treasure for the sake of regulating conditions in the Balkans. The most striking and at the same time the most pleasing symptom, however, is that there are no protests at the turn events have taken. The conviction seems to have penetrated through the whole nation that it must be so that we are not out for an adventure, but merely obeying an inward necessity, when we make the cause of Turkey and Bulgaria our own. In reality we are only obeying a compelling geographical command.

Germany needs, like every other land which desires to live in freedom and independence, access to the sea. She had that in the north so long as Germany and Britain were at peace, but lost it when the latter became her enemy, and placed a huge padlock on the door of the German house by blockading the North Sea. Hence, unless we wish to die a death of economic suffocation, nothing remains but to force our way through in the opposite direction-a route already indicated by the course of our greatest natural thoroughfare, the Danube.

"The road is free! On Oct. 26, 1915, when a Bulgarian patrol entered the camp of the Austro-German army at Kladowa, East and West joined hands. The time has passed when each tried to subjugate the other in a sanguinary lifeand-death struggle. Each will retain its own peculiar characteristics, recognising and aiding each other. Great tasks, extraordinary in their limitless prospects, await us there' (Haller, op. cit.).

It would be invidious to deny the possibility of developing the means of communication between the North Sea and the Black Sea. Charlemagne had the intention to build a canal joining the Main (which flows into the Rhine) and the Danube. The Main-Danube canal was completed in 1840, under Ludwig I of Bavaria, but, like many other such waterways, it fell almost into disuse with the development of railways. Furthermore, it is frozen over for weeks, or even months, every year. The war seems to have brought home to the Germans the possibilities of this connexion; and during the past year there has been considerable agitation in favour of enlarging the existing canal to enable ships of 600 to 800 tons burden to pass through. Engineers have already drawn up plans which have been accepted by the 'Bavarian Canals Society' (President, King Ludwig III). The canal leaves the Main at Bamberg, passes through

The

Erlangen and Nuremberg, and joins the Danube at Ratisbon. It is proposed to avoid certain obstacles by correcting the present course, so that the new ship-canal would be connected with the Danube at Kelheim. Germans hope by this means not only to facilitate their trade with the Balkans, but also to open up new areas of supply. This, it is believed, would be an effective weapon in case the North Sea were again blockaded. Such a development would of course deprive Austria-Hungary of many geographical advantages, besides increasing Germany's political influence in the south-eastern European States. It would no doubt promote one of the fundamental ideas of Naumann's Central Europe,' a book which has been received with mixed feelings in the Dual Monarchy.*

Signs are not wanting to show that there are still Germans who remain unconverted to Weltpolitik. Prof. Hettner refers to the antagonists to a German colonial policy in these terms:

'It is all the more astonishing that, now as we are approaching victory, there are patriotic men raising a warning voice against the acquisition of new colonies, even advising the surrender of our old colonies and the renunciation of our maritime policy, or at least that this should only occupy a subordinate position. Without further ado it may be admitted that the first care of a nation must be its own immediate territory, before it can venture to satisfy the desire for luxuries. Those advisers would be right, if our world activities were merely the luxury English critics have dubbed them. But they are no longer luxuries, they have become an absolute vital necessity. We can no longer cover the home demand for food from home sources; without an outlet for our energies, without importing food and raw materials, without a market for the products of our industries, without opportunities for realising our goods and investing our capital in the outside world, we cannot exist. . . .

"The possession of colonies and, in fact, every kind of political activity in foreign lands assumes the possibility of the means of communication with them remaining open, not only in peace but also in war. Such a cutting-off from our colonies, as well as from all other domains where we have been engaged in economic, political and cultural work, as we

* Dr Naumann has recently been lecturing on this subject in Bulgaria.

are suffering from in this war, can only have a disastrous result. We can only be and remain a world-nation when we have free communication at all times with every part of the globe. World-economics, world-culture and world-politics must be based on a secure system of world-communication.

'Even of late years it has seemed as if our Oriental policy was by no means firmly established. Thus, in 1913, the author of "Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg" (German World-policy without War) advocated the renunciation of our Oriental plans in favour of expansion in Central Africa. But it is to be hoped that the present war and the alliance with Turkey will give our Eastern aims a firm and permanent position in our foreign policy. So long as the Orient was only accessible through the Mediterranean it was outside our consideration. But its special importance now lies in the fact that here we have found a door leading to the outside world, a continental route which is not dominated by England's naval supremacy, and which in case of war cannot be closed by England. It is true that it leads through foreign territories, and therein lies the difficulty.

'Our naval development must proceed together with our work in the Orient because our colonial possessions are all overseas; instead of giving them up we must increase them. The indispensable preliminary condition for our world-work is that the seas are free, i.e. delivered from British domination. It is true that up till now this freedom has been nonexistent, but still we have had fruitful fields of work beyond the seas. We were merely walking blindfold along the edge of a precipice. The long period of peace with England had caused us to overlook the danger which lay in England's naval supremacy. Indeed, we were hardly conscious of it, although many of us have viewed the future with anxiety, since the relations between the two countries became less friendly. But I do not believe that anyone had ever imagined the catastrophe which has now befallen our shipping, our overseas trade, and our colonies, and that therewith England would ignore the principles of international law and wage war, not only against the German Empire, but against the private property of German subjects. England's supremacy on the sea must be broken. Now that our Weltpolitik has brought us into armed conflict with England, we must endeavour, in spite of Britain's power, to gain that which will be conducive to our welfare; and that is not a limitation to West Africa, but a sphere of interest or an empire which stretches across Africa from one ocean to the other. We will win our place in the sun, and to this end

destroy England's world domination, and keep Russia within her proper limits. Nor will we renounce the Pacific either to American or Japanese dominion. Until we have broken England's power we cannot be a great and free nation' (Hettner, op. cit.).

The entire September number, 1915, of the 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte' was devoted to the Eastern question. In an article already cited, entitled 'Deutschland und die Türkei,' Prof. Düring writes:

'I spent fourteen years in the Orient just in the period when German interests and influence began to increase there. My great love for the country and its people has always led me to wish and hope that Turkey would rise to the rank of a first-class power with Germany's help. For, in common with many thoughtful Turks, we have long since recognised that such a development would be impossible with Russian, French or British aid. In fact none of these Powers ever intended or desired the hope to be realised, but on the other hand thwarted its realisation by every means in its control.'

And Prof. Roloff follows up the idea.

'Turkey has become a kind of "life insurance" for Germany against the English danger. For, in case Britain eventually attacked Germany, the reply would be an attack through Turkey against Egypt. A beginning has also been made in the tremendous task of awakening new life in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, the once fruitful Mesopotamia. For many years past a British company has been engaged on this gigantic problem. They have endeavoured, by reconstructing the decayed irrigation canals, building new dams, and extending the irrigation system, to revive in this dead land the same or even greater fertility than it enjoyed thousands of years ago. Now we may safely assume that German engineers will complete the work of transforming and opening up these enormous territories.

'Another task to which the Turks must devote themselves is the development of their sea power. Germany too must acquire a naval station on Turkish soil. France and Britain have consistently opposed both these aims with all the powers at their command. Yet it will be necessary to force them through, in order to break down Anglo-French supremacy in the Mediterranean' (Roloff, op. cit.).

'It is imperative that in the present war we should dispel from the British mind the belief that any injury whatever

Our alliance with

can be inflicted upon us by a blockade. Austria-Hungary and the re-birth of the Turkish Empire are the foundations upon which the plan can be realised. In these three Empires there is everything to hand which we require. England herself has indicated the way to our goal by the wrath with which she has pursued us since the commencement of the Bagdad railway. That was the first attempt to undermine Britain's supremacy of the seas by boldly evading it with a land route. Of what use would Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal be to England, if our land-ways to Persia and India are secure beyond the range of the biggest naval guns? The time must come when the British will be met by land cannon wherever they may try to land. The logical and crushing reply to a British blockade is a stupendous Continental System which will finally drive John Bull from one ocean to the other like a Flying Dutchman.' *

The past, present and future of Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula are dealt with in great detail by several writers, all of whom write under the assumption that Germany is sure of a victory in the war which will enable her to direct the destiny of the territories in question. It must be admitted that in the meantime nothing has transpired that is calculated to destroy these hopes, while the capture of Bucharest on Dec. 6 will doubtless have strengthened them. If any deduction is possible from Germany's huge effort to crush Rumania, it is that Germany attaches the greatest importance to the removal of a menace to the Berlin-Constantinople line.

Herr Hans Rohde gives a clear account in his 'Germany in the Near East' of the existing and projected railway between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf. The following particulars have been taken from this source. The section Haidar-Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Konia (466 miles) belongs to the Anatolian Railway, and is built for a speed limit of 21 miles in the hour. The remainder of the line is known as the Bagdad Railway, on which the speed limit is 46 miles

Wilhelm Weiler: 'Der Krieg gegen England' (The War against England), in 'Süddeutsche Monatshefte' for Sept. 1915.

+ Deutschland in Vorderasien,' von Hans Rohde. Mittler & Son : Berlin, 1916.