Emperor Nicholas, in the hope of averting the dangers which menaced the peace of Europe. It was dated January 29, five days after M. de Kisseleff had demanded explanations, but before that envoy had announced his determination to quit Paris. The Emperor Napoleon began his letter, "Sire”—not "Sire, my brother," the usual form-for Nicholas had never addressed him in the usual form. He ended it by styling himself his Majesty's "good friend," and good friend was long a cant name at St. Petersburg for the Emperor Napoleon. In this extraordinary Imperial missive, the French Emperor coolly recapitulated the history of the Eastern Question, not from the beginning, but from the time of the Menschikoff mission; and he told it in a manner showing, and intended to show, that the Emperor Nicholas had by his acts caused the Maritime Powers to adopt what Russia called a system of pressure; but what the Emperor Napoleon said was a system "protecting, but passive." It was the Czar, he said, who, by invading the Principalities, took the question out of the domain of discussion into that of facts. It was the offensive, the unexpected affair at Sinope, which, by touching the military honour of the Western Powers, obliged them to place an interdict on the Russian fleet. The Czar, he implied, ought to have known that the 3,000 pieces of Anglo-French cannon in the Bosphorus were a pledge that the protecting Powers would not permit Turkey to be attacked by sea. Now, there must be a prompt understanding or a decisive rupture. He offered the Czar peace or war. Let him sign an armistice, and let all the belligerents' forces be withdrawn. Then he politely told the Czar, in direct terms, that, as he desired, he "should" send a plenipotentiary to negotiate with a plenipotentiary of the Sultan, respecting a convention to be submitted to the Four Powers. "" Let your Majesty," the letter went on, adopt that plan on which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly in accord, and tranquillity will be re-established, and the world satisfied. If, from a motive difficult to be comprehended, your Majesty should refuse, in that case, France as well as England will be obliged to leave to the fate of arms, and to the hazards of war, what might be decided at present by reason and justice."

Now, without questioning the sincerity of the writer, we need know but little of the nature of the Emperor Nicholas, to be certain that no missive he received, no despatch he read, could be more calculated to inflame his passions. Should he, the Czar of all the Russias, accustomed for thirty years to have his will, and to dic- | tate to others, submit to a lecture from the upstart at Paris? What one Minister said or wrote to another was of little moment, compared with what one Emperor wrote to another; and when one Emperor dictated to another, and offered him courteously an alternative, how could it be borne? It is not to be supposed that this singular production of the Napoleonic mind destroyed any chance of preserving peace: the last chance had long been blown to the winds. Properly speaking, there never had been any chance except one-submission to Russia. But the letter, published as it was in the

Moniteur, served only two purposes: it enraged the Czar; it glorified the Emperor Napoleon. It was a purely spontaneous act of the latter for his own benefit, and it repaid the small cost of producing it; for its terms pleased the French, who were enchanted with the spectacle of their Emperor, and two-year old empire, loftily pointing out to the mighty occupant of an ancient throne, how he should perform his duties, and satisfy reason and justice. What England had a right to complain of in this French speculation, was the use of the name of the Queen of England in connection with that of Napoleon. That was a liberty and a solecism: a liberty because permission was not asked; a solecism because the Queen of England never acts at all except through her Ministers, and the Emperor Napoleon was not one of these. He had no right to link his own name with that of the Queen.

This imperial caprice had no influence, except on the fortunes of Napoleon and the temper of Nicholas. It neither hurried nor delayed events. Parliament had met, and there was much talk of peace; but this was not the language which drew forth cheers in both Houses. The conduct of Ministers was criticised severely, and Mr. Disraeli went so far as to accuse them of "credulity or connivance." But the House scouted an accusation which was preceded and followed by a cheerful assent to the votes of supplies for increasing the land and sea forces of the empire. Mr. Disraeli, in fact, performed an act of opposition, as in duty bound; but Lord Derby had in his place already declared he would sacrifice the interests of party to patriotism; and even Lord Grey, hostile to the war, insisted that it should be carried on with a resolute determination to strike heavy blows, the heaviest that could be struck. The country was still more hot and resolute than the Parliament, and the protracted cheering which followed Lord John Russell's famous exclamation at the close of a spirited vindication of the course pursued by Ministers-" May God defend the right!"-only faintly expressed the depth and heartiness of the national resolve.

The diplomatists still talked of peace, and gossipped over schemes of accommodation; but the Governments of the West and North prepared for inevitable war. The Western Powers entered upon an intimate alliance; Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent were sent on a military mission to Turkey, and in the middle of February it was notified to the Porte that England and France would send a considerable force to Constantinople. Greece, which showed a disposition, and more than a disposition, to take sides actively with the Czar, was told, in so many words, to choose between the goodwill of France and England, and the blockade of Athens. Servia, where Russian agents invoked the spirit of disaffection, was warned to be upon her good behaviour. Austria and Prussia were implored to adopt a bolder policy, and unite with the Maritime Powers. From his vast resources the French Emperor proceeded to select a choice army, taking by preference the picked troops which had been seasoned in Algerian warfare; and England, with smaller means, laid hands on whatever

regiments were nearest. The fleet was not forgotten, and seamen were rapidly raised to man a squadron for service at the earliest moment in the Baltic. England, in fact, grown rusty during a long peace, was ill-prepared for the work she had undertaken. Neither her military nor her naval establishments were up to the exigencies of war; while her administration was a painful chaos of routine and contradiction. But her energy and goodwill were never doubtful, and with a steadfast heart, but unready hand, she plunged into a war with that Northern Empire which boasted of its destiny to control the fortunes of the East of Europe by land and sea. It was on the 13th of February that Count Nesselrode notified to the Ambassadors of France and England, at St. Petersburg, that Baron Brunnow and M. de Kisseleff had quitted London and Paris, and that diplomatic relations were suspended between Russia and the Western Powers; and the two Ministers shortly afterwards took their departure. It was now the policy of Russia to watch the moves of the Western Powers. She would not declare war, flattering herself she would thereby escape the responsibility of that momentous decision. Accordingly she held her peace. But, on the same day on which the Russian Government offered passports to the French and English Ministers, an order came out to levy nine men in every thousand in the western part of the empire. That "fiery prelate," the Metropolitan of Moscow, had dismissed the 16th division of Infantry on their southward march, presenting them with the image of the most holy father Sergius, telling them to remember that they went forth to fight "for the most pious Czar," for their country, for "holy Church against infidels, against persecutors of the Christian faith," and insulters of the Holy Places; and reminding them that " 'by faith kingdoms are conquered." This fervid appeal was printed officially, but it needed not that to show how grimly in earnest was the most pious Czar. Russia had exhausted her efforts in trying to detach Austria and Prussia, and now she determined to trust to herself alone, confident in her military might.

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Captain Black

He arrived at

six days for an answer, and no longer. wood carried this stringent demand. Vienna just as fresh proposals for peace reached Count Buol from St. Petersburg, the last effort to detach Austria. Captain Blackwood was detained a few hours while the Conference at Vienna examined these proposals, and while the Ambassadors informed their Governments, by telegraph, of this new incident, and requested instructions. These Russian proposals were found to be as objectionable as ever. Except that Russia ceased to require that a Turkish Minister should be sent to St. Petersburg, "it was that same old story," of which even diplomatists had become thoroughly weary. So the Conference, having duly examined the document, and having found it utterly inadmissible, recorded the fact after the solemn fashions of diplomacy; and messenger Blackwood, with his summons and its supporting despatches, jumped into the train and started for the North. He arrived at St. Petersburg on the morning of the 13th of March, and Consul Michele, in charge of English interests, at once sent to the French consul and the Austrian legate the packets brought for them. On the 14th Mr. Michele and M. de Castillon waited on Count Nesselrode, who, however, declined to see them together, and called for the English consul. The interview was short. The summons was duly delivered, and the positive instructions to the messenger to return in six days were made known. The Emperor was then in Finland, whence he did not arrive until the 17th; and it was not until the 19th, the last day of grace, that Count Nesselrode requested Mr. Michele to wait on him for an answer. "On entering the room," writes the consul, "his Excellency's greeting was of the most friendly description. He said, 'I have taken His Majesty's commands with reference to Lord Clarendon's note, and the Emperor does not think it becoming to make any reply to it.' I replied, M. le Comte, in a matter of so much importance I am sure I shall be excused for desiring to convey to my Government the exact words employed by your Excellency.' The Count at first used the words, His Majesty does not think it becoming in

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(ne le croit pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon). Upon my repeating this phrase after Count Nesselrode, his Excellency said,

L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable,' &c.; and I again repeated after him the entire sentence. After I had done so the Count said, 'Yes, that is the answer I wish you to convey to your Government. L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettro de Lord Clarendon.' Nothing could well be more contemptuous in substance, or more polite in form; and so, with this singular scene at the Russian Foreign Office, exit Peace and enter War.

bringing that empire within the European system; and that the Four Powers would not enter into any arrangement with Russia, or any other Power, which did not accord with these principles, without previously deliberating in common. So far there was union; but there was no union in arms. Yet the very requirements of the protocol were those which, as every fact had shown, Russia would not agree to without an application of adequate force. A wide chasm separated the Western from the German Powers-the gulf of war. All that the protocol did, beside justifying the war in which the German courts would not engage, was to pledge them to a basis of peace. What the Germans, and especially Austria, were eager for, was the evacuation of the Principalities; that was a German as well as an Austrian interest, and Prussia, aspiring to be the leading German Power, could not neglect her duty in that respect; and so, ten days later, namely, on the 20th of April, Austria and Prussia formed an offensive and defensive alliance. To do what? Defend the Sultan? Defend Europe? No; to "defend the rights and interests of Germany." They undertook to hold troops in readiness, and they guaranteed to each other reciprocally their German and non-German possessions. They did not ally themselves with the Western Powers, to defend with them the common interests of the Sultan and Europe. The "interests of European welfare "were, indeed, invoked as a motive for German action; but the substantial parts of the treaty related to Germany alone. Russia had at this time whispered in the ear of the King of Prussia that the original motive for seizing the Principalities had been removed by the concessions granted to the Christians by the Porte. Prussia, therefore, hoped the Czar would withdraw his troops; but, as this hope might prove delusive, Prussia agreed to add another article to the treaty providing for hostilities. The two Powers in effect declared that they would make war on Russia "in the event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or in the event of an attack on or passage of the Balkan by Russia." How, then, can it be said, that even at the end of April, 1854, the Four Powers were united? At this time neither Prussia nor Austria would make war to thrust the Russians from the Principalities. England and France were actually present on Turkish soil to effect that object. The Four Powers were agreed upon several very important points of great though deferred interest-the bases of a peace; but they were not agreed upon the most important point of all-the mode of obtaining the peace. On that point the Western Powers took one path, and the German Powers another. As we shall soon see, Austria had reason to fall farther away from Prussia, and to approach the Western Powers. But it is now time to turn from diplomacy to those other arbiters of the destinies of nations, who are called in to cut the knots which diplomacy ravels together, and then fails to untie.

The allies do not appear to have entered on the war with any very definite notions. England and France formed an alliance together, and then allied themselves with the Sultan. In defending the Sultan, they were to

defend a fundamental principle of European policy in the concrete, and they were to take no advantage to themselves by the act. But their earlier views were limited even from the defensive point of view. While Lord Raglan and the Duke of Cambridge were proceeding through France, to meet Marshal St. Arnaud on the way, and to take counsel with the Emperor Napoleon; while Count Walewski and the British public exchanged compliments at the Mansion House, and Queen Victoria and Prince Albert went to a fancy ball at the house of the French Ambassador, the French and English troops were slowly moving up the Mediterranean, the French and English fleets were cruising on the Black Sea and the Baltic, and the Turks were fighting on the Danube. If the allied Powers had then formed great designs for offensive war, they were not in a condition to execute them, for, although they had troops to send, neither had an organised army with which to act at once. They, therefore, at first adopted a middle course. They determined to secure a line of retreat for their ships, and a base of operations from which, in the event of the Turkish army being driven over the Balkan, they could effectively defend Constantinople. At this time there was existent an exaggerated dread of Russian power. The Czar was so strong, the Sultan so weak, so men thought, that it was deemed possible the Russians might force both the Danube and the Balkan by the rapid marches of an overwhelming force, and thus confront the Sultan in his capital. To provide against this, and also to cover their weakness, the allies determined to land their troops at Gallipoli. The shores of Europe at the mouth of the Dardanelles terminate in a remarkable tongue of land, bounded on one side by the straits, on the other by the Mediterranean, and joined to the Continent by a narrow neck of rugged country at the western end of the Sea of Marmora. Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent had been sent out to inspect this peninsula, and they agreed with earlier military surveyors that it would be advisable to fortify the neck a few miles to the east of Gallipoli, covering the point of debarkation, and commanding the flank of the great road through Adrianople to the Turkish capital. Therefore, as the allied troops began to arrive in March and April, they were employed in throwing up entrenchments, known as the lines of Boulair, and extending from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora. It was in the camps near Gallipoli that the whole of the French and part of the British army were organised for active service; but while they were gradually assembling there, the Turks were fighting so manfully on the Danube, and so effectually thwarting Russia, that the lines of Boulair became useless, and the allies, as we shall see, found it needful to take post on the southern, instead of the northern slopes of the Balkan.

When it became certain that war would ensue, the Emperor Nicholas reinforced his army in the Principalities, and raised it to the strength of about 150,000 men, including an immense force of cavalry, and no fewer than 520 guns. Against this mass the Sultan could barely array a nominal force of 120,000 men, and s