SIR,

To the Editor of the Anti-Jacobin.

It is the custom of THE PARTY to represent every demand made by us, during the late Negotiations, or the hinge on which those Negotiations respectively turned, as the cause of the War being continued, and as the object of its continuation. Thus, because on the first Embassy of Lord MALMESBURY, we required the restitution of the Netherlands to the EMPEROR, it was asserted that the War was prolonged by us for the sake of enforcing that restitution and because, in the late discussions at Lisle, we demanded the cession of the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Trinidad, we are now said to be at War for those Possessions.

It is plain, that the object of these Statements is to introduce a comparison between the value of Peace and that of the Territories in question; and as it is no difficult matter to show, that, abstractedly considered, Peace is of far greater value than any Foreign Acquisitions whatever, it would follow, according to this mode of reasoning, that the British Government are chargeable with continuing the War on very insufficient and unjustifiable grounds.— But a very little consideration will convince any one, not only that this reasoning is sophistical, but that the statement on which it is founded is false in point of fact.

It is impossible to peruse even the French Accounts of our Negotiations, without being convinced, that the demands made by us (whether in themselves proper or not) were in no respect the cause that a Pacification did not take place; and that if we had made no such demands, the work of Peace would not have been a whit farther advanced. Nay, it is notorious, that the last Negotiation

VOL. I.

gotiation was broken off, not because in the Project delivered by us we demanded the Cession of certain Conquests, but because we would not agree to an unconditional and gratuitous Surrender of all our Conquests, as a Preliminary to Negotiation. I am not here enquiring whether, on the supposition that Peace could have been obtained at the price of all our Conquests, we ought to have paid that price. Such a question would be quite irrelevant; we have never had the option of obtaining Peace even on such terms: the Enemy has never intimated, even in the most distant manner, that if we would abandon the idea of retaining any of our Conquests, he would consent to Peace. And if, in compliance with his arrogant demands, and in order to prevent the Negotiation from being broken off, we had agreed to sacrifice all the Acquisitions which have rewarded the bravery of our Fleets and Armies, still we should only have committed ourselves, by showing how far we were willing to go, in order to gratify our impatience for Peace, and he would have been free to make any fresh demands which his Ambition or Malice might dictate.*

No less futile and fallacious is the attempt to compare the intrinsic value of Peace, abstractedly considered, with

It now appears, by the "Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Lords in Ireland," that, immediately after the Negociation at Lisle was broken off, information of the event was sent from France to the Irish Directory, with assurances that the French Government would never abandon the cause of the Irish Union, nor make Peace with Great Britain, until the separation of Ireland from the British Crown was effected. Thus it is evident, that it would have been of no avail to renounce our claims upon the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Trinidad, unless we had also consented to abandon the Sovereignty of the British Crown øver Ireland. What other concessions French moderation would have exacted, as the price of Peace, it may perhaps not be very difficult to conjecture.

that

that of the specific objects which we may not be willing to abandon, in order to obtain a termination of hostilities. In every Negotiation, however disposed we may be to make liberal Concessions in order to induce the Enemy ta accede to terms of accommodation, a line must be drawn where our Concessions are to end. That line should certainly be chosen with judgment, with a proper attention to moderation and justice, and with a due regard to those essential interests, the security of which constitutes the chief value of Peace. But being drawn with reference to all these considerations, it is absurd to say, that because the Enemy rejects our Proposals, and insists on certain points which we are not willing to concede to, that the specific matters in difference between us are the objects for which we carry on the War. If our demands be dictated by a prudent attention to our own and the general security if they be consistent with equity and moderation, and not incompatible with the essential interests of the Enemy-they ought to be made, and persisted in, although, abstractedly speaking, their specific objects may not be of equal value and importance with Peace. For it is only on such principles that it becomes a great and independent Nation to conduct its Negotiations; and if, through an inordinate desire of repose, it suffers itself to abandon those principles, and to give way to the exorbitant pretensions of the Enemy, it would at the same time give up its consequence and dignity, and thereby sacrifice what is of much greater value than the points which it is thus induced to abandon. Of a disposition. so complying, so destitute of spirit, energy, and courage, an ambitious and encroaching Enemy is sure to take advantage, and it is impossible to say where the mischief would end; for the very consciousness of having sub

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mitted to mean and degrading compliances, is apt to debase the mind, and to disqualify it for the defence of those superior and paramount interests, which are immediately connected with the very existence of a Free State.

It is therefore a gross sophistry, to put in competition with Peace, or even to appreciate, according to their intrinsic value, those objects, which, being demanded on one side and refused on the other, may be the apparent, or even the real cause of the Rupture of a Negotiation. Those objects should be estimated by their relative value, upon the large scale of their relation to every thing which can render Peace itself valuable or desirable. Considered abstractedly, they may not be worth a contest for a week; but connected with the principles of just and honourable Negotiation, they may acquire an importance which nothing should be suffered to supersede.

Upon these principles, which I conceive no one will venture to controvert, it is plain, that if the French Rulers had, in the most explicit terms, offered us Peace on our giving up Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon (as well as all our other Conquests) it would be exceedingly unfair to argue, that because Peace is a Blessing abundantly more valuable than those Possessions, it was the duty of the British Government to accede to such extravagant demands. Without dwelling either on the peculiar value and importance of those places to this Country, or on the indispensable necessity that exists of opposing, by means of acquisitions on our part, some balance to the immensely extended power of France, I will not hesitate to assert, that if we had consented to treat on the humiliating principle of renouncing, without any compensation, all our Conquests as the price of Peace, we should have become contemptible in our own eyes, and

in those of all Europe; and that, by sacrificing our honour and our consequence, we should have inflicted a fatal wound on our Prosperity and endangered our very existence as a Nation.

A BRITISH MERCHANT.

SIR,

To the Editor of the Anti-Jacobin.

Saturday, March 3.

I have to acknowledge my obligations to you, for your early attention to my last Letter. And as every man is of importance to himself, I cannot help indulging the idea, that the publication of it may have "done the State some service,"

Be that as it may, I lose not a moment in expressing to you the satisfaction which I feel at the intelligence that just now reaches me, of the departure of the French Agent to whom I particularly alluded.

If this intelligence be true, the whole Scheme (which I endeavoured to develope to you, and which I had reason to know was in agitation) is completely dejoué. So much the better for the Country.

Your's,

A CONSTANT READER.

POETRY.

WE are obliged to a learned Correspondent for the following ingenious Imitation of BION. We will not shock the eyes of our Fair Readers with the original Greek but the following Argument will give them some idea of the nature of the Poen here imitated.