made ufe of the pretender, as the latter is faid to do, and as every prince or ftate, with whom we happen to be at variance, may be provoked to do? In fhort, I may fafely challenge the author of the enquiry, as great a cafuift as he is, to fhew any difference between the two cafes which I have compared together, except this, that we might have been exposed to great dangers from that settlement of Europe, which we fought to bring about, than we are, or can probably be expofed to, from that which we were folicitous to prevent. But the case is still ftronger than I have put it. For even after the death of the Emperor Jofeph, his prefent imperial majesty continued his claim to the whole Spanish monarchy; and you, and I, and many of us, continued to fupport his claim, and opposed with all our force the negotiations of peace, which were begun upon a different principle. Happily we failed of fuccefs. The many, who remonstrated, "That "we were haftening apace to make him a power "too great and too formidable; and that we should “find in him, at last, the enemy we then dreaded

only in another," prevailed. Had they not, in what a condition fhould we have been at this time? Would the emperor have been more grateful, or, less powerful, with the crown of Spain and the Indies, added to fo many others? If the union between him and the King of Spain is fo formidable to us, how much more reafon fhould we have had to apprehend the confequences to our trade, and in the end to our liberties and our religion themfelves if these divided powers had been united in the fame ungrateful perfon, as it is the mode at prefent to call the emperor?

If Don Carlos fhould marry the eldeft archduchefs, if the emperor fhould die without iffue male, if the King of France fhould die without

iffue

iffue male, if the Prince of Auftrias fhould die without iffue male, and the princes of the blood in France and Spain fhould not fupport the validity of the renunciations, all which is within the bounds. of poffibility, "Don Carlos may be at once empe"ror, king of France, and king of Spain, and have

a

the vaft ftrength and riches of all these pow"ers united and centered in him." This terrible object ftares our fpeculative enquirer in the face, and disturbs his head. It difturbs, very probably, thofe excellent heads, who fet him fcribbling, who can see so far into futurity at prefent; and who, not very long ago, were unable to difcern the nearest and most probable events. Let us confider now, what confequence of this kind might have happened, if, for fecuring a balance of power in Europe, the prefent emperor had been likewife King of Spain, If then the King of France, instead of marrying the daughter of Stanislaus, had married the eldest daughter of the emperor, which furely had been within the bounds of poffibility, there would remain but one chance at this time, viz. the emperor having a fon, to fave us from the combination of fuch a power, as would in reality form what we commonly, though improperly, call univerfal monarchy; fince there would be nothing elfe, which could hinder Lewis the Fifteenth from being King of France, of Spain, and of the Weft-Indies, mafter of all the Austrian dominions, and, by confequence, emperor. The truth I would inculcate by what I have faid is this, that as the partition treaty threw too much weight. into the scale of Bourbon, to the deftruction of the balance of power in Europe; fo the neceffary confequence of the war we made to reftore this balance muft have been, if we had fucceeded according to our defires, to destroy it again, by throwing too

much

much weight into the fcale of Auftria. This has been proved by the event, and the Enquirer demonftrates, or he demonftrates nothing.

As far, therefore, as we have brought this deduction, that is, to the end of the laft war, it is manifeft that the notion of preferving a balance of power in Europe has, for the reafons touched upon above, and which every man will extend in his own thoughts, proved to us like an ignis fatuus; in the purfuit of which we have been led from difficulty to difficulty, and from danger to danger.

If we enquire, whether the treaties of Utrecht and Baden did afford us an opportunity of correcting our errors, and of profiting by our experience, it will be found that they did; fince all the points, which had been in contest were then fettled, and this fettlement acquiefced in by all the parties to the war, except the emperor, who kept up ftill his claim against Philip the Fifth.

But the keeping up this claim could not have endangered the public tranquillity. He was unable to attack Spain for want of a maritime force, or even Sicily, which was covered befides by the guaranty of the neutrality of Italy; and this neutrality ferved likewise to hinder Spain from attacking him. There might have been a war of the pen, and there could have been no other between them.

At the worst, if the King of Spain had invaded any part of Italy, the guarantees of the neutrality might easily have prevented such an attempt; and in fo doing they would have obferved the treaties, and kept the peace, far from breaking either one or the other.

In fuch a state of foreign affairs, we had certainly an opportunity of looking carefully after our own. The King of Spain had no pretence to afk for any alteration in the fettlement fo lately established with

his

his own confent; and the emperor could not have complained of his majesty for obferving treaties, which he would not have made, but which he found made; nor for refusing to enter into a new war on this account.

Whether we improved this opportunity, or not, what our present condition is, and by what steps we have been reduced to it, I leave to the enquiry of some perfon more capable than myself. Let it fuffice, that I have endeavored to remove fome delufions, which have affected even men of the best understandings, and the best intentions; and to prepare the minds of my countrymen to confider, at this critical point of time, what our national interest really is, without being biaffed in their judgments by what they may have thought of it on any former occafions.

I am,

Most noble Sir,

Your Honor's

moft devoted Servant,

February 3, 1726-7.

THE OCCASIONAL WRITER.

POST.

POSTSCRIPT.

JUST after I had fent these sheets to the press, a paper, intitled, "A Letter to the Occafional Writer," was brought to me. I have read this stiff pedantic piece with more attention than it deferves, though I read it curforily; and notwithstanding the pains which the author takes to pafs for you, I am ready to acquit you of the scandal. You would certainly have writ better, and your pen at least would not have appeared so near a-kin to that of the Craftsman Extraordinary.

Who this author supposes the Occafional Writer to be, I cannot guefs. Such a wretch as he defcribes is, I believe, to be found no where, nor even fuch an image of guilt and mifery any where, except in the horrors of his own mind. I fhall therefore, with a decent contempt for this fcurrilous scribbler, and without any concern about his imaginary correfpondent, continue thefe inoffenfive letters, in great tranquillity and fedatenefs, as often as occafion invites me, or as I find myself in the humor.

THE