steam to communicate heat and motion to wines, porter, &c. in cellars, storehouses, and other places.

Mr Henry James and John Jones (Birmingham) for an improvement in the manufacture of barrels of all descriptions of fire-arms.

Mrs Sarah Guppy (Bristol) for tea and coffee urns, &c.

Mr Thomas Marsh (King-street, Clerkenwell) for improvements in the construction of watches.

Mr Robert Giles (London) for the invention of a cap or cowl to be placed on the top of chimneys.

Mr Michael Logan (Paradisestreet, Rotherhithe) for an instru. ment for the generation of fire, and various purposes in chemical and experimental operations.

Mr Andrew Patten (Manchester) for a discovery and improvements in the tanning of leather, by the use of pyroligneus or wood-acid.

Mr William Strachan (Chester) for a method of preparing the ore of cobalt for trade, manufacture, and painting.

Mr Jeremiah Steel (Liverpool) for a new apparatus, and for distilling and rectifying spirits.

William Everhard Baron Von Doornik (Wells-street) for an improvement in the manufacture of soap to wash with sea-water, with hardwater, and with soft-water.

Mr James Adams (Pitkellony, in the county of Perth) for a method of drying malt and all kinds of grains

and seeds.

Mr George Smart (Westminster) for an improved method of preparing timber so as to prevent its shrinking.

Mr Blenkensop (Middleton, Yorkshire) for mechanical means by which the conveyance of coals, minerals, and other articles is facilitated, and the expence attending the same is rendered less than heretofore.

Messrs Peter Moore and Co. (London) for a vertical bond in buildings, &c.

Mr Lawrence Drake (Cloaklane, London) for a method of preparing the various sorts of isinglass from river and marine fish.

Sir Saml. Bentham (Hampstead) for a new mode of excluding water of the sea, of rivers, or of lakes, during the execution of under-water works of masonry, or for the security of foundations, applicable to the construction of sea-walls, wharfs, piers,

&c.

Mr William Hardcastle (Abingdon) for improved cranes, to prevent accidents from the goods attached to the pulley overpowering the person at the winch, or in the walking wheel.

Mr George Dolland (London) for an improved method of lighting the binnacle compass, used for steering ships at sea.

Mr Benjamin Milne (Bridlington) for an improved double bell and gun alarm.

Mr Frederic Albert Winsor (Shooter's Hill) for a method of employing raw or refined sugars in the composition of certain articles of great demand.

Mr John Justice (Dundee) for an improvement in the construction of stove-grates calculated to prevent the smoking of chimnies, or to effect their

To provide for the subsistence of a great nation, independently of a foreign supply of grain, must be a leading object in every wise system of legislation. Without the wealth which an extended commerce affords, a people may be great and free; without the refinements of their more polished neighbours, they may be virtuous and warlike; but without an independent supply of the means of subsistence, they must for ever be at the mercy of any great combination of their enemies. The government of a country which is exposed to scarcity and famine, must have perils to encounter which no energy will overcome: the assaults of a people goaded on by want, and animated by despair, will not be easily repelled. As every great state which is dependent on the precarious aid of its neighbours for a supply of the necessaries of life must count on occasional disappointment, and as a scarcity of corn will always affect with the greatest severity those who are the most impatient of privations, and the most prompt to avenge their real or supposed wrongs, that power, of whose influence alone they are sensible, will, in such extremities, have cause to dread their resentment. It will not avail their rulers, in the hour of distress and danger, to charge the sufferings of the people on foreign powers, or to impute to the unrelent

ing policy of their enemies the grie vances of which they complain. Such a justification will be addressed to men prejudiced by habit and deaf from despair.-These weighty considerations have long fixed the attention of the most enlightened statesmen of this country on the subject of the Corn Laws; and it is a singular circumstance, that notwithstanding the numerous discussions which this great question has undergone, even its elementary principles should yet be involved in doubt and contradiction.

Whether any interference of legislative power for regulating the corn trade be justifiable on sound and liberal views of policy, has been often questioned by speculative enquirers; but on the supposition that some restraints may be beneficial, there can be little doubt as to the objects which should be kept in view in imposing them. The leading object must be to secure, at all times and in all circumstances, an abundant supply; since it will hardly be disputed, that the dan gers of dependence on foreign and hostile powers for the corn with which the people are to be fed, and the occasional recurrence of scarcity and famine, must greatly overbalance all other inconveniences. Moderation and steadiness of prices are also objects of high importance, in so far as they can be reconciled with national secu

rity and independence.-An important distinction, however, must be made among these different objects, the one being wholly within our power; the other but partially attainable; and the last depending on a variety of circumstances, the effect of which it is difficult to estimate with accuracy. By adequate encouragement, we can secure abundance until the population shall have increased beyond the numbers which the actual or possible produce of the soil can maintain; but the vicissitudes of the seasons must always present an insurmountable obstacle to any system which aims at a perfect uniformity of prices. Yet although the evils attending considerable fluctuations cannot be altogether reme. died, they may be greatly mitigated; and in this, as well as in all other questions of practical policy, it is the duty of the legislature, out of evils which cannot be wholly avoided, to choose the least. The high or low price of corn again is not absolute, but relative; not a fixed, but a varying quantity; not susceptible of determination upon abstract principles, but to be estimated with reference to the actual price of labour, and the variable circumstances of the community.-In this very general view of the leading principles of all corn laws, it may be affirmed, therefore, that an ample and independent supply is demanded by the high consideration of national safety; that steadiness of prices is required for the comfort of the lower orders; while the cheapness of corn must be eminently subservient to the prosperity of commerce.-An opportunity will occur afterwards for the illustration of these propositions; but if there be any truth in them, we may well ask, What ought to be the answer of the people of a great country, if they are called upon to sacrifice in part one or other of these advantages? Must they not confess, that as an extended

commerce is an object of worthy am bition only as it contributes to the happiness of the people and the power of the state, it ought for ever to be kept in due subordination to the higher interests of the community?—There is no reason to believe, however, that the people of this country will soon be called upon to make so painful an election; but in considering the general principles of the Corn Laws, these important distinctions must never be disregarded.

To ensure a plentiful supply of corn in unfavourable seasons, it is necessary to have a surplus in ordinary years. Those who think that the deficiency of a bad season will be compensated by the frugality of the consumers, must forget some of the most striking phenomena in political economy. It was long ago proved, that a very small deficiency in the supply of corn will be sufficient to occasion an enormous rise of price; and as the vicissitudes of the seasons render such deficiencies unavoidable, no country can be said to be independent of foreign supply as to the necessary article of grain, which does not, in ordinary years, raise a surplus beyond the wants of its domestic consumption.

How is this surplus to be obtained? It is a principle of common sense, as well as a maxim of political philosophy, that all the products of human industry will be brought to market in proportion to the demand for them; and that the prospect of reward is the only sure incitement to toil. If the home market alone be accessible to the farmer, he will proportion his supply to the demand which it presents. He may not be able indeed exactly to calculate its wants in so many quarters of wheat; but he will readily ascertain, by an infallible criterion-the state of priceswhether there be a general excess beyond the natural and accustomed limits.-You will in vain, in such circum

stances, expect that surplus which is to provide against the inconveniences of deficient crops; the farmer acts on the same principles with all other labourers and capitalists, and will accommodate his operations to the state of the demand. But an enlarged supply can be secured only by extending the demand; by opening the markets of foreign nations to the enterprise of the farmer; and by assuring him of a reward for his labour.

The foreign market may be accessible to the farmer without any encouragement except that which is implied in the entire freedom of the corn trade. The comparative fertility of the soil, the cheapness of labour, and many other circumstances, may enable him successfully to compete with the foreign grower, without any incitement or reward from his own country. But, excepting in these favourable circumstances, the foreign market must be inaccessible to him; no surplus will be raised to meet the exigences of unfavourable seasons; the country will be exposed to great fluctuations of price, to dependence on her neighbours for corn, and to occasional visitations of scarcity, perhaps of famine, unless the enterprise of the farmer is sustained by special encouragement, and the disadvantages under which he labours are compensated to him by the bounty of government.

Different expedients have been suggested for giving this artificial encouragement to agriculture. A bounty on the production of corn would, we have been told, be the most natural and efficient stimulus; since by increa sing the quantity of corn, and lowering the price to the purchasers, it would not only secure an abundant supply for our own consumption, but would open foreign markets to the surplus which would be created

But those who think thus misapprehend the object which the corn laws are intended to accomplish. To give

an absolute encouragement to the growth of corn, to bestow a preference on agriculture over all other branches of industry, would be at once capricious and unavailing. To in crease not the absolute, but the relative quantity of corn produced-to insure a supply always, or at least generally, beyond the wants of the population, is the only legitimate object of legislative interference. Now, what would be the effect of a bounty on production? It would enable the farmer to bring his corn to market at a cheaper rate; and, by a reduction of the price of grain, would give a great and immediate encouragement to population. It is a maxim of political economy, that labour, like every thing else, is produced in proportion to the demand for it; in proportion to the comfort and opulence which are şecured for the labourer. Any measure, therefore, by which his wages are increased, or by which his command over the necessaries of life is extended, adds to his power of rearing a family, and of increasing the population. A bounty on the production of corn would thus increase the population till it bore again the same proportion to the produce of the land, which it had done before the bounty was granted. The legitimate objects of the bounty therefore would not be attained; the absolute quantity of corn would indeed be increased, but its relative a bundance would remain as before; and

the same danger of scarcity and famine which had formerly existed would still recur.

But a bounty on exportation, while it bestows no encouragement to produce corn for home consumption, of fers a powerful incitement to produce it for foreign nations. It is free, therefore, from some of the most prominent objections to a bounty on pro. duction; for, as it affords no encou ragement to the growth of corn for the home market, it communicates co

impulse to population. What then are the advantages of this measure? and what is the precise manner in which it operates ?

It is assumed of course, that the bounty to be granted is the result of mature deliberation and exact know. ledge of the state of the corn-markets both at home and abroad. If the price of corn be higher in Great Britain than among the nations of the continent, the bounty must be such as to compensate to the farmer the whole difference of price, together with the expence of carriage to the foreign market. If it be inadequate for these purposes, the law will remain a dead letter, and can never occasion the exportation of a single quarter of wheat. If it be more than adequate, it must be attended with serious inconveniences; since by giving the foreign an advantage over the home market, it will carry off more than the surplus, and very unnecessarily raise the price to the domestic consumer. But if the bounty be such as to give neither market an advantage over the other, its operation will resemble an extension of the home market; but with this great and striking advantage, that the surplus destined for foreign countries can always in years of scarcity be retained as a provision against distress. A bounty, therefore, so regulated as to give the British farmer the same, or nearly the same, advantages in the foreign as in the home market, is alone defensible on any sound principles of policy.

What are the advantages of such a bounty? By extending the market to the British grower, it will induce him to raise corn sufficient for the supply of this extended market; to provide a supply beyond what is required for domestic consumption. The same de

at

sire of gain which induced the farmer to labour for the limited market, will tempt him to labour and improve for the new and more extended demand which is opened for his produce; so long, at least, as there remains a capacity of further improvement in the country.-A bounty on exported corn will not encourage population home; as the bounty applies only to the corn which is raised for the foreign market, there will be no fall of price to the domestic consumer; the condition of the labourer and of the people at large will, therefore, remain unchanged. Prices will be kept steady and uniform; a surplus will be created, which, in years of scarcity, may, by withdrawing the bounty, or prohibiting exportation, be thrown into the home market, and the evils of scarcity will be avoided. The prices of corn, even for a series of years, will be kept steady, as the violent fluctuations which are occasioned by a small deficit in the supply can never occur under such a system.

In further illustration of the effects of the bounty, the words of a great author may be quoted, who has shown the most profound knowledge of this subject.*

Let the effects of the bounty," says Dr Johnson, "be minutely considered. The state of every country, with respect to corn, is varied by the chances of the year.

"Those to whom we sell our corn, must have every year either more corn than they want, or as much as they want, or less than they want. We likewise are naturally subject to the same varieties.

"When they have corn equal to their wants, or more, the bounty has no effect; for they will not buy what they do not want, unless our exube