for Hylan, the Democratic candidate, who was elected, 149,000 for Mitchel, the fusion candidate who stood for re-election, and 53,000 for Bennett, the Republican candidate. In the senatorial election in Wisconsin, last April, Victor L. Berger, another member of the National Committee, and under Federal indictment for sedition, received 110,000 votes, against Lenroot, Republican, who was elected by 142,000 votes, and Davies, Democrat, who got 132,000 votes. In the Chicago municipal elections held at about the same time, the Socialists lost one of their three members on the City Council. The large Socialist vote in the New York and Wisconsin elections is to be explained by the fact that, in each case, the candidate undoubtedly drew heavily from German and antially forces, numerically strong in both places. The Socialist party has afforded almost the only rallying ground for those opposed to the war; and, whatever its potential future strength, its actual power is relatively small.

Very erroneously, many have tried to see in the New York and Wisconsin elections a test of American devotion to the cause in which the country is engaged. In New York, the friends of Mayor Mitchel advertised him as the fighting mayor; a vote for him was declared to be equivalent to a shot at the Kaiser. The Democratic candidate for office contented himself with declarations to the effect that no American could outdo him in loyalty. When it came to voting, the issue of the war played a relatively small part; local issues, especially with regard to the schools, were far more important. It is probable that, beyond those who voted for Hilquitt, very few had any conscious intention of passing judgment on the war when they cast their ballots. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Tammany Hall, the Democratic political machine, which ordinarily controls New York, but which had been out of power for four years, was, in the normal course of events, 'due to come back' in 1917.

In Wisconsin there was no choice as to loyalty between the Democratic and Republican candidates. The State is normally Republican, and the Republican candidate was elected. There, too, the Socialist vote probably measured the struggle of the disaffected. In the Republican primary, however, which preceded the election

by only a few days, there were two candidates-Thompson, backed by Senator LaFollette, whose expulsion from the Senate on grounds of disloyalty has frequently been demanded, and who had received a vote of censure from his own legislature; and Lenroot, who ran on a platform supporting the war. The LaFollette candidate was defeated, but by a narrow margin. When it is remembered that the Republican party in Wisconsin contains a very large German element, and that LaFollette, in spite of his attitude toward the war, is still gratefully remembered in that State because of his identification with a host of liberal measures, it is not surprising that the contest within the party was so close, or that many voters refused to regard it as a contest over the issues of the war.

Nothing could be more misleading than the results of state and local elections as indices of the American attitude toward the war. The Democratic President will have as hearty and effective support from the Republican governor of Massachusetts, elected last November, as he will have from the Democratic governor of Missouri, elected a year earlier. Local elections are determined mainly by local issues, with which the war has nothing to do. Furthermore, in a country so large as the United States, the population of which is so heterogeneous, where issues vary so widely and local governments are so entirely detached from the national government, it is especially dangerous to generalise from the results of local elections.

During the past year the American people has gone through a process of education unexampled in its history. This process had its beginnings, indeed, in 1914; but these preliminary stages have been so admirably described by Mr G. L. Beer in his book on 'The English-speaking Peoples,' that they need not be recounted here. On April 1, 1917, the average American knew that his sympathies were strongly with the Allies. He was convinced that Germany was the aggressor in 1914; he was shocked by the German methods of carrying on the war; he was highly indignant (though his hot wrath over the 'Lusitania' had somewhat abated) at the German attitude towards the United States. Of course there were

thousands of Americans, in all parts of the country-not merely on the Atlantic sea-board-who had been chafing for two years because their country had not yet entered the ranks of the belligerents; but opposed to them were millions who were not only not convinced that the United States should take part in the war, but who were strongly of the opinion that she should not. If the elections of 1916 had been clearly on the issues of a more or less benevolent neutrality versus active participation in the war, they would have been carried overwhelmingly by those in favour of neutrality.

When, therefore, the Administration was forced to recognise that the continuance of neutrality had become intolerable, its first duty was to convince the American people that this was indeed so. Fighting to make the world safe for democracy' was very well, and the idea of it was rather stimulating; but, to the average American, democracy seemed reasonably safe in his own neighbourhood, and, indeed, upon all the continent of North America north of the Rio Grande. If Europe was not safe for democracy, let the Europeans make it so. That the United States was actually menaced, that, if the Central Powers were victorious and dominant in Europe, America must put itself upon a military footing of the greatest magnitude and would be compelled, in all probability and in the not too distant future, to contend with Germany in armed conflict-these eventualities were not altogether clear. The first step in the process of education, therefore, was to convince Americans that the war in which they were engaging was in reality a war of self-defence.

In his war-message of April 2, 1917, the President expressed the conviction of the Government that the German 'Government entertains no real friendship for us, and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience.' Later, Mr Lansing, Secretary of State, said in an address:

'Let us understand once for all that this is no war to establish an abstract principle of right. It is a war in which the future of the United States is at stake. If any among you has the idea that we are fighting others' battles and not our own, the sooner he gets away from that idea the better it will be for him, the better it will be for all of us. Imagine Germany

victor in Europe because the United States remained neutral. Who then, think you, would be the next victim of those who are seeking to be masters of the whole earth? Would not this country, with its enormous wealth, arouse the cupidity of an impoverished though triumphant Germany? Would not this democracy be the only obstacle between the autocratic rulers of Germany and their supreme ambition? Do you think that they would withhold their hand from so rich a prize?

'Let me then ask you, would it be easier or wiser for this country, single-handed, to resist a German Empire flushed with victory and with great armies and navies at its command, than to unite with the brave opponents of that Empire in ending now and for all time this menace to our future? Primarily, then, every man who crosses the ocean to fight on foreign soil against the armies of the German Emperor goes forth to fight for his country and for the preservation of those things for which our forefathers were willing to die.'

Such arguments as these served as text for a vast quantity of published matter, editorials, articles in periodicals, pamphlets, and for numberless speeches. Agencies of the Government and voluntary organisations cooperated in carrying on the educational campaign. The imperialistic designs of Germany were studied and exposed; substantial volumes were compiled of extracts from German sources, to show how far the imagination of the German people had been fired by dreams and deliberate plans of world-conquest. Long before the end of the first year, Americans in general were amply convinced that their country was fighting, not only for high ideals of freedom and right, but for its own protection against the most sinister menace.

Another step in the process of American education was due to German peace intrigues. In the early months of last year there were to be found many in America who would have welcomed a peace by negotiation. There were those-and not all of them were under German influence-who urged that the President should state clearly the terms upon which the United States would negotiate a peace. Those who realised the futility of a premature discussion of peace terms pointed out that the President had already, in his various messages to Congress and in his public addresses, indicated with

perfect clearness the objects of the United States in entering the war, and that any restatement of these objects was superfluous and would be misunderstood as an evidence of weakening resolution. The peace movement in the United States, if it was entitled to be dignified by that name, came to a head, or rather to an anticlimax, in the meeting of the so-called People's Council of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace in Chicago in the early fall of 1917. This group, the motives of which were more than suspected, was composed of Socialists and discredited Pacifists. It was refused permission to hold a meeting in several towns of the Middle West; and in one place at least its members were forced, by indignant citizens, to make a hurried departure. When at last it succeeded in holding a meeting in Chicago, it had become an object of ridicule as well as of suspicion; and its high-sounding resolutions, demanding a restatement of terms of peace, found no answering sentiment in public opinion.

In his reply to the Pope and in his Flag-Day address of June 14, 1917, the President exposed the nature of the German peace-intrigue, laid bare the ulterior motives of the German Government, and demonstrated the danger to America and to the world of even an apparent readiness to listen to the insidious proposals. As a result of the President's words and of the support and elaboration they received from numberless writers and editors, the mass of Americans came to understand clearly the uselessness of talking peace at this time.

Nevertheless the President considered it to be a part of his duty to conduct an offensive of his own, with the twofold purpose of giving encouragement to the Liberal elements within the German Empire, and of detaching, if possible, Austria from her overshadowing ally. Later, when the Russian débâcle was at its height, the President's policy had the further object of endeavouring to rally the moral forces of that unhappy country. This 'diplomatic offensive,' as it came to be called, was watched by the country with interest and sympathy, if with no very great confidence in its effectiveness. When on Jan. 8, 1918, the President, in addressing the Senate, enumerated fourteen specific objects as representing the principles for which the United States is contending, his programme Vol. 230.-No. 456.

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