Page images
PDF
EPUB

Granted notwithstanding previous Rule.]—It is no objection to granting a rule for a certiorari to bring up an order of two justices, that a rule had been granted for a certiorari to remove an order of sessions, with all proceedings relating thereto, confirming that order of justices on appeal, but to which no return had been made into the Queen's Bench at the time of the motion. Unless it appears by affidavit that the original order (sought to be returned by the certiorari as "relating to" the order of sessions) had been, in fact, duly returned to the sessions by the justices, as they ought to have done, Reg. v. Morice, 14 L. J. (M. C.) 75; 1 New Sess. C. 585.

It makes no difference that the former rule for a certiorari was made absolute before judgment given as to the second rule.

N. B.-The order directed a portion of highway rate to be paid to a surveyor for repairing a turnpike road.

P. 959, add at end of note (x), S. P. Reg. v. Morice and another, 14 L. J. (M. C.) 75; 1 New Sess. C. 585, S. C.

P. 982, end of note (g), add,

One justice may take examination of pauper unable to be brought to petty sessions to be examined as to his settlement, and report the examination to any other magistrate or magistrates, and they may adjudge the settlement.

P. 1016, as to this application by attorney, see Reg. v. Lancashire (Justices), 3 P. & D. 88, (a certiorari case on 3 G. II. c. 18, s. 5, ante); R. v. Abergele (Inh.), 5 Ad. & E. 796; also Reg. v. Lancashire (Justices), 4 B. & Ald. 289 (certiorari cases on 13 G. II. c. 18, s. 5).

P. 1017, 1. 7 from bottom, just before "After the birth," insert" by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 3."

P. 1017, 1. 5 from top, as to " usually acts,” see Reg. v. Milner and another, 14 L. J. (M. C.) 157.

P. 1019, note (s), last line but one, for "discharging " read "disobeying." P. 1020, 1. 4 from top, after “child” add as a note,

It seems that no grounds of appeal are required. See Reg. v. Derbyshire (Justices), 1 New Sess. C. 461. Where the sessions refused to hear the appeal for want of such grounds, and a rule nisi was granted for a mandamus to compel them, it was held that a copy of the rule nisi should be served on respondents as well as the justices, S. C.

P. 1024, after (b), add as a note,

Quære, if this enactment renders valid the order in bastardy, No. 7, in the schedule, which does not state the corroborative evidence to have been given on oath? See Reg. v. Wroth and Rich, 1 New Sess. C. 494, decided on the former act.

An order of affiliation made at petty sessions, under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, recited that application for a summons to the putative father had been made by the mother "to J. M., one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace usually acting in this division " (see ante, p. 1017). Held, that his jurisdiction sufficiently appeared, as the words "in" and "for" are used synonymously in the forms in the schedule of 8 Vict. c. 10, Reg. v. Milner and another, 14 L. J. (M. C.) 157.

[blocks in formation]

OF SESSIONS OF THE PEACE IN GENERAL.

Session of the Peace, what.]—THE term "Session of the Peace" is used to designate a sitting of justices of the peace for the execution of those powers which are confided to them by their commission or by charter (a), and by numerous statutes. The words "of the peace are used to distinguish such a session from other sessions or sittings, as

(a) Thus Edward the Fourth, by charter, granted to the manor of Havering-atte-Bower, being of ancient demesne of the crown of England, that the steward of the manor, and one of the discreetest tenants or inhabitants thereof, to be from time to time chosen by the tenants and inhabitants, and their successors, should be justices of the peace within the manor. See R. v. Mashiter, 6 Ad. & E. 153; 1 Nev. & P. 314, S. C.;

[ocr errors]

R. v. Sandford (Governors of), 1 N. & P. 328; Weatherhead v. Drewry, 11 East, 175; and 3 Burr. 1752. But all powers and jurisdictions to try treasons, capital felonies, and all other criminal jurisdictions whatsoever, granted or confirmed by any law, statute, or charter, to any mayor, corporate officer, or chartered justice of the peace in any borough, were made to cease on 1st May, 1836, by 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 107.

B

Session of Parliament, Court of Session in Scotland, and Session of Weights and Measures in London.

The jurisdiction in respect of which sessions of the peace may be holden, is determined by the pleasure of the crown, as expressed in the commission or charter of the justices. The commission of the peace under which the magistrates of a county derive their powers, dates within the period of legal memory. In early times there were persons of weight and substance in each county, who were called Conservators of the Peace but the authority they enjoyed is unknown, and unquestionably they had no court of record in which they could act as judges. By 1 Ed. III. st. 2, c. 16, intituled "Who shall be assigned Justices and Keepers of the Peace," it was directed "that in every county good men and lawful, which be no maintainers of evil quarrels in the country, shall be assigned to keep the peace;" but in what manner they were to maintain order, and how they were to execute the authority thus conferred, does not appear; though doubtless they were to take such measures for that object as the old conservators used (b). By 18 Ed. III. st. 2, c. 2," two or three (c), the best of reputation in the counties, shall be signed keepers of the peace' by the king's commissions; and at what time need shall be, the same, with other wise men and learned in the law, shall be assigned by the king's commission to hear and determine felonies and trespasses done against the peace in the same counties, and to inflict punishment reasonably, according to law and reason, and the manner of the deed." But by stat. 34 Ed. III. c. 1, intituled " What sort of persons shall be Justices of the Peace, and what authority they shall have," it was directed that "one lord, with three or four of the most worthy, together with more learned in the law," should be assigned for keeping the peace; power "to take, arrest, and chastise" offenders, was given; and also power "to hear and determine at the king's suit all manner of felonies and trespasses done in the county," according to the laws and customs of the realm.

This statute is said by Lord Holt to have made justices of peace complete judges (d); and in pursuance of its direction, the commissions of the peace issue, under which the magistrates for counties act in the several sessions which we shall presently consider.

The commissions of the peace last for six months after the demise of the crown (e), and in general extend over the whole county or bo

(b) See per Holt, C. J., in Harcourt Fox, 1 Shower, 528.

(c) Six by 12 R. II. c. 10. Eight by 14 R. II. c. 11.

(d) 1 Shower, 528. See 3 B. & Cr. 649; 3 B. & Ad. 688; 2 Q. B. R. 1011, as to his being a judge of record. (e) 1 Ann. c. 8.

rough (ƒ) for which they are granted. But the crown, by its prerogative, may grant such commission for any particular district of a county, either with concurrent or exclusive powers. It may also confer it on as many persons as it thinks proper, to act as justices in and for each of the boroughs and counties of cities and towns named in Schedule (A) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76; and in those of the boroughs in Schedule (B) of that act, to which a commission of the peace shall be granted on petition of the town council. Such persons must, however, reside in the borough, or within seven miles of it, while they act as such justices. However, in towns and places not being counties of themselves (g), the justices of the county at large have concurrent jurisdiction with those of the minor ambit, unless ousted in express terms by a non intromittant clause in the charter or commission (h). It is doubtful whether the mere grant of a court of separate quarter sessions made under 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, to a place, over which, at the time of passing that act, both sets of justices had jurisdiction, would oust that of the justices of the county at large (i).

In a late case upon the effect of s. 3, of 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 96, where at the time of passing that act, the county justices had sole jurisdiction over a district in the same parish with a borough having justices of its own, but without any non intromittant clause; it was held, that the county quarter sessions retained exclusive jurisdiction over that district, since the act, notwithstanding separate quarter sessions had been granted to the borough under it; for no appeal to the borough sessions had been given by 5 & 6 W.IV. c. 76 (k).

Sessions of the Peace in Cities and Towns.]—Before section 107 of

(f) 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 98. (g) See R. v. Glocestershire (Justices), viz. the Clifton and Bristol case, 4 Ad. & El. 691.

(h) Blankley v. Winstanley, 3 T. R. 279; and Bates v. Winstanley, 4 M. & S. 429, the Leicester cases; and see R. v. Clarke, 5 B. & Ald. 665, the Bath case; R. v. Shepherd, 2 Adol. & E. 298, Marlborough case; Talbot v. Hubble, Strange, 1154; R. v. Sainsbury, 4 T. R. 456, the Southwark case.

(i) See 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 3, and post, Chap. III. s. 1.

(k) Reg. v. Bridgewater (Inh.) 2 P. & D. 586; 10 Ad. & El. 711. Before the passing of the Municipal Corporation Act in 6 W. IV. Bridgewater was

a borough having four justices only, and a right to hold separate quarter sessions; but the charter had no non intromittant clause. The borough included only a part of the parish of Bridgewater, [but the whole of that parish was within its liberties and the jurisdiction of the borough justices.*] Both parish and borough were in Somersetshire. In this state of things, and till 1 Geo. IV. c. 36, appeals against poor rates allowed by justices of the borough, lay to the borough sessions, there being four justices of the borough. After that act, such appeals might be taken to those or to the county quarter sessions at the option of the appellant. By the operation of 5 & 6 W.

The report of this case in 8 Law Journal, Magistrates' Cases, 72, states this and other facts, the reverse way.

5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, took away all criminal jurisdiction in boroughs except under that act, it was usual in most cities and towns corporate that the mayor and other justices having jurisdiction there, either concurrent with the county justices or exclusive of them (as in the cases of particular charters or of counties corporate), should hold sessions of the peace at various intervals, to try offences of a minor description committed within the municipal boundaries. In this duty they were generally assisted by a barrister-at-law, who, as recorder or deputy recorder, acted as assessor to the mayor. In general, these sessions had powers similar to those holden for the county, with the exception of some few cases, which, by special enactment, the latter alone were competent to determine. The most important of these were appeals against orders of removal: which, by sect. 6, of 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30, were only to be heard at the general or quarter (1) sessions of the county, division, or riding wherein the parish or place from whence the removal takes place shall lie, and not elsewhere, any former law or

IV. c. 76, the boundary of the borough
was altered so as to exclude parts of the
parish from it, (giving them to the
county under sects. 8 and 111, both as to
locality and jurisdiction.* A subsequent
grant of separate quarter sessions as-
signed a recorder to be the king's justice,
to inquire, &c. of offences committed
within the borough, and there were
seven justices there. The occupiers of
the parish made one poor's rate for the
whole, which was duly allowed by two
county and three borough justices. A
party rated appealed to the county
quarter sessions against so much of the
rate as affected his property situate out
of the new limits, though within the
(ancient) liberties of the borough, on
the ground that other property situate
in the borough was omitted from the
rate. The question of jurisdiction was
argued on the effect of the latter part of
sec. 3 of the act; and the Queen's Bench
held, that the county sessions possessed
sole jurisdiction over the appeal, the
legislature not having conferred any on
the borough sessions in such a case.
The court intimated that the clause in-
tended to leave matters of jurisdiction
in statu quo ante; so that those parts
of a borough which, at the passing of
the act, were not exempt from the ju

risdiction of the county justices, still
remain within their jurisdiction (see sec.
111,) and as before passing the act, an
appeal against the poor's rate would lie
from the whole parish to the county
sessions? it will so lie now. The rate
was confirmed as amended by those ses-
sions; Patteson, J., saying, that as the
borough had not more than six justices
before the passing of 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76
(see 1 Geo. IV. c. 36), the point did
not arise, whether a parish partly within
and partly without a borough, has a
right of appeal to any sessions whatever
in respect of a rate laid on the whole
parish, or to the borough quarter sessions
only. See 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 4, 5;
5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 111; and Reg. v.
Suffolk (Salop and Lancashire Justices)
2 Q. B. R. 85, and R. v. St. Edmund's,
Salisbury, id. 72. Had there been
more than six justices in the borough
when the act 5 & 6 W. IV. passed, the
operation of 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 38, would
have exempted it from the county juris-
diction, and the parish would have been
divided between the two jurisdictions,
neither of them having cognizance of the
entire rate; for the borough sessions
could not examine the rate on persons
in the county, nor the county intermed-
dle with the rate in the borough; see

*Whether those parts of the parish which were excluded had been parts of the ancient borough did not appear.

« PreviousContinue »