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Tecum habita, et nôris quàm fit tibi carta fupellex. Perf. iv. 57,
Survey thy soul, not what thou dejt appear,
But what thou art, and find the beggar there. Dryden.
Teipfum concute.

-Hor. S. 1. 3. 35.
Examine then thyself with fricteft care.
Macrobius tells us of one, who consulting the oracle, asked, by what means he might attain happi-
nejs? it was answered, Know thyself. But this answer was supposed to have been given to Cræfus,
Somhthing like it is that of Antiphanes.

El θεηγός εί, ζίλτιστε, θνητα τα φρύνει.

As thou art mortal, think of mortal things.
Some give it to Homer as the grand source of all wisdom and learning. From Heftor's declining te
fight with Ajax, knowing him to be a better man,

Αιαντος δ' ελενε μαχην τελεμονάδας. .
Ajax he shuns thro' all the dire debate,

And fears that arm, whose force he felt so late. Pope.
This admirable sentence however is bantered by the comic poet Menander;
Κατα πολλ’ αρ έστιν και καλώς τριημένοι,

Γο, γνώθι σαυτόν, χρησιμώτερον γαρ ήν
Tògrã Je T's anars.
Talk not of that fam’d sentence, Know thyself,

'Twere better far a man should know the world.
(3) Magni est animi injurias oblivisci. Cic. (de Orat.) It shews greatness of mind to forget
an injury. Delle ingiurie il remedio a lui scordarsi. Ital.

Semper et infirmi eit animi exiguique voluptas
Ultio-Juv. xiii. 191.

Revenge betrays a weak and little mind.
(i) Fortes enim non modo fortuna adjuvat, ut eft in veteri proverbio, fed multo magis ratio.
Cic. (Tusc. Q. ii.) It is not Fortune alone tbat alists and advanceth the brave, but Reason; which, by
certain precepts, as it were, confirms even courage itself.

Audentes fortesque Deus juvat. Ovid.

Audaces adjuvat ipsa Venus. Id.

A faint heart never won fair lady. Prov. Or as the French say, Le coüard n'aura belle amie.

'Αλλ' οι μεν αθυμέντες άνδρες πότε τροπαιον εστήσαντο,

Timidi nunquam ftatuere tropæa.
No trophies ever grac'd a coward's name.
1Τρός σοφίαν μεν έχαν τολμαν μαλα συμφορον έστι,
Χωρίς δε, βλαβερή, και κακότητα φέρει.
Unless to wisdom fortitude is join'd,

Lofjes ensue, and fortune proves unkind, () So Gronovius, that it


seem an Hemistic,
al. piger fibiipfe obftat.
Idle folks have the most labour. Prov.
Idleness is the key of beggary.
Idleness turns the edge of wit.
Idle folks want no excufee


Desuetudo omnibus pigritiam, pigritia veternum parit. Apul.

Difuse begets idleness, and idleness a lethargy. (1) Si tamen illam diutina peftis non infecit, nec enecuit-(fic ferè omn.) but Murelus from Pincian reads it, fi tamen illam diutina peftis infecit nec enecuit, provided the contagion of fin, which hath so long infected it, had not quite destroyed it. Gronovius prefers the former, because Seneca useth the word infici, in a stronger sense, than merely a flight and easily-curable disorder. Ep. 59. Diu in istis vitiis jacuimus; elui difficile eft; non enim inquinati fumus fed infetti. Ep. 71. Animum non coloravit fed infecit.

(m) But as Seneca, faith Muretns, differs from Posidonius, so I must beg leave to differ from Seneca: for I think the prefaces to the laws of Plato are admirable ; first, on account of the love of virtue, which is so eminently displayed therein : and, secondly, that where this prevails not, the minds of men are to be drawn off from sin and wickedness by the fear of punishments, under the fanctions subjoined to those prefaces. Be this as it will, nothing, I think, can be more just than what Seneca here faith, with regard to the brevity of laws; and nothing more applicable to our due observance of the positive laws of God, in the Christian scheme, than his; mone, dic quid me velis feciffe: non disco, fed pareo. Tell me what you would have me do; I am all obedience. God hath told us what we ought to do, and what to believe; and if through the weakness of our underftandings we cannot in some cases see the reason of such a law; or, where the sublimity of the subject will admit of no greater clearness, give a reason of the things we believe; yet we may give a good reason for our belief in those things: It is the word and will of God, therefore we believe ; we believe, and therefore we obey. M.

(n) Cicero, (ii. de leg.) Et illud bené di&um eft a Pythagora, doctiffimo viro, tum maximi et pietatem et religionem verfari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus. That the time when men are most honest, is, when they present themselves before the Gods. This is mentioned likewise by Plutarch. De Superft. p. 169. De Def. Orac. p. 447.

(0) Gr. undèy ay av. Gall. Affez y a si trop n'y a. Ital. L'abondanza delle cose ingenera faftidio. And our English proverb, too much of one thing is good for nothing.

Diogenes ascribes it to Pythagoras; Aristotle to Bias; others to Thales, and others to Solon; and some ascribe it, as the nosce teipfum, to Homer from Od. o. 69.

νεμεσσομαι δε και άλλω
Ανδρι ξενοδοκω, ος κ' έξοχα μεν φιλικσιν,
*Εξοχα δέχθαιρησιν· αμείνω δ' αισιμα παντα. .
For oft in others freely I reprove
The ill-tim'd efforts of officious love :
Who love too much, hate in the like extreme,
And both the golden mean alike condemn. Pope.
Παντων μεν κοροςές, και ύπνο και φιλότητος
Μολπής το γκυκερής, και αμυμονος έρχήθμοιον. ΙΙ. ν. 637.
The best of things beyond their measure cloy ;
Sleep's balmy bleffing, love's endearing joy;
The feast, the dance; whate'er mankind de fire ;
Ev'n the sweet charms of facred numbers tire. Pope.
Τυδιδη, μητ' άρ με μαλ' αινες, μητε τι ωκε. Π. κ. 249.
Be not too lavish,

or in praise or blame.
But I had rather faith Erasmus give it to Hefiod.
Μετρα φυλάσσεται καιρός δέπι πάσιν άρισος.

Pindar in imitation of the foregoing lines from Homer;

Képor da Xesuci'e hend, weil

Τα τερης ανθ' αφροδίσια. Pindar in Plutarch, rocor d'ê xe , und er ágær, émos trepisos a unsur-As if the wife men had Extolled above measure that saying, too much of nothing.

Ilavtev iné prväpiso-Phocylides.

The mean of every thing is beft. Sophocles in Ele&tra. Mni'cis 573 Alpes

υπεραχθεο μήτ' επιλέθε. .

Patient submit; nor let thy rage
Too far transport thee, nor oblivion drown

The just remembrance of thy matchless woes. Franklin,
Euripides Hippol. 264.

έτω το λιαν γ' ήσσον επαινώ
Tš un niv ägayo---
Και ξυμφησεσι σοφόι μοι.
Too much of any thing is sure amiss ;

Since all philosophers agree in this.
Alpheus, Anthol, 1. 1. c. 12. το μηδέν γαρ αγαν, άγαν με τερπει:
Athenaus, 1. 1. Πασας δ' έκκραδιας ανίας ανδρων αλαπαζε

Πινόμενος κατά μετρον υπέρ μετρον δε χεριων. .
A cbearful glass revives the drooping foul;

Not fo, o'ercbarg'd, with the unmeasur'd bowl. Plin. l. 11. Perniciofiflimum autem est in omni quidem vita quod nimium eft. - In every cir. cumstance of life too much of any thing is dangerous.

Quintilian (1. 12. c. 6.) writes, modum in pronunciatione regnare, quemadmodum in cæteris omnibus, that a mean is to be observed in pronunciation as in all other things. Plautus, in Panulo, Modus omnibus in rebus,---est optimus.

Ef modus in rebus sunt certi denique fines.
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. Hor. S. 1. 1.
In every thing observe the golden mean,
Virtue within fix'd bounds is only feer. Shard.
Virtus est medium vitiorum utrinque redactum. Id. Ep. i. 18.
On each extreme a different vice is seen,

For virtue's throne is seated in the mean. Id.
Lastly Plutarch, in the life of Camillus teacheth, that true piety consists in the mean between
Atheism and Superstition.
W) The same with Horace ; Semper avarus eget.Ep. i. 2. 5.

See the pale mifer, (who intensely pries
On untouch'd bags with over watchful eyes,
Nor dares to use the wealth his labour won,)
Create the very want he means to foun.

Anon. (9) With what measure you mete it fvall be measured to you. Therefore, what foever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets. Matth. vi. 2. 12. (6) The contemplative and the active. So Philosophy; Ep. 95. See Lips. Manud. Diff. ii. 5.

(s) Alluding

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(s) Alluding to the customs of the times when the Princes or Governors published the edicts, for the admonition, correction, and compulfion of the people. See Lipf. ad Tacit. Ann. 1. 3.

(6) i.e. knowledge of what is contained in the decrees; and an habit obtained, by that means, of doing what is right.

(u) Abigatque rumores] The edition of Muretus reads it tumores, perhaps by the error of the press; though it hath its meaning; to pluck down our pride.

(x) This is what the Stoics absolutely deny, and maintain that men are all naturally born good, but that from our communication with a corrupt world the innate sparks of virtue are extinguished, and the contrary vices arise, and are confirmed. Cicero (de Leg. i.) Juftos quidem Naturâ nos efle factos, tantum autem esse corruptelam malæ consuetudinis, ut ab eà tanquam igniculi extinguantur a Naturâ dati, exorianturque et confirmertur vitia contraria.

Not so the Academics, who maintain, with Apuleius, in a Platonic sense, Hominem ob Airpe ipsa neque absolutè bonum, nec malum nafci, sed ad utrumque proclive ingenium esse. Habere quidem semina quædam utrarumque rerum, cum nafcendi origine copulata, quæ educationis disciplina in alteram debeant partem emicare. That man is not born absolutely either good or bad; that be bas certain innate qualities, which from discipline and instruction, or the want of it, are inclined to either fide. If virtue, says Galen, comes by nature, and depravity from sentiment and example; tell me who corrupted the first man, when as yet, it is supposed, there was no malignity in the world? They could not but have it from themselves. It is said that this argument converted Posidonius from Stoicism, and inclined him to think with the Academics.

Horace speaks more agreeably with the Chriftian scheme, when he says, Nemo vitiis fine nafcitur.
So Demofthenes, pedev ei ucep Tev esi Señv, the Gods alone are free from all fin. And Propertius,

Unicuique dedit vitium Natura creato.

Nature in every breast implanted vice.
Undoubtedly, let some affected disputants argue as they please. Every man is sensible of that de-
pravity, or proneness to evil, which deviating from original righteousness, and being repugnant
to the law of God, bath of itself the rature of fin; and is therefore by Divines called original fin,
( (2)

Os homini sublime dedit, cælumque videre
Jussit et erectos ad fidera tollere vultus.' Ov. Met. i. 88.
Hence, while his fellow-creatures of the earth,
Prone to the ground their fight, betray their birth:
Man of erected frane looks up on high,
Heav'nward he cajis his elevated eye,

And grows familiar with bis native sky.
Cicero (de Leg. i. 9.] Cum cætera animalia abjeciflet ad pastum, folum hominem erexit ad cæli
cognitionem. Id. (de Nat. Deor.) Qui Deus) constituit eos (homines) humo excitatos, celfos, et
erectos conftituit ut Deorum cognitionem cælum intuentes capere poffint. Sunt enim ex terra ho-
mines, non ut incolæ et habitatores, fed quasi spectatores fuperarum rerum atque coeleftium, quo-
zum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. He (the God of Nature) bath made
us of a ftature tall and upright, that beholding the heavens we might arrive to the knowledge of the
Gods ; for we are not fimply to dwell bere as inhabitants of the earth, but to contemplate the bravens,
and the fars ; a privilege not granted to any other kind of animated beings.-- Xenophon has used the
fame argument to sew the wisdom of the Deity in the conftitution of man, as he hath other argu-
ments similar to what are used by the Stoic, soon after in his Examination into the Senses. (N.)

(<) Seneca (de Benef. vii. 10.) Video serrum ex üfdem tenebris elle prolatum, quibus aurum et argentum; ne aut instrumentum in cædes mutuas deesset, aut pretium : I obferve that iron is produced from the fame seat of darkness as are gold and fluer, that there may not be wanting an in;lrument for murder, or a reward for the same.


nec bela fuerunt
Faginus aditabat cùm fcyphus ante dapes.

Then wars began,

When the gold cup expellid the beechen can.
So to the Apothecary :

There is thy gold; worse poison to men's foul,
Than these poor compounds, which thou d'arsi not fell.

I fell thee poyjon ; thou haft fold me none. + This Lipfius does not allow, if you except the two last; as the foregoing honours were conferred upon him in his absence.

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You desire, Lucilius, that I would consider of what I told you in my last, should be deferred to another day (a); and to let you know whes ther I thought that part of philosophy, which the Greaks call παραινετικη, and we (præceptiva) preceptive, or exhortatory, fufficient to make a man perfectly wise. I know you would not take it amiss thould I

I therefore renew my promise, notwithstanding that proverbial form of speech-postea noli rogare, quod impetrare nolueris Ask not again for what you wish not to obtain.

you wish not to obtain. For it is no uncommon thing to ask with earnestness, what if offered we should refuse: now, whether this is owing to levity, or fauciness, the best way of punishing it is by a ready compliance.

refuse you.

We would fain seem, I say, to desire many things, which, in reality, we are averse to. A certain Author produced a large history, wrote in small characters and closely folded up, which when he had read great part of, I will give over, said he, if you please. No, no; read on, rend on; cry the audience, who had much rather he should hold his tongue.

Thus we often wit for one thing and pray for another; and speak not the truth to the Gods themselves : but the Vol. II. Z


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