made improvements thereon, before being dispossessed of such lands, should be paid full value for such improvements. The Legislature of 1840 passed a supplemental act authorizing any settler on the half-breed tract, who had some color of title to the same, to select not more than one section, and hold such land till the title was finally settled. A receipt paid for taxes should be evidence of title to enable the person to hold such land. The next session followed this up by passing a law that the white settler was to have a lien on the land for improvements which he had made. During the session of 1848 another act was passed permitting the defendant in an action of ejectment to raise the question of fraud in procuring title by the plaintiff, whatever the nature of title might be, and the allegation of fraud should be investigated by the judge. (See Chap. 4, Sess. 1839-40.)

Now a long fight began in the courts, and it was not now a fight over the rights of the half-breeds, as these unfortunate people, for the most part, had disposed of all their holdings, for a mere song, to the powerful land companies, or their agents. The Legislature, by its various acts, had tried to protect the actual white settlers against the claims of the speculators, who were seeking to get possession of these lands, which had become the most valuable in the territory.

At the January term, 1846, of the Supreme Court, the case entitled "Joseph Webster, plaintiff in error, vs. Hugh T. Reid, defendant in error," was decided by the court, composed of Charles Mason, Joseph Williams and Thomas S. Wilson. This case involved the title to one hundred and sixty acres of land, and the court held that Reid, who had previously purchased the 119,000 acres for less than six thousand dollars, was the owner in fee simple of this land.

In 1841, Johnston & Reid, as attorneys for the St. Louis claimants of the half-breed lands, filed a petition in the United States Court for a decree of partition. Francis Scott Key, author of the "Star Spangled Banner," who was

then an attorney for the New York Land Company, also holding forty-one shares in these lands, drew up the decree, by which the half-breed tract of land was divided into one hundred and one shares, and arranged that each claimant should draw his portion by lot, and that he should abide the result whatever it might be. This decree was signed May 8, 1841, and for more than ten years litigation continued. By agreement, a plat was filed of record October 6, 1841. According to that plat, titles to half-breed lands are now held.

The Court held as follows: "That the act of Congress of 1834, vested the right and title in the half-breed Indians, all the right the United States had, with power to the halfbreeds to transfer their portions by sale, descent or devise, according to the laws of the State of Missouri." Neither the treaty nor the act of Congress mentioned the names of persons who could take under the law, and it was for this reason that the territorial legislature, on January 18, 1838, with a view to ascertain who were the real owners, appointed the commission to pass upon the titles and to set aside these lands in severalty.

The grounds upon which Webster rested his case were as follows:

1. That he was a purchaser in good faith of the land from Na-mau-tau-pus, a half-breed Indian of the Sacs and Foxes, and that other Indians had so testified and made oath.

2. That he had resided on these lands and made improvements thereon.

3. That no notice had been personally served upon the defendant, Webster.

4. That plaintiff had been one of the attorneys in the case, that the sale had never in fact taken place, and that the return of the sheriff was false.

Another question raised in the case was, the meaning of Indian titles. The court held that the half-breeds held the land in common, and could not dispose of it without the

consent of the United States, but that the later act conferred this fee simple title and hence the act of 1834 conferred the right to sell and dispose of land on certain conditions.

Another question decided was, that although a legislature could not by law destroy vested rights, it did have a legal right to create and augment them. The case is reported in Morris, page 467. Another case was brought by Reid against Wright, which was decided at the May term, 1849, adversely to Reid. The court at that time was composed of John F. Kinney, George Greene and Joseph Williams.

Judge Kinney wrote the opinion, holding, "That it is the right and duty of the judicial power in the state, to declare all acts of the legislature made in violation of the constitution, to be void, and that the legislature of Wisconsin territory, could not curtail rights conferred, nor confer rights withheld by the ordinance of 1787." "That in an action of right, the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title, and must show a valid subsisting title in himself, and that no interest can accrue from a void judgment." (See Reid vs. Wright, 2 G. Greene, page 15.)

The former case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and before that body decided the case, it is worthy of notice, that the State Supreme Court of Iowa arrived at the same conclusion, holding that the bona-fide settler and purchaser from the half-breed had title, and that the various acts of the legislature of both territories were void and repugnant to the ordinance of 1787.

At the December, 1850, term of the Supreme Court of the United States, that learned body handed down the longlooked for decision, reversing the territorial court, and deciding adversely to the purchaser of the land by sheriff sale to Hugh T. Reid. This was the blow which put an end to the strife which had waged long and bitterly for many years. The lawyers for the various land companies, quit-claimed for a reasonable consideration, all interests in these lands, and the matter was thus settled once for all.

The opinion was written by Justice John McLean (17871861), one of the most noted lawyers of his day and a profound judge, who held in the Dred Scott decision seven years later, "that slavery has its origin in force, not in right, nor in general law to which it is opposed." A few of the many points decided in the case are as follows:

"Where a judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the territory, and the record was certified by the Supreme Court of the state, after its admission into the Union, and the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court, it will take jurisdiction of the case.

"Where the legislature directed that suits might be instituted against the owners of half-breed lands lying in Lee county, and notice thereof being served through newspapers and judgments were recovered on suits so instituted, such judgments are nullities.

"The court holds that where there is no personal service of notice on individuals, nor attachment or other proceedings against the land in question, there can be no valid judgment.

"The law provided that the court could decide without the intervention of a jury matters of fact. The court held that this was inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and with the ordinance of 1787, and if the law was void, the judgments under it equally so.

"It further held that the purchaser should have been allowed to show by evidence, the title upon which he relied; and he should have been allowed to show that the judgment relied upon by Reid had not been obtained in conformity with the law." (See Webster vs. Reid, U. S. Reports 52, Howard, book 11, p. 437.)

Part of the land involved in the half-breed purchase had once before been under consideration by this court in 1839. This was on the Honori title, over the town site of Montrose. Honori had purchased a tract of land in 1799 from the Spanish government, and in 1805 sold his contract to one J. Robedoux. He died and Auguste Chouteau was appointed

executor. He sold it to Thos. F. Reddick, the same year. After the half-breeds disposed of their lands, the various claimants brought partition suits to invalidate the title of the Reddick heirs, and this remains the oldest title to lands in Iowa.

From 1837 to 1850, emigration from the Scandinavian countries had begun in earnest, and as early as 1838-39, a settlement had been made, at what is known as Sugar Creek, in Lee county, Iowa.

The settlers early bought lands and obtained what was known in those days as "straw titles" and "blanket claims," which were declared worthless, so that a number of them lost every dollar invested. The misfortunes of their countrymen discouraged others in the settlements in Illinois and farther east, and hence the influx of Scandinavians later, began in the northeastern part of the State, and as a result the northern half of the State has a large Scandinavian population. There is no question but that if the first settlement had prospered, the Scandinavian settlements would have been found in the southern half of the State, and would have extended into the state of Missouri, for as a rule, people migrate by latitude, not by longitude.

Although "blanket claims" and "straw titles" prevented the first Scandinavians from getting a foothold in eastern Iowa, the chaotic condition of titles resulted in producing a lot of able lawyers in southern and eastern Iowa.

H. T. Reid was an able attorney, and represented the St. Louis Land Company. Edward Johnston became a United States attorney and later judge. H. S. Austin removed to Chicago, and Dan F. Miller, Sr., practiced law for more than fifty years in Iowa, and was one of the well-known men in the State, being a partner of Judge James M. Love, who was judge of the federal court for many years. Hawkins Taylor, the sheriff, became a noted politician and held the further honor of having arrested Hyram Smith, a brother of Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, in the early days of the