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fluctuations of the labour market, bad | Class of the Army Reserve of 1867, aristimes, the influence of strikes and ing from the unwillingness of soldiers to trades unions. If he fall sick, and sick- enter it-I referred the case, for their ness is another and a very serious short- opinions, to selected commanding officers coming of the First Class Army Reserve, of regiments in Ireland. Their report rehe has no regimental hospital to go to; or, echoed briefly the causes stated in this if his work stop, he has to face daily speech: insufficient pay of the soldiers accumulating debt and destitution. It of the Reserve, and want of civil emis apposite to state here a few facts as to ployment, to enable them to make up the absence of organization in the First for their insufficient pay by work. I Class Army Reserve. They are not sub-approved this opinion, and submitted it ject to the provisions of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, except when called out on emergency and national peril, for training, or exercise, or drill, or aid, to the civil power; they have no regimental or hospital organization; three months' anticipated Reserve pay; and a roving pass from muster day to muster day. They are allowed an uniform, necessaries, and liberal pay, when called out. Anticipated pay, bounty and deferred pay-all three are similar in their effects. Pandora's gift; the lump sum of money in hand-that fatal temptation to the lower classes--the great field of British recruiting to indulge, to an extent before unknown to them, the popular passion-drink, which the history of our naval and military law proves to be the chief cause of the crimes and misfortunes of these classes. Of the three evils, bounty is the least, because whilst in a voluntary service, such as ours, it is, and always will be, a successful attraction to enlist; the disorders to which it gives rise, because, under the control of regimental authorities, from the lance corporal to the commanding officer, are easier checked and have fewer bad consequences than anticipated pay and deferred pay, which are under no military restraint. It was, therefore, with unaffected regret that officers of experience learnt that deferred pay was to be given, for the sake of not a great economy, in lieu of the soldier's pension, that great incentive to good conduct, which gives the deserving soldier with long service, a happy, because however humble, an independent home amongst kith and kin, and which he values still more because he looks on it as a reward granted him for long and faithful service by a grateful Sovereign and generous country, which saves him from the dependence, the cold comfort, and the isolation of the workhouse. I was instructed, in the spiring of 1870 by the War Office, to state the cause of the collapse of the First

to the Secretary of State for War, who
confirmed it, and acknowledged the
correctness of the Report as to the two
deficiencies which had caused the col-
lapse of the Reserve-too little pay, and
want of civil employment-by intro-
ducing into the Army Enlistment Act of
1870, which established the First Class
Army Reserve, provisions which doubled
the pay of its soldiers, and abolished,
with the view of rendering Reserve
workmen acceptable to the civil em-
ployer, the 28 days' training with the
Militia, which left it with only 12 days'
annual training under Staff serjeants of
pensioners. But these concessions did
not produce the desired effect, for in
1876 the War Office found it necessary
to amplify them, and increase the pay of
the Reserve men to 6d., and, at the
same time, to further reduce the training
to seven days in the year. It is to be
regretted that the War Department, in
their eagerness to make the system of
civil employment Reserves succeed,
should not have submitted to Parlia-
ment the difficulties which they had en-
countered in working this, as I have
ventured to say, untried theory; more
especially as the increase of Reserve pay,
and abolition of the training of the Re-
serve with the Militia, enacted in the
Army Enlistment Act of 1870, had not
caused the system to work satisfactorily.
If Parliament had been consulted, the
War Office would not have had recourse
to expedients which affected discipline,
training, and the rules of the Service.
I have some right, my Lords, to make
the mention I have done of that regret,
because in June, 1871, I expressed in
debate "my great regret
"that the
War Office had in 1870 been silent and
kept your Lordships in the dark as to the
War Office having, in consequence of a
Report from the commanding officers of
regiments in Ireland, confirmed by my-
self, as to the causes of the collapse of
the Reserve of 1867, that is-insufficiency

of pay and want of civil employment,, modern art of war-skirmishing with increased the pay of the Reserve to 4d., proper precautions-the knowledge and which increase they had stated to Par- use of ground against the improved liament, but had been silent as to the arms of the present day-which would reduction of their 28 days training with have been so useful to them if called the Militia, and the difficulties occa- to take the field against Continental sioned by civil employment. If your troops. The unfavourable result of Lordships had been thus made ac- allowing the soldier's knowledge of his quainted in 1870 with the inherent diffi- duty to be optional with him caused culties and unfavourable consequences the discontinuance, as I was informed of the civil employment system with by the Under Secretary of State, when consequent curtailment of a great part of I asked for the defaulters lists of the the training, you would, with your habi- Reserve of the annual training of the tual care for the public interests, have ad- Reserves at their district-place of asvised the adoption of remedial measures sembly, under the wholesome influence which would not have increased since that of military law, where their military time the Army Estimates, whilst they spirit was kept up, and acts of undisdiminished the efficiency of the training cipline such as absences were registered of the Reserve and compromised the in- and punished-the soldiers equipped in terests of discipline. And, certainly, their uniforms were practised in drill my Lords, nothing could prejudice the and in marching in their new ammuniinterests of training and discipline more tion boots, a military precaution against than the two expedients to reconcile the foot - soreness, which, however little civil employer to the Reserve workman, thought of by civilians, has, when and I must observe that curtailment of neglected, caused disasters ensuing from drill is also agreeable to him. Both of a tardy march or a delayed, concentrathese expedients were resorted to also tion. The noble Earl stated that there without being previously communicated were no defaulters lists, because the to Parliament by the War Office after Reserves had not been assembled at the concessions of 1870. The first their district places for training. The of these two expedients was the mis- other exemption was of Reserve men prision by the late Secretary of State with responsible employment of a for War of his own Regulations of higher class generally, Government February 9, 1871, that whenever the employment-such as gaols, &c. These Reserve was called out for training it exemptions were, I understand, very was to be under the provisions of the numerous-I speak under correction, Mutiny Act and the Articles of War. as the War Department has not given The War Office ignored this Regulation, me the promised Returns and so and allowed the training to be volun- completely freed them from their military, that is at the will of the Reserve tary duties that they did not even atsoldier. The results of taking out of tend the important concentrations of the hands of the military superiors the Second and Fifth Army Corps. the duty of instructing the soldiers and This second exemption-I do not know leaving it in their hands, a policy un- whether it was allowed by the late or known in the civilized armies of the present Minister of War-is not so world, was a reversal of all the positions serious as the first; but it is a departure of authority and subordination. The from that equitable distribution of the general officer commanding in Ire- soldier's duties, which is an essential gualand and other officers in command had rantee of his contentment and discipline. to solicit and invite, when they ought to The excusing a comrade and an equal have commanded, the attendance of from common duties excites jealousies soldiers at training. The good or un- and unfavourable feelings in a Force. employed soldier complied; but the one And it is a bad example that military with good employment or the bad soldier, instruction which is an imperative duty, sent excuses or, as Lord Sandhurst said, and without which a soldier is useimpertinent refusals; and it was another less, should be allowed to be entirely. unfavourable symptom that the Reserve superseded by the duties of civil emmen who attended were in a very small ployment. It is due to the present minority. The training was neglected Secretary of State for War to state for several years, and the Reserve was here how much the Army is indebted to untaught in the valuable A B C of the him for having at the late concentra

tions assembled the First Class Army | ing it a holiday, gave their Reserve Reserve at their different destinations workmen leave for seven days. Still, under the provisions of the Mutiny Act they would not give them another day, and Articles of War. But even these although it was for the march past. really fatal exemptions could not render Crowds came from London and all satisfactory the working of the unfortu- parts to see these gala parades. But nate system of civil employment, for, as it is impossible to blind oneself to the I have stated, the pay in 1876 was fact that a call to arms of the First raised to 6d., and the 12 days' training Class Army Reserve under very different reduced to 7. It is remarkable that circumstances would have produced very although such sweeping and numerous different results, such as a call in bitter concessions were made to the civil em- winter weather for aid for an indefinite ployer and the Reserve soldier, not time to the Civil Power in Ireland or only none were granted to the tax-foreign service, with no leave from the payer, but each concession to them was civil employer, but, on the contrary, accompanied by an additional tax, so the certainty that they would find their that in this year he has to pay treble places filled should they return. And I for a Reserve proportionately diminished venture to ask, what would be the course in value as his protection in times of great pursued by the Reserve soldiers with emergency and imminent national peril. comfortable homes and well-paid emI shared the general satisfaction ex-ployments, with the prospect of nothing pressed at the creditable and military appearance and set-up of the First Class Army Reserve at the concentrations of the two Army Corps in July last, as well as at their good conduct, their knowledge of elementary drill, and the correctness and steadiness with which they performed the movements; I speak from hearsay. But it is only just to the case to add that these movements were very simple, that a bugle was not heard, skirmishing was not practised, although now, on account of improved arms, so important an instruction. And as regards their conduct it is equally fair to the case to say that is confidently stated that the small percentage of men absent from the Reserve would have

been much larger, if old illegal absences struck off the strength of the Reserve had been entered in the state; and no merit can be claimed for men not absenting themselves when they were exempted from all their duties and got all their pay: that at exercises with other troops, commanding officers had been anything but satisfied with their conduct; and that in two instances on the march to and from the July concentrations, parties of the Reserve had misconducted themselves; and certainly Lord Sandhurst's opinion of them when commanding in Ireland was anything but favourable of them. The concentrations were a fete, and cannot be considered as a criterion of the Force. The weather was beautiful; the Reserve men wore their new clothes, received extra pay for the concentration; the employers, consider

but daily pay, rigid performance of their duties in tents, 12 men to a tent, or a bivouac with all the hardships of a campaign? The most important feature of the concentration of the First Class Army Reserve remains to be told. But before doing so, it is necessary for the better comprehension of the great military question with which it is connected to take a glance at the past-the events and speeches of 1870-71. With reference to those times, the Secretary of. State in February, 1871, was pleased to say that—

"Events had occurred in Europe of so marvellous a character that he thought it no exaggeration to say they had no parallel in the records of history or in the fables of Herodotus;'

and added that the influence of these

events had

"created the fixed determination in the minds of the British people to place their military establishments on an efficient footing, and to have an Army with Reserves."

After reading that speech it will be for your Lordships to judge whether the Militia regiments and their Reserves, so much eulogized by competent judges at the concentrations in July last, are not entitled to less doubtful praise than the noble Viscount bestowed on them at that time; whether the short service, which he said lay at the root of all Army reform and its offspring "a special Reserve" as he called it, for the formation of both of which, he says, he introduced a Bill into Parliament in 1870, have justified the noble Viscount's high eulogium of them and the expectations

which he formed of their success; and whether the hope expressed by him has been fulfilled, that he would get, by means of the short service, 9,000 men for the First Class Army Reserve, for which number he had charged in the Army Estimates; and finally, whether he was right in stating that he " considered himself entitled to adhere to and sustain the policy of attenuated regiments in the time of peace." The important feature of the First Class Army Reserve was the misapprehension, I believe, a general one, that that Reserve was a short-service one-whereas on the contrary it was a long-service one and composed of old soldiers, too old some of them for a campaign. The importance of this fact is the consideration to which it gives rise respecting the causes why far from being a short-service Reserve, no short-service men served, notwithstanding the predictions of the noble Viscount which I have quoted, that he could get 9,000 men by means of the short service; and notwithstanding that if the short-service men who had served the three years since 1870, which the 4th paragraph of the Army Enlistment Act of 1870 allowed them to do, for the express purpose of forming a Reserve, which the Preamble of that Bill and the War Minister stated was the object of the Bill-more than 9,000 men would have entered the Reserve by this time. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that these men must have been used for other purposes than that of the Reserves, and that purpose could only have been to fill up the vacancies in regiments embarking for India and abroad, which were below their strength, and to fill up vacancies in them caused by the medical authorities rejecting as unfit for foreign service, on account of their bad physique under age, or other causes required to stay at home. A War Office Return shows that the First Class Army Reserve, the only Army Reserve liable to serve abroad, consisted of long-service men and numbered about 5,300 in July last. The late Minister of War's predictions fell to the ground, therefore, that he would get 9,000 short-service men for the Reserves, who were to make up for his policy of attenuated regiments, to which, on account of the certainty of having the "Special Reserve," he steadily adhered. All the Reports of successive Inspector Generals, however much they may speak in favour of re

cruiting, admit the absence of the men of height and bodily strength who formerly enlisted, and that a great proportion of the recruits of the present day require what is called fattening up for a year or two. It is notorious that the great numbers of the recruits since short service was established are under age. The Artillery Guards who require men of a better physique are short of their strength. Under these circumstances it is clear that short service without pension does not enable recruiting to compete so successfully as formerly in the "labour market." Under the influence of these considerations, I consider it my duty to say that the Government is as little able at the present time to send an Army on foreign service as they were in 1874, when the rights of the Treaty of Paris were surrendered to the illegitimate demands of Russia, which was as much opposed to Treaty as to International Law; that it was at least a satisfaction to know that a surrender of those rights which no Englishman could hear mentioned without a flush of the cheek and a sigh, the friends I had in the late Cabinet had yielded a great British right-which they must have loathed to do as much as their countrymen-through the pressure of the want of military means of going to war should Russia have persisted in her demands, which, however, there is no doubt she never intended to do. I have had the honour to submit to your Lordships the opinion founded on the state of Ireland for centuries, and the want of regimental organization, regular pay, and military control of the First Class Army Reserve, and the numerous causes which I have stated in this speech affecting the efficiency of the Reserves-that they are useless in England, and dangerous in Ireland; which opinion, serious as it is, was not controverted by any Member on either side of your Lordships' House. It would, therefore, be waste of time to enlarge on the subject. As regards India, my Lords, short service is a failure; so say all the best military and financial authorities, and a Committee sat lately on this subject, which proves that Indian feeling, as well as of a great party in this country, on this subject is favourable to the Indian view of the question. It was urged by former Committees that this country was put to a great expense in instructing and preparing troops to serve in India, and

that this ought to be a set-off to the great expense which the short service caused to Indian finance. But I cannot think that this reasoning is fair. Great Britain, in common justice for her own credit and interest, is bound not to send a less efficient Army to India than the one she maintains at home. And, even if this were not the case, the very many expenses which India must incur from the great mortality of troops, owing to her tropical climate, and the filling up of death vacancies and sending home invalids and men to replace them, would more than pay the Debt of India to this country.

Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Papers showing why the conditions of service in the fifth paragraph of the Regulations for the Discipline and Payment of the Army Reserve, that the provisions of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War should apply to

the Force whenever it is called out for training and exercise, were not carried out from 1871 to 2nd March 1876; and for any papers showing how many men of the 1st Class Army Reserve have been invalided.-(The Lord Strathnairn.)

VISCOUNT CARDWELL thought when the noble and gallant Lord rose, he was going to express his gratification that his own doleful expectations as to the result of the legislation in connection with the Reserves had not been fulfilled, but he (Viscount Cardwell) had not been gratified in that respect. When the late Government came into office, the principle of a Reserve had indeed been accepted by Parliament, but the number of men enlisted was insignificant. In 1870 the system was adopted of enlisting men for short service, with a view to the formation of an efficient Reserve. The question now therefore was, whether it was best to have a Reserve founded upon the principle of short service in the Line, in combination with civil employment afterwards; and the result of the system was seen exemplified in the case of the Prussian Army. What was the present state of affairs in connection with our own Army? Great facilities had been given by the late, and since extended by the present Government to men to choose whether they would serve for a long period with a pension, or for a short period, with civil employment afterwards. The result was that a very marked and decided preference, and a steadily increasing preference, had been shown for short service in the ranks, with civil employment during the period of service in the Reserve. The

noble and gallant Lord said they could. not expect to have a Reserve in existence, of course a system which only commenced towards the end of 1870, and required six years of actual service with the colours, as the general rule, could not be expected to have contributed great numbers to the Reserve, in the earlier part of 1876; but the Returns on the Table showed that at the end of 1875 there had enlisted over 57,000 men for short service, with subsequent civil employment, and there must have been a considerable number added to those figures since that time. The number enlisted now must be considerably over 60,000. This was certainly sufficient proof, that so far as numbers were concerned, the experiment had not failed. He should have thought that the noble and gallant Lord, with his experience, would have remembered what Lord Raglan said when he had less than 10,000 men in the Crimea available to defend the lines, and when the late Duke of Newcastle told him there were 2,000 recruits to send out-" For God's sake do not send them out, as they will only die like flies." What had been the remedy for that state of things? Why, the forming of a good Reserve force such as they had at present in progress, to which no objection could be made, inasmuch as it consisted of men who were inured to service, and who would be perfectly able to take their places beside the Regular troops in the field. The noble and gallant Lord might assert that we had an attenuated first line, but he knew perfectly well that for the purpose of resisting invasion, we never had before anything like so great a Force in the country in time of peace as that which was left by the late Government, and was maintained by the present Government. As to the attenuated front line not being filled up by the Reserve, it should be borne in mind that the Act only passed in 1870, and of course it had not yet produced 60,000, or any large number of men, for the Reserve. There was no enactment that men should go into the Reserve at the end of three years; there was indeed a power to send them into the Reserve at the end of that time, but there was a strong objection taken to acting on it by no one more pertinaciously than by the noble and gallant Lord himself. The late Government did not want to force the system, so they began with

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