That the holder of a first mortgage has paid up all delinquent taxes and the insurance on the property, added the amount to the sum due on his mortgage, foreclosed and bid in the property, for the full amount, is no ground for discharging a receiver appointed at the instance of a second mortgagee prior to such foreclosure. Farmers Nat. Bank of Owatonna v. Backus, 69 N. W. Rep. 638. -RECOVERY BY MORTGAGEE OF SURPLUS BID.

Maudlin v. Association (Minn.) 65 N. W. 645, and Truesdale v. Sidle (Minn.) 67 N. W. 1004. followed. Babcock v. American Savings & Loan Assoc., 69 N. W. Rep. 718.

-REDEMPTION-RATE OF INTER

EST.

Where a mortgage by its terms draws interest at the rate of 51⁄2 per cent. per annum, and is foreclosed by advertisement, the real property thus sold may be legally redeemed by the mortgagor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, as the case may be, by paying the sum of money for which the same was sold, together with interest on the same from the time of sale at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. Evans v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 715. -REDEMPTION AS ASSIGNMENT -FRAUD.

B., a married woman, whose husband had deserted her, owned a tract of land subject to a mortgage which had been foreclosed. Her agent, to whom she had intrusted all negotiations for the sale of her equity of redemption, represented to defendant that her husband was dead. Relying upon this representation, defendant accepted her sole deed, paid her $200 therefor, and subsequently redeemed from the mortgage sale by paying $764, which the purchaser at such sale accepted and retained without objection. Several years afterwards, it having been ascertained that B.'s husband was still living, plaintiff obtained a quit-claim deed from him and his wife, and also another quitclaim deed from the purchaser at the mortgage sale, both for nominal considerations, and upon these muniments of title brought ejectment against the defendant. Held. that while the deed from B. to defendant was void. and therefore defendant not a legal redemptioner, yet the redemntion by him amounted to an equitable assignment of the interest of the pur

chaser acquired under the mortgage sale; and that, upon the expiration of the time of redemption, the defendant became the equitable owner of the premises, and the purchaser at the mortgage sale a trustee for him of the bare legal title; and that both B. and such purchaser, as well as plaintiff, their grantee, who bought with notice of defendant's rights, are estopped from asserting that the redemption by defendant did not thus operate as an assignment. Knight v. Schwandt, 69 N. W. Rep. 626.

LAGE OF ST. JAMES-CONTRACTOR'S BOND VOID.

The village of St. James is not expressly authorized by law to take a bond for the security or benefit of third persons. Therefore, held, that a bond voluntarily executed for such purpose is void. Park v. Sykes, 69 N. W. Rep. 712. NEGLIGENCE

ANTICIPATING CHARACTER OF ACCIDENT. Where an act is negligent, the person committing it is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have reasonably anticipated that injury would result in the form or way in which it did, in fact, happen. Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 640.

NEW TRIAL - NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

the

A party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence must show that he could not have discovered the evidence, and produced it on the trial, by any reasonable diligence on his part. Strict proof must be made on this point, and facts, not and paying the expense thereof equally between them, and that such stipulations should apply to and bind heirs and assigns, executors and administrators, of the respective parties. K. erected the party-wall, one-half upon his lot, and one-half upon the adjoining lot of S. Subsequently K. conveyed by warranty deed to M., and thereafter M. conveyed by warranty deed to G., who also purchased by deed of warranty the lot of S., and thereafter erected a two-story building on said lot, using said party wall the whole length for such purpose, and occupied the same. Held, that the covenants in the agreement ran with the land, and that a personal action by K. against G. was not enforceable. Kimm v. Griffin, 69 N. W. Rep. 634. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AGENT SELLING ON CREDIT.

It is not within the apparent authority of a general agent, having the entire management of his principal's business, to bind him by a contract for conclusions, stated in the moving affidavits. from which the court may draw the conclusion that due diligence was used. Rule applied, and held, that

the trial court did not err in refusing a new trial. Bradley v. Norris, 69 N. W. Rep. 624.

PARTY WALLS-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH LAND CONVEYANCE.

A party-wall agreement, under seal, between S. and K., adjoining lot owners, which was duly acknowledged and recorded, provided that whereas

K. was about to erect a two-story brick building on his lot adjoining that of S., and in consideration that K. erect a good and substantial 12-inch wall, 80 feet long north and south, extending 6 inches on the adjoining lot of S., then said S. promised and agreed that whenever he should erect a building on his lot, and use that portion of said party wall built thereon, he would pay K. one-half the cost of said party wall, to the extent of his use of the same; and for their mutual benefit it was agreed that in all deeds and transwall fers, of whatever nature, said should be reserved as a partition wall, and that the same should be kept in good condition and repair at the expense of both parties, they dividing the sale of chattels belonging to such business, to be paid for by credit of the purchase price upon an indebtedness due from the agent to the purchaser. The burden is upon the purchaser to show that the agent had such authority. But where there is no question as to the good faith of either the agent or purchaser, and both the agent and principal are dead at the time of the trial, any circumstantial evidence fairly tending to establish the agent's authority is sufficient to make a prima facie case. Authority proved. Stewart v. Cowles, 69 N. W. Rep. 694. --REAL ESTATE AGENT - VALUE OF SERVICES.

Held. it was not, under the circumstances, error to admit the expert evidence given as to the value of plaintiff's services, which evidence is complained of merely because the expert witness did not hear all of the testimony of plaintiff as to the character of the services rendered. Levanson v. Mellan, 69 N. W. Rep. 620. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY DISCHARGE-CONCEALMENT.

H. was the agent of plaintiff insurance company, and was short in his accounts. He formed a partnership with P. to carry on the agency business, and H. & P. as principals and the other defendants as sureties executed a bond to the company, conditioned for the faithful performance by H. & P. their duties such agents. At the time the bond was executed. the sureties did not know that H. was in default. In a suit on the bond, held, in such cases, it is ordinarily the duty of the obligee in the bond to disclose to the sureties the fact that the principal in the bond is already in default, and a

failure to do so is evidence of bad faith, which will discharge the sureties; and whether, in this case, the company was guilty of bad faith in failing to disclose to the sureties that H. was short in his accounts, is a question for the jury. Traders Ins. Co. v. Herber, 69 N. W. Rep. 701.

WITHHOLDING COMMISSIONS. Held, withholding the commission" of the insurance agents, while permitting them to perform their duties as such agents. did not have the effect, in this case, of releasing the sureties on their bond for the faithful performance of their duties. Traders Ins. Co. v. Herber, 69 N. W. Rep. 701. PROMISSORY

ATION.

NOTES-CONSIDER

Order granting plaintiff a new trial on the ground defense of want of consideration was not proved, sustained. Cooper v. Hayward, 69 N. W. Rep. 638. --ACTION AGAINST GUARANTOR

NON-RESIDENT MAKER

DENCE.

to

EVI

the

The defendant transferred plaintiff, and guarantied the collection of, a promissory note executed in Wisconsin, of which state the maker was a resident at the time the note was executed. Before the maturity of the note the maker removed from the state of Wisconsin, and became a resident of the state of Illinois. Held: 1. That. if the maker had continued to reside in Wisconsin, the plaintiff would have been required to proceed against him in that state, or prove that such proceedings would be wholly fruitless, before pursuing the defendant on guaranty. The fact that the guaranty was made in Minnesota is not material. 2. But that plaintiff is not bound to follow the maker into the state of Illinois. 3. That the burden is on the defendant to prove that the maker has property in Wisconsin out of which the note might be collected. in whole or in part, and not upon plaintiff to prove that he has not. Fall v. Youmans, 69 N. W. Rep. 697. RAILROADS STATUTE

his

OF

VIOLATION COLLISION LIM

ITING LIABILITY.

The plaintiff, while engaged in the business of news agent on defendant's train, was injured by a collision caused by the negligence of defendant in not stopping its train before arriving at a railroad crossing, as required by Gen. St. 1894. sec. 2706. The statute referred to requires railroad companies to cause all their trains to entirely ston not more than 60 rods and not less than 10 rods before each arrival at the crossing of any other railroad, and provides that every corporation that violates the provisions of the statute is liable to a forfeiture of not more than $100 por less than $20, to be recovered in a civil action, and is further liable in the full amount of damages done

to person or property in consequence of any neglect to comply with the requirements of the statute. Held, in view of the provisions and manifest object of this statute, that a contract between the defendant and plaintiff. exempting the former from liability for in juries caused by its negligence. is void, as against public policy, as respects negligence consisting of a violation of the statute, although defendant may not have borne to the plaintiff the relation of common carrier. Starr v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 632.

SALE-WARRANTY-NOTICE.

Where a horse is sold with a warranty that such horse is capable of fulfilling certain conditions, and which, if not fulfilled, the vendor will replace the horse with another of equal value. or return the notes given for said horse, held, that the burden of showing that the conditons were not fulfilled rested upon the vendee, and the vendor was entitled to notice thereof. and an opportunity either to replace the horse with another of equal value. or return the notes given for the horse. Beckett v. Gridley, 69 N. W. Rep. 622. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-INTEREST IN LAND-CONTRACT NOT TO BE PERFORMED IN ONE YEARPERFORMANCE ON ONE SIDE. Defendant had guaranteed the co!lection of certain notes which he had transferred to the plaintiff, and which were secured by mortgage on real estate; the security, however, being worth only a part of the amount due on the notes. After the notes became due and were dishonored, the defendant orally promised plaintiff that. if he would foreclose the mortgage, and bid in the property for the full amount due, if such foreclosure did not result in the collection of the money by redemption of the premises, he would pay the plaintiff the amount due on the notes and costs of foreclosure, the property then to be deeded to the defendant. Held, that this oral agreement was within the statute of frauds, both as an agreement that by its terms was not to be performed within a year, and also as a contract for the sale of land or some interest therein. Also that it was not taken out of the statute by the fact that plainiff proceeded and foreclosed and bid in he property in his own name for the full amount due on the mortgage. Veazie v. Morse, 69 N. W. Rep. 637.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS--PERSONAL INJURIES--AMENDMENT OF 1895.

Laws 1895. c. 30, amendatory of Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, sec. 8 (Gen. St. 1894, sec. 5138, subd. 1), did not operate as a re

peal or amendment of section 5136, subd. 5, wherein it is provided that the six-year statute of limitations shall apply to actions for injuries to the person or rights of another, not arising on obligation, and not thereinafter enumerated. The amendment falls within the doctrine of ejusdem generis, and applies only to actions based upon wrongs of a like nature to those spécifically mentioned in section 5138 as it stood originally. Brown v. Heron Lake 69 N. W. Rep. 710. STRUCK JURY

--

REGULARITIES.

WAIVER OF IR

1. Gen. Laws 1895, c. 328, sec. 1. providing for struck juries, requires the sheriff to attend at his office at a time designated for striking a jury, and in the presence of the parties or their attorneys, or such of them as attend for that purpose, select, from the number of persons qualified to serve as jurors in the county, 40 such persons as he shall think most indifferent between the parties and best qualified to try such issue; and then the party requiring such jury, his agent or attorney, shall first strike off one of the names. and the opposite party, his agent or attorney, another, and so on, alternately. until each has struck out 12 Held, that where a party appears at such time and place, and takes part in striking the names from a list previously prepared by the sheriff. without objection, he waives the right to raise an objection thereafter a's to this irregularity, if any, in the manner of thus selecting a struck jury. Riley v. Chicago. St. P. & M. Ry. Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 718. -DUTY OF COURT

Held, also, that the trial court should have heard evidence as to the impartiality of the list selected by the sheriff, and then exercised his judgment as to whether it was impartial; and that it was error not to do so. Id. -CALLING JURORS.

Held, further, that under Gen. Laws 1895, c. 328, sec. 1, a party is entitled to have the jurors called as they stand upon the panel. Id.

TITLE INSURANCE-POLICY-TENANCY OF PRESENT OCCUPANTS.

The phrase, "Tenancy of the present occupants," stated in a title insurance policy as a defect in or objection to the title against which the insurer does not insure, must be construed as meaning the tenancy which arises through the occupation or temporary possession of the premises by those who are tenants in the popular sense in which the word "tenant" is used. The phrase does not include the claim of a person who, asserting ownership in fee against the tithe insured, is in actual adverse possession at the time the policy is issued. Place v. St. Paul Title Ins, & Trust Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 706.