investigate the motives and consequences of actions; but, after having done so, they, of themselves, experience no emotions. In surveying human conduct, however, as soon as the intellect has thoroughly penetrated into the springs from which it proceeds, a feeling of decided approval or condemnation, distinct from all other sentiments, and from pure intellection, arises in the mind; and this is produced by the faculty of Conscientiousness.

This faculty is of the very highest importance as a regulator of all the others. If Combativeness be too active, Conscientiousness prescribes a limit to its indulgence; it permits defence, but no malicious aggression: if Acquisitiveness urge too keenly, it reminds us of the rights of others if Benevolence tend towards profusion, this faculty issues the admonition, be just before you are generous : if Ideality aspire to its high delights, when duty requires laborious exertions in a humble sphere, Conscientiousness supplies the curb, and bids the soaring spirit stoop its wing.

Nay, not only does it operate as a curb upon our too active