transports, and four freight ships. The weather for the previous week had been tempestuous, and every master was full of anxiety. The Prince, so precious at that time, had been refused admittance into the harbour. The Resolute, laden with hundreds of tons of ammunition, was also kept outside. When the gale had furrowed the sea with huge rolling waves, rushing with fierce shocks upon the deadly cliffs, it became evident that an unspeakable tempest was impending. Captain Cargill, of the City of London, turned her head to wind, and steamed out to sea, slowly but surely. He wished the Prince to follow his example. His warning was not heeded. The Prince remained, hanging by a single anchor on a lee shore. The gale became a hurricane, and the sea like a rolling prairie in motion. The waves leaped upon the cliffs, and their spray dashed in the faces of the hardy men who, leaving their camps, clung liko insects to the rocks above, ready to help if help were possible. Soon the anchors of the sailing ships dragged, then parted, and, borne on the top of the billows, vessel after vessel dashed broadside on to the rocks, and with a loud crash splintered into fragments. One moment human forms were seen struggling in the waters, and in the next they had disappeared. All over the sea drove a blinding mist, and through the mist loomed that dreadful coast, vexed and beaten on by the howling sea. In the midst of this havoc the men on the cliffs, using ropes, snatched a few sailors from the engulfing waters. Four ships had split upon the senseless rocks in a brief space. A lull came. The wind caught up the mists, and hurried them away. It was but a momentary glimpse of safety. Out to seaward, in the cradle of the tempest, blacker mists and fiercer blasts were careering "A noise like a shrill shriek," ," "a harsh, screaming sound, increasing in vehemence as it approached," came rushing over the sea. It was the blast which ashoro swept down the stoutest tents, and which at sea destroyed the strongest vessels. One of the freight ships instantly perished on the rocks, with all her crew. Prince had been riding at single anchor, and trying to relieve the cables from the strain by steaming head to wind. This anchor loosened its clutch of the soft bottom; the ship began to drift, in spite of her steam power, then her crew began to fell the masts. It was an unhappy project. The mizen fell, and, fouling the screw, the doom of the Prince was sealed. The next wave carried her up to the cliffs. The shock was apparently slight, that is, she did not go to pieces. But in a moment a mighty wave caught her on its surging crest, and, with a hoarse roar, hurled her full on the rocks; she broke like glass, and all that was left of this fine ship and her crew were seven men snatched from the raging surf, and a few planks tossed helplessly to and fro. Three more vessels, including the Resolute, next went ashore, and every ship there looked upon wreck as certain. The Retribution war-steamer, having the Duke of Cambridge on board, had three anchors out; she lost two, and when destruction appeared inevitable, she was saved by sacrificing her guns, her coals, her shot and shell. In the midst of the turmoil, the master of the transport Avon, a on. The 251 powerful steamship, slipped the cables, and, braving tho waves, ran dexterously into the harbour. No other ships went ashore, but all those which rode out the gale lost their masts, and were seriously damaged. Nor had the shipping within the harbour escaped. The waters of the land-locked pool were hardly stirred; but the dreadful gale, rushing through the narrow gorges of the rocky hills, hurled the vessels one upon the other, tore them from their moorings, forced them over almost on to their beam ends, and snapped their masts. The Sanspareil was driven two feet up the steep shore. The paddle-boxes of three steamers were rent away. Boats were lifted up and carried inland. On shore the gale levelled the tents of the marines and riflemen. A fine old tree standing in the town was torn up, and in its fall, it crushed through the guardhouse. A row of acacia trees was blown down. The houses were unroofed, and their verandahs rent from them. Off the Katcha and the Balbek there was the samo loss of shipping. Two French transports went down, with all on board. Six English transports and a Turkish frigate were wrecked. All the line-of-battle ships were more or less injured, and ran imminent risks of sinking. Off Eupatoria, a French 100gun ship, the Henri IV., and a French frigate, the Fulton, went ashore, while a Turkish 90-gun liner sank in deep water, with all on board. This terrible tempest was the climax of our misfortunes. The battle of Inkermann had proved that the army must winter on those desolate hills; the effects of the storm made it manifest that the troops would havo to face the winter without adequate supplies. No fewer than 2,500 watch coats, 16,000 blankets, 3,700 rugs, 53,000 woollen frocks, 19,000 lamb's-wool drawers, 35,700 socks, 12,880 pair of boots, 1,800 pairs of shoes, and stores of drugs and other necessaries were lost in the Prince. Fourteen of the wrecked transports were laden with forage and provisions—namely, 359,714 pounds of biscuit, 74,880 pounds of salt meat, 157 head of cattle, 645 sheep, 8,000 gallons of rum, 73,986 pounds of rice, 11,200 pounds of green coffee, 1,116,172 pounds of forage corn, and 800,000 pounds of pressed hay. With the Resolute were engulfed several million rounds of ball cartridge, and the reserve ammunition for the artillery. Even these losses do not measure the extent of the calamity, for many ships were injured so much that the army was for a long time deficient in sea transport, and consequently in the means of repairing the ravages inflicted by the storm on stores of all kinds. Although the harbour of Balaclava was, after the 25th of October, in danger of being seized by the enemy, there seems to have been no good reason why that risk should not have been incurred, and the Prince and the Resolute allowed to anchor inside. The gales of the second week in November showed that the south-west winds in the Black Sea were quite as likely to be as formidable as the Russians. It is only fair to say that Captain Christie and Captain Dacres-the naval officers in charge of tho harbour-were willing to permit the entrance of the ships, and that it was their superiors who kept the ill-fated vessels outside. Lord Raglan, immediately after the dignant and unreasonable; they ascribed the failure of the expedition and the distresses of the troops to the wrong causes, and they demanded the recall of the general and the dismissal of the Government. To understand how this came about, we must consider how the Government conducted the war, and the means at hand wherewith to conduct it. battle of Inkermann, had taken steps to obtain clothing and shelter and ample supplies of food. But in the interval the troops suffered greatly. "For the remainder of November," writes Captain Hamley, "it rained almost without cessation, and the plains became one vast quagmire. The soil is remarkably tenacious, and the feet both of men and horses were encumbered at every step with a load of clay. Not only all the interior of the For nearly forty years the British nation had not camps was deep in mire, but the floors of the tents them- taken any part in a war in Europe. The vast expense selves grew muddy. It is difficult to imagine a more of the war against the first Napoleon, the suffering it cheerless scene than that presented wherever you caused, the habits of despotic Government which it intraversed the plains. The landscape, all lead-coloured duced, the obstinate resistance of a great party to needful above, was all mud-coloured below; the tents, wet and reforms, had all served to inspire a dread of a standing stained with mud, had become dreary spots on a dreary army. The consequences were most serious. The nation background. About them waded a few shivering men was in danger of having no army at all. The popular in greatcoats, trying to light fires behind small screens dislike to a soldiery, which was long used as an armed of mud or stones, or digging up the roots of the bushes, police, was so keenly felt by the Duke of Wellington, where the coppice had vanished from the surface. Rows that he did his utmost to keep the soldiers out of sight, of gaunt, rough horses, up to their fetlocks in the soft, and hoped thereby to maintain at least the minimum drab-coloured soil, stood with drooping heads at the force required by the actual pressing exigencies of the picket ropes, sheltered from wind and rain each by a nation. For thirty years there was a steady progress dirty, ragged blanket-in which it would have been towards the reduction of the establishments, that is the difficult for the keenest connoisseur in horseflesh to re- very bases on which a military structure is built. cognise the glossy, spirited, splendid teams that had Nearly all the efforts of the reformers were, by a strange drawn the artillery along the plains at Scutari." So with paradox, directed towards the diminution of the military the Scots Greys. Their horses on landing, for shape, machine, as if diminution were synonymous with size, spirit, and condition were not to be surpassed, reform. The consequence was that, in the strict sense "When the winter began, the survivors of the Greys, of the word, we had no army at all. At no period sublong-haired, bony, spiritless, and soiled with mire, pre- sequently to 1815 were we in a condition to go to war. served no trace of their former beauty." One of the The pith of the army, the infantry, consisted of a number most painful spectacles was the dead and dying horses of very fine regiments, kept down at the lowest nulying all over the plains. So the road to the camps be-merical condition. The cavalry regiments were good, but came a track of liquid mud; the valley of Balaclava desolated and melancholy; the town as muddy as the plains, and the tideless harbour a common sewer. Imagination alone can picture to itself how it fared with human beings forced to winter in such a place in the face of a fierce and desperate enemy. A general of weak mind would have quailed and bent under the awful burden thrust upon him, and would, perhaps, have taken some half-measures, giving up this and that, and, losing his self-command from day to day, would at last have been swept away by his foes and execrated by his country. Lord Raglan did not lose his self-command; he did not forget his duty. Whatever the cost, he knew the best course was to maintain a bold, unbroken front, keep an unrelaxing grip on his enemy, until England and France had time to put forth their might, relieve him and his army from their heroic task, and enable them to act as well as endure. Yet Lord Raglan was subjected to almost as much censure as if he had been a weak man, and had deserted his trenches, his cannon, and his battle-fields, and had stained the flag and the military honour of his country by a dastardly submission. For the next two months it was his duty, and the duty of the British army, to endure; and although his firmness and heroism were not appreciated then, they are appreciated now. in numbers they were each barely equal to two good squadrons. There were in England but a very few guns in fighting order. There was a weak commissariat; there was no land transport corps or military train. Such a thing as a camp of exercise was unknown until 1853. There were no opportunities for handling large masses of all arms. The militia even was suffered to fall into abeyance for many years. There were men in England fully alive to the consequences of this neglect of the military machine; but their voices were not heeded, until the revolutions of 1848, and the success of Louis Napoleon in 1851, roused the whole nation from its apathy. An improved tone in public feeling, a better estimate of the real value of a good army, and a real dread of danger from without, led to some improvements. The militia force was revived. Lord Hardinge had the courage to insist on the adoption of the Minié rifle, and Mr. Sidney Herbert prevailed on his colleagues to establish a camp. The artillery was placed in a state of great efficiency. But that man would, in 1852-3 have been regarded as mad who proposed a military train, an ambulance corps, and an effective military staff. These necessary parts of an army were not in existence. And besides these deficiencies, there was another and a vital one there was no Minister of War with paramount authority, whose duty it would be to make the best of a When the people heard of the sufferings of their small army, and keep it effective. The Secretary of oldiers in the Crimea and at Scutari, they became in-State for the Colonies was also Minister of War; and his A.D. 1854.] CONDITION OF THE ENGLISH ARMY. authority over the army was practically shared by those who should have been his subordinates. The navy was hardly in a better plight. It was undergoing a process of transformation from a sailing to a steam navy; but although we had some fine screw war-steamers and were building more, the service had fallen into such disrepute that the greatest difficulties were experienced in manning a ship, and some men-of-war lay six months waiting for a complement of hands. The interior economy of the navy required as much improvement as that of the army. The naval and military renown we had won in the great French wars still clung to us; but when the Czar compelled us to fight him, we had little wherewith to sustain that renown, except the valour of our soldiers and our 253 until a late period that the Czar, would give way; and so they refrained from making adequate preparations, and from showing the Czar that they were in earnest, and thus drifted into the midst of what they wished to avoid. Hence it was that they went to war with the largest military power in the world on the basis of a weak peace establishment. The army in 1853 consisted of little more than 102,000 men for the service of the British empire, exclusive of India. In 1854 ministers proposed and carried, in February, an augmentation of 10,000, bringing up the total to 112,000. These men they had to obtain by enlistment, for the militia then was young, and little more than a paper force. It was not embodied, nor had the Government power to embody a single regiment; for The British nation went into the war with unequalled the militia had been raised to resist invasion only, so seamen. could call out a man, except for the annual training, were obliged to obtain an Act of Parliament. Moreover, just on the threshold of war, so rotten was the system of promotion and retirement, that they were compelled to appoint a Royal Commission to report on the best mode of enabling the Queen to avail herself of the services of officers in the full vigour of life. Thus Europe was astonished at the spectacle of a great power remodelling its military system, enlarging it, and strengthening it on the brink of a conflict with the vast and well-appointed armies of Russia. For it was soon found that the Ministry of War must be separated from that of the colonies; and when this was done, no minute defining the powers and functions of the new department was framed; so that the Duke of Newcastle, who left the colonies for the new war department, had to grope his way towards the vital work he had undertaken to do. The Duke was a man unanimity and determination. They were eager to close | jealous were the Commons; and Ministers, before they with the Emperor of all the Russias. Before the disclosure of his perfidy, they regarded him as the keystone of the despotic system on the Continent, as the standing menace to European liberty; and when the proofs of his perfidy were placed before them in 1854, their instinct in favour of fair-dealing was so outraged that their passions rose to the pitch of hatred, and settled down into a grim purpose to punish and restrain. That, after the month of January, 1854, the ministry of Lord Aberdeen shared these sentiments, is now unquestioned; but they shared them in very unequal degrees. Lord Aberdeen hated war, because of the suffering it inflicts on humanity; Mr. Gladstone hated war for the same reason, and because it is so expensive; Mr. Sidney Herbert leaned to this side. The whole Cabinet was convinced of the necessity and justice of the war, but the majority had indulged in a strong desire for peace, and a strong belief, VOL. VIII.-No. 386. of some hardihood, and great energy and industry; but he was new to the business, he had not sufficient weight in the Cabinet; one at least of his colleagues envied him the place he filled; and it may be surmised that, with all his good intentions, Lord Aberdeen's innate repugnance to war exercised, unconsciously, a paralysing influence over the whole Cabinet. A more vigorous and decided mind at the head of the executive would have begun in 1853 to make those preparations which, made then, would have prevented so much suffering in the winter of 1854. A man of greater weight at the War Office would, even in 1854, have been able to impress his colleagues with a sense of the magnitude of the impending conflict, and have obtained their assent to the most vigorous exertions, made with a distinct perception of all that was required to enable England to carry on her share of the war in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people and her character as a great power. But the fact is, that it was not until the end of 1853 that the pulses of the British nation beat with warlike fervour. The Government doubted—at least the Aberdeen section-whether the House of Commons would sanction the policy which they had pursued. There was one man in the Cabinet who had what the first Napoleon called "popular fibre" in his constitution, but he was in the Home Office. Lord Palmerston understood the crisis better than any of his colleagues, and would, in 1853, have taken means to back ip his diplomacy. Lord Aberdeen was afraid of appearing to threaten, or to do anything which might lay him open to the factious charge of provoking hostilities. So timid were the Government that, as we have said, they allowed 1853 to slip by without obtaining power to embody the militia, except in the improbable event of an invasion; and when Parliament met, they only asked for an addition to the army of 10,000 men, because they thought the House of Commons should sanction their policy before they brought the army, even on paper, up to a reasonable strength. Such was the fruit of an unwholesome dread of war, a lingering belief that peace was still probable, and a misapprehension of the character of the Czar. Yet, although at the opening of the session it was manifest that the Ministry had nothing to fear from the Opposition beyond the usual criticism, and that, as a set-off against this, they had the cordial support of the people, it was not until March that they asked for 15,000 more men, and not until May that they demanded an additional 15,000, and obtained the ready assent to the embodiment of the militia, and power to accept the offer of their services for the Mediterranean and colonial garrisons. But this was too late, for it was found that only boys enlisted; and although, in two months, so far as mere drill goes, you can make a good infantry soldier, in two months a boy does not grow into a man. The Duke of Newcastle drew off from the colonies every man he could lay his hands on, and formed a reserve, which, in June, went to the East under Sir George Cathcart. He then formed another reserve, by abstracting more regiments from the colonies, and denuding the Mediterranean fortresses of regular troops. This second reserve went to the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann. Then our supplies of real soldiers were quite exhausted. We had nothing to send but raw youths, unfit to sustain the hardships of a winter campaign. We could only send gristle, instead of bone and sinew. This was the consequence of not augmenting the army in 1853. Correctly speaking, it was a consequence of the neglect to maintain an efficient and numerous army for many years. To show how completely the nation and also the Government were in error, it is only necessary to state that both believed they had sent a mighty force to the East, and had sufficient means to keep it up. Lord Aberdeen said, at a public meeting, that they had sent to the East an army such as the Duke of Wellington never commanded; and Lord Granville affirmed that his hearers would look upon him as a Munchausen, if he were to enumerate all the equipments, stores, ammunition, and guns sent with the army. While the British nation were prepared to give any amount of money, Mr. Gladstone took it into his head that it would be a fine thing to pay for a big war out of the current taxes of the year. He declared he would not resort, until compelled, to the system of loans. He found, however, that a large war could not be conducted out of the produce of the taxes. Because Pitt had raised loans recklessly, that was no reason why Mr. Gladstone should not be more provident. It was right to augment the taxes, for the warring generation ought to pay its share; but the war was made for posterity more than for the then existing generation, and it was right that they should share the burden also. The secret thought which dictated this attempt to do without loans was a wish to disgust the people with the war. As if a national passion, animating all classes, and resting on a just basis, could be diverted from its aim by a device so weak! The boldness of the Duke of Newcastle, who, as early as April, 1854, contemplated the invasion of the Crimea and the capture of Sebastopol, stands out in strong contrast to the timidity of a Cabinet which had delayed until the eve of battle to put in order its machinery for managing the war, and to raise adequate reserves, and which, when at war, proposed to carry it on out of the revenue of the year. But this lack of foresight and insight, these narrow views, are chargeable alike against the people and the Government. Throughout the summer the people waited impatiently for news of the doings of their fine little army. They were unprepared for the consequences of actual operations. They forgot that the worst foes of an army in the field are not the bullets and steel of their opponents, but the sickness which results from exposure, fatigue, improvidence, and a poisonous climate. The sick in the hospitals always outnumber the wounded, as the wounded outnumber the killed on the battle field. The men went down by scores on the pestilential shores of Bulgaria, and the people of England were amazed at this, the inevitable consequence of carrying on war in A.D. 1851.] STATE OF PUBLIO FEELING AT HOME. ... 255 indifference, favour, routine, perverseness and stupidity, unhealthy regions. They were eager for an advance on the Danube, but an advance on the Danube would have tripled the number of sick. Independently of those political and military considerations which presented themselves at a higher point of view, the army needed a change from a weary inactivity in a deadly country to action; and when the Russians retired from the Danube, the allies were ordered to the Crimea. The people of England were in an ecstasy, and daily expected to hear of the fall of Sebastopol. The battle of the Alma stimulated their warlike ardour; the flank march was regarded as a triumph; the opening of the trenches was looked on as the threshold of victory. Had Sebastopol fallen at the end of October, the sufferings of the sick and wounded would have been overlooked. But Sebastopol did not fall. The Czar, by a display of unlooked- The violence of national feeling, however, ha" not for energy, poured his legions into the Crimea. The risen quite to this pitch, when Ministers found it necesallies were besieged. Inkermann followed Balaclava, sary to summon Parliament, that they might stain and the tempest struck its blows on the heels of Inker-power to raise a Foreign Legion, and power to accept mann. The fine army, without adequate reserves, was a the offers of militia regiments to do garrison duty diminished and suffering handful. But the work to be abroad. The two Houses met on the 12th of December, done increased as the men decreased. Winter was before and sat until the 23rd. The whole policy of the war was them. Their winter clothing clung about the oozy rocks discussed as well as the state of the army in the Crimea; of Balaclava. The rains broke up the only road. There but although the Opposition, led by Lord Derby and Mr. were supplies, but they could not get them without a Disraeli, tried to defeat both measures, they were carried terrible expenditure of strength. The expedition had by considerable majorities. The speeches delivered failed, and no provision had been made, we will not say during this short session served to herald the storm for defeat, but for frustration. which was about to burst over the Government in January. The virulence of the paper war at home increased during the recess. Every croaker on the muddly and half-frozen plains of the Crimea sent home doleful and indignant accounts of his sufferings. Many of these terrible stories were pure inventions; but everything, without discrimination, was printed and believed. The bulk even of educated men were at that time far more ignorant of military affairs than they are now; and ignorance, when joined to indignation and presumption, is fruitful in suggestions to overcome difficulties. Many were the pieces of foolish advice tendered to the Government. But next to a genuine desire to relieve the suffering of the soldiers, was a desire to punish somebody. The attacks in the newspapers became more fierce when it was known or surmised that there were members of the Cabinet who reeled under this storm of public censure; and it was soon manifest that when Parliament again assembled the Ministers would be driven from power. The people of England heard of the sufferings of their army, and of the failure of the plan to take Sebastopol, at the moment when they were waiting for news of success. They heard the truth, but they heard a vast deal more than the truth. They fell into a state of fierce rage. Every calumny, every exaggeration, every graphic description, every unfair insinuation was eagerly swallowed and believed. They were told that the army was reduced to 8,000 men; that the general was a compound of imbecility and hard-heartedness; that the staff officers were ignorant, incompetent, reckless; that no one cared for the troops; that the men were starving; and that the horses were even reduced to the consumption of each other's manes and tails. They were told that want of foresight and sheer blundering had prevented the making of a road to the camp; that labour abounded, but that General Airey would not send for it; that shelter could be easily procured for man and horse, but that no one would take the trouble to get it; that provisions were scarce, because Mr. Commissary-General Filder did not know his business; that no one took care Parliament met on the 23rd of January, and Lord of the sick and wounded; and that the Government had Ellenborough, Mr. Roebuck, and Lord Lyndhurst at once neither provided medicines, nor medical comforts, nor put hostile notices of motion on the paper. Mr. Roebuck ambulances, nor proper hospitals. Every day the dis- proposed an inquiry, by a committee of the House, into missal of the Ministry, the recall of Lord Raglan and the condition of the army in the Crimea, and the conhis staff, and the punishment of Mr. Filder, Admiral duct of the departments whose duty it was to minister Boxer, Captain Christie, and the medical officers was to the wants of that army. Lord Ellenborough intended loudly demanded. Perhaps the climax of violence was to ask for returns showing the number of the force sent reached when the Times declared that "the noblest army out, and the number of killed, wounded, and sick. Lord ever sent from our shores had been sacrificed to the Lyndhurst's notice of motion embodied a censure on the grossest mismanagement; " and went on in this style:- Government. These were symptoms of the exasperated "Incompetency, lethargy, aristocratic hauteur, official state of public feeling. More than this, there was a |