previously filled and possessed by the object, so as to leave no room for any new notion. These remarks apply principally to sight, and next to touch; which two senses act extensively in giving information, and that too upon general objects, whilst the remaining three inform us only, as it were, by their immediate action, and as to specific objects. 281. How differently do things appear to us, when we pay attention to them, and when we do not! And how much do our opinions depend upon the disposition of our minds!- W. Danby. 282. Every thing is mixed, and so mixed, that it is often out of our power to analyze the mixture. We are therefore struck, partial judges as we are, with the most prominent parts of it, which we mistake for the characteristic qualities of the whole. It may, perhaps, like other analogies have one with the chemical mixtures, which have their affinities and opposites, and are rendered more or less simple or compound, salutary or mischievous, by them; and are capable of being neutralized or made useful, by the addition of some other ingredient, which is often within the reach of human contrivance, and shews that there are few evils for which a remedy may not be administered.-W. Danby. 283. It is hard to get rid of an error, therefore take heed of admitting it. - Dr Whichcote. 284. Stupidity generally proceeds from laziness or unwillingness. Want of ability is more shewn in not doing a thing well, than in not doing it at all. -W. Danby. 285. How chained down, with most of us, is the mind to the sphere of action it has been accustomed to, and almost to that in which the body moves!W. Danby. 286. Of prejudice it has been truly said, that it has the singular ability of accommodating itself to all the possible varieties of the human mind. Some passions and vices are but thinly scattered among mankind, and find only here and there a fitness of reception. But prejudice, like the spider, makes every where its home. It has neither taste nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. There is scarcely a situation, except fire and water, in which a spider will not live. So let the mind be as naked as the walls of an empty and forsaken tenement, gloomy as a dungeon, or ornamented with the richest abilities of thinking; let it be hot, cold, dark or light, lonely or inhabited, still prejudice, if undisturbed, will fill it with cobwebs, and live like the spider, where there seems nothing to live on. 287. The stronger a man's mind is, the more likely he is to be governed by his own prejudices. Strength of mind, as the term is commonly used, does not always mean or imply strength of judgment.-W. Danby. 288. Dogmatism is a bad supporter of truth. Many certainties are contradicted: many falsehoods pass without contradiction. Contradiction is no mark of falsehood, neither is the absence of contradiction a mark of truth.-Pascal. 289. We have a knowledge of truth, not only by reasoning, but by intuition, and by a clear and vivid intelligence; and it is in this way that we attain our knowledge of first principles. It is therefore in vain for reason, which has no share in producing them, to attempt to attack them. The sceptics, who make this their object, are labouring totally in vain. We know when we are awake, however unable we may be to demonstrate it by reasoning. This inability shews nothing more than the feebleness of our rational powers, but not the uncertainty of all our knowledge, as they pretend. For the knowledge of first principles, as for instance, that there are such things as space, time, motion, number, matter, is as certain as any with which our reasonings furnish us. Nay, it is upon this knowledge, by perception and intuition that reason must rest, and found all its procedures. I perceive that there are three dimensions in space, and that number is infinite; and my reason afterwards demonstrates, that there are no two square numbers assignable, one of which is exactly double the other. We perceive principles, and we conclude propositions: and both with equal certainty, though by different ways. And it is as ridiculous for reason to demand of perception and intelligence a demonstration of these first principles before it consents to them, as it would be for the intellect to demand of reason a clear intuition of the propositions it demonstrates. 290. The plain evidence of facts is superior to all declarations. Letters of Junius. 291. We can only judge of things comparatively: to do this justly, we should compare them, not with what might be, but with what is.-W. Danby. 292. The scales of some minds are too fine, too nicely adjusted for common purposes;-diamond scales will not do for weighing wool. Very refined, very ingenious, very philosophical minds, are all too scrupulous weighers: their scales turn with the millionth of a grain, and are all, from some cause, subject to the defect of indecision. They see too well how much can be said on both sides of a question. There is a sort of philosophical doubt, arising from enlargement of the understanding, quite dif ferent from the irresolution of character which is caused by infirmity of will; and when once some of these over scrupulous weighers come to a balance, that instant they become most wilful. After excessive indecision they perhaps start suddenly to a rash action.-Edgeworth. 293. Those accustomed to judge by feeling, understand little of reasoning; they decide by a glance, and are not able to search into principles. Others, on the contrary, who are in the habit of reasoning from principles, cannot enter into matters of feeling; principles are all they look for, and they can do nothing by mere sight.-Pascal. 294. Independence of judgment is one of the rarest things in the world; and the prevailing defect in education is the neglect of the reasoning or discursive faculties. The consequence is, that among those who are regarded as well-educated, few are capable of comprehending or discussing an extensive or complicated question. It is observed by the elegant author of Fitzosborne's Letters, that thinking is one of the last exerted privileges of cultivated humanity.-W. B. Clulow. 295. The best way to acquire a well-balanced and healthy tone of the faculties, is to exercise them all more or less, and accustom them to alternate tension and relaxation. W. B. Clulow. 296. It seems at first sight extraordinary, that many who reason correctly on some topics, should fail to do so on others. The explanation, however, appears to coincide with that which applies to diversities of sentiment among different persons. In all cases of error, only part of the subject is perceived. Let the particulars which go to make up truth on any question, be brought equally before ten thousand separate minds, and they will all adopt the like accurate conclusion.-W. B. Clulow. 297. Perhaps the leading distinction of superior intellect is a power of compression; a faculty which pre-supposes that of generalization. A subordinate understanding never perceives more than certain fragments or mutilated portions of a subject, -surveying the field of thought as a landscape through a tube.-W. B. Clulow. 298. A certain The discovery of new ideas is not essential to the character of mental originality. juxtaposition or combination of well-known truths, will often supply unquestionable proof of decided originality and invention. It is with the operation of thought somewhat as with that of the kaleidoscope, which out of a few simple materials, freshly arranged, and submitted to the action of light, produces the most surprising forms of novelty and beauty. Perhaps, I may add, that what are called creations, and in a certain sense with accuracy, are rather but new forms or combinations elaborated out of the mind's pre-existing stores, by the chemistry of genius.-W. B. Clulow. |