which, when war came, failed to rise to the height of its opportunity. It is impossible as yet to apportion the responsibility fairly among these various factors. But, if we endeavour to judge the problem without prejudice, we shall be forced to admit that we should have waged war with much greater energy and success had we been more firmly united as a nation and as an empire. And further, if we are capable of learning wisdom from adversity, we must understand that after the war national existence will depend on national unity.

It would be folly to imagine that even in the most perfect unity there will be no differences of opinion upon policy and administration, no vigorous antagonisms of persons and principles, no divergences of interest between classes, and no political parties-for this would mean stagnation, and stagnation is not unity. It is possible, however, to conceive a State in which public opinion will pass prompt and final judgment upon all proposals, according as they seem to promote or endanger the well-being and security of the nation. This is the standard now; why should it ever change?

Art. 14.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

THE persistently bad weather of the past three months has caused an unavoidable slackening in the Allied offensive on the Somme. A period of heavy rain and south-westerly gales, interspersed with occasional fair intervals of brief duration, set in on Oct. 2, and continued well into November. The atmospheric conditions, by interfering with aerial observation, prevented the effective cooperation of artillery in the attack; and the chalky soil of Picardy, under the action of incessant wet, was soon reduced to a state which precluded the employment of large bodies of troops in the attack, and made it difficult for heavy guns to change position. The continuity which had previously characterised the operations was, in consequence, interrupted; and the attacks which were carried out from time to time, as occasion offered, were, for the most part, restricted to such limited objectives as could be attained and made good by comparatively small forces.

The comparative inactivity imposed by the weather was the more unfortunate because, at the beginning of October, there was every prospect of more brilliant successes being in store for the Allied armies than any which had been achieved during the earlier stages of the offensive. The new British troops had become hardened and experienced, and were elated by the unbroken series of successes which had definitely established their supremacy over the enemy both on land and in the air. They were in the confident mood which, by triumphing over obstacles, commands the favours of Fortune, and carries armies to victory. The Germans, on the other hand, were, for the most part, suffering the depression which is induced by a long succession of reverses, accompanied by heavy losses, and varied by no substantial success which might have served to cheer their flagging spirits. Moreover, the formidable system of fortifications which had been evolved by German ingenuity, and perfected by nearly two years of unremitting labour, had collapsed before the onset of the Allied armies, who now had before them only hastily prepared entrenchments, providing inadequate cover during bombardment, and comparatively poor facilities for resisting attack. The

enemy was without reserves, every division which could be borrowed from other parts of the front in France having been thrown into the fighting on the Sommesometimes twice, or even three times-and practically destroyed as an effective force. In fact, the crisis of the prolonged conflict seemed to have been reached when the weather joined forces with the Germans, and, by checking the Allies' progress just when a vigorous advance was most essential, saved them from defeat.

The capture of Eaucourt l'Abbaye on Oct. 1, and of Le Sars on Oct. 7, opened up the line of attack on the 'hammer-headed spur,' which, springing from the main ridge between Flers and Martinpuich, and sweeping round to the east of Eaucourt l'Abbaye at a distance of 1500 yards, broadens out into the form which suggested its name, filling the greater part of the space between Thilloy and Le Sars, and overlooking those villages at a distance of half a mile. The western end, marked by a tumulus known as the Butte de Warlencourt, was occupied early in November, but the eastern extremity is still in the enemy's hands. A second dominating spur, which stretches from Morval in the direction of Thilloy, and commands the German positions in the region of Le Transloy, was also the objective of minor operations, in conjunction with the French, throughout October. By the middle of November the greater part had been captured, and the Allied trenches had been pushed down the eastern slope within 1200 yards of Le Transloy; while, further south, the French had taken the twin villages of Sailly and Saillisel, and occupied the western margin of the Bois St Pierre de Vaast. During the same period, the capture of a series of entrenchments between Le Sars and Thiepval enabled the British to establish their front on a line two miles north of Courcelette, astride a third great spur which extends from the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt to the region between Pys and Miraumont.

The operations outlined above gave our troops possession of a considerable part of the northern slopes of the watershed between the Ancre and the Somme, and of the three important spurs commanding the line of villages, from Grandcourt and Miraumont, on the west, to Le Transloy, on the east, which the enemy has fortified

as pivots of his system of defence in the lower country beyond. The western extremity of the ridge beyond the Schwaben Redoubt, and a formidable maze of fortifications on the slope which falls steeply to the Ancre, including the strongly defended village of St Pierre Divion, were still in the enemy's possession; and these, together with the heights above Beaucourt and Beaumont Hamel on the opposite side of the river, had to be taken in order to complete the conquests of the preceding four months by securing possession of the gorge through which the upper waters of the Ancre issue into the Somme valley. The German positions in this locality both commanded the British entrenchments to the southwest, and the line of advance from Thiepval and Courcelette towards Grandcourt and Miraumont.

The improvement in the weather, which took place on Nov. 9, after a final burst of storm and rain, offered an opportunity which Sir Douglas Haig was not slow to seize. Before dawn on Nov. 13, under cover of a thick mist, an attack was delivered on a front of about 8000 yards astride the Ancre, extending from the neighbourhood of the Stuff Redoubt, on the right, to a point midway between Beaumont Hamel and Serre, on the left. The enemy's positions were thus simultaneously assailed in front from the south-west, and in flank from the south-east. The attack was preceded by a brief bombardment. The Germans appear to have been completely taken by surprise, for the attack, in its earlier stages, was not strongly opposed. St Pierre Divion was taken early in the day, and before evening Beaumont Hamel had fallen. On Nov. 14 Beaucourt was captured, while, south of the Ancre, the front was advanced to the outskirts of Grandcourt. On Nov. 18 the weather broke again, and the operations had to be suspended.

The loss of these positions, together with nearly 7000 prisoners, was a severe blow to the Germans, who had, apparently, persuaded themselves that the Allied offensive had come to an end. The defences are said to have been even more formidable than those of Thiepval; and the success of the operation is evidence of the excellence of the Staff arrangements, and of the intelligence and resolution with which they were carried out. The dense

mist, which favoured surprise, made it difficult to maintain order and cohesion in the attack; and the precision with which the objectives were reached testifies to the discipline of the troops, and to the courage and resource of their leaders. To quote the official report, 'The troops employed have shown conspicuous skill, dash, and fortitude; and our success was not won without a hard struggle, as the enemy resisted strongly, and the condition of the ground greatly increased the difficulty of the attack.'

On the front south of the Somme, the French, during October and November, carried out a series of operations which had the result of bringing up the reentrant in their line between Chaulnes and Berny. On Oct. 10 they captured the hamlet of Bovent, 1200 yards north of Ablaincourt, the western outskirts of the latter, and the greater part of Chaulnes Wood. Four days later they advanced their line eastward from Bovent, taking the hamlet of Genermont, within half a mile of Fresnes ; and, by a separate attack, captured the first-line trench east of Belloy on a front of 2000 yards. Finally, on Nov. 7, they completed the occupation of Ablaincourt, and gained possession of Pressoir, which lies 600 yards to the south-west, on the road to Chaulnes. The toll of unwounded prisoners taken in these operations amounted to nearly 4000.

But the most notable event on the French front was the brilliant offensive conducted at Verdun between Oct. 24 and Nov. 4, and continued on Dec. 15, by which our Allies recovered the Damloup Battery, Forts Vaux and Douaumont, the Thiaumont Redoubt, and the Haudromont quarries. The enemy were completely taken unawares, having, apparently, persuaded themselves that the French had exhausted all their energies on the Somme. The recapture, on Dec. 15 and 16, of the Bezonvaux and Hardaumont redoubts, the village of Bezonvaux, the Chambrettes Farm, and the villages of Louvemont and Vacherauville, together with the intervening position of the Côte du Poivre, restored the French practically to the positions occupied on Feb. 24, the third day of the great German offensive. The number of prisoners taken in this series of operations exceeded 14,000. The enemy's chagrin may be judged