which tends toward, a possessory relation. "He is only a friend," is usually understood as signifying, “He has no thought of being a lover;" and to say of an attachment, "It is a mere friendship," is much like saying, "It is not in any sense real love." Yet few would venture to assert that one could not be a friend to a person with whom he was linked by family ties, or that real love excluded the possibility of real friendship.

Even when the affections go out toward objects that are other than personal, there is a similar distinction between the terms “love” and “friendship," as those terms are commonly employed. "Love" is supposed to involve some possessory relation with the object of attachment, while “friendship" does not necessarily imply any such relation. A love of country is a love of one's own country; a love which has its basis in what that country is to the patriot, or in that country's claim on him as its citizen, and in the recognition of benefits which that country confers upon him or upon those dear to him. But one can be the friend of a country which is not his country, which has conferred no benefit on him or on his directly, and which he would not even care to call his own country. So, again, when one is spoken of as “a lover of literature," or "a lover of art," or "a lover of science," as over against one who is "a friend of literature," or "a friend of art," or "a friend of science," the intimation is that the "lover" is in some special relation with the object of his affection, while the "friend" is not necessarily so related with that object. Self-interest is not an essential element of the sentiment of friendship; apart from any question of the supposed advantages of the state or

relation into which two persons might be brought by becoming mutually friends.

In languages older than our own, the distinction between the love that craves and the love that goes out uncravingly is indicated in equivalents of "love" and "friendship." Thus the Sanskrit-elder sister in our family of tongues-gives for "love," lubh, "covetousness or "greed;" and for "friendship," pri, "unselfish love." The Greek has philia for that love which goes out "longingly" after its object, "an inclination prompted by sense and emotion;" while in the Septuagint and the New Testament it has agape, a "love without desire." The Latin correspondingly has amo as representing the love that turns to another in a spirit of agreement and of longing; but, as an equivalent of agapaō, it has diligo for the act of "a distinguishing love-without desire,” a love that selects and rests on the one selected without asking any return.

The common thought is, that "love" and "friendship" merely differentiate degrees of affection; and that intensity and devotedness are the distinguishing characteristics of "love" in comparison with "friendship." But the place given in both sacred and classic story to the illustrations of self-sacrificing friendship proves that no lack of depth and fervor limits the force and sway of this expression of personal attachment. Greater love hath no man than that love which is shown in friendship, at its best and truest manifestation. Not in its measure, but in its very nature, is an unselfish friendship distinguishable from a love which pivots on a reciprocal relation, secured or desired.

Friendship is love for another because of what that other is in himself, or for that other's own sake, and not because of what that other is to the loving one. Friendship is love with the selfish element eliminated. It is an out-going and an on-going affection, wholly and inherently disinterested, and in no sense contingent upon any reciprocal relation between its giver and its object, nor yet upon its return or recognition. Friendship, in short, is love apart from love's claim or love's craving. This is pure friendship, friendship without alloy. This is friendship at its truest and best; and this it is that makes the best and truest friendship so rare, so difficult of conception, so liable to misconception. This also it is that multiplies the specious resemblances of friendship-in hearts that are incapable of comprehending its full reality; and that gives to those imperfect substitutes for its reality such a disappointing power.

In all holiest and most unselfish love, friendship is the purest element of the affection. No love in any relation of life can be at its best if the element of friendship be lacking. And no love can transcend, in its possibilities of noble and ennobling exaltation, a love that is pure friendship.

NASMUCH as friendship is loving another for that other's own sake, and not for what that other is to the one who loves, friendship by its very nature consists in loving, rather than in being loved. In other words, friendship consists in being a friend, not in having a friend; in giving one's affection unselfishly and unswervingly to another, not in being the object of another's affection, or in reciprocating such an affection.

Love, it is true, may beget love; and, again, love is likely to be a result, or an outgrowth, of qualities in both the loved and the loving one which make affection reciprocal: hence friendship is often a mutual affection. In every such case, however, each friend is a friend in his loving, rather than in his being loved; and he would be just as truly a friend, and his friendship would be just as hearty and just as abiding, if he were not loved in return, or if his love were unrecognized.

Herein it is that friendship has its distinction from, and its superiority over, all other loves. Other loves are based upon a love received or desired. Friendship is an out-going and unselfish love, without an essential thought of the affection's return. Friendship may exist conjointly with other loves. Again, the other loves may exist-they more commonly do—without the higher element of friendship. But only so far as a love finds its chiefest joy and its very life in loving, is it true friendship's love.

This distinction is the basis of Plato's teachings concerning the nature of the highest and purest love. Plato would distinguish between the love which is "friendship" and the love which is "desire;" between the love which goes out uncravingly, and the love which craves return. He even suggests that friendship, as the purest love, is dependent for its life on only one of the two parties involved; "that if only one of the two loves the other, they are both friends:" one being the friend who loves, and the other the friend who is loved; one the friend subjectively, the other the friend objectively. And in this sense only it is that it takes two to make a friendship.

Aristotle is yet more explicit on this point. His view is, that friendship "consists in loving, rather than being loved;" "that to love seems to be the excellence of friends; and that it is more the part of a friend to confer than to receive favors." "Those who wish good to their friends for their friends' sake," he says, "are friends in the highest degree,”-in contrast with those who have a selfish interest in desiring their friends' welfare. Even