point of Scotch history-the Reformation. And we regret this the less because up to the period at which Mr. Burton ends his narrative the Scotch Reformation had not assumed those distinctive features which give it a peculiar interest. Mr. Burton has created some surprise by saying, in his calm unenthusiastic way, that the Reformation in Scotland took its course not so much from the religious opinions of the people as from external political convulsions. But however startling this may be to certain national prejudices, there can be no doubt that up to 1560 at all events it is perfectly true. On the 25th of August in that year Calvinism was established by Parliament, but what life should be breathed into those legislative Acts was to be determined by the future. So far the struggle of the creeds had been little more than a contest between French and English influence. In after days opposition raised a fierce popular spirit, and gave to the Scotch Reformation its peculiar characteristics as a religious movement. But these matters are all to come. We look forward to Mr. Burton's future volumes with great interest. In many respects the subjects which lie before him are better suited to his powers than those he has here dealt with. We may fairly look for a fuller and sounder estimate of the Scottish Constitution before the Union than we have in the nine or ten pages at present thought equal to the subject. Some account also of the sources, and an historical sketch of the growth of Scotch law, might come with propriety from a Scotch lawyer. And in the more modern aspects of character with which he will have to deal, and in the expanding strength of public opinion, which he has already shown himself so acute to detect and wise to appreciate, Mr. Burton will be quite at home. It would be idle to say that he has reached the highest standard of historical excellence. But he has enriched historical literature with a valuable and instructive work, and we anticipate, with confidence, that the two remaining volumes in which he promises to complete it, will surpass even the varied merits of those now before us. ART. X.-1. Les Institutions Militaires de la France. Par 2. Un Mot sur le projet de la Réorganisation Militaire. Par le Général CHANGARNIER. 3. L'Armée Française en 1867. [Par le Général TROCHU.] Seizième Edition. Paris: 1867. IF F the Constable's sword and the Marshal's staff in modern France were in the hands best able to wield those symbols of military authority, the three distinguished officers, whose recent publications stand at the head of this article, would probably not have employed the pen to place their experience and judgment at the service of their country. But as matters stand, France is indebted to them for a most animated sketch of her military institutions, and all Europe may profit by the wise and enlightened principles of military organisation which they have expressed in these pages. The cause which has opened this momentous discussion is not far to seek. The astonishing results of the campaign of last summer, which we have already twice commented on in these pages, awakened doubts where no doubts existed before, as to the relative strength of the great continental armies. The Prussian system, which was officially regarded and described in France, but a short time ago, as 'a school of militia, of doubtful ' value for defensive warfare, and extremely imperfect in the 'first period of offensive operations,' has suddenly shown itself to be the mistress of Germany, and has become an object of interest and emulation to the rest of Europe. The French Government instantly, and perhaps hastily, avowed that it could no longer regard the existing armies of the Empire as of sufficient strength to uphold the military renown of France against so formidable an antagonist. A Bill was immediately prepared to enable the Government to raise the forces of France to no less than 800,000 men; and although this measure has been received with marked disfavour by the population, by the legislature, and even by the military authorities, it is not denied that a large augmentation of the reserves of the French army is indispensably necessary, and that the burdens of military service and military establishments are likely to be increased there, as in every other part of the Continent. This is, it must be confessed, a deplorable result of the political changes which have been effected by the ambition of Prussia and by the policy of Count Bismarck. Already, before the late war, the enormous amount of the forces levied by conscription and maintained at a prodigious cost, were the standing reproach to our age, and a standing menace to that peace which is cordially desired by all nations. We had ventured to entertain hopes that sooner or later a general disarmament might be effected; and that France, which was so long regarded as the only Power capable of threatening the tranquillity and independence of other nations, would some day set the example of a more pacific course of action. But whatever may be thought of the political institutions of the French Empire, justice and truth require us to acknowledge that it is not by Napoleon III. that the great treaties, on which the law of nations and the peace of Europe rested, have been set at nought, and that it is not France which has snatched an immense political aggrandisement from a military triumph. On the contrary, the consolidation and increase of the vast military powers of Germany under a single sceptre have been more unwelcome and dangerous to France than to any other Power; and these events have forced her to enter upon an inquiry into her own resources, which she would willingly have avoided. The Emperor Napoleon is perfectly aware that in no former time in the history of the French nation was that warlike people more averse to war; and nothing but the imperative necessity of maintaining the forces of the country on a footing of equality with those of its neighbours could have reconciled him to the measures he has proposed. The effect of the comparison which has thus been instituted between the work which the Prussian armies. have lately performed and the work of which the French armies are capable, has disturbed the complacency of the French; it has awakened a suspicion that they may be behindhand in the great evolution of military power in which their neighbours and rivals have made so much progress; and it has satisfied reflecting men that no absolute reliance can be placed on the splendid achievements of the past, or on resources which seemed but yesterday to be invincible, to maintain the honour of the French arms and to ensure the safety of the country. A more thorough organisation, a more comprehensive system of enlistment and of reserves, a more effective armament, and perhaps a new system of drill and tactics, are required to encounter with success an antagonist by whom all these improvements have been already carefully studied and zealously prosecuted. These truths are now commonly ad * * The well-known anonymous pamphlet which appeared in Germany three or four years ago under the significant title 'How to mitted in France, not without some sacrifice of national pride, though with no misgiving as to the ultimate result. They are truths equally important to ourselves and to every other State. It is undeniable that immense changes are occurring, and have occurred, in all that relates to the formation, instruction, and command of armies. The circumstances under which war will hereafter be carried on are more sensibly altered than they have been at any time since the invention of gunpowder; and the Power which is first able to turn these altered circumstances to its own advantage will have at the outset a superiority which may, as at Sadowa, decide in a few hours the fate of a campaign. Nevertheless, the art of war, like all the sciences which are the result of combination, is reducible to certain fixed principles equally applicable in all ages; and whilst all the accidents of warfare are being transformed around us, it is more than ever important to adhere to those elementary truths which are common to every army and to every age. It is for this reason that we propose to examine these publications. The details of the organisation of the French army are not of a nature to interest and instruct the general reader; they must be reserved for more technical investigation. But the merit of the eloquent and patriotic writings now before us, consists in the application of broad and constant principles to an altered state of affairs; and the writings of the Duc d'Aumale and General Trochu contain so much wisdom and thought that they cannot be read without advantage in any part of the world. The history of the organisation of the regular army dates in France, as well as in this and other countries, from about two centuries ago. Prior to the reign of Louis XIV. and the later years of the English Commonwealth, war was carried on by men-at-arms, troops of horse, and bodies of troops who bore the same relation to a modern army that a picture by Wouvermans bears to the armies of Solferino and Sadowa. The soldier was equally brave and more independent; but the art of acting in great masses, and the discipline by which the individual is entirely merged in the corps to which he belongs, is of comparatively recent date. The formation of regular armies required systematic organisation-uniformity of arms and dress, regularity of advancement, stricter conditions of service, graduated pay, and more certain methods of ensuring the sustenance of troops. make war on the French,' is now acknowledged to be the composition of Prince Frederic Charles of Prussia, one of the victorious generals who commanded at Sadowa. These are the elements of which Louvois was the first great master, and by his careful application of them he contributed more to the success of the arms of Louis XIV. than Turenne and Luxemburg, who led his troops to victory in the field. The whole administrative correspondence of Louvois still exists in the Archives de la Guerre' at Paris; it has recently been carefully examined by M. Rousset, and the result is a biography of that great Minister, which is one of the most interesting and instructive books of the present day.* The organisation of the French army by Louvois lasted, with no material changes, until 1793; it perished in that great convulsion which overthrew the privileged classes, who played so great a part in it, and the monarchy. In the French army thus constituted during the eighteenth century most of the peculiarities prevailed, which have now disappeared from every European army but our own, and are now fiercely assailed in this country. The men were raised by voluntary enlistment. The regiments retained a local name and character from the districts to which they belonged-the brigades of Picardy, Normandy, Champagne, and Auvergne corresponded to our Coldstream Guards, Sutherland or Gordon Highlanders, Connaught Rangers, or Welsh Fusileers. The King's Household troops were a privileged corps, with this distinction, however, that in the Royal Guards and Musketeers the purchase system never obtained, and that they were open to all ranks of society. In the rest of the army, regiments and companies having been originally raised by private persons for the service of the Crown, had become a species of property, like the commissions in our own army. The old French army was a highly aristocratic institution; for although the purchase of commissions was tolerated, Louvois had contrived to make the military service rather onerous than profitable, and the consequence was that the rich and the noble could alone hold them. The French nobility served with unflinching courage and enthusiasm; they were as ready to spend their fortunes in the purchase of a step, as to spend their blood on the field of battle. And although the roture were not absolutely excluded from the rank of officers, and commissions were sometimes vouchsafed by the King even to private soldiers of signal valour and merit, the noblesse d'épée may be said to have officered the army. Even the ferocious energy of Louvois, backed by the vigour of his great infantry inspector, Colonel Histoire de Louvois et de son Administration politique et militaire jusqu'à la paix de Nimègue. 4 vols. Paris: 1862. |