enough to crawl to the Tribunal, and depose against her Murderers!

The Editor of the Morning Chronicle laughs at these things. Has he the feelings of a Man?

MISTAKES.

Morning Post v. Morning Post.

"LORD FITZWILLIAM'S conduct is not less honourable to him"self than pleasing to the Friends of the Country, in which his "spirit and independence naturally gives him great weight. — "We sincerely admire Lord FITZWILLIAM's political integrity "he has given us another instance of the purity and indepen"dence of his motives, Morning Post, Feb. 10.

"Lord FITZWILLIAM is a man of property; but his abilities qualify "him, at best, for a Man-milliner he is naturally a little insignifi "cant man, and his late conduct has even sunk him below his pro"per level." - Morning Post, Feb. 20.

"At last the Subscription at the Bank has assumed an appearance "of activity." - Morning Post, Jan. 27.

"There is much tardiness evinced in the Subscription at the Bank." Ditto, ditto.

We have a great affection for these pro and con Paragraphs. They show a laudable desire to say something, if the Authors knew but how.

When the Jacobins have entangled themselves a little farther in the mazes of infamy, by continuing to oppose a Measure which all their attacks but serve to promote, we shall have some pleasure in laying before our Readers a series of Paragraphs, from their first confident prediction of its total failure, to their agonizing acknowledgements that it has in some degree succeeded. We think we can promise that that Number will neither be unin structive nor unentertaining.

SIR,

To the Editor of the Anti-Jacobin.

I and many of my Neighbours have been among the constant Readers and Admirers of your excellent, Paper, from its first establishment; and I am happy to tell you, that it has produced the best effect, in exposing the Principles and Designs of our Foreign and Domestic Enemies, and in rousing all descriptions of Persons (as far as my observation extends) to a just sense of the present crisis. But there is a danger to which (if I mistake not) we may in a short time be exposed, of which you do not yet appear to be apprised. Some accidental circumstances have brought it under my observation; and it seems to me to be so much connected with the objects you have in view, that I think I cannot do better than communicate to you what I have learnt, and what occurs to me in consequence.

I have reason to believe then, that the French Government, and the Leaders and Patrons of the different Seditious Societies at home, both begin to despair of succeed ing in their open attacks against the Independence and Constitution of this Country; and that, finding the public mind fully awake to their designs, they see the futility of employing any direct means for their accomplishment. But the design itself is far from being relinquished, and they are, I believe, at this moment busily employed in contriving some plan for shifting their ground; and endeavouring, under false pretences, to effect by artifice and disguise, what they have in vain attempted by violence and intimidation. From the success of this device, I know they imagine that they shall at last repair the series of disappointments

disappointments which they have experienced during the last twelve months. In the beginning of 1797, they hoped very soon to see the Country reduced, by the failure of Public Credit, to the necessity of suing for Peace on any terms; and a humiliating and disgraceful Peace, they rightly consider, as the first step to a Revolution. But the stoppage of the Bank, which raised their expectations. to the highest pitch for a moment, soon led to consequences, the direct reverse of those which they had looked for. It has shewn, that the Financial Resources of the Country are now less exposed to embarrassment from the menaces of Invasion, or from any of the events of War, than at any former period.

At the time of the Naval Mutiny, they flattered themselves the Country was on the point of being left helpless and defenceless, an easy prey to the Invader. But the ardour and spirit of the Country at that awful crisis, gave them a juster sense of our National Character; and the glory and reputation of our Fleets have since been nobly redeemed by Victories more splendid than those of any former period, and by effusions of liberality, loyalty, and zeal, which go farther than even our Victories, in disconcerting the hopes of the Enemy.

The Secession of the Parliamentary Leaders of Opposition, which was a measure evidently adopted with the vain design of discrediting the authority of Parliament, and weakening the energy of Government, at a moment of unexampled difficulty, has, in like manner, led to consequences directly contrary to what it was intended to produce. It has turned only to the discredit of those who adopted it; sunk in their own estimation, as much as in the public opinion, they saw at first no other expedient to save themselves from total insignificance, but that of open

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ly combining and leaguing with a set of desperate Incendiaries, who have long been the objects of detestation to every Friend of Peace and Order. But the disgust attending this new coalition, has made the Parties to it already repent of so desperate a measure; and they are anxiously looking for the moment in which they may present themselves in some less revolting shape, to the observation of the Public.

The Foreign Enemy, in the midst of all their ostentatious menace of Invasion, have as little encouragement to expect any real success in those projects, as the Leaders of Sedition in their attempts to excite Internal confusion in this Country. They see our Military Preparations ; they have felt our Naval Power: and they cannot overlook the proofs of ardour and spirit which are every day manifesting themselves in every part of the Country. The new and vigorous system of Finance adopted this year by the Legislature, and the generous and spontaneous Contributions which are flowing in from different parts of the Country, have nearly extinguished the hope of wearing us out in the Contest, and tiring us, if they cannot force us, into submission. This concurrence of circumstances has naturally enough led both the French Government, and their Confederates and Allies, the Friends of Radical Reform, to the new plan to which I have before alluded, and which I believe them to be now actually preparing for

execution.

It is manifest enough, that the Leaders of Opposition will catch at any thing which can afford a chance of bringing them into power. It is evident too to the enemy, that if this end could be accomplished, a Peace, by which we should throw ourselves at the feet of France, and a Revolution at home, must shortly be the consequence. But

both

both the Enemy and the Opposition are sensible, that these truths are so well known and felt, that no domestic event is so much dreaded in the Country as a change of Administration; and that notwithstanding the natural desire for Peace, no Peace on disgraceful and humiliating terms would at present be accepted.

To overcome the difficulties arising from these considerations is what they are now aiming at. They have conceived, that if Peace can be spoken of in general terms, without any mention of Conditions, the idea will be caught at with avidity. And they even persuade themselves, that by judicious and dextrous management, the suggestion of a disposition to renew Pacific Overtures, may be made the instrument of repressing the ardour, and slackening the exertions of the Country; and if it can be connected with the idea of a change of Ministry, may have the effect of altering the Public Opinion with respect to the Opposition. If the Public can be taught to believe that the conduct of the French, in the late Negotiation, is owing only to their distrust and hatred of the present Administration, and that with one differently composed, they would be sincerely ready to treat on just and liberal grounds; they know that their real object will be effected. Let them once persuade the Country to make this experiment to try a new Government, in the hope of its being agreeable to France to rely, in the first instance, on vague and general professions, and to embark on such grounds in a new Negotiation, committed to the management of those who have so long asserted that the War on our part is unjust, and that we have no means to prosecute it - Let them gain this first step, and all the rest is easy. The general disposition to treat on liberal terms, will soon be followed by Conditions haugh

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