It is unnecessary to dwell on the undisguised laxness of a definition, which makes moral inability synonymous with a sensation of inconvenience, and excuses a man of rank and wealth from the discharge of admitted obligations every time he can allege that such discharge might cramp his means for providing an ample supply of servants and horses.' The administration of justice demands integrity, not merely in judges, but also in witnesses. Let us see how our Jesuit Divines fashion their teaching on this head. The first point laid down is, that no obligation to make reparation can attach to any one who has given false witness from invincible ignorance, inadvertence, or delusion, a proposition which, though not wholly free from objections, we will not canvass. But Father Gury proceeds to consider the case of one who, with the view of supplying deeds that have been lost, and of promoting the success of indisputable right, (the indisputableness of such right being left to the subjective test of individual appreciation), either reproduces, that is, forges, or tampers with a writing, a chirograph, or a deed of acknowledgement; and he concludes that, though-a person acting thus 'would, indeed, sin venially on the score of a lie, the document produced not being the authentic one, on the strength of which judgment should rest; and though he might possibly incur a grave sin against charity toward himself by exposing his person to imminent peril of very severe penalties in the likely event of detection; nevertheless, he would be wholly free from all sin against mutual justice, and would consequently stand absolved from all obligations to make restitution.'* An illustration, suggested by a memorable case not likely to fade from the memory of the living generation, will bring out better than much argument the consequences which might follow, if this ruling were to hold good. Amongst the numerous witnesses who spoke confidently to the identification of the Claimant as Roger Tichborne, it is undeniable that many spoke in unimpeachable good faith. It is well known that in the tangled web of the evidence in this suit a sealed document, which had been deposited by the genuine Tichborne with a particular person, constituted a capital incident. Let us now assume that in the belief of Roger's death the paper had been destroyed, but that the depositary was amongst those who had persuaded themselves as to the Claimant being the true man. In this state of mind he blames himself as having imperilled, by premature destruction of the document, a claim the justice of which has become to him a matter of firm belief. That he is a witness testifying under invincible ignorance is Gury, vol. ii. p. 21. De Obligationibus Testium. beyond beyond dispute, for his faith in the Claimant is the result of thorough delusion. What would be more natural than that, with so earnest a conviction as to the justice of the cause advocated, he should be overcome with remorse at the injury he believes himself to have wrought, and a burning desire to do whatever may be in his power to make it good? And now let us further assume that this depositary had sat at the feet of Father Gury, that he had penetrated himself with his teaching, and that at this conjuncture of severe mental trouble there flashed back on him the recollection of this particular ruling. He then exclaims to himself, Here is a man striving to assert undoubted right,' in the chain of whose evidence one link is alone wanting, and that link is wanting solely in consequence of my own unwarrantable hastiness; I know the goodness of the case; I am deeply sensible of my obligation to promote 'undoubted right'; and most happily my memory recals the exact tenour of the rashly destroyed document; for I have it under the hand of that superlative master in morals, Father Gury, that in such circumstances, to reproduce a document, and palm off a supposititious copy on the judge, is no sin of gravity, but at most an act of fibbing or of exposing myself lightly to the inconvenient penalties of the law; therefore I will reproduce the document, and thereby do the one thing needful to ensure the triumph of struggling and ' undoubted right.' On what ground, we ask, could any Jesuit divine hold that such an act under these circumstances would not be exempt from all serious blame? Critics of authority have brought charges of apocryphal compositions and tamperings with texts against scholars either themselves Jesuit Fathers or under the influence of Jesuit training, and the evidence, already not slight in support of such charges, cannot but gain in force when we find the most accredited spokesman of the Order pounding maxims that deliberately countenance recourse to fabrication and forgery.* 6 It *Lest it should be thought we are too hard on Father Gury, we submit another of his rulings. A will written in the testator's own hand, so that no outside witness to its contents can be forthcoming, has been made in exclusive favour of Adrian, who is aware of the fact. Immediately after the testator's death there occurred this mishap. As the joyous heir was feasting bis eyes on the document ensuring his possession of fortune over the heads of the natural heirs, an untoward gust of wind swept it into the fire, and the precious deed was burnt. Adrian was on the point of going into sheer despair, when a wonderful idea struck his mind. Lo and behold, he imitates perfectly the writing and signature of the testator, and thus puts things back exactly as they were.' The question is whether Adriau did wrong, and how far he might be bound in justice to make any reparation to the natural heirs who would have come into possession but for his having palmed off his own handiwork as the testator's deed. Gury holds Adrian guilty of nothing more serious than a lie, and even this is not so positive, but that it has been gravely disputed. The same uncertainty, in the opinion of divines, attaches It is not possible in a review of Jesuit doctrine to avoid touching on the delicate chapter of its maxims in reference to relations between the sexes. The specimens of distorted speculation already given will afford an idea of how unfit for reproduction in this periodical must be the problems which the imagination of these doctors conjures up in regard to this slippery topic. A few examples, carefully picked, we must however give. In the matter of plighted troth we learn from Gury, 'that he who has sworn it to a girl rich and healthy . . . is not bound by his oath should she happen to have become poor or fallen into bad health.'* Again we are informed that a probable opinion, countenanced by St. Liguori, would allow an engagement to be broken off if a 'fat inheritance'† should accrue, seriously modifying the status as to fortune of either party, and the case is thus illustrated:- Edmund had betrothed himself to Helen, a girl of the same station and fortune as his own. As he was on the very point of celebrating his wedding, he acquired a fat inheritance from a deceased uncle. Wherefore he repudiates Helen, that he may marry another with a fortune to match. It seems that Edmund should not be disturbed for this.' Jilting is no unfrequent practice, but it is striking to find it justified in a Handbook of Morals, whenever faith could be kept only by the surrender of a big advantage which would be tantamount to great loss.' Will it surprise the reader, that a string of rulings can be adduced in support of the opinion, that seduction under express promise of marriage need not involve a moral obligation to observe this promise? Father Gury puts the problem plainly: "Is the ravisher bound to wed the girl he has ravished under promise of marriage?' and after stating an opinion affirmative of such obligation, except in that practically most frequent case where it might be feared marriage would lead to bad consequences,' he developes another opinion having the intrinsic signs of adequate probability' in denial of any such absolute obligation.§ Father Moullet is no less explicit on this head. "Whoever has seduced a maiden or a widow, under promise of marriage, ought to wed her, speaking per se, whether the promise was made in attaches as to whether Adrian may have done what amounts to a mortal offence against legal justice' by fraudulently reproducing a document. But whatever may be the difference of opinion on these heads as to any supposed moral duty of making some restitution to the natural heirs who by his successful trick are left without anything, Gury is clear and distinct that it cannot exist, for by the original will Adrian had acquired a certain strict right.'-See Gury, ‘Časus Conscientiæ,' Testamentum casu destructum et arte redivivum, p. 260. Gury, vol. i. p. 204. Gury, vol. ii. p. 412. Si sponso adveniet pinguis hereditas. 'Casus Conscientiæ,' p. 595. § Gury, vol. i. p. 438. earnest earnest or was feigned.' But, he adds, . . . I say, speaking per se, for the seducer is not bound to marry when the girl might easily have perceived that there must be deception, as for instance, from great disparity of condition; in such case she has to impute the deception to her own self.'* Next to seduction under assurances, followed by desertion, the exposure of offspring would probably be pronounced by the majority of unsophisticated persons as the most heinous offence that could well be committed; yet from the language of our divine we must conclude that he at all events does not consider the proceeding as one very difficult of palliation, or which should be stigmatized as an offence of the first magnitude. Without expending one word of reflection on the character of the transaction itself, Father Gury enquires whether it might not be incumbent on wealthy persons, who drop at Foundling Institutions their children, be they simply illegitimate or born of an adulterous connection, to make some payment, rather than abandon them to public charity. The point is declared to be full of perplexity. One opinion very commonly accepted is in the affirmative; but the contrary is maintained in an opinion countenanced by St. Liguori, and given in detail by Gury, on the ground that as these institutions are intended for the indiscriminate reception of the illegitimate progeny of all classes, in protection against infanticide, payment would be contrary to the principle of public charity on which they are founded. Nevertheless, our Father believes that, on the whole, rich parents might be encouraged to make some donations; but, in his tender care lest they should be over mulcted, he calculates that a payment of 150 to 200 francs is ample for the fulfilment of all moral obligations on the part of profligates, however opulent, who might think it convenient to get out of sight their illegitimate offspring by clandestinely depositing them in a Foundling Home.† The last point we would notice, in this division of our inquiry, is the fact that belief is inculcated by our divines in the grossest superstitions that can affect the mind of man -in Witchcraft and the Black Art. Magic is of two kinds,' says Moullet, natural and superstitious (superstitiosa, the technical term for the black art), which is the art of doing * Moullet, Comp. Mor. Theol.,' par. i. p. 342. For this see Gury, vol. i. p. 441. He did not originate these views. Layman has the following: Fas est filios illegitime natos interdum exponere, si ita necesse sit ad gravem infamiam vitandam, adhibitâ tamen cautione, ne frigore moriantur et ut prius baptizentur, appositâ scedulâ, nec cum periculo infamiæ tenetur parens filium sic expositum sustentare.' 'Theol. Mor. Comp.,' Mogunt. Moullet, pars prima, p. 198. 1637. wonders * wonders by help of the devil . . . involving express or tacit invocations.' Gury's words are, 'Magic is the art of doing wonders which . . . can be done only through the devil invoked explicitly or implicitly.' And, again: Witchcraft is the art of working harm through intervention of the devil; it is of two kinds, amatory and poisoning; amatory witchcraft, otherwise a philter, is a devilish art, whereby lustful passion or aversion is inspired towards a person.' According to grave Jesuit authorities, it is within the faculty of the devil, working through these arts, to assume the phantom appearance of humanity in lovely shape; so that an irresistible passion for the Evil Fiend himself, lurking mockingly behind the phantasmagoric mask of a beautiful being, is held up before the imagination of those who are disciples of this teaching as amongst the horrible consequences that may befal them from these devilish drugs. As for the second kind of witchcraft, this is, what Gury says in definition of it,' Poisoning witchcraft is precisely the art of doing injury to your neighbour in various modes through help of the devil, or by disease, the causing idiocy, &c. Commonly witchcraft is called sortilege, because by it an evil lot is thrown on those against whom vindictiveness is exercised, through the operation of the devil.' Such is the teaching which, at the present period of the nineteenth century, with the express approval of those who from Rome govern the Latin Church, is being studiously infiltered into the minds of that preponderating majority of the Roman Catholic youth who are being trained under the influence of Jesuit tuition. We must now touch shortly two or three points of primary importance in connection with the questions which we have marked off as constituting a second category, and which group themselves around the central problem-where the line between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions is to be fixed. Here we must call in assistance additional to that of our previous guides. What we require is some organ as well attested in regard to genuineness of inspiration as Gury, and directly discussing the practical problems involved in the demarcation between Church and State rights. We shall be safe against the charge of having picked out an inadequately authenticated guide, if we turn for instruction as to what is taught by sound Jesuit doctrine on these topics to the pages of the 'Civiltà Cattolica,' stamped as it is with the highest voucher for its orthodoxy by a Pontifical Brief ad hoc. That Brief is a document of exceptional, we believe of unique character. In it Pius IX., speaking in his * Gury, vol. i. pp. 172-3. De Magia et Maleficio. Pontifical |