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tion, it might mean only that he is King (as far as he is King) not of other States, but of this. - Surely a very harmless truism !

And shall we, then, suffer the ATTORNEY GENERAL to step in, and inuendo away all the candour of so plain an Exposition ; by contending (as he must do, if he means to impute blame to the Toast) that “ His Grace « of NORFOLK (if sober) meant that our King is the « People; or that we have no Sovereign but in the " Majesty of the People : that is, in other words, that we « have no King at all (in Title) but that all his power 6 is in the power of Subjects over him, and over one « another?"

Was ever disingenuity like this? Yet this ATTORNEY GENERAL has the gift of reasoning; but (as FalsTAFF said) « his potations are thin." I doubt if he is Member of a single Club. He certainly neither drinks nor swears. His midnight lamps are more contemplative and studious than those of the Duke, but less animated and brilliant.

Such a man will never do for the SYMPOSIARCH-the Master of Revels to the Whigs, the Controller of the merry politics of a Tavern. And without some such forced construction, there is (as I think I have proved) nothing in the Toast but what you, Sir, might drink yourself, not only harmlessly, but (if the wine were of the Duke of NORFOLK's choosing) beneficially; and what I, Sir, if you would admit me of your party, should be happy to drink with you.

Your's,

A SYMPOSIAST.

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To the Editor of the Anti-Jacobin.
SIR,
It is the custom of THE PARTY to represent every demand
made by us, during the late Negotiations, or the hinge on
which those Negotiations respectively turned, as the cause
of the War being continued, and as the object of its con-
tinuation. Thus, because on the first Embassy of Lord
MALMESBURY, we required the restitution of the New
therlands to the EMPEROR, it was asserted that the War
was prolonged by us for the sake of enforcing that resti-
tution and because, in the late discussions at Lisle, we
demanded the cession of the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon,
and Trinidad, we are now said to be at War for those
Possessions.

It is plain, that the object of these Statements is to in-
troduce a comparison between the value of Peace and that
of the Territories in question ; and as it is no difficult
matter to show, that, abstractedly considered, Peace is of
far greater value than any Foreign Acquisitions whatever,
it would follow, according to this mode of reasoning, that
the British Government are chargeable with continuing
the War on very insufficient and unjustifiable grounds. —
But a very little consideration will convince any one, not
only that this reasoning is sophistical, but that the state-
ment on which it is founded is false in point of fact.

It is impossible to peruse even the French Accounts of our Negotiations, without being convinced, that the demands made by us (whether in themselves proper or not) were in no respect the cause that a Pacification did not take place; and that if we had made no such demands, the work of Peace would not have been a whit farther advanced. Nay, it is notorious, that the last Ne. . FOL. I.

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gotiation was broken off, not because in the Project delivered by us we demanded the Cession of certain Conquests, but because we would not agree to an unconditional and gratuitous Surrender of all our Conquests, as a Preliminary to Negotiation. I am not here enquiring whether, on the supposition that Peace could have been obtained at the price of all our Conquests, we ought to have paid that price. Such a question would be quite ir. relevant; we have never had the option of obtaining Peace even on such terms: the Enemy has never intimated, even in the most distant manner, that if we would abandon the idea of retaining any of our Conquests, he would consent to Peace. And if, in compliance with his arrogant demands, and in order to prevent the Negotiation from being broken off, we had agreed to sacrifice all the Acquisitions which have rewarded the bravery of our Fleets and Armies, still we should only have committed ourselves, by showing how far we were willing to go, in order to gratify our impatience for Peace, and he would have been free to make any fresh demands which his Ambition or Malice might dictate.*

No less futile and fallacious is the attempt to compare the intrinsic value of Peace, abstractedly considered, with

• It now appears, by the “ Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Lords in Ireland,” that, immediately after the Negociation at Lisle was broken off, information of the event was sent from France to the Irish Directory, with assurances that the French Government would never abandon the cause of the Irish Union, nor make Pesce witb Great Britain, until the separation of Ireland from the British Crown was effected. Thus it is evident, that it would have been of no avail to renounce our claims upon the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Trinidad, unless we had also consented to abandon the Sovereignty of the British Crown over Ireland. What other concessions French moderation would have exacted, as the price of Peace, it may perhaps not be very difficult to sonjecture.

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that of the specific objects which we may not be willing to abandon, in order to obtain a termination of hostilities. In every Negotiation, however disposed we may be to make liberal Concessions in order to induce the Enemy ta accede to terms of accommodation, a line must be drawn where our Concessions are to end. That line should certainly be chosen with judgment, with a proper attention to moderation and justice, and with a due regard to those essential interests, the security of which constitutes the chief value of Peace. But being drawn with reference to all these considerations, it is absurd to say, that because the Enemy rejects our Proposals, and insists on certain points which we are not willing to concede to, that the specific matters in difference between us are the objects for which we carry on the War. If our demands be dic. tated by a prudent attention to our own and the general security — if they be consistent with equity and moderation, and not incompatible with the essential interests of the Enemy - they ought to be made, and persisted in, although, abstractedly speaking, their specific objects may not be of equal value and importance with Peace, For it is only on such principles that it becomes a great and independent Nation to conduct its Negotiations; and if, through an inordinate desire of repose, it suffers itself to abandon those principles, and to give way to the exorbitant pretensions of the Enemy, it would at the same time give up its consequence and dignity, and thereby sacrifice what is of much greater value than the points which it is thus induced to abandon. Of a disposition. so complying, so destitute of spirit, energy, and courage, an ambitious and encroaching Enemy is sure to take advantage, and it is impossible to say where the mischief would end; for the very consciousness of having sub

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mitted to mean and degrading compliances, is apt to debase the mind, and to disqualify it for the defence of those superior and paramount interests, which are immediately connected with the very existence of a Free State.

It is therefore a gross sophistry, to put in competition with Peace, or even to appreciate, according to their intrinsic value, those objects, which, being demanded on one side and refused on the other, may be the apparent, or even the real cause of the 'Rupture of a Negotiation. Those objects should be estimated by their relative value, upon the large scale of their relation to every thing which can render Peace itself valuable or desirable. Considered abstractedly, they may not be worth a contest for a week; .but connected with the principles of just and honourable Negotiation, they may acquire an importance which nothing should be suffered to supersede. .

Upon these principles, which I conceive no one will venture to controvert, it is plain, that if the French Rulers had, in the most explicit terms, offered us Peace on our giving up Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon (as well as all our other Conquests) it would be exceedingly unfair to argue, that because Peace is a Blessing abundantly more valuable than those Possessions, it was the duty of the British Government to accede to such extravagant demands. Without dwelling either on the peculiar value and importance of those places to this Country, or on the indispensable necessity that exists of opposing, by means of acquisitions on our part, some balance to the immensely extended power of France, I will not hesitate to assert, that if we had consented to treat on the humiliating principle of renouncing, without any compensation, all our Conquests as the price of Peace, we should have become contemptible in our own eyes, and

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