the traditions that he has left behind. Very soon he becomes a fervent Canadian.

If the federation of the Empire is to be successful, it must be a federation of nations. Lord Milner, in one of his speeches in Canada, put it finely when he said that 'Imperial patriotism must be based first of all upon Canadian patriotism.' The best contribution that Canada can make to a new Empire must be its Canadian quality. The success of the British Empire depends upon its power of harmoniously associating many races and several nations, and not, as in the United States, on an attempt at chemical fusion. And along with the necessity, in the organisation of the British Empire, of making room for expanding nationalism goes the necessity of basing it upon genuine democratic activity. The great problem to be solved is, Can democracy organise itself, acquire complete corporate efficiency, and retain its genuine democratic quality? The writer believes that it can, and that its ability to do so depends upon the development of a new education. It is idle to talk of democratic control if democracy has no knowledge of the problems that it is supposed to manage. The work of the 'Council for the Study of International Relations' is a recognition of this very thing; and the avidity with which people, hitherto unacquainted with international affairs and with the larger problems of politics, listen to any genuine explanation of them is a sign that the thing can be done.

Art. 11.-THE FLEETS OF OUR ALLIES.

IN the perspective of a war, in which seven of the eight great naval Powers have been engaged for a minimum period of nearly two years-Italy having joined the Quadruple Entente on May 23, 1915-there is a tendency for the work of the lesser fleets to be overlooked. The simultaneous prosecution of hostilities by vast armies in many theatres has, moreover, led inevitably to a lack of appreciation of the work done at sea. Little is heard of the vast accumulation of naval force which is similarly engaged in the conflict. With the entry of Italy into the war, the number of capital ships-battleships and battle-cruisers-in the opposing fleets was raised to nearly two hundred, aggregating nearly 3,000,000 tons displacement. The array of cruisers of various types reached two hundred, and of torpedo craft there were over seven hundred. The imagination is stunned by the impression of mobile power which such figures suggest, and yet during a period now approaching three years the only action which can accurately be described as a battle is that which was fought in the North Sea on May 31 of last year. Cruiser squadrons have been engaged, but again this activity has occurred mainly in the North Sea, though the Baltic has also exhibited from time to time a measure of liveliness.' The Falkland Islands action did, it is true, break the silence which enshrouded the Pacific; but, once the British battlecruisers had ceased firing, the fog of war again descended.

It may seem to the casual observer a remarkable and anomalous condition that, although war broke out in August 1914, in April 1917 not ten per cent. of the battleships now in the various fleets have on a single occasion fired a gun in anger. The experience is only what might have been expected, in view of the superiority of naval power opposed to the enemy. Germany and AustriaHungary entered the war conscious of their naval inferiority. The odds were heavily against them at sea; a large man-of-war once lost could not be replaced before the conclusion of hostilities, and therefore they confided their hopes to a war of attrition. Destroyers, submarines and mines have been employed in the hope that thereby the strength of the main fleets of the Allies

would be reduced, and a condition of something approaching parity of strength produced. That plan has failed, but the strategy adopted by the Central Powers has placed the seamen of the Allied Fleets at somewhat of a disadvantage in relation to the public opinion of the several countries. The uninstructed spectator of events has little conception of the invincibility of a defensive policy in these days of long-range coast artillery, elaborate minefields, antitorpedo nets, and mobile flotillas of swift destroyers and menacing submersible craft. Except at an extravagant cost, it is impossible, without the aid of military power, to force a fleet in hiding out to sea. It is possible that this may not prove a permanent condition. Incidents which occurred during the Dardanelles operations suggest that, in time, it may be possible, by the use of aircraft, to dig out an enemy's fleet. But, for the present, as experience has shown, the enemy fleets in northern and southern waters are immune from attack so long as friendly armies hold the peripheries of the naval bases. The result is to rob the superior fleets of the satisfaction of violent action.

But a battle is merely a means to an end. In that respect warfare at sea differs fundamentally from warfare on land. On land, an army seizes territory and acquires authority over persons and property, even though the opposing army escapes destruction. There is no parallel to this condition at sea. Fleets do not occupy territory. A naval battle is fought in order to secure the right to use the seas for military and economic purposes. When an enemy fleet retires to its base or bases, it concedes to its opponent the fruits of victory. It would be more satisfactory to the Allies if they had had opportunities of destroying the opposing naval forces, and thus settling, once for all, the issue. But, in the absence of battles, the advantages of victory have been harvested. If the Allied Fleets had won no silent victories, there would be no British armies confronting the enemy in France, Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa, because their existence depends upon the victorious assertion of sea power; and the other armies would have lacked the increased strength which they have drawn from the control of ocean communications.

There is a temptation to assume that this success

has been due in the main, if not entirely, to the influence exerted by the British Fleet. In this country there is certainly no inclination to undervalue the work which British squadrons and flotillas have performed. The British Fleet is to-day stronger, absolutely and relatively, than when the war opened, and the pressure which it is exerting on the enemy is greater than at any period either in this war or in any preceding war of which records exist, unless it be the struggle of 1861-65 between the Northern and Southern States of America. The results which have been achieved against a Power which ranked as the second greatest naval Power in the world may be traced ultimately to a master-stroke of strategy -the concentration of practically all the main effective units under the White Ensign in the North Sea. There is no parallel to the action of the Admiralty in the years preceding the war in drawing up the plans which were adopted for the disposition of the Fleet. Strategical conditions, it is true, recommended the course which was taken, but the policy of concentration nevertheless marks a strategic innovation. Never before had the British people witnessed the assembly under the authority of one flag-officer of practically all the most efficient and powerful ships at their command. What would be said to-day if, in the North Sea, the British strength was inferior to that of Germany, or at best represented a bare margin of safety'? That that is not the condition which exists is largely due to the cooperation, active and efficient, of the Allied Fleets.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume that in facilitating the great concentration in the North Sea the fleets of our Allies have rendered their most notable service to the cause. The Russian Navy has proved a great source of embarrassment to the Germans. The enemy regarded the naval forces of the Tsar as of slight importance, and exhibited no little contempt for Russian seamen. This estimate was based upon the unfortunate series of incidents which occurred in the Far East during the war with Japan. From the very opening of hostilities in the summer of 1914, the Germans assumed the offensive; the cruiser Augsburg,' in bombarding Russia's advanced naval base, Libau, fired the first shot to be

discharged by any man-of-war in this struggle. A paper estimate of Russian naval strength was calculated to support the belief that the Germans would be able to exercise an almost unrestricted command of the Baltic. Under the Russian ensign, there were only four preDreadnought battleships, half a dozen large cruisers, mainly obsolescent, five light cruisers, eighty effective destroyers, and a few submarines. It was, perhaps, almost inevitable that a materially minded people like the Germans should underestimate Russia's real strength at sea, omitting to take account of all that had occurred in the naval service since the close of the war in the Far East. The Russian Fleet had experienced a renaissance, the most active influence in which had been Admiral von Essen, who for several years before the opening of the war had been in command of the Baltic Fleet.

War found the Russian Navy comparatively weak in ships, but strong in its personal elements; officers and men had been accustomed to cruising in all weathers; the commanding officers had been encouraged to run risks, the Commander-in-Chief realising that war consists in accepting well-calculated hazards. Owing to the inferiority of Russian materiel, it was impossible to translate into action the policy which Admiral von Essen had preached and practised, at any rate so far as the small battle squadron was concerned. A cautious policy was all the more essential, since four new battleships of the 'Gangut' class, displacing 23,000 tons, and each armed with twelve 12-inch and sixteen 4.7-inch guns, were in an advanced stage of construction at Petrograd under the supervision of leading British shipbuilders. In addition, four battle-cruisers, of 32,000 tons, and carrying a main armament of twelve 14-inch guns, were in course of construction at the Baltic and New Admiralty yards. Several small cruisers and a large number of destroyers and submarines were also in hand. In the circumstances, it would, therefore, have been an act of folly on the part of the Russians to risk the one efficient battle squadron of four ships in commission during the early stage of hostilities, since they had the assurance that, if the war proved a long one, they would be able to exercise a commanding influence on the course of naval events in these northern waters.