so to explain the origin of all things as to exclude a Creator from the universe. To enumerate all the wild conjectures, the absurd and fantastic fictions of these system-makers, would be a waste of time; whatever may be the modifications which their hypotheses may assume, we can conceive of three only by which an attempt can be made to account for the phenomena of nature, without admitting the creating power of a great First Cause. Either, first, that the world had a beginning without a maker. Or, secondly, that it has existed as it is from all eternity. Or, thirdly, that matter only is eternal, and that all its forms and combinations arise from the essential properties which it possesses.

That matter, with all its present modifications, had a commencement without a producing cause, involves an absurdity so gross and palpable, that it is doubtful whether any have deliberately maintained such a position. For, if there ever had been a period when nothing existed, nothing, it is evident, could ever have existed. It is impossible to conceive of the commencement of existence without a cause. That cause could not be in itself; since that would suppose its existence before it did exist, in order to produce itself, which is a contradiction. It could not be in any other being, since it is supposed that no other being existed. It follows, then, undeniably, that something must have existed from eternity.

We come, therefore, to the second hypothesis, that the whole system of nature has existed as it now is, from all eternity. This supposes that the motions of the planets, the succession of summer and winter, of day and night, of vegetables, of animals, of the race of man, have been eternal.* Let me here beg attention to a few preliminary

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* This was maintained by some of the ancient philosophers, and appears to have been the opinion of the author of the Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever.' "We ought to argue only from experience; and experience would teach us that the species of all animals has eternally existed.”—p. 45.

Whatever

remarks, before we examine this hypothesis. exists, must exist either necessarily, or by some producing cause. There is no medium. It must have the ground or reason of its existence either in itself, or in some other being, That which exists necessarily must be self-existent and independent; that which exists in virtue, or by means of some other being, is contingent and dependent. Necessary existence means that which cannot by any possibility be non-existent, or otherwise than it is. That which is eternal, must be self-existent, independent, uncaused, and necessary. The application of these remarks will, if I mistake not, show the unbounded absurdity of the hypothesis in question.

The present form and series of productions, and races of living beings, never, according to this scheme, had a beginning; that is, they are all eternal, and therefore without a cause, self-existent, independent, and necessary. Now observe whither these premises will carry us. Trees, plants, animals, are all in their respective series eternal, and consequently necessary, self-existent, and independent. If, therefore, the series be self-existent and necessary, every part which goes to compose it must partake of the same quality; every individual plant, or tree, or man, must, there, fore, be self-existent and necessary. But every individual of each series has a cause of its existence, is produced by another, and is dependent and contingent. Therefore, every individual is at the same time dependent and independent -self-existent and produced-necessary and contingent, which is absurd. If it be replied, that though each individual is dependent and contingent, yet the whole series may be independent and necessary, we ask, what is it which gives to anything its essential qualities, but the parts of which it is composed? To suppose that any number of dependent and contingent beings can make up a self-existent and independent whole, is as absurd as to say that an infinite number

of dead bodies would make up a living mass, or that the continued addition of nothing to nothing would make something. To assert that every individual in a series has a beginning, and yet that the series had no beginning, is an insult to the understanding, which nothing but an inordinate attachment to a favourite hypothesis would for a moment tolerate.

And farther, that cannot be infinite which has parts. For to suppose that infinite in space which is composed of parts, would be to suppose it infinite and finite at the same time; since every part must have form and limit, and that in which there is no part that is not limited, must also be limited. In like manner, that cannot be infinite in duration which is made up of parts, since every part must have some point at which it commences, some point at which it ends; here then are distinctly limits to every part; and that in which there is no part that is not limited, and therefore finite, cannot be otherwise than limited and finite. Now, the eternal series which the atheist supposes would, if such could exist, be an infinite number of parts; but whatever consists of parts is but an aggregate, a multiplication, of such parts, a continued repetition of one single part. Therefore, since this infinite series has no single part which is not limited and finite, it must itself be limited and finite. But an atheist may object that he does not apply the term infinite to this series, he only says that it has had no commencement, but has for ever continued to flow on in one uninterrupted course. Be it so, we shall not quarrel about terms. It amounts to precisely the same thing, since, whether the series is said to be infinite, or without beginning, it is still composed of individual parts, can have no property but the accumulated properties of its parts, yet must have every property which pervades its parts. And therefore, if every part has had a commencement, there can be no part that

has not had a commencement; and to say, that while every part has had a commencement, yet the series itself has had no commencement, is as revolting an absurdity as can well be uttered.

Again: that which is eternal can have nothing before it; there cannot be two eternities of different lengths. But if "all things continue as they were," the planetary movements, and the annual and diurnal motions of the earth must be eternal. Now at no given place are the day and the night simultaneous; one must precede the other. Assign the order of precedence to which you please, and every twelve hours there will have been a greater number of the one than of the other. Either the eternal series of days, or the eternal series of nights has been the longer; one of them, therefore, cannot be eternal, unless two eternities can be of different lengths, which is absurd. If either of the series be supposed to be eternal, and not the other, it can only acquire this property by the addition of one; it would follow, then, that one, added to a finite number, would make it infinite; and that the whole quality of infinity would depend on this unit. The same line of argument may be applied to the seasons, the lunations, the tides; and will show that it is impossible that what alternates can be eternal.

There is only one point more to which I shall apply this mode of reasoning; it is to the existence of the human race. If the race of man has been eternal, his production and dissolution must be eternal. But his production must precede his dissolution; therefore we arrive again at the absurdity of two eternities of different lengths. Nor is this all; for we know that all the particles which compose the human body are derived from that nutrition which comes primarily from the earth; they must, therefore, have existed as food, before they entered into the composition of his body; and in the great storehouse, the earth, before they formed

those organized substances which compose his food; this makes an eternity of a still different length. An hypothesis which involves contradictions so palpable and numerous, cannot be true, and ought not to be entertained for a moment.*

But it is not by arguments of this kind only, that this hypothesis is refuted. Should any feel a difficulty in comprehending, or a reluctance in admitting reasonings of so abstract and metaphysical a nature, we refer them to history and to science, for a contradiction to the supposition that the world as it now is, together with the human race, is eternal. The history of past ages, so far as its records have been transmitted to us, show that whatever may have been the duration of the world, the race of man, at least, is of comparatively modern origin. As we become acquainted with the earliest histories extant, we feel ourselves carried back towards the infancy of human society. We can trace backwards the progress of science, the advance of the arts, and the rise of

This kind of reasoning has sometimes been employed in the following manner against the hypothesis next examined, which, admitting that no form or combination of matter is eternal, yet maintains the existence of an eternal series of causes and effects. "The universe," says Mirabaud, " is an immense chain of causes and effects, which flow without ceasing, the one from the other."-System of Nature, Vol. I. p. 89. Now, is it possible that there can be "a chain of causes and effects," of any kind, "flowing one from the other," without a first link? If it is contended that in this chain there is no first link, then there has been an eternal series, every individual of which is dependent, and yet the whole is independent, which, as before observed, is absurd. Every link hangs on something, and yet the chain hangs on nothing! If it be replied, though we should admit a first cause, or, to continue the figure, a first link, still the difficulty returns, what supports the first link? We answer, that by the admission of an Eternal Being, of necessary and independent existence, no such difficulty exists. We have, then, that which has necessary and independent existence supporting that which is contingent and dependent. If it be again said, the analogy fails, because a chain has an external force, the power of gravity ever operating, rendering support necessary, but that here is no external force; we reply, that the cause of dependence does not in the least affect the question; an effect from the very nature of its relation, is as much dependent on the preceding cause, as any link, by the force of gravity, is dependent on a preceding link. To suppose an uncaused series of things, every one of which is caused, is an absurdity at which every unprejudiced mind revolts.

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