possesses. The triumph of mind over matter is the constant theme of admiration. Man is indeed limited, not by the the changes of which matter is susceptible, but by his own power to act upon it, which he possesses only to a certain extent. It is true, that by denying the existence of mind as distinct from matter, the atheist views these changes as operated by matter on itself; but still, is not the mind irresistibly impressed, by all that is seen of nature, with the idea that matter is capable of undergoing changes by foreign influence, of being subject to extraneous power, if any other being or beings exist? And in this case, what capability has matter of securing itself against the power of any other being, by foreseeing any attempt or providing against it? And is this possibility of subjection, control, and change, compatible with that absolute perfection which eternal, independent, self-existence supposes? But in the admission of an eternal, intelligent First Cause, no difficulty of this kind occurs. All things are dependent on him, and he is subject to none. Unbounded power, infinite wisdom, and supreme benevolence mark all his works. He is an ever active agent; and never a passive subject. His will is the law of the universe. All the ordinances of heaven, all the arrangements of the earth, are his appointments; the whole economy of nature is under his superintendence. All power is weakness, all wisdom ignorance, all glory as nothing and vanity, when compared to the perfection of such a being! Now where does the greater difficulty lie? Since there must, by the acknowledgment of the boldest atheist, be some eternal being possessed of self-existence, is it more difficult to conceive this absolute perfection of nature to belong to an intelligent First Cause, or to senseless matter?

And further, does not limitation of existence, either in duration or space seem contrary to the absolute perfection of a self-existing being? What is not eternal in duration

cannot be necessary and independent in its existence; and what is limited in space is so far imperfect. Matter cannot be infinite; form is essential to matter, and what has form must have limits. But the mind finds no difficulty in admitting the infinity as well as the eternity of an intelligent, self-existent, First Cause. We conceive of him as existing in This is precisely the idea of God; exactly the view We cannot comprehend

all duration, and in all space. which we form of the existence which the Bible gives us of him. eternity or infinity; but the mind is irresistibly impressed with the existence of both these attributes. Make the attempt to suppose that either of these has no existence, you will find it impossible. If infinity exists, it must be the property of nothing, or of matter, or of a being distinct from matter. To suppose it to be the property of nothing is absurd; it cannot, for the reason already stated, be the property of matter; the conclusion is inevitable, it must belong to a being distinct from matter; of whom we cannot conceive matter to be independent. And who or what is this great being, but that eternal, self-existing one, "of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things."

But it is asserted, that it is "utterly impossible as long as we are men to form any distinct idea" of such a being. If by "distinct idea," be meant the idea of a being distinct from matter, we deny the assertion; the idea has been formed from time immemorial. If it be meant that we cannot form a clear idea of the fact that such a being exists, this we deny again for the same reason. But if the meaning be, that while " we are men," of finite minds, we cannot form an adequate idea of what is infinite, we admit it, and needed not an oracle to reveal it, or a philosopher to prove it. But to what purpose is this alleged? Does the atheist believe only things of which he has an adequate idea? Can he comprehend the eternity which he admits must have

existence, and with which he is desirous of investing matter? When the mind arrives, in its reasonings, at the conception of such a being as an intelligent First Cause, it feels, indeed, that it cannot comprehend his eternal and necessary existence, and it is overwhelmed by a sense of the infinity of his attributes; but it finds an adequate cause for all other beings, and an explanation of the phenomena of the universe. But if we think on the eternity and self-existence of matter, in addition to the impossibility of comprehending eternal and necessary existence, we feel the insuperable difficulty of connecting this absolute perfection of nature, with what appear manifest imperfections, its unconsciousness, its passiveness, its limited existence. The difficulty, then, is thrown back on the atheistic scheme, the force of this argument for the eternity of matter vanishes, and it leaves the position which it was intended to strengthen without support.

That it is impossible, "by any means we possess," to prove the existence of an intelligent First Cause, is an assertion which we hope, in our ensuing discourses, to prove is as destitute of truth as the arguments which we have examined are inconclusive. It only remains for us now to examine the second position taken by this hypothesis, that matter, by its own inherent powers, has produced all things which exist.

We have shown that the supposition of the eternity of matter, is not only perfectly gratuitous, but that it is attended with insuperable difficulties; but even if this were conceded to the atheistic philosopher, he would be far, very far from having accomplished his task; he has made scarcely any advance towards proving that the present system of things could have existence without a supreme and intelligent Creator. The problem which his hypothesis has now to solve is, given matter, an extended, moveable substance,

to account for all the forms of beauty, and order, and adaptation, which we behold. That matter possesses properties besides these just specified, and that to these properties, acting by invariable laws, are to be traced the changes which we behold in nature, is not denied. But who invested matter with such properties, and who gave to this unconscious being laws from which it should not depart? Or, if this form of putting the inquiry be objected to, we ask, how is it that senseless matter possesses qualities so admirable, and acts so uniformly? All that we know or can know by experience, is, that certain conditions of bodies are followed uniformly by certain other conditions; that, for instance, the sudden collision of hard substances is followed by vibrations in the air, and these vibrations are followed by a peculiar sense in the organ of hearing, that the impulsion of a stone by the hand is succeeded by motion, and that the placing of any body at liberty from obstruction, is followed by its descent to the ground. The uniformity of these occurrences we call laws; but we must not forget, when we speak of matter acting by certain properties, and according to certain laws, that it has neither perception nor volition, and that it does not, therefore, properly speaking, act. Judging by the results of intelligence in their own minds, men in general assign these properties and laws to the communication, or the continued action, of a being of infinite wisdom and power. Atheism, however, affirms that these qualities are essentially inherent in matter, and co-eternal with it, and, consequently, a necessary part of its existence; and, unless this be true, the hypothesis in question vanishes into airy nothing" for, if matter did not eternally and necessarily possess them, they must have been communicated by a superior power, or be the mode in which the divine energy constantly acts. This is again an assumption, a mere opinion, and it might be met by an opinion which is, at least, equally

valid, that an intelligent First Cause has invested matter with these properties. The atheist may allege that these properties and the laws of their action have, as far as we know, ever operated. This is granted, as far as human experience has extended; but our knowledge is limited, the utmost that can be said with safety is, that we never knew matter without them, but this does not prove that matter may not have received them, or that they belong to matter by necessity of nature. Accustomed as we are to see the uniformity of these laws, and the constancy of these properties, it is still possible to conceive of matter in being without them, or of their existing in a very different form. We can imagine the laws of mechanical powers and chemical agencies to be otherwise than what they are, without such difference implying the non-existence of matter, which must be the case, if they were necessary and essential. But let any one consider attentively the adaptation of the laws of matter and motion to produce the most beneficial results; the vast number and diversity of these laws ever operating in the great system, and the admirable manner in which each is adapted to the other, and all completely harmonizing together, and he will not only perceive that they are just the arrangements which an infinitely wise and powerful being might have made, but will also, if free from prejudice, feel it very difficult to resist the impression that these are all but secondary causes, producing, indeed, in their operation, innumerably diversified results, but all subject to an intelligent First Cause, and all the effects of his wisdom and power.

It is impossible to prove, and therefore ought not to be assumed, that matter possesses inherently, by virtue of its existence, any properties necessary and essential to its nature, except extension and solidity. But if matter had possessed only these, it must ever have remained an inert mass, incapable of producing anything to all eternity, or of effecting