and at the same time incapable of contradiction, that at those seasons and in those circumstances when men think most soberly, the conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, and of their responsibility to him, is most powerfully felt. If this impression existed only in the height of excitement, if its strength were greatest when prejudice and passion had their full sway; if, on the other hand, in seasons of retirement, if, when affliction had sobered down the passions, and the prospect of quitting for ever this present scene had abated, if not destroyed, the prejudices of the mind, this belief were generally found to fade, or weaken into hesitancy and doubt, the presumption which such a change would seem to afford against the truth of this belief, would be triumphantly brought forward by the advocates of infidelity. But it is well known that the very reverse of this is the case; that if ever, with men in general, or with the truly pious and devout, this conviction loses any of its strength or influence, it is amidst the bustle of life, the collision of interests, and the power of passion. When retired from the world, when, though in the full vigour of the mental powers, the great change is contemplated, generally speaking, this feeling deepens, this conviction irresistibly takes hold of the mind. When is it, on the contrary, that infidel principles have their greatest sway? Is it not in the riot of dissipation, the headlong pursuit of wealth and power, the strife of ambition, and the excitement produced by bold and daring companions? And does it not frequently happen that in retirement, in the silence of night, in the chamber of affliction, the infidel hesitates, doubts, and trembles; and that, in the prospect of death, he is glad to avail himself of church services or Christian prayers!

The advocates of infidelity feel the pressure of this difficulty, and endeavour to extricate their system by alleging the failure of the animal powers, the weakness of the brain,

and the decay of the intellect. This is, however, but a poor shift. Does the retiring from bustle and tumult, does the subsiding of the passions into calmness, or the sobering down of the spirits so as to allow the judgment to have its undisturbed operation, enfeeble the intellect, or disqualify it for the perception of truth? It is an undeniable fact, that, not uncommonly, amidst considerable pain and weakness, or when very near the point of dissolution, and in the full apprehension of it, the mind retains its entire power, and is able to think, converse, and reason, with all its accustomed precision. And these are the cases and circumstances to which we refer, in which infidelity is commonly seen to be as destitute of truth, as it is of power to support and cheer the mind, and when the aid of religion, formerly neglected or despised, is invoked. We may be reminded of infidels who have died as they lived, and passed out of life with a bravado or a joke on their dying lips; we speak of cases which are common, and which will, I believe, be found to be general, in which the solution which infidelity offers will not apply. Is not this fact, then, enough to throw suspicion on a system which not only fails in the hour of trial, but which so commonly loses its hold on the mind, in proportion to the seriousness and sobriety with which it is disposed to view every great question?

In this class of arguments we may rank the moral phenomena attending the existence of atheistic principles. What is the soil in which atheism delights to grow; what is the aliment on which it feeds? Is it moral rectitude-is it virtue -is it purity of heart? Are these the qualities in which infidelity takes its rise, is its power deepened in proportion to their increase, and weakened as they decline? Are scepticism and virtue so closely allied, that the advance or retreat of the one may generally be ascertained by that of the other? I ask the most determined advocates of the system which I

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am combating, whether their own observation has not shown them that the very reverse of this is the case? What exhibition of character has generally marked the transition to and from infidelity? And how has the standard of morals been affected by it? Is it not a well known fact, that when a youth who has been brought up in habits of piety and virtue embraces sentiments of this kind, a visible deterioration of morals follows? Does he feel himself bound by the same restraints of sobriety, chastity, and temperance as before? Instead of this, do we not generally see the reins thrown on the neck of indulgence and passion, as far as circumstances will allow? To whom is atheism so welcome as to the most flagitious, and debauched, and unprincipled? And the return from vice to virtue is as generally marked by a deeper conviction of the existence and government of a Supreme Intelligence, and with a belief in the retributions of a future state. I do not say, however, that immorality of conduct, in every case, attends the adoption of these sentiments; much less would I be understood as making such an accusation against my sceptical townsmen; many causes may considerably modify and restrain the influence of opinion on conduct;-I speak of their general tendency and result, which have been such as to produce, on the minds of all who have had opportunity of observing, an assurance that infidelity is, in a very high degree, unfavourable to the interests of morality.

I know I shall be met here with an objection, drawn from the conduct of Christians; and I readily, though with deep regret, acknowledge that the great majority of Christians in name have done no honour to Christianity, that amongst them may be found instances of the greatest villany and the grossest vice. But does Christianity sanction the misconduct of wicked men, who are called by its name,-does it not renounce them, and pronounce on them its severest

condemnation? If men will pretend to Christianity, who neither trust its promises nor obey its precepts, whose whole life is at variance with its spirit, shall their insincerity be charged on a religion which they insult and dishonour? Why should it thus be identified with persons whom it utterly disclaims? It has been the necessary result of national establishments of Christianity, that all who are born within certain geographical boundaries bear the Christian name; by the great majority of such persons, its principles are neither appreciated nor understood; nothing is known of it but a few outward forms, a few articles of a creed it seldom thought of, and a few sentences of prayers, repeated, almost mechanically, at certain seasons. The existence and perfections of God, with all the solemn and glorious facts of which revelation speaks, rarely occupy their minds, and still more rarely influence their conduct. We do not acknowledge the Christianity of such, we charge them with practical infidelity, who thus "have the form of godliness, but deny its power." There is, then, this important difference; among nominal Christians immorality prevails, because the great principles of religion are seldom thought of, and have not been received with that sincerity and seriousness which would render them influential; it is not because they believe that an all-seeing God has his eye continually upon them, and holds them responsible for their conduct, but because they lose sight of the important fact, and act in a way inconsistent with its belief; but it is not because its truth. lose sight of the great article of their belief, concluding, their disbelief, that they become vicious or iny unbelieving immoralities of nominal Christians arise freto consider, with Christianity; it will not, I presume, be saidly been advanced.

t of atheists arises from the want o

n has seldom had an opportunity
d exerting all its power.

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."-Cæsar, de Bel. Gal.