On the contrary, he goes out of his way to state the fact, that faith has been kept towards the soldiers, in order to assign what appears to him the reason; namely, " that it "might have been dangerous to break it." But what, in the next line, is the inference from these false and uncandid premises?" That it was not necessary to stand upon "ceremony with the officers"-ERGO Public Faith

has not been observed towards them A very fair and conclusive argument! to which, however, is added, as a collateral proof, that "the new levies were engaged to

serve during the war, with the same advantages as "those of old regiments." Is there any thing in these words that restricts the King's undoubted right to reduce any of his Regiments, either old or new, at any time he may think proper? Is it not a prerogative the Crown has at all times exercised? The unlimited right of the Crown in this respect being therefore incontrovertible, the question is, whether, in the late extensive instance of its application, it would have been most consistent with justice and sound policy, to strengthen the new levies by drafting into them the men of the old, or to complete the latter by drafts from the former? on the one hand, to break and destroy the whole system of discipline, habits, and attachment, existing in the old bands, by incorporating them into new and unorganized levies, under officers, prematurely raised to rank without knowledge and experience in military matters? or on the other, to infuse into new levies the true spirit of subordination and military duty, by attaching them to the old regiments, under officers whose lives had been devoted to the study and practical improvement of their profession? - With respect to the words "during the war," they were evidently introduced to create and define an obligation of the persons en

gaged

gaged towards the state, and not of the state towards the: persons who are thereby bound. If a different argument indeed could be founded on these words, it would prove that Government had no right to reduce any new raised regiment during the war; consequently, it must apply as much to the men as to the officers; and then what becomes of the Author's admission, "that faith had been kept to the " former?" To be plain with Marcus; let him state a case, with the documents in proof (his own, if he thinks it one) in which public faith has been violated towards an Unattached Officer, and he shall have an explicit answer. In throwing out this challenge, however, we must observe, that we do not think the Morning Post the proper channel of redress for the grievances of a British Officer.

The next point noticed by Marcus, is the Patronage of the Army. Quoting our assertion, that in the exercise of it, His Royal Highness's object is to render as light as possible the burden of the half-pay; he exclaims, "really the impudence of this assertion hardly deserves c an answer. "Whether he has been most successful in exposing our impudence or his own, our Readers will judge, when they find that his first allegation, in proof that every consideration of economy is sacrificed to patronage, is, that the DUKE of YORK has reduced the Army from one hundred and fifty Battalions to ninetyeight! Is not the recommendation to vacant regiments the principal patronage of the Commander in Chief? and is a diminution of fifty-two regiments (not fifty-four, as stated by Marcus) no diminution of that patronage? However, in order to prove that if public economy had been considered, the reduced officers, amounting, according to him, to one thousand seven hundred and twenty

ight, might all have been provided for, Marcus next tates, that the number of officers in the old regiments vere augmented by two Field-Officers, two Captains, nd sixteen Subalterns, each, amounting in the whole to one thousand nine hundred and twenty new commissions. In the first place, we deny the accuracy of this statenent, which on the one side does not include all the reduced officers, and is exaggerated on the other, inasmuch as many of the old regiments had been augmented previous to the reduction. But to show the sophistry of this argument, it will be necessary to look a little closer into the calculation on which it is founded. Marcus takes the whole number on both sides, and endeavours to make it tally with the view in which he places the transaction; but to make good his case, he should have shown that the proportion of each distinct rank in the list of reduced officers, agreed in number with the vacancies of a corresponding rank to be disposed of in the old regiments. For instance, how were the Colonels of the fifty-two reduced battalions to be provided for in the augmentation of the old regiments? For this purpose, were the Colonels of fifty-two old regiments, almost all General Officers of long standing, to be dismissed altogether? By this augmentation, it is true, an additional Lieutenant Colonel and a Second Major were added to each of the old regiments; but would it have been just towards the parties, or expedient for the public, in the disposal of these commissions, to have preferred the striplings who, by profuse bounties and the exertions of active crimps, had raised in a few months the number of men that entitled them to those ranks in the new levies, to the Major or senior Captain of the regiment, whose titles to promotion in many cases were fifteen or

7

twenty

twenty years meritorious service, joined to the military knowledge derived from so much experience? Could these titles be disregarded? If they had, Marcus perhaps might have been silent on the patronage of the Army: but would the public have been satisfied? - we believe not. So much for Field-Officers.

With respect to the reduced Captains, were there no Lieutenants in the old regiments deserving promotion? Or if there were none, how were all the reduced Captains of fifty-two battalions, consisting of ten companies each, to be provided for at once by an augmentation of two Captains to each of the ninety-eight battalions remaining on the establishment? In all cases, both at the period of the augmentation, and on every subsequent occasion, where the strictest principles of justice did not absolutely require that the promotion should take place in the line of the regiment, the Commander in Chief has been governed by the strictest principles of economy, in appointing some unattached officer, of a rank corresponding to the vacancy, from the reduced levies. In this manner, as we have already stated, no less than 3 Colonels, 19 Lieutenant-Colonels, 20 Majors, and we now add, 256 Captains, 644 Liuetenants, and 387 Ensigns, have been provided for in the old regiments.

The strictures of Marcus, on our statement of the saving to the Public, from this curious system of patronage, are so singular, that we cannot pass them over in silence. Admitting the amount of the half-pay saved to be 84,8621. 10s. sterling; he adds, that "in calculating it

as an annuity at ten years purchase, we suppose no mor"tality." The calculation, it must be obvious to every one but Marcus, is on the contrary, an average founded on a fair allowance of moratlity; but on this subject we

refer

refer him to his agent for farther information. Marcus, however, considers the saving in another point of view "It is evident," he says, " that if there has been a "saving of 84,8621. 10s. per annum half-pay to the Na "tion, it has paid double that sum in full-pay. This "mode of proving that placing 1337 officers on full-pay, " is a saving of their half-pay, is both novel and inge"nious, and I congratulate the Gentleman on his important discovery.”

In return, we beg leave to congratulate Marcus on his important discovery, that the Nation loses 84,8621.10s. by placing upon FULL PAY 1337 officers to whom the public would otherwise have to pay that sum annually, instead of placing in the same situations, with the same FULL PAY, 1337 persons to whom the public before paid nothing.

SIR,

To the Editor of the Anti-Jacobin.

Oxford, Jan. 8, 1798.

I AM fully aware that the subject upon which I beg leave to submit to you a very few observations, is comparatively trifling and insignificant in the general scale of Jacobin violence. I may be told, that the obligation imposed by the French upon the Inhabitants of Italy, to surrender whatever was valuable in Sculpture and Painting, amounted merely to the transfer of Ornament, and was the established consequence of Victory. I am not sufficiently conversant with the Law of Nations, to assert that such a claim is unauthorized by Conquest, or to contend, that because the practice is new, it is therefore unjustifiable.