What

enumerated, proceed upon an assumption, therefore, which is wholly erroneous, and which implies in the legislature the most careless waste of the national resources, and great ignorance of the natural limits and real objects of a bounty on exported corn. could tempt any statesman to propose a bounty, which should give foreigners so great an advantage, as the author's argument supposes, in the purchase of British corn, it is difficult to conjecture; yet, without bestowing on the foreign market this unnatural and unnecessary preference, it is impossible that its demand should ever interfere with the reasonable interests of the British consumer, or lead to the unhappy consequences which are anticipated by the reviewer.

Such then is the nature, and such the operation of a bounty on exported corn. The country which grants the encouragement suffers a loss pure ly commercial to the extent of the bounty; and this is the real amount of the inconvenience which it sustains. The other evils, which have been enumerated by different writers, are imaginaryThe loss, however, which is inevitably sustained by granting a bounty, may in some circumstances become a subject of the most serious consideration. National security and in dependence are objects of the first importance; but if the danger of scarcity be not imminent, and there exist other means by which it may be averted, the policy of granting a bounty on exported corn will become more than questionable, where the general circumstances of the country are unpropitious to the measure. In the present state of this country and of Europe, it seems impracticable to reestablish the bounty; for it has been proved by the evidence before the committees of both houses of parliament, that Polish wheat may be brought to market at one half the price at which British wheat can be sold. To give a

bounty which might compensate this difference, and enable the British grower to undersell the foreign merchant, would involve this country, which already incurs so great an annual expenditure, in a waste of money which the most urgent necessity alone could justify. Till some important change take place in the relative situation of this country to the rest of Europe, or the danger of scarcity become more immediate and alarming, there can be no hope, therefore, of the re-establishment of the bounty. There are other expedients, however, which have already been adopted with great advantage. We can. not, indeed, secure all the benefits of a bounty by means of these expedients; we have, therefore, but a choice of difficulties. But as an opportunity may recur in which it will be politic to re-establish the system of bounties on exportation, it is of importance to vindicate that system from the numerous objections which it has become fashionable to array against it. As the regulations, besides, which are under the consideration of the legislature, have a reference to the great principles of the corn-trade, and as these principles cannot be better discussed, than in considering the question respecting the bounty, the foregoing enquiry must have prepared the way for the reflections which are now to be offered on the line of policy of late recommended to parliament.

Those who think that exportation cannot be encouraged, will admit, however, that it ought to be free.But this is not enough; and in contending that more may and ought to be done, we advance to that controversy which has of late excited so strong a sensation throughout the country. The question is, whether entire freedom of importation shall be allowed; whether the agriculture of this country shall be exposed by foreign competition to great hazard, if not to utter destruction?-It is almost unnecessary to repeat, that the object

of restraints on importation is the same with that which the bounty aims more completely to attain-to ensure as far as may be possible the independence of the country on foreign supplies to avoid the evils of scarcity, and thus, in some measure, to equalize the price of grain.

These objects can be accomplished only by keeping up the prices in the home market to a certain extent du ring years of plenty; by securing to the farmer an adequate return for his capital and labour; and thus affording a regular and steady encouragement to agriculture. Those who, while contending for restrictions, deny that in ordinary years they will keep up prices, involve themselves in contradictions by which their enemies know well how to profit. Let it be confessed at once, therefore, that it is the object of the proposed regulations to encou rage British agriculture, and that this encouragement can be given only by securing to the farmer profits which might be endangered by foreign competition. Such are the objects of the proposed regulations; and there seem to be many reasons in support of such a system of policy.

But here we are met by the general argument that if you allow foreign grain to be freely imported, you will always find as much as you require from foreign countries, at the lowest prices; that if you thus secure the cheapness of corn, the wages of manu facturing labour will be low; your manufactures will be able to preserve their superiority in foreign markets; and although you may import foreign grain in large quantities, you will export your manufactures in abundance to pay for it. It may be answered, however, that although such reasoning be quite consistent with the general principles of political economy, the question, how far it is expedient at present to act upon such views, depends on the actual circumstances of

the country, and the peculiar nature of the trade in corn. If no wars had existed for the last twenty years; if no new taxes had been imposed; if commercial intercourse with the continent had been uninterrupted; if the prices of grain, and of other commodities in this country, were on a level with those of the rest of Europe, it might be difficult, although not impossible, to find a good reason for imposing restraints on the importation of foreign grain, since the expence and difficulty of transporting so bulky an article would probably afford sufficient protection to our farmers. But now that we are in a state so very different in all respects from that which has just been described a state perfectly arti ficial with regard to prices, we shall do well to pause before recommending an immediate freedom of importation. The events of the late war, the operation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and of our orders in council, put such restrictions on the importation of corn during the last five years, as were nearly equivalent to an act of parliament imposing very high duties, and gave the British farmer the benefit of nearly the whole demand of the Bri tish market. The consequences have been-high prices in the first instance

an increased supply, and ultimately a fall in the price of corn, proceeding from the great encouragement given to its production. A large additional capital has been invested in agriculture, and more agricultural industry has been employed under the stimulus of this accidental protection.

The result of this singular combination of circumstances has been-that in the years 1811 and 1812, a surplus of corn was exported to the value of nearly 300,000l. each year; and there is reason to believe that the surplus was not of less value during the fol. lowing year, although the destruction of the documents to prove it, by the fire at the Custom-house, renders it

impossible to ascertain the precise amount. The domestic supply of corn, therefore, is quite abundant, and the agriculture of the kingdom has been brought almost to a state of perfection. Nor is the price too high, when considered with reference to the general circumstances of the country. "Under all these circumstances it has been asked, Is it expedient suddenly to allow a free importation of corn? Will such a proceeding ensure to the country the continuance of that prosperous state of agriculture which to this moment has existed, and that extent of supply and moderation of price which we now enjoy? Or will it not throw every thing back, and directly lead, first, to a diminished supply of corn?-secondly, to a high price?and, lastly, to scarcity and famine?" The state of the agriculture of the country at present has been compared to that of the silk manufactures; and it has been asked, whether, "if the duty on the French manufacture of this article were repealed, the manufacture at home would not be ruined? So in respect of corn; if, after agriculture has been brought to its present state of perfection by the restrictions which have been accidentally imposed on importation, now that these restrictions are removed by the peace, no law should pass, in some degree to supply their place, foreign corn would be imported, and a sudden stop put to cultivation ?"'*

In illustration of this opinion it has been observed, that the Poles can afford to bring their corn to Danzic at 82s. a quarter; that the quality of their wheat is excellent; that if the importation were left free, vast quantities of it would immediately be imported, and the price of grain would be lowered so much as to deprive the British farmer of all profit on his stock, and to compel him to reduce the num

ber of his farm servants and labourers. The immediate effects, therefore, of a free importation would be-ruin to the British farmer-the diversion of the capital employed in agriculture to other channels-the diminution of agricul tural produce, and the same deficient supply which this country so lately experienced. If foreign corn can be brought to market at less than one half the price at which British corn can be produced, the agriculture of the country must not only languish, but perish entirely. If the Poles can send their wheat into the British market at less than 40s. a quarter, while the English farmer, to pay his expences and afford him a reasonable profit, must charge 80s. it is evident that our own farmers must be ruined by a system of free importation.

Some of the advocates for restric tions on importation have no doubt endeavoured to prove too much, and have seriously injured the cause which they are so anxious to sustain. They have asserted, that even if a suffici ent supply of corn could be obtained from abroad, the price would not be so low, upon the whole, as if we were to subsist entirely on corn of our own growth." Although, if to the stock we have now on hand, (it has been said,) of our own growth, a quantity of foreign growth were added, the market price would be lower than it now is; and if to the quantity of corn which we shall derive from the next harvest, a quantity of foreign corn were added, the price of corn for the next year would be lower than it otherwise would be; yet if in the next sowing season much less grain should be sown than was sown last year, and the crop in consequence should fall much short of that quantity which is sufficient for our own consumption, then the market price would be governed by a different principle

from that which governed it till that time; it would be regulated, not by the cheapness of corn abroad, but by the dearness of it at home, which would be the inevitable effect of a short sup. ply." But this argument supposes that foreigners who are accustomed to grow corn for the British market, will be guided by different principles from those which influence our own farmers. -The same author remarks," that the motives which must govern the conduct of the importing merchants are that they may bring corn to the country with the utmost possible profit; that to do this they leave the deficiency of our own supply to run up prices very high before they will come into the market; that the established traders will take care so to manage as not to let the price, however, get so very high as to encourage new speculators to come into competition with them; but having got the prices as high as they can, without incurring such a hazard of competition, then they will begin to feed the market with foreign corn, but only in such quantities as shall keep down competition against themselves, but not to an extent which would have any great effect in lowering the price of corn." Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than this reasoning. The foreign merchant, who is supposed to provide in part for the wants of our market, will act upon the same principles with the farmers at home, and will bring his corn into the British market as soon as he can do it with advantage. To talk of his waiting till the prices have attained the utmost limit, is to suppose that he is regulated by different principles from those which guide

other farmers and merchants in similar circumstances. It is quite unreasonable, therefore, to contend that any restrictions upon importation will keep down the price of corn in the British market. The encouragement of agri

culture is in fact the object of all such regulations; but agriculture can never be encouraged except by raising the price of grain to a higher rate than it would have attained without legisla tive interference.

It is an error also to suppose, as some writers have done, that after a great deal of capital has been withdrawn from agriculture, and our ave rage production shall be less than it now is, that is, less than our average consumption, if we should have a bad harvest; and if, at the same time, the harvest abroad should also be a bad one, then we should be in this critical state-that, just in proportion as we stood in need of a greater supply of foreign corn than usual, foreign countries would be the less able to let us have it, and that we should then not only feel the effects of a system of free importation by very high prices, but also by the pressure of scarcity and famine."-Surely the respectable persons who maintain such opinions, display an indiscreet anxiety to magnify the evils of a free importation. If this country were to become regularly dependent on foreign nations for a supply of corn, that supply would be regularly produced to meet the wants of the British market; and although it might be equally, it could not be more exposed than the produce of our domestic agriculture, to the varying influence of the seasons. There might be a failure in foreign crops as well as in the crops of this country; but this is an evil to which, under any circumstances, we must remain exposed.

As a limitation on Dr Smith's ar gument-" that the expence of transporting corn must be sufficient to give our own farmers a decided protection," it has been well remarked, that "when Dr Smith wrote his work it might have been sufficient, because the price of corn and other commodities of this country, was on a level with that of

the rest of Europe. But to say that it is now sufficient, is to betray'a want of due consideration for the peculiar circumstances which belong to this period; and which ought to direct us in our application of the general principles of political economy. Every one who has at all attended to the sys tem of prices which has been establish. ed for many years, and to the price of foreign corn, must allow, that the expence of bringing corn now from Dantzic to Leith, Hull, or London, affords no sort of protection to our farmers "'*

The general arguments of the author of the Wealth of Nations, and other enlightened political economists in favour of a free trade, have been often resorted to in discussing the question of free importation, as well as that of the bounty. That, as general principles, the doctrines of these eminent men are perfectly just is admitted; but in applying them to particular cases, it is necessary to consider the object with a view to which such maxims have been established, and to reflect whether that object be the only one which an enlightened legislature ought to contemplate, when regulating the trade in corn. That entire freedom of trade is favourable to national wealth admits of little doubt; and it is indisputable that the maxims of Dr Smith have been established with reference to this object alone. But if in legislating on the corn trade, different views ought to influence parliament, then the general maxims will not apply to this particular case, since it were absurd to adhere to the mere terms of any general proposition, without considering the whole views of its authors.

Upon this subject Sir Henry Parnell has made some very sound observations." But the greatest stress is

placed by the advocates of a free trade," says he, " upon that general principle of Dr Smith's, which lays down the expediency of a perfect freedom in all trades whatsoever.

"It is well worthy of observation, that, though Dr Smith has repeatedly urged the policy of a free corn trade, he has not supported his doctrine by applying this principle to it. It is, therefore, fair to infer, that he did not think it could be applied; and it is also fair to make this farther inference, that those who now bring it forward, as applicable to the present question, have not well considered it.

"A noble lord, who argued upon this maxim, asked why the principle of buying where we could buy the cheapest was to be considered as a fallacious principle? and urged the policy of buying corn from foreigners, rather than of attempting to grow it at home, because they are able to grow it cheaper than we can grow it. But this question proved he had taken a superficial view of Dr Smith's argument, and of the peculiar nature of the corn trade.

"When Dr Smith recommends a free trade, he has in view, not merely to point out how we can buy what wheat we want at the cheapest rate, but the most direct way of adding to the stock of industry, annual produce, and general wealth of the country. His whole object is to shew what course of policy will most contribute to the riches of the community:

"Before, then, the principle of a free trade can be urged, as that principle which ought to govern us, when legislating on the corn trade, it ought to be made appear to be a trade, concerning which no other consideration should have weight, besides the limited consideration of what plan of dealing with it will, in the end, give us