wrecked by a submarine earthquake in Simoda Bay, in December, 1854. Thus the naval operations of the allies presented nothing striking, and the opportunity of striking a blow at the colonisation of the Amoor was lost. Since then the Russians have redoubled their efforts in this region. The territory they occupied has been formally ceded to them by the Chinese; and Russia is in a fair way of becoming a great Pacific power. In 1860 her navy there included nineteen steamers, carrying 380 guns, while there were twelve steamers afloat on the Amoor itself. The man to whom Russia most owes her progress on the Amoor is Count Nicolas Mouravief, for a long time Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, and for his services in these regions invested with the title of Amursky. CHAPTER XXXIV. Russian Conquests in Asia; their Extent and Importance-Views of Lord Aberdeen in 1829-The Frontier Line in Armenia-Gumri and Bayazid Turkish Forces in 1854-Appointment of Zarif Pasha-Selim Pasha her not only to assail Central and Western Europe on both flanks, from the Baltic and from the Black Sea, but to seek a road to Hindostan over the body of the Persian monarchy. The great object, however, was that famous seat of power on the Bosphorus which we have seen the allies defend by striking at Sebastopol; and around Constantinople the Czars had drawn a net which it required the swords of the West to cut asunder. It was not at Odessa, and Nicolaief, and Sebastopol alone that the Russians had accumulated the means of assault upon Turkey. The only road to Constantinople did not, and does not, lie through the Balkan. If the Sultan were his sole antagonist, the Czar knew that, aided by his powerful fleet, he would probably be able to reach the goal of his ambition by a simultaneous march from the Danube and from Armenia. At least, by attacking the Turks in Asia, he would always be able to diminish their means of defence in Europe, and could not fail to gain either territory or prestige. By degrees he might get control of the great road from the Black Sea ports to Ispahan, and with it the control of the large commerce passing thereby. "The cession of the Asiatic fortresses, with their neighbouring districts," wrote Lord Aberdeen in 1829, in commenting on the Treaty of Adrianople, "not only secures to Russia the uninterrupted occupation of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, but places her in a situation so commanding as to control at pleasure the Lake arrives at Kars and entrenches it (1855)-Description of Kars Appointment of Vassif Pasha-Opening of the Campaign of 1855-destiny of Asia Minor. Prominently advanced into the Williams Pasha goes to Kars-General Mouravief invades Armenia; attempts to surprise Kars, and fails-Blockades the Camp-Progress of the Works-Mouravief scours the Country-Russian March towards Erzroum - General Brunner defeated before Kars-Schemes for relieving the place-Discord in the Cabinets of the Allies-Trials of the Garrison-Turks routed at Pennek-Mouravief resolves to storm -Splendid Defence of the Garrison-Omer Pasha's Diversion a Failure Kars-Battle of the 29th of September-Awful Losses of the Russians -Cowardice of a third Selim Pasha-The Kars Garrison abandoned to itself-Its Sufferings-Capitulation, November 27th-End of the Campaign. RUSSIAN Schemes of conquest have been marked by great deliberation and tenacity of purpose ever since the days of Peter I. To make Russia a great European Power was the least part of the design which was initiated by the greatest of Czars. The policy which he set on foot had for its object the resuscitation of the Empire of Byzantium, and the establishment of a throne which, from Constantinople, should become dominant in two continents. The first steps toward this end were taken rapidly, considering the magnitude of the conquests effected. In little more than a century the Russian frontiers had advanced many hundreds of miles in all directions. In Europe Poland had been absorbed, Sweden plundered of a province, and Turkey deprived of Bessarabia, the Crimea, and the Kouban. In Asia the Caucasus had been passed, and Georgia seized. Large tracts of territory had been shorn off Persia and Asiatic Turkey. Russia had become master of the Caspian, and from Gumri and Erivan stood across the roads leading by Erzroum and Trebizond to Constantinople, and at the head of the valleys leading to Syria and the Persian Gulf. Her outposts on the Caspian were nearer to Lahore than to Moscow. Her grasping ambition led centre of Armenia, in the midst of a Christian popula- A.D. 1855.] STATE OF THE TURKISH ARMY ON THE FRONTIER. Western Asia." And why? Because it opens to the enemy a road at once to the Persian Gulf and Syria. Actual inspection by competent military eyes thus confirmed the view adopted by Lord Aberdeen in 1829. The line of country from Akalzik to Erivan, which Russia had then just conquered, and which she had so long coveted, opened to her the gates of Persia and Asia Minor. Both sides in 1854 knew the value of the prize for which they were contending. The Turks owed the preservation of Anatolia to the energy and courage of a Hungarian and a few Englishmen. The Russians sent one of their best generals to command on that frontier, and had not the European officers stopped him by holding Kars until they were on the brink of famine, that general would have carried the flag of Russia to Trebizond. Such being the importance of the frontier, it is not surprising that the British Ministers watched with anxiety the progress of hostilities in that quarter; and with all the more anxiety because they were comparatively powerless to render aid. It required all the energies of England to maintain an army in the Crimea. She could not send troops, but she could send officers. France might have spared a force, but France had no wish to protect the Turks in Armenia, and had she done so we should have looked with jealousy on her efforts. There was the Turkish army under Omer Pasha, which, after the Austrians entered the Principalities, was, at least, in the spring of 1855, comparatively useless. But here again France stepped in, and would not consent to the employment upon the Armenian frontier of the only efficient general in the Sultan's service. Therefore the struggle in Asia Minor was carried on by the Turks alone, with the aid of a few European soldiers. The Turkish Pashas on the Russian frontier drew supplies and pay (when they could get it) for 40,000 men, but they never commanded a force so large. The difference they put in their own pockets. Corruption and peculation and frauds of all kinds characterised the conduct of the greater part of these Turkish officers quite as much-and that is a high estimate-as their incapacity and cowardice. Many of the superior officers were not military men, not even military Turks; and, with a few rare exceptions, the whole mass of officers were utterly unfit to command. The soldiers, whom they plundered and neglected, were strong and warlike, and patient and much-enduring men; but they were indifferently armed, and wholly undrilled and undisciplined. Their courage was beyond question, but courage without training is of little value in armies. The artillery, as usual, was the most efficient arm in the service—indeed, the only one on which any reliance could be placed in the field. For although the infantry were brave and stubborn fighters, they were, for the most part, ill-trained and worse led; while the cavalry could not fight in the European and had been spoiled for fighting in the Asiatic manner, with the exception of a few irregulars under European officers. Nevertheless, all these troops were good behind entrenchments, and the true policy of the Turks in 347 Armenia would have been to wage a defensive war. In that course they would have found in the nature of the country a great ally, and if they had preserved the frontier intact they would have done the Sultan and the common cause good service. But the Turkish leaders had that kind of impetuosity which accompanies incompetence. As soon as the war broke out they began to assail the enemy. A party from Batoum captured Fort Nicholas, just across the frontier, by surprise. This was not a bad move, for it stimulated the ardour of the soldiers. Unfortunately, the ambition of the Pashas was stimulated also. The commanders on the Kars frontier took the offensive, and began to engage the Russian outposts. The Commander-in-Chief was Abdi Pasha. He had been educated in the military schools of Austria, and had some talent and knowledge, yet this was marred by a constitutional inactivity and slowness. His second in command was Ahmed Pasha, an incompetent man, who shone in the intrigues of the Turkish ante-rooms. The Russians were posted at Baindir and Akisha. Learning the amount of their force at the former place, Abdi Pasha sent against them a body of troops superior in number, who, falling upon them unawares, routed them, and drove them headlong into Gumri. At the same time Ahmed Pasha had moved upon Akisha. His movements were slow, and the enemy, being prepared, inflicted upon him a severe repulse. Learning this, Abdi Pasha ordered his subordinate at once to retreat upon Kars. Ahmed Pasha would not obey nor disobey. It is a convincing proof of his stupidity that he divided his forces, sending part back to Kars, and remaining with the rest within reach of the enemy. Prince Andronikoff, who commanded the Russians, saw his opportunity, and seized it with great spirit. He quitted his entrenchments and offered battle. Nothing loth, the Turk stood to fight. He was still superior in number. He was able to show an equal front, and at the same time to outflank his opponent. Nevertheless the Russians utterly routed their foes. They were able to do this, because Vely Pasha, who was in command of the Turkish left, which was formed across. the Russian right, stood by a mere spectator of a combat which by frauk valour he might have made a decisive victory. As it was, Andronikoff broke the Turkish right, Ahmed Pasha, quite incapable of command, was driven in disorder from the field, while Vely Pasha, intent on saving his men, marched away without loss. The troops hurried back to Kars in confusion. They were a mere rabble." The Russians did not pursue, otherwise Kars might have fallen in 1853. The untoward conduct of Ahmed ruined the whole campaign. The upshot was very remarkable. Abdi Pasha, who had won a victory, was recalled; his lieutenant, who had destroyed his own army by disobeying his superior, was appointed Commander-in-Chief; while Vely Pasha, who had run away from the field of battle, was promoted. Such is the power of intrigue and gold. Happily for the Sultan, the Russians were not prepared for action, and were far less to be dreaded than the Pashas. Unhappily, these Pashas had ruined the Sultan's army, instead of husbanding their resources and drilling and organising for the spring cially, gained for him the respect even of the Pashas. campaign. It is justly said that he saved the army from dissolution; for the soldiers took heart from his very presence and readily obeyed him. But when Zarif arrived, he brought with him several Poles and Germans, and these, by their intrigues, ruined the wholesome influence of Guyon, whose advice was sometimes not heeded, at others disdained. The only other European officers of mark at this time in Kars were General Colman, a German, Baron de Schwarzenberg, a Belgian, and two Americans, both tried soldiers, Bonfanti and Tevis. England had not yet sent any of her sons to the aid of the Turks in Armenia. It was a great fault of the Turkish Government that it had established no depôts in Armenia. Everything, except wood and grain, had to be transported from Constantinople. The Russians had been allowed to purchase the grain crops in the two preceding years; another instance of the long-sighted policy of Nicholas, and his Nor were their destructive powers limited to action in the field. In the winter they allowed the army to rot in Kars. "The miserable fate of the army of Ahmed Pasha," writes Dr. Sandwith, who had the best opportunities of knowing, "is among the darkest records of the war. His whole faculties were bent upon making money." He had to repay himself the money spent in bribes to destroy the reputation of Abdi Pasha, and then to make a fortune out of the army. "I could not exaggerate the horrors the poor men suffered under his command. On the approach of cold weather, the troops were crowded into the dark, ill-ventilated hovels of Kars, and there they crouched during a long and rigorous season, deprived of their proper food and clothing, and dying of disease and hunger. During these winter months 20,000 men were carelessly buried in shallow graves in the frozen earth outside the town, and wild dogs and wolves fed on their remains." The hospitals were dread-wilful determination to break up the Turkish Empire. ful abodes of pain and starvation. Out of seventy doctors only forty survived the winter. "No great mortality, however, marked the muster rolls sent to Constantinople, for the pay, food, and appointments of the dead men went to fill the coffers of the Pasha and his myrmidons." Abdi Pasha, on his return, exposed to the Sultan's ministers the truth regarding Ahmed, and this scoundrel, in turn, was recalled. But, no sovereign is so badly served as the Sultan. The Minister of War could find no better man among the servants of the State than a favourite of his own-Zarif Mustapha Pasha, who had been a pipe-bearer, a writer to a regiment, an officer of the commissariat-never a soldier. Yet this was the man selected to command an army, whose business it was to protect a long and exposed frontier from the attacks of a watchful, disciplined, and intrepid foe! Had the Turks formed a large magazine at Erzroum, and constructed a strong camp at Kars, supposing an honest and capable Pasha could have been found, the disasters and sufferings of 1853-4 might have been avoided. On the contrary, nothing having been done in time, all that was needed had to be done in a hurry, and the army had to be supplied from Constantinople, first by sea to Trebizond, then by execrable roads over rugged mountains to Erzroum, and thence by roads equally difficult to Kars. It was by this route that supplies and reinforcements reached the front in the spring of 1854. The Turkish armies on the frontier, stationed at Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, and Bayazid, presented a nominal total of 37,000 men, of whom 20,000 were at Kars, 2,000 at Ardahan and Bayazid, and 13,000 at Batoum. The Russians had disposable 8,000 men near Batoum, 4,000 at Akiska, opposed to the 2,000 Turks at Ardahan, 15,000 at Gumri over against Kars, and 3,000 at Erivan threatening Bayazid—a total of 30,000 disciplined troops and Georgian militia. The forces on both sides were augmented some weeks later,, but the proportions were not greatly changed. It was now the spring of 1854, and the Western Powers were just sending troops to the East. Through the long winter there had been a few Europeans at Kars, and to these the army owed everything. There was the Englishman Guyon, who had carved himself a name on the records of the Hungarian War of Independence. In the winter of 1853, when Abdi and Ahmed brought their At the beginning of May the Kars army was reviewed armies to near destruction, Guyon had been summoned by Zarif, and a division sent forward to support General from Damascus, and he had obeyed with a rapidity Kmety and the irregulars. This division took post startling to the Turks. A most frank and gallant and at Soobattan and Hadji-Veli Khoi, while the cavalry tireless soldier, it was to his exertions that the Turks outposts were on the Arpa-Chai river, then the frontier were indebted for the commencement of that entrenched line. Neither side, as yet, showed any activity. The camp of Kars, destined to be so famous. There was Russians were not in great strength, and the Turks had George Kmety, a Hungarian leader of valiant Honved only just recovered from the evils of the winter. But in battalions in 1848-9, and, like Guyon, driven into June the enemy showed that he was capable of striking Turkey when Russia, throwing her sword into the scale, a blow. On the 8th he made a simultaneous advance turned it in favour of Austria. Kmety was an excellent along the whole line. The Russians had formed the soldier, and although an infantry officer, he took in design of surprising Selim Pasha, who, with the Batoum hand and made great use of the Turkish irregular horse army, had crossed the frontier and lay at Urzughetti. Ho with which he covered the front, and guarded Kars for had some 13,000 men and only thirteen guns. The promonths from all chance of falling by a coup de main.ject was that Prince Andronikoff should fall upon him, These two, until the arrival of Zarif, were the principal supports of Turkish power. Both were, to some extent, readily listened to, and Guyon's noble character, espe and in order to prevent the arrival of any aid from other quarters, it was arranged that the whole of the Turkish posts should be threatened at once. But the Russians A.D. 1855.] MARCH OF THE RUSSIANS UPON KARS. might have spared themselves the trouble, had they known that Selim and Zarif were jealous of each other, and did not act in concert. On the 8th of June the Russians threatened Ardahan, and the Turks reinforced the post, but no action took place. At the same time a body of Cossacks appeared near Bayazid; these were utterly routed by the Turkish irregulars. From Gumri Prince Bebutoff issued with 10,000 men of all arms. General Kmety fell back before him, and crossed the Kars-Chai. The Russians came up to the left bank of the stream, halted a short time, and then began to retreat. No sooner had they turned than Kmety followed. The 349 with the loss of all his guns and baggage; and he hurried with the wreck of his army to Batoum. The battle, however, was well fought by the troops, and the defeat is ascribed to the exhaustion of the men's ammunition. Thus the Russians again proved the superiority of discipline. The Batoum army was ruined and useless for further operations, and Prince Andronikoff was able to detach the greater part of his force towards Gumri. The Russians had opened the campaign with a fruitful victory. In July, having nothing more to fear from the army of Batoum, Prince Bebutoff resolved to try the mettle of enemy had retired over the Arpa-Chai, when Kmety | the Kars army, marched out of Gumri, and crossing the crossing in pursuit attacked with so much rapidity and Arpa-Chai, encamped on Turkish territory within a few vigour that the Russian irregulars were dispersed, and the infantry obliged to turn and defend themselves. It was not until the guns opened that Kmety withdrew. This skirmish gained for the brave Hungarian the full confidence of his men. From that day the despised Bashi-Bazouks would follow him anywhere. In the meantime, Prince Andronikoff had pushed forward towards Urzughetti. Selim Pasha, alarmed at his approach, retreated in haste over the frontier. Compelled at length to stand, he took up a strong position, and received battle on the 16th of June. Here he was totally defeated, VOL. VIII.-No. 394. miles of the Pasha's camp at Soobattan and Hadji Veli Khoi. A solitary mountain rising out of the plain intervened between the two forces. Prince Bebutoff brought with him 15,000 men, and he probably designed to surprise the Turkish camp; but if so, he was not quick enough in his movements, for on the 3rd the whole army of Kars, leaving there a small garrison, arrived, and took up the position of Hadji Veli Khoi. Both armies were now reinforced. Kerim Pasha, a gallant old man, brought in the force which had been posted at Ardahan, raising the Turkish army to nearly 40,000 men. Th Russian detachments were called in, and Prince Bebutoff the mercy of Zarif Pasha. In this exigency, as soon as found himself at the head of 28,000 soldiers of all arms. he learned the news of the defeat of Selim, Zarif resolved An action seemed to be near, but the Turks were to fight Bebutoff. There was still time. The detachdilatory and the Russians cautious. On the 12th both ment was still on the march from Bayazid. But when armies were drawn up and approached each other, but he should have acted with decision, the Turk wavered just as they were about to close a furious thunderstorm and hesitated; and before he decided, the Russian army broke over the plain; the field became a mass of mud, was again united in his front. It was on the 5th of and both armies retired. At intervals these storms August that he made up his mind to fight the next recurred, preventing battle. The Turkish commander, morning. He should have acted on the 2nd, when the no soldier, did not know how to act. The Russians enemy was still looking for his coming troops. It was behaved like masters, and foraged on all sides with now too late. The Bayazid detachment had rejoined impunity. The Kurds, in the rear of the Turkish army, Prince Bebutoff. The spies in the Turkish camp had showed strong symptoms of disaffection, and tho roads informed the Russian of an intended movement. But between Kars and Erzroum became unsafe. The Turkish the report carried into the enemy's camp was that the soldiers, eager for battle, lost heart by the long delay, Turks were either about to attack or retreat to Kars. and, what was worse, lost confidence in their officers. Prince Bebutoff prepared for the retreat by detaching a For more than a month the Turks were kept quite force to Perghet, but luckily for him he was informed in inactive. On the 27th the Russians detached a force to time, that, instead of retreating, the Turks were about to plunder Perghet, and carry off all the wood in the houses, advance. He therefore recalled the detachment at once, and Zarif Pasha offered no kind of opposition. On the and with a united force stood ready to meet his foe. 29th General Guyon reconnoitred the enemy's camp at the head of a thousand horse. The Russians turned out, and for once Zarif Pasha supported Guyon by sending Kerim Pasha with a strong force to protect his retreat, and followed it up by ordering the march of nearly all the army. The Turks offered, but the Russians declined battle, and retreated to their camp. During this period the only combats that had occurred had been fought by Kmety and his irregulars, who had on more than one occasion surprised and discomfited the enemy, and had once broken into his camp. The Turkish plan had been decided in council. It was suggested by Guyon, and adopted by Zarif Pasha. The army was divided into two main columns, the right under Kerim Pasha, the left under Vely Pasha; and, of course, Zarif was to direct the whole. The BashiBazouks, who mustered in great numbers, were to menace the Russian camp on both flanks; while a small detachment of all arms was to seize a height commanding the Russian left wing, and fall on at the proper time. The army was to be in motion at midnight, so that at dawn it might appear before the Russians and begin the battle. Accordingly, soon after midnight the army was put in motion. The right column made its way over the undulating plain in tolerable order, and arrived in position before dawn. But the left, struggling in the darkness over broken ground, fell into disorder, lost its way, and when the sun rose was still distant from the field. There on the hills to the right stood Kerim Pasha, with about 10,000 men, fronting the whole Russian army in order of battle; while the detached corps was on the heights commanding the Russian camp. Thus the Turks were in three fractions; the Russians in one compact mass. Prince Bebutoff had been playing a very wary and dangerous game, one that must have led to his destruction had he been opposed by a competent commander. The right wing of the Turks was at Bayazid, on the other side of Mount Ararat. Another Selim Pasha commanded there. He had under his orders 5,000 men and seven guns, and he was emphatically directed, if attacked, to fall back by Toprak-Kaleh upon Kars. During the inaction of Zarif Pasha, whose character the Russians accurately judged, Prince Bebutoff had actually ventured to detach 8,000 men and thirteen guns from his camp, with orders to proceed by Erivan upon Bayazid. When these Russians debouched from the mountains, Selim, instead of retreating, thought fit to fight a battle, and being the weaker party, and foolish besides, he was routed with the loss of seven guns, many hundred men, and large supplies of provisions. Then, instead of retreat-worst possible cavalry, regular and irregular, and undising towards Kars, he fled to Van, and thus threw open to the enemy the road to Erzroum. Thus the Russians gained a victory, occupied an important country wellsupplied with cattle and sheep, and put a stop to all commerce between Persia and Turkey by barring the direct road followed by the caravans. Having struck this blow, Prince Bebutoff became anxious for the return of his large detachment. The rumour in the Turkish camp was that the victors of Bayazid were pushing on for Erzroum. In reality they were counter-marching with commendable speed to strengthen Bebutoff, who had for a fortnight been at The Turks had in the field a force of 20,000 infantry, 3,900 cavalry, 78 guns, and 8,000 or 9,000 BashiBazouks. The Russians had 16,000 infantry, 2,600 cavalry, 64 guns, and 4,000 irregular horse. The Turks possessed the best and most numerous artillery, the ciplined infantry, but more numerous than that of the enemy, and, if well led, capable of conducting itself well. The Russian infantry was not so good as that in the Crimea, but their dragoons were admirable troops. As soon as daylight enabled Prince Bebutoff to perceive the state of the Turkish army, he determined at once to throw upon the isolated right wing the whole weight of his guns and horse, and a strong force of infantry. As he closed with Kerim Pasha, General Guyon urged on the advance of the left wing, and the question now was, could Kerim withstand the onsets of the enemy until Vely Pasha's troops were able to join in the fray. Prince |