has in Russia nearly 40 divisions, besides a number of Austrian divisions which have been fully employed on police duties, to which has now been added the burden of a campaign against the Czecho-Slovaks, the magnitude of which cannot be foreseen. Although his troops are poorly equipped for fighting, General Syrovy has the whole expanse of Asiatic Russia behind him, with complete control of the Siberian railway. While his present position is perilous, exposed, as he is, to attack from various directions by superior forces, if his army should have the manoeuvring power to retire along the railway while avoiding a serious engagement, it might lead the Germans a dance from which they would derive neither pleasure nor advantage. The increasing dearth of communications would cause them to be more and more tied to the railway, restricting their manoeuvring power, and limiting them to frontal attack. Assistance in the form of material, if not of men, would ultimately reach General Syrovy from the east; his forces would grow-for the inhabitants have been glad enough, when possible, to rid themselves of the Bolshevist yoke, and local governments have already raised forces at more than one centre in Siberia-and his position would become more secure. The Germans, on the other hand, would drag behind them a lengthening chain of communications, which might break at any moment unless supported by larger forces than they can spare from those at present in Russia to keep order in their rear. With such possibilities in view-for the Germans do not overlook possibilities-it is not surprising that they should be anxious to escape from further complications on the White Sea coast, to unravel which they had originally thought it necessary to invite, or requisition, the assistance of the reluctant Finns. Since the Germans made their conditional offer to stay their hand in Karelia, the Allied attacks in Macedonia and Palestine have introduced a new factor in the problem they have to solve. Although the collapse of Russia has opened a new way to the east, the Germans have no mind to relinquish the old road via Constantinople, with the advantages it confers of commanding the exit from the Black Sea, and of threatening the Suez Canal, which Bismarck described as the neck of the British Empire.' Apart from these considerations, the abandonment of their vaunted position in the Balkans would be a long step towards admitting defeat, and would be a fatal blow to their prestige in Russia, and among the small peoples who have fallen under the sway of Germany. They cannot, therefore, afford to look on at the collapse of Bulgaria and Turkey, on whose maintenance in the field their position in the Balkans depends. The shortening of their front in France by the recent retreat will enable them temporarily to withdraw a few divisions for employment elsewhere; but, with the prospect of an unrestful winter on the western front, the indefinite requirements of the situation in the east may impose a severe strain on their resources. Events in Palestine, in the Balkans, and in France cannot, in fact, be correctly viewed as disconnected episodes. Each has its place in the general perspective; and it is impossible, at the moment, to assign to each its relative importance. It is not by accident that Germany's minor allies have been attacked at the time when the situation in the west demands all her attention. The conjecture put forward more than two years ago, that the force at Salonica might find its opportunity 'when the enemy, having been weakened and reduced to the defensive, is being driven back on the main fronts,' does not seem to have been wide of the mark. Since this article went to press the surrender of Bulgaria has been reported; and it is an open question whether Turkey, staggering under accumulated defeats, and isolated from Germany except by way of the Black Sea, may not follow suit. Germany has lost the old road to the east; and she must either cut the loss, or attempt to retrieve it before the Allies consolidate their military position in the Balkans. Such an attempt could only be made at the expense of the position in the west; and, to offer a prospect of success, it would need a far greater expenditure of force than the Germans might have deemed sufficient had the Bulgarian army kept the field. INDEX TO THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH VOLUME OF THE The names of authors of [Titles of Articles are printed in heavier type. A. Aga Khan, H.H. the, 'India in Allbutt, Sir Clifford, 'System of Allies, War Council, 250-disposi- tions of the reserve, 250-252- -German peace intrigues, 96- Vol. 230.-No. 457. 2 M Ammianus, Marcellinus, the History Archer, William, India and the Armas, José de, 'Spain and Gibral- Army, British, military operations Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., on the rise B. Barton, Edward, Ambassador to Beer, G. L., The English-Speaking Benelli, Sem, 'L'Altare,' 137-pæan Binyon, Lawrence, For the Fallen,' Blood, Colonel W. P., The Course Briggs, Prof., 'Commentary on the Cæsar, Julius, in command in Gaul, Capital, proposed tax on, 201. Casement, Roger, seditious articles, 215 Why Casement went to Chirol, Sir Valentine, 'Cecil Spring- Cohen, Herman, The Court of Commons, House of, characteristics, minal Appeal, The Court, of, -cases of conviction, 344-dis- Curtis, Lionel, 'Letters to the People D. D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 'Laudi,' 139 Darwin, Charles R., voyage in the Debt, National, amount, 196. Devonport, Lord, appointed Food Driver, Prof., An Introduction to F. Fayle, C. Ernest, 'The Principles of Finance, British, During and abroad, 210-position of shipping, Fisher, Rt Hon. H. A. L., 'The Last Food Problem, 1914-1916, 145- supplies, 161-causes of the rise France, ideal, 134-military opera- Frankau, Gilbert, 'The City of Fear,' Frederick the Great, character of G. Garton Foundation, 'Memorandum Gaul, the Conquest of, and Cicero, Gentz, Friedrich von, Fragments Germany, ideal 'Germania,' 132-134. Germany, military operations on the |