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from that dimmer enlightenment which can suffice (as we gather from the Society's motto) only for an inferior glorification of God. For the knowledge we are in quest of we shall turn to the writings of Jesuit Fathers fully qualified to be considered authoritative spokesmen of their Order. It is however well to establish first the degree of guarantee implied by the Society's official imprimatur affixed to a book by a Jesuit writer; for, in his rejoinder to Pascal, Father Daniel pleaded that it could not fasten on the Order any responsibility for the opinions set forth in such publication. This plea is wholly untenable. In the Constitutions' it is written that no differences of opinion are admissible, whether in conversation or public discourse or written books, which last it is not allowable to publish without approval and consent of the General, who, however, may confine their examination to three men endowed with sound doctrine and

eminent judgment.' Again, the faculties of these Examiners are absolutely limited to inquiry into writings transmitted by the General, and to the draughting of an opinion, on which 'the General can take such decision as may to him seem suitable.' The Father Revisors have merely consultative powers; they never can sanction publication; they are not even allowed to receive a book for review from any one but the General; in every instance the sanction for publication expressed by the word imprimatur must emanate directly from the General himself at his absolute discretion.†

It would be a labour of supererogation to show what has been proved over and over again, that certain Jesuit Fathers in former days did broach gravely questionable opinions. No interest could attach to a repetition of work done so admirably for all times by Pascal. But interest may attach to the demonstration that the spirit of casuistry, riddled by his pungent invective, still flourishes with unimpaired vigour, and that the same maxims, which it might have been deemed that the shafts of Pascal's piercing wit must have banished for ever, are being inculcated at the present day in every Roman Catholic school, college, and seminary where Jesuit doctrine prevails, and this comprises the vast majority. The works on which we shall rely for evidence cannot be open to challenge. No modern treatise can show a more formidable array of guarantees than Father Gury's 'Com

*Const. iii. cap. i. Inst. S. J., vol. i. p. 372.

† See Regulæ quæ a Patribus Revisoribus in recognoscendis nostrorum Libris observandæ sunt,' 1650. Reg. v., ' Absolutis cujusque libri consultationibus tam ejus libri approbationem, tam censuras, Patri Nostro subscriptas exhibebunt ut de his statuat quod convenire videbitur.' Reg. x., 'Nullum librum scriptumve a quoquam recognoscendum accipient præterquam a P. Generali aut ejus nomine a P. Secretario.'

pendium

pendium of Moral Theology.' It has been appointed, in Roman Catholic seminaries in all lands, as the standard Manual of Moral Theology. It has been printed in every country, and translated into every tongue. The Roman edition of 1866 is called the seventeenth, but we do not feel sure whether this reckoning comprises other than Italian issues. The one we quote from was issued in 1872 from the presses of the Propaganda' at Rome-the highest possible voucher for the entire approval of every line and every word in the book by the supreme representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. The volume on 'Cases of Conscience,' by the same author, is a commentary in practical elucidation of the larger work. The 'Compendium,' by Moullet, first appeared in 1834, at Freiburg, in Switzerland; and was particularly recommended by the Bishop of Lausanne to the whole clergy of the diocese,' on the special ground that the author's conclusions were eminently distinguished for their happy mean between 'rigorism and laxity.' The edition before us, printed at Prato in 1846, again enjoys the episcopal endorsement of its contents, while Gury brings the cumulative weight of his recognition to the value of Moullet, by referring to him as a decisive authority for the soundness of a particular opinion. Advocate and antagonist will alike admit that the system of lax opinion popularly charged against Jesuit divines rests on three cardinal propositions-of Probabilism, of Mental Reservation, and Justification of Means by the End. We shall begin by examining whether those who now address us as approved organs of the doctrine of the Order have at all abandoned, as to these three heads, the sentiments which caused so great scandal when propounded by former Jesuit celebrities. Je vois bien que vous ne savez pas ce que c'est que la doctrine des opinions probables; c'est le fondement et l'A. B. C. de toute notre morale,' says Pascal's imaginary Jesuit in the 'Provinciales ;' a statement amply corroborated by Father Gury. The first section in his ponderous volumes is devoted to an analysis of human actions and of their constituent motives. In the chapter on Lust we come across this axiom: Temptation when greatly protracted need not be positively withstood continuously, inasmuch as that would be over-irksome and render one liable to innumerable scruples.'* We then have definitions of conscience in various conditions, and of the moral facts from which it would be justified in deriving elements for its guidance and satisfaction. Prominently amongst such moral facts is ranked the opinio probabilis, which is explained to be any judgment resting on some really

* Gury, vol. i. p. 15, Resol. 6.

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grave motive, even though combined with dread of the opposite.' This means that, notwithstanding an irrepressible inward impression that truth is really in opposition to a given opinio probabilis, yet any opinion, in behalf whereof can be adduced what is technically termed a 'grave motive,' may be safely accepted as full warrant for taking action in its sense. It is of such essential importance to grasp thoroughly the import, as expounded by the Father himself, of this doctrine which is the corner-stone in his system, that we must request the reader's attention to some illustration on the matter. We have had probable opinion declared to be an adequate justification for conscience to act upon it; but we have not yet learned what are the tests for an opinion to be judged probable. Father Gury is explicit on this head. If a person be of learning and uprightness,' then for any opinion he may entertain to become assuredly probable' for his own guidance, it suffices that he should be conscious of having thought it out diligently' and persuaded himself to his own satisfaction of its correctness; † for the general public one single author of exceptional superiority' is capable of rendering probable any opinion he may express, even though his teaching be contrary to what is commonly held ; while in the case of a person 'unversed in letters' it is enough that he can point to a particular opinion as having fallen from any one whom he himself deems to be possessed of learning and insight,' for his confident acceptance of such opinion as a rule of action.§ As in the immediately subsequent line the efficacy of probable opinion is declared to ensure its rendering the dictate of conscience practically confident,' that is, to remove it beyond the reach of all disturbing scruples, it is evident how far-reaching must be a doctrine which makes it justifiable to act on the authority of opinions, notwithstanding irrepressible inward misgivings as to their correctness, on the mere ground that they are found in type in some book, which for some reason is affirmed to be the production of a man of learning, or that they have been uttered by a person affirming that he has clearly argued himself into their truth. But this is not all we are taught in reference to probable opinions. Father Gury affirms,

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* Gury, vol. i. p. 36, Cap. 4. De Consc. Prob.
+ Id., vol. i. p. 38, Conclusio 4.
§ Id., vol. i. p. 39, Concl. 8.

+ Id., Concl. 7.

Id., p. 39. Filliucius says this: Dico licitum esse sequi opinionem probabiliorem, relictâ minus probabili, etiamsi sit magis tuta. licitum esse sequi opinionem minus probabilem, etiamsi minus tuta sit.'-Quæst. Morales, Lugduni, 1633, tom. ii. p. 12. And Moya, ' Quamvis opinio sit falsa, potest quilibet tutâ conscientiâ illam practicè sequi propter auctoritatem docentis.'--Opusculum, p. 27.

in a special proposition, that the fact of extrinsic probability, which consists in the merely clerical circumstance of a particular opinion being within the literal sense of terms employed by a particular writer of reputed authority, of itself gives to that construction all the value of probability; and this even though, by another ruling of the Father, the justificatory range of probable opinions reaches to points of divine as well as of positive legislation.† Accordingly we are instructed that it is no part of the duty of a spiritual adviser to disturb peace of mind derived from opinions the probability whereof is to him gravely doubtful. Is it lawful or incumbent on a Confessor,' asks the Father, 'to absolve a penitent bent on following an opinion, probable indeed, but contrary to the judgment he himself holds?' And his reply is in the affirmative, on the ground that the penitent has the right to follow any opinion truly and wholly probable, while the Confessor has no right to impose his own opinion even though it be more probable. For a Confessor is no judge of the opinions his penitent should follow, but is only a judge of his disposition.' Do we not here become instinctively conscious of being in presence of those adoucissements, which were so scornfully lashed by Pascal ?

The foregoing propositions are so many applications of the principle of dispensation, and the latitude involved therein acquires a range absolutely unlimited, when brought into correlation with the supreme depositary of sacerdotal essence. The query whether the Pope can dispense from God's precepts is thus solved: 'He can dispense therefrom for a just cause in cases where divine law comes into action through human will, as in vows and oaths. In other cases the point is one of controversy, whether he is empowered actually to dispense for some very grave causes or only to declare God's law suspended for the time.' 'But,' adds Gury, not a little significantly, in practice the difference is of small consequence.'§ Without, however, bringing into play the supreme agency of

Gury, vol. i. p. 53. Amongst the authorities cited in support of this proposition is a decision of the Congregation of the Holy Penitentiary that the material fact of an opinion being in St. Liguori's writings is ample warrant for its adoption without any need to weigh his reasons.

† Ib., vol. i. p. 52, Quær. 78. An licitum sit, uti probabilitate, non tantum in materia juris positivi sed etiam juris divini et naturalis?

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Id., vol. i. p. 52. This ruling is repeated, vol. ii. p. 360: An possit absolvi poenitens qui vult sequi opinionem sententiæ Confessoris oppositam? Resp. Affirm. si sit vere probabilis.'

§ Id., vol. i. p. 77. It should be noticed that in the section on Laws and their binding force, every Papal utterance or Brief, even though not inserted in the Corpus Juris, is declared to be possessed of the full force of law (see p. 89), a statement which would cover the oracula vivæ vocis.

Pontifical

Pontifical plenitude, many concrete cases are given by Father Gury, in which a notable departure from the received acceptation of the law is justified, and some of these cover precisely the points in the history of the Order that have caused much controversy. Thus we are told that it is certainly not unlawful to adopt the symbols and vestments of pagans if only these are considered by the wearers in the character of prevalent national customs, and therefore not necessarily per se referable to a particular worship.* But even if they should be the vestments and symbols of religion,' Father Gury sees a way to justify their adoption by Christians; they might be lawfully worn if only the vestments were not exclusively distinctive between sect and sect, for then their primary use would be to cover the body, and only their secondary use to distinguish the sect'-a ruling that very appositely meets in part the case of the Chinese rites. The Jesuit missionaries were, however, accused besides of having materially modified articles of Christian doctrine to suit the Chinese intellect, so as even to have excised such points as the Incarnation and Crucifixion. If they did so, they did only what Father Gury distinctly affirms to be quite legitimate. The query is gravely mooted, whether explicit belief in the Mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation be indispensable in a Christian,'t to which Father Gury replies, that opinions are divided on this head; but, says he, the one which is the more probable is in the negative, for the reason, that a merely implicit belief sufficed before Christ, and therefore should also suffice after his coming.'

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He then considers whether 'absolution can be obtained by one who ignores the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation; and, again, after some circumlocution, his conclusion is, that according to the more probable opinion, he can be validly absolved if only he be living in invincible ignorance.'‡ Here we have met with a term of first-rate importance in the system of our Jesuit divines, but also of singular elasticity, the bearing of which it is essential to grasp. Let an individual be surrounded by preachers straight from heaven, speaking with tongues of divine persuasion, and yet, according to the definitions given of what constitutes invincible ignorance, he might, with impunity, withhold acquiescence, alleging moral in* See Gury, vol. i. p. 124.

+ Gury, vol. i. p. 125. 'An requiratur fides explicita mysterii SS. Trinitatis et Incarnationis de necessitate medii?'

Gury at least puts his proposition as admitting of some controversy. Moya's language is even more positive: Fides explicita de Mysteriis Incarnationis et Trinitatis non est medium necessarium ad salutem.'—' Opusculum,' p. 36.

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